خودآیینی

Modern rationality fostered autonomy development in its historical course, which was identical to "rationality" and opposed to epistemic authority in an unalterable sense. Zagzebski mentions this process as the autonomous conceptual turn. He ignores essential rational necessities that have high epistemological and virtuous significance. Therefore, Linda Zagzebski (1946) exposes this misconception and examines the concept of autonomy. She explains the necessities that have been ignored in acquiring knowledge.The concept of autonomy states that humans should understand propositions by relying on their epistemic powers and prevailing views and not entrust the responsibility of justifying their beliefs to anyone. It faces the important questions as follows: 1) Is the goal of knowledge achieved by focusing solely on faithful belief? 2) Does autonomy pay attention to the rational necessities required for acquiring knowledge in this comprehensive sense? 3) In which rational ignored imperatives do the moral imperative understand and promote knowledge or accept the epistemic superiority of another being harmed? 4) Is the absolute negation of epistemic authority rational and feasible for these necessities? In the following research, we have analyzed Zagzebski's pillars of epistemic authority and its relationship with rationality. We find Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi's (549-587 AH/1155-1191 AD) critical and sympathetic components, which reflect the ordinary and original approaches in the thinking of these two thinkers in the approach of the illumination philosophies. Suhrawardi attempts to move beyond purely argumentative knowledge and change the evaluation focus from belief to the believer. He advances the true path of knowledge differently from his peripatetic philosophy. The themes of the illumination philosophy reveal the importance of forgotten angles, thoughtful coherence with Zagzebski's philosophy's pillars, and a deep understanding of the issue of epistemological authority. 

This research was conducted using a comparative method between Linda Zagzebski and Suhrawardi. Although it is difficult to find common features and compare two philosophers who have viewed knowledge from different civilizational and temporal perspectives, this can be influential in gaining a broader understanding of some problematic philosophical issues. To understand Zagzebski's perspective, epistemic authority, a topic widely questioned in today's epistemology, contains important rational imperatives that become clear. Like Zagzebski's viewpoint, Suhrawardi's philosophy does not address the issue of epistemic authority, and his important epistemic themes contain some standard features that criticize the proposition-centered view and justify epistemic authority. It becomes increasingly apparent in comparison and analytical studies and is introduced as a unique example of Zagzebski's results.This study is organized into three parts, with three common pillars between the two philosophers. The method proceeds in each section: First, we address the concept's pillars. Zagzebski places autonomy in its true meaning and makes it justifiable while compatible with epistemic authority. Then, from Suhrawardi's point of view, we compared his approach with Zagzebski's perspective by dwelling on consistent themes. Finally, we have reached a final summary and conclusion.   

In the first section, we have shown that Zagzebski's central importance of reflective self-consciousness is consistent with Suhrawardi's theme of self-knowledge. Zagzebski recognizes the contemplative trust consciously to accept the sublime based on intellectual virtues. Suhrawardi also achieves knowledge by emphasizing the practical approach to self-knowledge and acquiring spiritual virtues to aid self-discipline.In the second part, we have shown that Zagzebski focused on reflective reasons to explain the rationality of epistemic trust in the virtuous by achieving the foundation of trust's validity as a non-cognitive state. This component's coherence with the theme of companions of trust and truth opposes self-supremacy in Suhrawardi's revival of wisdom. It is worthy of consideration and provides the basis for tolerance and interaction in religions and cultures.In the third section, we compare Zagzebski's epistemological model to the development of practical wisdom in Suhrawardi's divine model. We emphasize the transfer of personal and intuitive knowledge to increase humanity's cognitive reserve and the unity and cohesion of societies. 

We can reach the following conclusion and summary based on the comparative nature of this research:There is an understanding of seeking truth from two perspectives that reduce the distance between the other self and another. At the same time, he sees himself as similar and familiar to the other in that understanding. This self-cultivation and reflective attention reduce incorrect inference and, consequently, the incorrect tendency towards epistemic egotism.Autonomy without a practical path of self-purification lacks the humility or intellectual courage necessary to acknowledge the epistemic superiority or another's authority.Zagzebski and Suhrawardi have considered influencing the nature of knowledge and changing its relationship with rationality by proposing reviving wisdom and transmitting the legacy of sages and theologians.Mere imitation and the pleasure of seeking resemblance are not conscious and virtuous. It must be taken not to lose self-confidence and self-awareness.In Suhrawardi's philosophy, ​​epistemic authority is compatible with the components of traditional culture, and its challenges in endangering self-awareness have not been considered. However, Zagzebski thinks about limiting it and is aware of the consequences of epistemic tyranny.

Regarding the motivation for moral actions, three scenarios are conceivable. Moral behavior arising from an individual's internal drive or from an external factor is termed autonomy and heteronomy respectively. The third scenario known as the “submission to wilāyah” or “divine submission” is presented. This third state, while enabling man to become self-sustained in terms of autonomy, frees him from heteronomy and establishes him as a follower of divine guidance (wilāyah). Kant, the proponent of the theory of autonomy, centers humanity as the ultimate purpose and asserts the independence and intrinsic freedom of reason and will from any causal system. This study employs an analytical-critical method to explore Kant’s principle of autonomy in light of the themes of divine submission in the Quran and al-Ṣaḥīfa al-Sajjādiyya, aiming to highlight similarities and differences between Kant’s view and the Quranic perspective of submission to wilāyah and divine guidance. The findings reveal that both perspectives reject internal motivations inconsistent with reason and domination by external factors other than God. However, their differences include Kant's belief in the sufficiency and authority of rational will, individualism, prioritization of self-understanding, the promotion of moral plurality, the neglect and denial of divine submission themes, and the impossibility of practically achieving true autonomy.

According to Adorno's Aesthetic Theory, aesthetic experience is a unique experience that, unlike the reified experience of life within the social totality, is not based on domination. This means that the subject does not relate to its object instrumentally, or the object is not merely a means to some external end, but rather the very end of the experience. He states that every work of art, in a certain sense, is the experience of "the world once again", namely the world cleansed of immediate purposes- or of what Adorno calls "the reality principle". Adorno is not the first philosopher to characterize aesthetic experience in this way. Many aestheticians, following Kant, have described it as some sort of free or disinterested experience in which we appreciate the object for its own sake. What is original about Adorno’s theory, however, is that he seeks to explain this openness or “freedom to the object” as an original, repressed mode or behavior, giving aesthetic experience a critical and political significance. He says that aesthetic experience is a “refuge” for “those impulses, forms of behavior, feelings or whatever else that otherwise fall victim to the progressive control over nature and to the rationality that progresses together with it.” In this paper, we aim to reconstruct this thesis as it appears in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (1970) and his 1958-1959 Lectures on Aesthetics. This will demonstrate how Adorno, by offering a dialectical account of the relation between art and nature, successfully combines aesthetic formalism with social critique.

This research focusing on self-creation, a key element of Richard Rorty's playful belief system, also known as ironism. It explores how Self-Creation is manifested in the creation of texts. Following the Romantic tradition, Rorty aims to achieve human freedom by moving away from metaphysical ideas. He describes his philosophical stance as ironism, redefining the notions of truth, essence, and language to create his envisioned framework.According to Rorty, truth is not a universal, timeless, or spaceless entity but is constructed through human interactions and expressed through language. In his view, language does not serve as a bridge between truth and humans but is the creator of truth itself, requiring the ability to persuade others. Rorty's ironism emphasizes Self-Creation, which he defines as the freedom to narrate any story we wish to tell.Focusing on this aspect of ironism is crucial because it aims to achieve freedom by acknowledging human individuality. By altering their perspective on language and truth, a self-autonomous person can expand the boundaries of thought by creating new linguistic metaphors, thereby opening up new intellectual possibilities. When such an individual engages in text production, they must consider how the relationships between textual components can make the realization of freedom more achievable.Can we hope for freedom if the text is structured according to the coherence and harmony favored by metaphysicians? Is it possible to advocate for freedom while undermining it through the text's organization and presentation based on metaphysical patterns? Or must the components of the text be arranged in a new relationship, thereby creating a new language game?This new language game can establish a significant distance from previous ones, allowing new entities to emerge. This is the core of the ideal Rorty seeks in discussing individual freedom. The author believes that focusing on compositional qualities such as disharmony, diversity, and dispersion can more effectively achieve Rorty's concept of Self-Creation.Among the works of Persian-speaking researchers, numerous articles and books explore Rorty and his ideas. However, the question of operationalizing Rorty's goals and his romantic ideal through text production has yet to be thoroughly examined. This gap is also evident in Rorty's works. Although he paid attention to the works of writers and novelists, he focused primarily on those who aimed to achieve freedom in the public sphere. Therefore, focusing on texts emphasizing the realization of self-creation and freedom on an individual level can significantly advance Richard Rorty's thought.

This research employs analytical and descriptive methods to examine Rorty's ironism and self-creation. It then introduces ways to achieve self-creation in text production by focusing on compositional qualities aligned with ironism, contrasting the qualities favored by metaphysicians.

To further distance ourselves from metaphysical thoughts, which is the goal of Rorty's philosophy, it is essential to recognize the types of compositional qualities that organize texts. Metaphysicians favor two compositional qualities: coherence and harmony. These qualities require the components of a whole to be placed in a causal or obligatory relationship with each other, structuring the text accordingly. By eliminating ambiguity and disharmony, the text can transmit its message more quickly to the audience, and language can better fulfill its mediating role.Given this context, applying alternative structural patterns such as disharmony, diversity, and dispersion—where the arrangement of components differs from what metaphysicians prefer—can facilitate the production of new thought forms. Introducing works by writers like Samuel Beckett and Peter Handke can provide a clearer understanding of this new path explored in this research. Examples of such works can also be found among Persian-speaking writers and the fifth generation of Iranian literature.

Rorty, by emphasizing the tradition of Romanticism, aims to realize human freedom within the realm of philosophy. He considers freedom at both public and individual levels. On the individual level, the pursuit of Self-Creation is achieved through non-essentialist, anti-nature thoughts, and twentieth-century perspectives on language. Focusing on imagination allows the self-autonomous ironist to craft their desired narrative. By viewing language as contingent, Rorty demonstrates how it can be used to construct new realities, enabling individuals to realize their freedom.If freedom is pursued through the creation of works with new compositional qualities that oppose the metaphysicians' preferred qualities of coherence and harmony, it will seem more attainable. By generating new linguistic metaphors, new terms will gradually emerge, creating a new intellectual space and facilitating the possibility of moving towards new forms of living.

While Descartes tried in his philosophy after using the procedure of doubt by introspection and rational intuition to achieve the essence of “the self” as thinking substance and then by clear and distinct ideas that he already had of “the other” (including God and other creatures) to make judgement about the existence and the essence of “the other” and in the end by using the truths which were known with the mediation of natural light of reason to acquire the regulator moral principles with “the other”, Pascal in addition of asserting the impossibility of discovering “the self” by introspection, reversed all the creative process of Descartes and considered discovering of “the self” in its relation with “the other” and succedent to it and as a result, the free thinking and autonomous Cartesian subject that faced “the other” only as its object of knowledge and supposed the existence and the essence of “the other” as something dependent on the ideas that he had from them, manifested in complete contrast with the heteronymous and subordinate Pascalian human that his only alteration before and after grasping the God’s grace lies in experiencing the different kinds of heteronomy and the impossibility of autonomy and finally, regulation of relation with “the other” just establishes by referring to a “super other” i.eh. God.

Here, an attempt is made to answer this question in a descriptive-analytical way: Baumgarten is known as the German founder of aesthetics, But Can he properly justify the independence of aesthetics from other fields? In order to achieve this goal, instead of considering the historical course of his treatises, we have followed the discussion according to precedence and conceptual order. Among this conceptual arrangement, the focus is on the discussion of "perfection". Also poetry as the central issue of Baumgarten's aesthetics is considered. For Baumgarten, perfection is an object of inner coherence. Perfection in the subject refers to the perfected degree of sensible high when arousing sensible representations. In fact, Baumgarten believes that beauty and perfection are intertwined. In this way, beauty is in the chain of sensible perception. According to Baumgarten, perfection and beauty do not just depend on objective Cohesion and coordination in the object or artistic work, it is perceived through the subject. The subject receives the sensible effect as the degree of pleasure and displeasure. Beauty is, intuitively and undistinguished moral and, indirectly related to moral concepts through symbols (or signs). Logic is correlated to rational principles and rules over the aesthetics. With Baumgarten's effort, taking into account the more flexible function of rational laws in reason, a regin is opened to accept aesthetic due to the relation with moral domain and etc, rules Despite Baumgarten`s deeply efforts, the field of aesthetics is not autonomous.

Constructivist interpreters of Kant's moral philosophy claim that all moral values and norms depend on agents and the good will create moral values. The realist interpreters of Kant's moral philosophy claim that the will and its autonomy are not incompatible with moral realism, because at least some values exist independently of agents. In this view, a detailed analysis of the good will is usually not given or it finds an unimportant role. Contrary to these two interpretations, in this paper, with an interpretive method, by explaining the fundamental meaning of good will, we discuss the compatibility of Kant's good will with moral realism, in such a way that the key role of good will is maintained. The basis of the good will is autonomy. On the one hand, autonomy is the formal condition of moral facts, and on the other hand, the end in itself is the material ground for the good will. Therefore, the good will can be considered compatible with non-natural realism, because the good will has a formal function and its material ground is an intrinsic and real value.

In developing his Foundations of the Science of Knowledge, Fichte draws on two theoretical elements, the meaning of autonomy in Kant's thought, and a practical element, the French Revolution. In this regard, by completing Kant's autonomy (using the experience of the French Revolution), it enables it to penetrate the realm of necessity and foreign substance, and thus transforms freedom into a power beyond Kant's imagination. In this regard, he proposes two theories of action and rational intuition, an unprecedented dichotomy with Kant's philosophy in two areas of changing the theory of how experience is formed and the displacement of self-consciousness instead of consciousness. With these two changes, Fichte creates a new meaning of idealism, reality, and subjectivity. These new elements in Fichte's philosophy are formed not only by the dialectical construction between the French Revolution and Kantian autonomy, but also by the way in which the theory of freedom and how it is developed in the French Revolution is discovered. With this event, Fichte frees the Science of Knowledgefrom the double fall of the face of autonomy with necessity and the revolution with terror.

Autonomy is a rational virtue that assumes that an individual is independent of the other, with the ability to choose and decide in areas such as ethics, politics, and knowledge. The autonomous person with this definition resists religious authority. For this reason, autonomy always prevents the acceptance of religious teachings without independent evidence. The relationship between religious belief and rationality has made a hard choice for modern religious people. Modern humans have to relinquish rationality and believe in religious authority, or limit their religious beliefs to a small proposition for which it has evidence. Philosophers such as Zagzebski, Coady, and Robert & Wood are attempting to reinterpret the concept of autonomy that does not conflict with the acceptance of epistemological authority, including religious authority. In this article, after reviewing the definition of autonomy and its history, the relation between this concept and concepts such as independence and authority is discussed. Then, by providing a consistent interpretation of this concept, it analyzes the relationship between this new concept and religious authority.

Kant and Levinas’s point of departure in their works was the criticism of the Western tradition. The former proceeded to criticize a tradition that gives credit to object versus subject which ultimately leads to the spread of skepticism in epistemology and ethics. By referring to the Copernican Revolution and validating the subject both in ethics or epistemology, Kant seeks to guarantee the validity of knowledge on the one hand, and the applicability of ethics (where the agent of ethics is involved in its generation) on the other. Similarly, in the works of Levinas also the same attempts have been made, that is, he too proceeded to criticize the philosophical tradition in which “the same” and “self” are placed against “otherness” and “alterity”. He puts emphasis on both the Other and otherness and tries to build a metaphysic based on our relationship with the otherness (in a general sense) and other (in a specific sense). Levinas introduces “heteronomy” before Kant’s “autonomy” and builds ethics based on our relationship with the other. The present paper argues that in comparison with Levinas’s heteronomous ethics that relies on man’s sentiments and feelings, Kant’s autonomous ethics that emphasizes on a sort of common rationality among human beings seems to be more plausible and applicable in human society.

Law is a concept that has a long history in western thought. Even with all of the intellectual-cultural upheavals that have taken place in the western world from ancient times till the modern era, it has always retained its importance and centrality [in the totality of knowledge]. In modern thought, law changed along with the fundamental changes that occurred in the relation between modern man and the world. This was such that the subject became the foundation of the world and everything else became the object of this subject. In this relation, law took on a new meaning. Better than anyone, Kant, one of the greatest philosophers of modern thought, depicted the concept of modern law under the topic of the relation of the subject with the world. According to Kant, with its subjective law, the practical intellect delineates the will. Thus, the intellect delineates and legislates. This delineation is the very concept of freedom in the modern interpretation of this term. Therefore, modern law is autonomous. In the creation of the practical law, it is necessary for the intellect to assume its existence. This understanding of the law is completely different from the common meaning of the term that is popular in our legal circles today. An analysis of it is important in the understanding of our relation with modern law, especially in the delineation of the place of law in foundations of religious thought.

While the moral argument for the existence of God is a more familiar issue in philosophy of religion, recently, atheist philosophers have proposed a moral argument against the existence of God. This argument has been formulated in at least five ways: (1) from the problem of evil, (2) from the critique of alienation, (3) from autonomy, (4) from the critique of expediency, and (5) from the immoral teachings of world religions. Some of these formulations can be regarded as a theoretical moral argument against the existence of God and some of them as a practical/pragmatist moral argument against the existence of God. Theoretical moral arguments against the existence of God have concentrated on moral evidence that show there is no God and, so, theism is false, while practical moral arguments against the existence of God have concentrated on the fact that belief in God is an obstacle for fulfilled moral living and achieving the ends of moral life, or even makes our actions immoral. At the end, I conclude that none of the formulations of the moral argument against the existence of God are productive. However, there are important lessons in each of the formulations of the argument for theists if they attend to them.

Ethical discussion of genetic counseling is taken into account by the framework of genetic ethics; however, firstly, it is an applied issue rather than being a theoretical one. And there is much dependence to acquiring scientific, psychological, and communicative skills. Genetic counseling needs to pursue a comprehensive ethical strategy. In this strategy, some principles can be utilized that their frequent application for explaining and evaluating bioethical issues has made them known as “bioethical principles” including: “self-regulation”, “doing good deeds”, “avoid doing damages” and “justice”. However, application of bioethical principles in genetic counseling is not general and abstract and these principles are firstly, flexible and revisable in relation to a critical state and situation and secondly, they rely on acquiring particular and minor knowledge and skills. The thing that gives more depth and precision to application of the bioethical principles and helps the counselor to understand the situations is being dominant to technical skills in genetic counseling such as scientific and communicative ones.

Intellectual autonomy indicates how human being can preserve her epistemic agency and intellectually manage and regulate herself. This epistemic value is commonly proposed against intellectual heteronomy according to which the believer is not capable of applying her epistemic agency because of internal or external impediments. Since the early modern era, some philosophers and intellectuals have supposed, implicitly or explicitly, that religious belief violates intellectual autonomy. However, the responsibilist version of virtue epistemology shows that autonomy, as an intellectual virtue, is not epistemic self-reliance and independence from the other but prescribes a way to regulate one’s epistemic agency in intellectual interactions with the other. On this basis, a conscientious autonomous believer is capable of knowing and managing the variety of her epistemic relations with others. Intellectual autonomy in this sense is compatible with believing and maintaining religious beliefs. Religious belief can be autonomous if the believer (i) find the other’s role in her beliefs as imparting knowledge, critic, model, adherent, and authority and (ii) regulate, conscientiously and equipped with intellectual virtues, the way in which the other participates in them.

The concept of recognition, borrowed from Fichte, has undergone considerable modifications in Hegelian thought. It played a significant role in establishing Hegel’s own philosophy and theory of mutual recognition as an intersubjective and social relation. In order to explain Hegel’s approach to the concept of recognition, we need first of all to assess the place of this concept and its importance in Fichte’s philosophy. This task enables us to find out some differences in Hegel’s and Fichte’s attitudes and get closer to the true sense of recognition in Hegel’s system of philosophy. This article consists of three major parts: first of all, it is going to concentrate on the problem of freedom and autonomy in German Idealism especially in Kant. Secondly, it checks out the problem of consciousness of freedom from a Fichtean point of view. And finally, it talks about Fichte’s influence on Hegel which led to formation of the concept of recognition particularly in Jena period.

Rereading the Webber’s works and going beyond Parsons’ interpretation of Weber, Nietzschean aspects in his approach toward modernity are revealed, such that it leads to the promotion of his function as the mediator between Nietzsche and critical approach of postmodern figures such as Lyotard and Foucault. To verify this hypothesis, firstly, we need to have criterion to assessing the similarities and differences of Weber, Lyotard and Foucault. Secondly, the appropriate method for the application of that criterion is needed. The assessment criterion or theoretical framework of this article is Taylor’s three malaises and the method of the application of this criterion, is Lovejoy’s history of ideas. Based on this theoretical framework or method, four unit-ideas are selected as the elements of these three thinkers. Findings of this research indicate that the unit- ideas of ‘instrumentalism’, ‘value- differentiation’ and ‘cultural integrity’ and ‘autonomy’ are prominent in the thought of Weber, Lyotard and Foucault respectively.

The main aim of this paper is to describe and analyze one of the most significant criticisms of classical utilitarianism in the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition. This criticism، called the “integrity criticism،” was put forward by Bernard Williams in 1973 and، along with the so-called “justice criticism” which was put forward by John Rawls in 1971، is counted as the most significant criticism of classical utilitarianism. It argues that utilitarianism threatens the agent’s “integrity” and “autonomy،” and brings extensive “alienation” from her considered moral judgments and friendly and lovely relationships. This paper describes Bernard William’s criticism of classical utilitarianism and its various guises. Then، using Roger Crisp’s، Julia Driver’s، and Timothy Chappell’s interpretations، it analyzes it from various perspectives. Analyzing the “integrity criticism” in its various guises enriches our understanding of “utilitarianism” and helps us to find out how and why its different forms have been put forward.

Freedom is a fundamental concept in Kant's philosophy, including theoretical and practical philosophy, though its role in the latter is more significant. In his philosophy of ethics Kant considers freedom as the basis of his reasoning for ethics and in order to rule out the view that considers ethics as illusion he maintains that if we possess a free will, then ethics will turn out to be real and ethical laws will be valid for all. This article is an attempt to study the role of freedom in Kant's philosophy of ethics with special reference to his two main books on practical reason, namely, The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Ethics and Critique of Practical Reason.

J. Rawls is the most prominent political philosopher in 20th century. Hehas two periods in his works and thoughts. Kant has influenced him onfirst period which is evolved in A Theory of Justice. Kant claims thathuman being is autonomous, thus every person based on his reasonmakes choices. The person ought to act only based on his principleswhich are made choice by himself. In Kant, person’s decision fallowingthe desire, rather fallowing the reason which is a clear example ofheteronomous. Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, introduces the initialposition in which any person is ignorance of his interests. The principleof justice is determined via this position. The person who is in Rawlsinitial position and veil of ignorance is similar with Kantianautonomous person. Both of them, once, would make decision onprinciples of justice consider the conditions such as: neutrality, freefrom interest, autonomy; all in all, in two theories, the principle isselected by rational agents and such agents follow the laws which areselected by themselves.