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In our times, the discourse of power and othering has so dominated the relations of intersubjectivity that it has penetrated all strata of social, political, religious, and even human life. The control of such power has become so widespread and complicated that it seems there is no other driving force in human life today than this. It seems that we are facing a kind of aporia in the definition of the Other and intersubjectivity relations, in which the subject's relationship to the Other is still ambiguous and complicated. On this basis, it is necessary for new research to examine the relations between contemporary intersubjectivity and various aspects of other concepts with more seriousness and significance. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are among the most important thinkers who have analyzed the relations of intersubjectivity and emphasized the position and role of otherness in these relations. The main claim and finding of the present research are that our relationships with others rely on a balanced tension between reflective and pre-reflective relationships, conflict and interaction, preserving individuality and dissolving boundaries between self-other.  These tensions are just the inherent aspects of intersubjectivity relations before they are constructivist concepts that need to be resolved.  The external action and forced structure of the institutions and the discourse of power and their destructive role in the objectification of the subject cannot be ignored, but at the same time avoiding some differences between the subject and the other and focusing on the agency and activism of the subject, it is necessary to mix the orientation of intersubjectivity flows and events and it is a combination of these two approaches.

In this article, the author attempts to explain something that is rarely seen in Aristotle's ethical and political thought, which is the legal dimension that Aristotle incidentally stated between ethics and politics in order to link the two in the fifth chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics. In this chapter, Aristotle distances himself from justice in the moral sense and, by introducing another into his theory, enters justice in the legal sense under the theory of natural law, which itself is based on the Greek theory of nature. With this chapter of the aforementioned book, Aristotle completely transforms the meaning of law, citizenship, and life under the political state. In a way, politics is completely influenced by the non-subjective right or rights of man from this moment on, and here Aristotle makes a difference between household management, the relationship of gods and servitude, and the political situation, and makes politics a place for realizing the acquisition of moral virtues and ensuring laws based on distributive and corrective justice and other natural rights of citizens.

Non-intentional and immediate awareness has no already relationship with the other. While freedom is always related to others and not having a relationship with others does not fundamentally interfere with freedom. Therefore, freedom is never a question of knowledge. Consciousness in itself and for itself independently and unmediated by external objects internally projects its objectivity. This consciousness-based approach basically does not look outside itself, that is, it finds the origin and idea of ​​truth inside and without the mediation of others. The other is a competitor of freedom in all its forms in the sense that it does not allow any linguistic articulation to form outside its limits and swallows all the illusory elements of self-foundation. At the same time, there is no other way than facing the other towards a kind of reflexive awareness and knowing oneself as an ego. In addition, the link between freedom and moral responsibility is one of the most fundamental and long-standing topics of ethics, which establishes a link between the subject, the other, and agency. Kant's transcendental freedom constructs space as a support for empirical freedom and as a condition for the possibility of experiencing freedom. From this point of view, transcendental and unconscious freedom play the same role in relation to moral responsibility.

The purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between Buber’s and Levinas’s ideas by emphasizing the concept of otherness. Research has been conducted on various topics related to Buber’s and Levinas’s ideas in the field of moral philosophy. However, the relationship between them remains an ambiguous area of study. This research seeks to provide a comparative reflection on the concept of otherness according to the thoughts of these two philosophers. Based on the studies conducted, while Buber’s thoughts emphasize an I-Thou relationship that fosters a symmetrical, close, and reciprocal connection, Levinas highlights a face-to-face encounter characterized by an asymmetrical distance. Levinas criticizes Buber’s I-Thou relationship as insufficiently ethical because it prioritizes the self over the other in a self-centered process of formation. In fact, Levinas argues for the irreducible distance between the I and the Other, where the Other is no longer assimilated into the I or the self. According to Levinas’s thought, if, in encountering another, there is an expectation of reciprocal and equal treatment from the Other, one steps outside the ethical realm.

Emmanuel Levinas is considered one of the most important philosophers of the modern era. The importance of his philosophy is evident in ethics. In Levinas's moral philosophy, the subject-centeredness is removed from priority and the "other" and their "face" are prioritized, in such a way that the other's face indicates moral messages and the subject, upon receiving these moral messages, feels a duty to consider themselves accountable and responsible to the other. But the question is, what is the meaning of "face" in facing the other in Levinas's moral philosophy? And on what basis can its moral aspect be justified? In the structuralism and semiotics of philosophers such as Ferdinand de Saussure, external matters in the real world are signs, and these signs take on meaning within the scope of the subject's mental concepts and categories. This meaning is ultimately reduced to ontological issues. Levinas's moral philosophy, however, is a kind of deconstruction and rebellion against the structuralism and semiotics of philosophers like Saussure. In Levinas's moral philosophy, the face of the other is a moral sign that invites the subject to accept moral messages and take responsibility towards the other. In such a situation, moral messages and commands are not reduced to ontological issues. It seems that Levinas is trying to justify the moral aspect of the face on the basis of linguistics.

The possibility of a dialog and the establishment of a balance between the thoughts and theoretical foundations of Sartre and Lacan is ambiguous and somewhat complex, especially since various interpretations have been offered regarding the realization of such a dialog. Some argue that the thoughts of Sartre and Lacan are in irreconcilable contradiction to each other and can only be evaluated as two heterogeneous thoughts opposing each other. In particular, there is a deep and serious divide in their political and theoretical approaches, which makes it difficult to find a topic for dialog between them (Tolini and Muller, 2015: 89). Others take more radical approaches to the relationship between the two, and since Sartre's thought is intertwined with freedom and consciousness and Lacan's with overdeterminism and the unconscious, they consider Lacanianism to be synonymous with opposition to Sartre. On this basis, anyone who agrees with Lacan's thinking and accepts his approach to subjectivity and the Other is incompatible with and alien to Sartre's thinking (Almen, 2006:11). The aim of this study is to deconstruct the subject in the face of the Other and also to find moments that challenge the traditional readings of Lacan and Sartre. The basic question of the present study is: What role does the other play in the construction of the subject of Sartrean existentialism and the subject of Lacanian psychoanalysis, and is it possible to establish a dialog and a balance between these two approaches? Despite Lacan's criticism of Sartre's mythological reading of the concept of freedom and Sartre's criticism of psychoanalysis as a deterministic discourse, both emphasize in their philosophical and metapsychological positions the constant presence of the other and the search for a way to liberate the subject. The concepts of Sartre's "fundamental choice" and Lacan's "fundamental desire" in the present and the inescapable authority of the other express an escape towards the realization of freedom. Subjects want freedom and individual identity, but there are contradictions that make it difficult for the subject to choose and satisfy desire. Finding moments in which these contradictions are resolved in both schools of thought, existentialism and psychoanalysis, is difficult and complex, but possible.

Literature Review:

Numerous books and articles have already been published on Lacan and Sartre. For this article, we have used "Jacques Lacan" by Shaun Homer (2004) and "Ethics of the Real" by Alenka Zupančič (2000). As far as the comparison between the two is concerned, two important articles were used: "Sartre and Lacan: Considerations on the Concepts of the Subject and of Consciousness Psychoanalysis and History" by Tolini and Muller (2015), and "Analyzing Gaze in Terms of Subjective and Objective Interpretation: Sartre and Lacan. In Human Studies" by Sharma and Barua. While the latter two works focus primarily on the concept of the gaze and subjectivity, this article attempts to present an independent interpretation of psychoanalytic concepts, the Other, and their relationship in shaping the subject, as well as to establish a hypothetical dialog between these two philosophers.

Research was conducted fundamentally based on the study of library sources and articles published in international journals and internet sources. The research method is library-based, based on the analysis of Sartre and Lacan's works. This study uses a descriptive-analytical and comparative method.

Lacan's psychoanalysis and Sartre's existentialism have similarities in their exploration of the nature of human subjectivity and the omnipresent 'other'. Sartre is more closely associated with Lacan's psychoanalytic structuralism than is generally assumed. Lacan's account of the unconscious structure overcomes many of the problems that plagued Freud's psychological reading, which portrayed the unconscious as a realm governed by a kind of preconscious awareness, language, and symbolic order. Lacan's unconscious thus provides a direct link between this fundamental psychoanalytic concept and Sartre's existentialism. Sartre's attempt to overcome the aspects of the unconscious that he found problematic leads him to an interpretation that Lacan might have agreed with. This encounter has significant implications for the reassessment of Sartre's ambiguous and complex relationship with psychoanalysis, as most commentators have noted that Sartre's critique was directed at the unconscious and the determinism of Freud's modern psychology, rather than Lacan's psychoanalysis (Flynn, 2014: 221). Below we will assess some of the central concepts in Lacan's and Sartre's thought and examine their encounter

This study attempts to reassess and reinterpret the philosophical and psychoanalytic positions on subjectivity. It shows that by redefining the subject and the unconscious and emphasizing the role of choice and desire, we can offer similar interpretations of other concepts within these discourses.On this basis, psychoanalysis is not a deterministic approach that is opposed to the freedom of the subject, nor does the concept of the unconscious negate human agency and freedom. Sartre's emphasis on freedom is based simultaneously on the situation of the subject and the omnipresent existence of the Other. The subject is thus in a state of confusion and entrapment and tries to breathe in such a space. Both psychoanalytic and existentialist discourses strive to free the subject from deceptive situations and symbolic structures. Lacanian psychoanalysis cannot be reduced to structuralism, since Lacan never attempted to abolish the subject and does not see it merely as a reproduction of the symbolic world. Sartre's subjectivity cannot be reduced to pure voluntarism or absolute freedom, since it is dependent on events and the Other always surrounds it. There is always something in the subject that transcends the domination of others and the symbolic realm. Moreover, the Other itself cannot be a solid and complete entity and is always confronted with a fundamental failure.

In this article, we are trying to examine God and his place in Levinas's moral philosophy, which is based on another concept. For Levinas, the other is not a passive person, but an active person whose face indicates messages and moral commands, and upon receiving these messages and moral commands, a person feels the duty to consider himself accountable and responsible to the other. . The continuation of this accountability and responsibility leads to a moral life. But the question is, what is God's position in the structure of Levinas's moral philosophy? And what is it based on? And in other words; What are the components of religion in the structure of Levinas's moral philosophy? Levinas believes that when a person encounters another, he finds an inner desire and attraction towards him. This inner desire and pull towards the other, which originates from man's desire for infinity and perfection and God, is a fundamental and metaphysical desire and ultimately leads to the moral relationship and interaction of man with the other and God in a moral life. In the moral and divine life, man finds his true identity, which is a moral and divine identity, and by cultivating his moral talents, he steps on the path of becoming infinite and attaining God's perfections.

Immanuel Levinas is considered one of the most important philosophers of the new age. The importance of his philosophy is shown in ethics. In the moral philosophy of Levinas, the central subject is left out of priority and his "other" and his "face" are given priority in such a way that the other's face indicates moral messages and the subject feels duty upon receiving these moral messages. consider himself accountable and responsible to the other. But the question is, what is the meaning of "face" in facing the other in Levinas's moral philosophy? And on what basis can its moral aspect be justified? Can it be based on ontology and epistemology, or psychology and linguistics? Levinas, when Western philosophers tried to give priority to the subject and reduce all issues to ontology and epistemology, provided a redefinition of another concept and another face. The author believes that the moral foundation of another figure can be examined based on four bases: 1- ontology 2- epistemology 3- psychology 4- linguistic so that finally the moral foundation of Levinas's thought can be discovered in his linguistic basis.

In the present article, we are faced with two phenomenological philosophers who, in two different intellectual traditions, namely philosophical hermeneutics and moral phenomenology, have referred to the concept of the Other as the fundamental possibility of the individual. The other, as an ontological and common concept in the thought of Gadamer and Levinas, is the turning point of the condition for the possibility of understanding and ethics. Focusing on the concept of the other, while addressing the points of difference and commonality between Gadamer and Levinas, this article will show that Levinas’s preoccupation with the other as a philosopher refers to the foundations of ethics, and the condition for the possibility of foundations of ethics is encountering the other. In Gadamer, the turning point is the determination of the possibilities of understanding in dialectical and dialogue-oriented relationships. Without the other, in Levinas’s thought, ethics, and moral matter, and in Gadamer’s thought, the process of understanding will not occur in the form of a fusion of horizons. Therefore, this article shows that the other is a common concept between these two philosophers, which both of them cannot avoid in their philosophical analyses of ethics or the process of understanding.

In today's philosophy, the possibility of harmony, closeness and mixing of different fields, including the field of literature and philosophy, has been provided. The purpose of this article is to examine the phenomenological aesthetics of the works of Simon de Beauvoir, a famous philosopher and writer of the 20th century, and to explain the positive consequences of this creative attitude. In fact, de Beauvoir writes philosophically and in the form of writing a metaphysical novel, he brings literature and philosophy closer to each other. More than a writer, he is an artist who cultivates ideas about art and literature through his thoughtful texts and fiction works. Simon de Beauvoir is not a phenomenologist, but his thoughts have the talent of phenomenological reading, as his attention to intentionality, inter-subjective relationship, individual, experience, other and self-loneliness, has made his works worthy of phenomenological study and research. The present article aims to provide the possibility of such a reading of his works by briefly reviewing the concepts raised in de Beauvoir's works.

Man and his type of encounter with existence have a very high importance and place in Shariati's thought. Basically Shariati's ontology and anthropology are in strong connection with each other. Therefore, we can ask what view Shariati's ontology presents about man and his relationship with "other"? The result is reaching the duality of monotheism and contradiction, as the most important unsolvable problem in Shariati's ontology. This issue cause’s dialectics to prevail over Shariati's thought. The centrality of the dialectical movement in Shariati's ontology forces him to equate man with rebellion and encounter with popular religion and the modern world, and this subject of "being in the world" puts man under the shadow of the passion for liberation and destroys the possibility of the desirable encounter with “other”. Shariati sometimes provides discontinuous possibilities that indicate the human subjectivity and a favorable attitude towards "the other", But in the whole of his thought system, these possibilities collapse and in the best situation, the ideal encounter with the other will be an unformed situation in his thought.

The topic of this paper is the investigation and analysis of the fundamental peace that occurs in the light of the encounter with the "Other" in the imperialist subject. Levinas presents a subject who imposes his desires on the world in order to establish an earthly paradise and is busy devouring others and subduing them to himself. The imperialism subject, who formed his identity with violence and in relation to others, encounters the "Other" who resists his totalitarianism. Levinas’ idea to end violence is rooted in subjectivity that cannot be reduced to consciousness and imposes an infinite responsibility on the subject. From the beginning, encountering the face of the "Other" is peaceful. By reminding the subject for peace and solidarity, the face motivates him to fulfill his duty and before any question and choice, he makes the subject personally responsible for peace with the "Other"; a responsibility that has already been placed in it and cannot withdraw from it. The peace considered by Levinas is the fundamental peace, original and beyond conventional war and peace.

How to deal with "the other" and then its decisive role in adopting an intercultural approach is of undeniable importance among the philosophers of this field. Bernard Waldenfels, a contemporary intercultural philosopher, considers encountering with "the other" to be a kind of paradoxical encounter that can be referred to as the presence of the absent. This German philosopher has chosen a maximalist opinion regarding the encounter with "the other" and separated himself from others by saying "،the Alien" instead of "the other". While "the Alien" is not a negation of the subject and is rooted in "I", it cannot be reduced to a familiar thing or my property, nor can it be reduced to the previous order.The important theoretical consequences of this attitude with the "phenomenology of the alien" method are in line with the requirements of the contemporary polyphonic world and today's life, and not just today's life, but in general, human life is nothing but a constant movement of In-betweenness, and such a requirement has become possible due to the human body. The intercultural philosophy of Waldenfels is to deal with this issue with all the innovations and to solve the previous problems with an innovative foundation.

As the mother of feminism, Simone de Beauvoiris the most important element of the women's struggles in 19th century. Sheholds that women are under oppression in each period of their lives and this oppressionstems from a male-dominated society. Simone de Beauvoirasks women to struggle against this oppression but she didn't direct all problems imposed on women against men. Under the influence ofHeidegger and Sartre's philosophies and drawing on existentialistic views, she considers women as the object versus the subject, the other versus I and the being versus the becoming. In her view, women have been regarded as the 2nd sex in any period of their lives and to have access to their real and transcendent self, they should go over the situation that has been imposed upon them. In one chapter of her 2nd sex, she deals with the impacts of motherhood upon women and retells the women's disasters and problems. The present paper is an attempt to analyze and assessed Beauvoir's views on women's situation as the object, the mother and the 2nd sex who has the role of motherhood and then proceed to show that why becoming a mother cannot leave women from otherness.

Kant argued that in order to bring about validity for knowledge we have to make a paradigm shift. The paradigm shift which was well known as copernican revolution was based on this assumption that the one who observing could be able to determinate objects. For Kant subject as observer has the ability to determine the world transcendentally. For Hegel the Kantian paradigm shift count as subjetivising the objectivity. He blames Kant for not seeing this basic fact that, subject himself become in the objectivity and the relation could not be as Kant was assuming. Hegel by replacing the transcendental I with Giest attempts to instead of making objectivity, subjective, do the reverse. In this article we argue that by objectivizing the subjectivity, Hegel not inly became able to overcome the problems posed by Kantian philosophy but also assumes subjectivity as intrinsically intersubjective

While Descartes tried in his philosophy after using the procedure of doubt by introspection and rational intuition to achieve the essence of “the self” as thinking substance and then by clear and distinct ideas that he already had of “the other” (including God and other creatures) to make judgement about the existence and the essence of “the other” and in the end by using the truths which were known with the mediation of natural light of reason to acquire the regulator moral principles with “the other”, Pascal in addition of asserting the impossibility of discovering “the self” by introspection, reversed all the creative process of Descartes and considered discovering of “the self” in its relation with “the other” and succedent to it and as a result, the free thinking and autonomous Cartesian subject that faced “the other” only as its object of knowledge and supposed the existence and the essence of “the other” as something dependent on the ideas that he had from them, manifested in complete contrast with the heteronymous and subordinate Pascalian human that his only alteration before and after grasping the God’s grace lies in experiencing the different kinds of heteronomy and the impossibility of autonomy and finally, regulation of relation with “the other” just establishes by referring to a “super other” i.eh. God.

This article seeks to demonstrate, through a hypothetical dialogue between Hannah Arendt and Emmanuel Levinas, that the essence of politics must be sought beyond "real politics" and its agent, namely, the state. For this reason, politics requires a fundamental, radical and serious rethinking. This rethinking, however, must be carried out by first deconstructing politics to prepare it for emerging new possibilities; second deconstructing Ethics and extending it from the individual level to the level of "I in the We"; third reinterpreting the relationship between politics and ethics, which are already in the process of constructive judgment and are ready for a relationship that has no master or servant. As a result of such simultaneous reflections, the foundations of what this article views as Ethical politics could probably be clarified in general terms. This essay thus raises three long-standing questions: What is politics? What is ethics? What is ethical politics? The response to the first question is founded on Arendt's views. This paper draws attention to concepts such as plurality instead of unity, public realm instead of private realm, and peace instead of war. Relying on Levinas's philosophy of ethics, the second question is answered by emphasizing the primacy of understanding over cognition, the other over self, and the person over the land. Last but not least, the third question is addressed by establishing a link connection between the mentioned thinkers’ views and their shared ideas such as responsibility for the other, the primacy of the interest of humans over national interests and a new concept of state.

Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Buber have considered the human being, his existential issues, and anxieties in their philosophical issues. Among these topics is the subject of the "other" and "meaning of life". Sartre's views appear in the position of an atheist thinker about the "other" and meaning in life in two approaches. First, his radical view of the "other" is so pessimistic, and he calls it "hell", and the relationship with the "other" is based on "conflict". At this point, life is absurd and meaningless. He takes a moderate approach in his later views, believing that he has to invent a meaning for life and that the "other" can play an essential role in this meaning. Buber is a divine existentialist and sees the "other" and "meaning of life" in a deep bond. In his mind, the pursuit of authentic communication and the discovery of the meaning of life can only be possible when there is "Thou". Of course, Thou has a hierarchy, and the highest "you" is "eternal", and in the shadow of his grace, the meaning of life is discovered.

Immanuel Levinas is considered one of the most important philosophers of the new age. The importance of his philosophy is more apparent in the field of ethics. Levinas's moral philosophy revolves around the "other". In the structure of Levinas's moral philosophy, one central subject is out of priority and another is given priority. For Levinas, the other is not a passive person, but an active person whose face indicates messages and moral commands, and the subject, by receiving these messages and moral commands, feels the duty to be accountable and responsible to the other. to know The continuity of this accountability and responsibility leads to a moral life. But the problem is that the approach to moral life in the structure of Levinas's moral philosophy is based on what basis? And in other words; What are the components of a moral life in the structure of Levinas's moral philosophy? Levinas believes that the subject finds an inner desire and pull towards the other when facing another's face. This internal desire and tension towards the other, which originates from the subject's desire for infinity and perfection, is a fundamental and metaphysical desire and leads to the subject's moral relationship and interaction with the other and ultimately to moral life. Within the moral life, the subject finds his true identity, which is a moral identity, and by cultivating his moral talents, he steps on the path of becoming infinite and achieving perfection.

This article proposes of analyzing and investigating Husserl's approach to other’s constitutions, as alter ego. What emerges from Husserl's statement in the fifth meditation of Cartesian meditations is the other’s constitution as a commencement for the foundation of a world in which objectivity is available to all. Husserl calls this world intersubjective. Husserl's account of this constitution includes two basic steps: In the first step, the second reduction implements, by which all intentions, motivations, meanings, etc., aimed at others other than me, are neglected. Then, by expressing the character of the other’s perception as an indirect presence, the meaning of the other is transferred from my body to the other’s body, through an assimilative apperception and by a meaning transfer in the pairing process. At least three serious criticisms can make of this description: (1) The second epoché removes all the meanings directed at the other from the ego. Therefore, any reference to the other that is supposed to acquire its meaning from the ego excludes. In the transcendental sphere, the second epoché takes place by abstracting from everything gives to me as something other than myself; therefore, what remains after the execution of this epoché is only "I." In the second epoché, everything that concerns explicitly I leaves me in what Husserl calls "the special sphere of ownness." This reduction includes the decision only to consider what belongs to me; therefore, to find how "I" gives meaning to the subjects who are bodies as perceptual objects belonging to this reduced sphere of "ownness" and also to discover those capacities that transcended as subjects, this reduction implements. (2) Husserl's description of the body leaves out many aspects of it, And even at the starting point, it does not consider the perceptual difference between the perception of my body and the body of others. He emphasizes the claim that a person's own body is uniquely separated from other animal and human bodies. A person may be supposed to experience this body as an organism when he attributes to its feelings, perceptions, and meaningful actions. Husserl's description of a person's experience of his own body seems to be a particularly limited experience, because Husserl fails to explain the vast part of physical experiences that are known as experiences beyond one's control. Such descriptions of the body seem to be more suitable for mechanical beings that rely on the governance and control of the body.(3) Husserl's statement to distinguish between organism and pseudo-organism is unclear, obscure, and unsatisfactory. Expressing ambiguous terms such as variable but harmonious behavior, as well as not providing a criterion to recognize the harmonious behavior of an organism, are among the things that make Husserl's description difficult. First, in this type of reasoning, it is usually not clear how much improvisation - that is, how many observers apart from the revealed other - is needed to ensure a sufficient number of cases of harmonious behavior. Second, it is also unclear what one should do when faced with another person without having the opportunity to observe their behavior several times. That is, it is unclear to what extent single behaviors or limited behaviors can demonstrate the criterion of behavior harmony.As a conclusion, regarding (1), (2) and (3), despite Husserl's remarkable insights, suggest that the constitution of alter ego appears to have problems that are far from being resolved.