حس مشترک

In transcendental wisdom, imagination is one of the levels of perception, and the power of imagination is considered one of the types of inner senses. Malasdra has established several proofs for the isolation of this power. In the present article, first, one of the most important proofs of the power of imagination It is investigated and after that, it has been tried to explain its aspects in the issue of abstraction of the imagination, considering the importance of self-importance in relation to perceptual forms. In the transcendental wisdom, considering the dignity of the soul, the ratio of the power of imagination to imaginary forms is not the ratio of ability and passivity; Rather, it is an active and emitting relationship, that is, the soul invents and composes imaginary forms. The mentioned claim is based on the fact that the soul goes through the process of perception, including sensory, imaginary and intellectual perception, and is the subject of sensory, imaginary and intellectual forms in each stage of perception. At the beginning of creation, the soul lacks all levels of perception; But during the path of physical movement, it gradually reaches the stage of creating and composing images. The above theory has some ambiguities, ambiguities that also affect the celibacy of the imagination, and without solving these ambiguities, the proof of the celibacy of the imagination is not free from problems and problems. The expression of these ambiguities can be clear and precise when in The present research can be aimed at explaining, evaluating and investigating these uncertainties.

Madness as a medical, social, literary, and philosophical issue has always been the focus of thinkers. Avicenna, as a philosopher-physician, investigated and analyzed this issue in two medical (physical) and philosophical (metaphysical) areas. In the framework of medical science, based on the mechanism of human temperament, he analyzes why madness occurs. However, temperamental disorders are the starting point of Avicenna’s philosophical explanation of melancholic illusions, and Avicenna’s innovation was sought in this field. Temperament disorder leads to a disorder in the functioning of the rūh-i bukhārī, and this leads to a disorder in the relationship between the rational soul (nafs-i nāteqah) and the body. Through this disorder, a disconnection is created between the mental forms of the madmen and reality, because the imaginative (mukhayyalah) faculty as the generator of imaginary forms, and the common sense (ḥiss al-mushtarak) as the home of tangible and imaginary forms due to the disconnection or weakening of their connection with the intellectual faculty, deprives the insane person of this possibility to separate the illusive forms from the real. The main problem that this research delves into is to explain the phenomenon of madness from Avicenna’s point of view with a descriptive-analytical approach, and it is an attempt to provide a detailed and comprehensive presentation of his point of view based on medical and philosophical foundations.

One of the most important and complex inner human senses is common sense. The common sense perceives information such as image, taste, sound and the like in objects through the five senses and combines this information with each other. The definition of this feeling in Islamic philosophy and neuroscience is a common definition. However, neuroscience refers to this sense as convergence zones. The specialization of convergence areas is that it establishes a link between the information obtained through the five senses about an object. Therefore, although there is a different name for combining the information of the senses in neuroscience and Islamic philosophy, but its definition and function are common. Of course, the direction of sharing is not limited to a mere definition, because the arguments of Islamic philosophers to prove the existence of common sense are still valid and neuroscience also confirms it despite the progress made in these sciences.Also, from the point of view of Islamic philosophy, the explanations of neuroscience about the areas of convergence are acceptable, but according to this philosophy, the findings of neuroscience only explain the material dimension of common sense perceptions. Because according to this philosophy, perception is not only a material phenomenon, but also an immaterial matter. Therefore, from the point of view of Islamic philosophy, especially Mullah Sadra's philosophy, although these explanations are acceptable, but perception happens after these stages, by the soul.

This paper is an attempt to show arguably how, and to some extent, Kant's third Critique is more prone than other ones to tackling a problem which can be called transcendental philosopher's main problem, i.e. how it is possible to have rules which both determine the validity (universality and necessity) of our propositions and accord with the changeable facts of our life. In Critique of Judgment, Kant brings up this main problem in this form: how is it possible to reach reliable rules for aesthetic propositions which are not objective? What may enable Kant's third Critique to overcome the given problem is his referring to the concept of common sense which provides an open forum for the construction of more dynamic rules. Therefore, here by focusing on the concept of common sense, I attempt to indicate that how kant in third Critique provides a circumstance prone to resolve the main problem, and also open to two readings followed by Hegel and Wittgenstein in two different ways.

Kant believes providing objectivity is one of the most essential functions of imagination. The role of imagination in establishing objectivity includes both the epistemic determinant judgment related to understanding, and the aesthetic reflective judgment. Kant constantly places imagination in connection with matters such as understanding, self-consciousness and/or pure intuition, or common sense, and reflective judgment. Imagination has always maintained a core role in relation to other faculties of cognition. This role could be simply regarded as the possibility of constituting objectivity. This paper seeks, in the first step, to critique pure reason by addressing how imagination in relation with understanding serves as a source of objectivity and then provides answers as to how imagination in its unity with common sense and the operation of reflection presented in the critique of the faculty of judgment, provides an objective reference to them, without which, the common validity for aesthetic-taste judgment will be lost. Hence, in Kant’s view, imagination has a requisite role in providing objectivity.

Discussing on imagination is an important and vital issue in Islamic philosophy and mysticism. It has numerous ontological and epistemological dimensions. Avicenna was the first philosopher who cosmologically has distinguished imaginary world from material and intellectual ones. Epistemologically, he has made a distinction between imagination and imaginative taking two approaches to imagination which tends to the sense and tends to intellectual world. The material characters are devoted to the imagination tending towards sense but the imagination which tending towards the transcendental world is creative and immaterial which is able to change the things in the natural world. We, at this paper, by analytical and descriptive research method, have attempted to survey Avicenna’s approach to the imagination who has affected the next mystics and philosophers.

The meaning and status of dreams in Philosophy is an issue discussed by most of the outstanding philosophers on their philosophical principles. From the Muslim theosophers’ viewpoint, the dream is a result of distancing the spirit from the external senses and approaching towards the internal powers. Sometimes human beings perceive the realities of existence as well as the future events through the realm of dreams and accordingly reach the intuitive knowledge. In his explanation of the veridical dream, Suhrawardi believes that the standpoint of the manifestation of images in dream is the soul while its main origins are the celestial souls. According to al-Farabi, dream is an idea created by imagination and its capacity increase due to separation from daytime activities during sleep. In his point of view, one can become united with the active intellect through imagination but that power is exclusive to the elected people. According to Ibn al-Arabi, the dream world is the world of symbols in which one must find the dream symbols in order to recognize the meaning of dreams. He treats the dream as the first origin of receiving the divine revelation for the people of blessing.

There are novel theories in epistemological realm of Avicenna's thought which, despite full incidence in the thoughts of philosophers after him, can be observed explicitly or implicitly in Avicenna's novel ideas. This feature makes it possible to divide the epistemological field of Avicenna's thought into two areas: peripatetic-Aristotelian and oriental. Following his peripatetic predecessors, Avicenna considers soul's perceptions only acquired and relying on the epistemological theories of abstraction and peeling, explains the quality of soul's acheiving these perceptions; however, in his oriental thought, Avicenna ascribes acheiving and preserving intuitive and non-acquired perceptions to the powers of common sense and image due to his novel approach towards these two powers in the last chapter of Isharat. It means that soul's perceptions can also be intuitive and non-acquired in Avicenna's philosophy as well as it is essential not to explain the quality of achieving these perceptions by the process of epistemological abstraction. Understanding soul's existential intensity and considering it as its epistemological hierarchy, unlike the dogmatist position, Avicenna retains a kind of approach in Islamic epistemology which makes it possible to achieve knowledge according to the reality.

Avicenna, one of the eminent peripatetic philosophers in Islamic world, has provided a special explanation for revelation. In his view, the origin of revealed sciences is Active Intellect and a prophet's soul is connected to Active Intellect by interacting with sacred intellect and the knowledge of the Unseen is reflected in his soul. Then this knowledge which is received by the prophet's imaginative faculty reach his common sense in a particular manner having the form of words. The present paper examines the different aspects of Avicenna's theory about revelation analysis in terms of his ontological and epistemological principles contained in his different works and shows how this philosopher has used his peripatetic philosophical principles for explaining such theological phenomenon like revelation.

In Islamic philosophical psychology common sense has been regarded as a cognitive faculty thereby sensible, artificial and intuitive concepts are produced. In this paper, historical approach of Muslim`s philosophers has been examined firstly. Epistemologically viewed, the perceptions of the faculty, both conceptually and intuitively, have been surveyed. Considering the epistemological function of the faculty in Avicennian philosophy, one of the most epistemological problems, namely the problem of correspondence, has been studied. And finally, Avicenna`s view on the considerable religious function of the faculty in perceiving and conveying the details of Divine revelation has been introduced.

In the Islamic philosophy, common sense is conceived as a cognitive faculty that perceives sensual, conventional, and intuitive concepts. This article deals with the issue of common sense ontologically and epistemologically. Muslim philosophers, since IbnSina, have adopted an ontologically reductionist approach to common sense by suggesting the unity of nafsand by reducing its faculties to mere concepts and names. In this article, common sense is epistemologically investigated. The question of whether common sense provides knowledge by presence or be presentation is examined first, and then IbnSina’s idea is explained with regard to the issue of correspondence. At the end, the authors study the problem of substantial motion in IbnSina to answer a challenge to his theory concerning lack of any pivot for absolute knowledge. The conclusion is some sort of epistemology, called gradational epistemology.

Among the perceptual faculties of soul, common sense has a special place. Without giving a clear picture of it, Aristotle attributes functions such as perception of common sense impressions and sense impressions by accident and recognition of aspects of distinction between objects and comprehension of feeling to this faculty. Whereas Aristotle has clearly rejected common sense alongside the five senses, Ibn Sina and hisfollowers regard it as one of the internal senses and attribute some of soul`s functions to it. Islamic philosophers, notably Ibn Sina, by removing certain ambiguities, putting forward reasons for proving it, and by enumerating other functions for it have reinforced Aristotle`s theory. It seems that common sense at most can be regarded as a vehicle for accepting and perceiving the sense impressions or the head of external senses; it employs the senses and then perceives the sense impressions. For this reason the act of issuing any judgment should be regarded as act by soul or attributed to the faculty of thinking. Despite the fact that the subject of knowing soul from Aristotle and Ibn Sina`s point of view have always attracted the attention of various thinkers and also each for his own part has done his best it enrich this subject, nonetheless it should be said that there are still questions that can be raised about the relation and interaction between soul, external senses, common sense and faculty of thinking that can only be illustratedproperly by an exact study of subjects such as sense perception, imagination and faculties of soul.

Concerning the contribution of Ibn Sina in formation and development of the theory of intentionality of mind, there are various ideas. Here, we will mention two groups of scholars who have put forth their ideas in this regard: 1. Some scholars believe that the role played by Ibn Sina in development of the concept of intentionality has been a fundamental one, since the Latin term "intention" is an equivalent for the term mana in Ibn Sina's works. 2. Some others believe that Ibn Sina has not introduced the theory of the mind's intentionality; and the term mana in his works has nothing to do with the mind's intentionality. To understand the role played by Ibn Sina in development of the concept of intentionality, we cannot suffice to study historical development of this concept; but rather, we have to refer to his works and, having analyzed his epistemological ideas, clarify his role. Thus, at first, we will describe history of this concept in the Islamic world in brief, and in particular we will mention Farabi's ideas; then we will come back to our main discussion i.e. intentionality according to Ibn Sina.

Esoteric senses are rarely discussed from an epistemological perspective, and hence the difficulty of discrimination between their ontological aspect from their epistemological one. However, one can find epistemological material amongst what is said in this regard. The author in this article begins with a definition and classification of the "esoteric senses", and has an overview on "common sense" and its repertory, and the domain and functions of "fantasy". Then he examines different aspects of "imagination" as a cognitive faculty, especially its errency and inerrancy. In the second part, the author discusses about memory, its domain, its functions, its quality, and the reliability of its outcome. He thinks that memory produces no certain knowledge, but it is a secondary way or instrument for preserving knowledge. It reproduces knowledge in the mind by recalling them. Whenever there is a slightest doubt about our conclusions in our mind, we can review and assess their arguments, and hence, reaffirm their accuracy. A mere reliance on memory is not immune from erring.