جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « حذف گرایی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

This article investigates and evaluates models of the unity of science in 20th century. In general, the models of unity of science could be divided into two parts and investigated separately. The first group are models which defend reductionism and eliminativism by relying on physicalism. The second group are the ones that by relying on methodology try to guarantee the unity of science. In evaluating the first group on the works of Thomas Nagle and William James it is argued that these models not adjusted to different ontological fields. The various methods of scientific research and different function of the values of preferring a theory in different contexts of comparison also undermine the claim of scientific unity in the second group models. Anyway, for avoiding the harmful result of the being incommensurable, relying on holism the possibility of giving a model of the unity of science could be defended which has provided possibility of interdisciplinary cooperation and defies any attempt for reductionism or ignorance of the plurality of methods.

According to eliminative materialism, folk psychology, as a common-sense theory about human behavior, is false; that is, most or all mental states that are posited by this theory do not exist, and hence its terms refer to nothing real. So, the eliminitivist believes that folk psychology should be rejected and replaced by scientific psychology. In this paper, after explaining the arguments for and against eliminativism, we will try to show that folk psychology is not a false theory, and mental states and entities do exist. Moreover, by making a distinction between knowledge by presence and non-presential knowledge, it will be shown that we can provide a further strong argument against eliminativism. Our knowledge to mental states such as beliefs, desires, hopes, fears and the like is knowledge by presence such that we find these entities without any doubt and immediately in our minds. So, rejecting their actuality by eliminativism is not justified.

One of the questions discussed in the philosophy of mind is how to ontologically explain the states of mind. New theories have been proposed in the philosophy of West to explain this issue, the most important of which are: behaviorism, the identity of mind and body, functionalism and eliminativism. In the meantime, John Searle and Davidson believe in non-alternative Monism and consider mind as one of the non-physical features of soul. Using intellectual method, the present paper tries to explain and criticize the theory of non-alternative monism by. It concludes that the subjective attributes of soul cannot be considered material because the proofs provided by the proponents of aforementioned theory are incomplete and do not prove their claims. Therefore, reducing abstract realities into material things is not rational.

Eliminativism is the view that mental-state terms have no reference and thus, there are no such things as mental states. According to this view, folk psychology which exploits mental states such as belief and desire in explaining behavior, is a false theory and should be replace by the scientific psychology which employs neural states and events instead of the mental. In the present paper, I will formulate the view, and introduce arguments for and against it.

There are at least four main theories about the relation of belief to knowledge:First is the idea of inconsistency of belief and knowledge, which was first proposed by Plato. Second is the idea of their correspondence which was suggested by such philosophers as Ayer, with which some Muslim logicians and philosophers have sympathized. Third is the separability of belief and knowledge and their different spheres, put forward by Colin Radford. And finally, is the theory supported by behaviorism, and called “eliminativism”. One of the consequences of these viewpoints is their different interpretations of the most important facet of belief, namely, “intentional aspect”, the history of which goes back to Ibn-Sīnā. This article is an attempt to explore these points of view. In the first part, the metaphysical issues about belief are discussed, and in the second part, epistemological aspect is studied. The author favors the idea that “understanding” is what can constitute knowledge.