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Since the revelation of the Holy Qur'an and the introduction of God with multiple names and attributes, the relationship between the Divine Essence and His attributes has been a significant topic of discussion among Islamic scholars.According to the Ashaere, the seven affirmative attributes—namely, knowledge (‘Ilm), power (Qudra), life (hayah), speech (kalam), will (Irada), hearing (Sam‘a), and sight (Basar)—are superadded (zā’id) to the Divine Essence and are eternal.This indicates that each of these attributes is both conceptually and externally distinct from God's essence; therefore, they are neither identical with nor separate from the essence (Ghazali, 1416 AH: 130).The Ashaere present comprehensive arguments to demonstrate the eternity and inherent nature of divine attributes, providing a detailed explanation of the eternity of each attribute.They emphasize that the proof of the eternity of one attribute inherently presupposes the eternity of other affirmative attributes (Iji, n.d.: 282), as the affirmation of certain attributes, such as power, necessitates the affirmation of others, such as knowledge (Iji, n.d.: 289)The Ashaere cite several arguments to support their claims, including the comparison of the present with the absent, the attribution of divine attributes to one another and to God's essence, the perfection of God's possession of affirmative attributes, and the eternity of God's essence.

Literature Review:

2.1   An Examination of Mulla Shamsa Gilani's View on Divine Knowledge: This article examines Mulla Shamsa's theory of divine knowledge, focusing on the Objectivity of Attributes with the Divine Essence from his perspective. The study primarily relies on Masalik al-Yaqin and Hashiya Ta‘liqa on Ilahiyyat Sharh Tajrid al-Khafri as its main sources. In the present research, in addition to these sources, manuscript works such as Al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿālīya, Risalat al-Wujudiya, and Risalat Huduth al-‘Alam have also been utilized.2.2       An Examination and Critique of the Present-Absent Analogy in favor of the Theory of Distinctness of Divine Attributes from His Attributes: It has a specific focus on one of the Ash'arite arguments regarding the Distinctness of Divine Attributes from His Attributes.2.3   An Examination and Critique of Fakhr al-Rāzī’s Theory of the Distinction between God’s Attributes and His Essence: A critique of the theory of attribute the Distinction between God’s Attributes and His Essence based on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s perspective.

This research aims to analyze and critique these arguments based on the philosophical principles of Mullā Shamsa Gilānī, employing an analytical-rational method.

Comparison of the present with the absent: The criticism of this argument is that while it shows that the divine attributes are not contingent and eternal, it does not prove Al-Ashʿari’s claim that God's perfect attributes are to be superadded to His essence. It can be argued that the divine attributes, being non-contingent, are eternal and yet identical with the divine essence. The difference between them is conceptual and not existential, for the nature of the necessary existence (Wājib al-Wujūd) entails that it possesses all the attributes of perfection." (Gilanī, 1059: version number 4085, p. 88).Attributing divine attributes to one another and God's Essence:  The criticism of the Ashaere argument in this matter, according to Mullā Shamsa, is that the difference between the divine attributes and between the attributes and the essence of God is purely conceptual and not existential. This is because God has a simple existence from which numerous names and attributes are derived due to His infinite perfection. These attributes are attributed to each other, and due to the simplicity of the essence and its lack of composition, the attribution of attributes to each other or the essence does not require a multiplicity of directions or aspects. (Gilanī, 1059: version number 4085, p. 88).The perfection of God’s possession of affirmative attributes: According to the principles of Mulla Shamsa, the argument states that God possesses all attributes of perfection. However, the conclusion drawn from this premise is broader than the premise itself, as the possession of such attributes may exist in the form of an identity with the divine essence. Moreover, asserting the eternity of these attributes in terms of absolute perfection contradicts another claim made by the Ashaere school, specifically the notion of superiority. If superiority is assumed, then the attributes would not be identical with the essence they describe but would instead differ from one another. Consequently, the described essence would not comprehensively encompass all attributes of perfection.The Eternity of God's Essence: Despite various critiques, a fundamental flaw in all Ashʿarī arguments regarding this matter is their presupposition of God’s temporal eternity. Given that God is immaterial, and an immaterial being is not subject to time, both God and His attributes exist entirely beyond temporal constraints. In other words, temporality—whether in the form of contingency or eternity—applies only to entities within the realm of time. Since God is not a material entity, these temporal classifications are inapplicable to Him. (Gilanī, 1052, manuscript version from the Majles Library; Ashtiani, 1378: 1/466; Mīr Dāmād, 1367: 18).The Ash'arite maintain that the seven essential attributes (such as knowledge, power, and life) are distinct from the divine essence and are eternal. They present various arguments in support of this claim; however, most of these arguments fail to conclusively establish either assertion—that the attributes are eternal and distinct from the essence—or even one of them. This is particularly evident in their primary argument concerning the eternality of the divine essence. While the eternality of the essence implies the non-origination of the attributes, it does not necessarily substantiate their eternal and distinct nature. Rather, the non-origination of attributes about the essence remains compatible with the theory that attributes are identical to the essence.Fundamentally, the flaw in the Ash'arite’s reasoning lies in their assumption of God’s temporal eternality. Due to His non-material nature, God is not subject to temporal creation, origination (ḥudūth), or eternity (qadam) in the conventional sense. Consequently, attributing temporality or eternal duration to God’s essence contradicts a proper understanding of divine simplicity and transcendence.NotesThe Ash'arite argue that affirming the eternality of God’s attributes does not imply disbelief (kufr) or necessitate a multiplicity of eternal beings. This is because true eternality belongs solely to the Divine Essence, while the attributes are merely descriptive aspects of that essence. As such, they are neither independent nor self-sufficient apart from the Divine Essence, ensuring their compatibility with Quranic monotheism. (Jurjani, 1325: 8/48).

One of the debates that has been discussed among sages for a long time is how to attribute God's nature to His attributes. The theologians, philosophers and mystics have come to different views by reflecting on this issue and paying attention to the verses and traditions. Among the philosophers, there are three main trends in this issue: firstly, the negation of the attributes of God's essence and its interpretation as the negation of its opposite from the sacred domain of God, that is, when God is described as the attribute of the universe, in fact, ignorance is removed from God. Second, the conceptual unity of divine attributes and their synonyms in the sense that when a perfection like knowledge is proven to God, in fact, other perfections are also proven to God, based on this in beings like humans; The meaning of knowledge is different from power, but in God Almighty, knowledge implies the same meaning as power implies. Third, the conceptual difference between divine attributes and its exemplary objectivity with Wajib Ta'ala.Believing in the third theory, the contemporary philosopher late Hakim Mohammad Taghi Amoli has expressed many proofs in his valuable book Derr al-Fawad. In this article, his proofs have been discussed and analyzed with a rational analytical method, and it has been concluded that the said proofs are sufficient to prove the theory of objectivity. is not.

Mystics consider the divine essence without considering its determinations to be indescribability. According to them, "God's essence" is superior to any judgment and description, and all the attributes of essence refer to "assignments of essence".At first glance, this claim has at least three major problems: (1) it is self-contradictory, (2) it requires all the problems of some theological theories, (3) it is contrary to religious texts and even many mystical texts, in which it appears that the essence are described.In this article, we have evaluated these three forms with analytical-descriptive method and we have shown that all three of them are the result of not paying attention to the correct meaning of indescribability. The mystics mean by the indescribability, is not that God is absolutely unknowable and indescribable, so that their claim is not self-contradictory or requires closure, and it does not mean to deprive the divine nature of perfect attributes, which contradicts with religious and mystical descriptions.Mystics, like other prominent Muslim thinkers, accept the brief knowledge of God's essence, as well as the description of the essence of truth, to the extent that it is possible for a creature to know Him.The mystics say that all our cognitions and all our descriptions are limited, determined, and incomplete, through determination and to the extent of determination, and they are not describe His indeterminate essence, so that even the term "indeterminate essence" is a kind of definite description of Him.

The field of value has a wide spectrum in the world of humanity and has significant applications and effects in philosophy, religion, economics, social sciences, ethics, psychology and even daily choices. One of the most fundamental issues that Allameh Jafari paid attention to in his philosophical opinions is the attention to the nature of "value" with an epistemological approach. According to him, "real values" are attributed to the realities of the world; Although the field of value and propositions related to it may not fall into the grid of contemporary experimental-laboratory weighing; But value propositions are knowable and can be as valid and valid as scientific propositions. According to Allameh Jafari's point of view, the measure of the reality of value is measured by its relationship with human nature, and the greater this relationship is, the more real the value appears. In his opinion, the home of "values" is the rational life of man and its origin is the divine and divine existence, therefore, "value" and "ought" can be deduced from human being. This article, with a descriptive-analytical method, aims at a new exploration of Allameh Jafari's views on value realism, which results in creating a path to confirm the theological-Islamic value propositions in various fields of human sciences.

The essential substance (nature) by itself only consists of its own essence according to the principle of “existence distinction from nature”, which is considered among the most important principles of Avicenna’s metaphysics and the metaphysical element of existence in order to exist must be occurred on it from the outside and from the determinant cause. Ibn Sīnā (Arabic: ابن سینا, Avicenna) also, based on this principle, establishes the important principle of “the necessary existent distinction from the potential existent” and he explains the issue of creation and the proof of existence of God on the basis of these two principles. Some of Avicenna’s phrases in explaining the distinction of existence on nature have led to different interpretations of his word. Ibn Rushd (Arabic: ابن رشد, Averroes)’ reading is one of the most important of these readings which has become popular among medieval thinkers through translating his works and his followers. Avicenna considers the distinction of nature and existence to be external according to Averroes’ view and believes that existence, like accidental categories, affects the nature. However, attention in Avicenna’s phrases shows that his purpose of considering ascription of existence to subject as accidental means that existence is not a part of essence and essentials and it is occurred from external over essence and nature and not that the existence is occurred to the nature like categorical accidents. Thomas Aquinas, though influenced by Averroes, considers his principle of distinction to be different from Avicenna’s and in some minor cases is different from Avicenna but the examination of his works shows that he is influenced by Avicenna in the main framework of the principle of distinction and its explanation is not significantly different from Avicenna’s.

One of the problems of theology is the how of the relationship between the qualities of perfection and the essence of God. The problem of research in this article is the comparative study of the views of Fakhr Razi and Allameh Tabatabai on this problem. The method of this article is library-documentary and descriptiveanalytical in terms of content. The findings of the research show that although Fakhr Razi had an Ash'ari tendency in this issue and believed in the superiority of attributes over essence, he was not faithful to his belief in all discussins, but Allameh Tabatabai believed in the objectivity of essence and attributes and has remained faithful to that

In ten of his works, Al-Fārābī discusses ousia/substance and its derivatives. Among these works, we frequently encounter quotations from Aristotle and Al-Fārābī's interpretation of them. He accepts the established meaning of ousia as substance and doesn't argue against its translation to maujūd, Eyn, maahiy[y]at and ẕāt. This article tries to show the similarities and differences between Al-Fārābī and Aristotle conceptions of substance and then to bridge between the two innovative theories of Al-Fārābī: one in his division of existence and another regarding his view on reality. In discussing the concept of substance, Farabi seeks to create a unity between Plato and Aristotle's views. In another way, this claim can be expressed that Farabi aims to create a unity between the book of metaphysics and Aristotle's treatise on categories. In this direction, his innovative theory of substance is born. Also, this paper shows some inconsistencies existing in his discussion, which makes his philosophical language even more ambiguous than Aristotle's in Metaphysics and subject to various interpretations. Finally, the relation between the concept of substance and the concepts of shai and tashakhkhos is discussed.

The ideas that have been fixed in a human’s mind, and the abstract realm of his life, in addition to its concrete realm is under their extensive and deep affections, are ideas whose spectrality is manifested in Stirner’s formulation of the human world. Despite encompassing thesecharacteristics, which are the characteristics of the essential, the specters of ideas are open to presenting an inessential project. Such this project, which is based on disclosing a conceptual binary in Deleuze’s philosophical system, discloses a philosophical reading which manifests the spectrality of idea as a basis for the essentiality of a certain sphere that “human” conceptual signifier constructs. This Stirnerean reading reveals that such a sphere is the non-pluralistic embodiment of its constituent elements.

Perception is the second stage of the developmental process of consciousness in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, which consists of logical necessity and universality. It clears the ground for the possibility of the emergence of things as “essence” for the first time in this process. The conflict between the unity of the thing and plurality of its properties is, however, a fundamental problem that thinkers in the first phase of the history of philosophy (namely, the Aristotelian’s intellectual tradition) tried to solve by making the distinction between essential and non-essential aspects of the thing and ascribing the latter to it multitudinous properties. Nevertheless, when the subject’s role in achieving knowledge came to the front in Modern Philosophy, this solution of Naïve Realism was being challenged, and rethinking it was quite required. As a consequence, this rethinking at first resulted in turning this conflict into an insoluble controversy between Rationalism and Empiricism in ascribing the essential aspect (unity) to the thing (or the object) and the non-essential one (plurality) to the subject by the former and its vice-versa by the latter; the controversy which Kant’s Copernican Revolution proceeded to be its final terminator through invalidating the traditional distinction between essential and non-essential and re-defining the notion of “essence” under the subject’s transcendental conditions for knowledge; However once again his solution was put into the challenge by Hegel’s phenomenology.

When philosophers and jurists of the natural law school talk about human rights, they consider them to be rights derived from human nature. Philosophers such as Richard Rorty have taken a deconstructive approach to the nature and universal truth about human beings, criticizing essentialism and fundamentalism in human rights with skepticism. Instead, with a historical and pragmatic approach, they dismiss the philosophical approach as a universal foundation for human rights and argue that fundamental rationalist projects such as the concept of human rights if Make no mistake, they are unnecessary and outdated. Rorty believes that at any time and place, a kind of legal discourse is formed for each society and is accepted as a legal principle by a consensus in the same society. Therefore, it would be futile to impose a universal and equal law as human rights on all societies. According to him, there is no transcendent human nature by which we seek to justify our beliefs. What brings us together is not human rationality but common historical contexts. Therefore, the best way to promote a culture of human rights is through our shared sad experiences, in order to lead people towards respect for human rights and a sense of empathy. Human rights here are not rational and metaphysical but constructive in the interests of humanity. Our attempt in this article is to answer such doubts: Can Rorty's irrational sentimentalism be able to distinguish between true and false human rights stories? How is his thought possible and explicable? On the other hand, is the classical theory of human rights, that is, the theory that defines human rights based on the common interests of the people, an unsuitable basis for understanding human rights in international relations? Is deconstruction the general principles of morality, is it not immoral and the negation of morality?

The main purpose of this research is to examine the views of Ghazali and Ibn Sina on one of the most controversial theological issues in the field of Islamic philosophy, namely the attributes of God and how these two thinkers explain the divine attributes. Due to the fact that Ibn Sina considers it impossible to understand the nature of God, therefore, he considers it possible to know him only through the knowledge of divine attributes.Because Ibn Sina considers God's attributes to be the same as His essence, so whoever can know His attributes is as if he has understood His essence. Contrary to Ibn Sina's opinion, Ghazali's approach regarding God's attributes has undergone many changes during different stages of his life. Because according to him, we can only attribute attributes to God that God has described Himself to. So, based on this, he considers God's attributes neither as his nor as other than him, and he believes that we should not ask any questions about this at all. The present article analyzed this issue with a library method and sought to resolve the ambiguities raised in this regard

The central issue in this article is to understand how is the relationship between the concept of "Being" and the meaning of "God" in Boethius' theological treatises. To this end, four issues are analyzed analytically-descriptively in Theological Treatises; 1. Why did Boethius raise the issue of ontology in Theological Treatises, and what was his purpose in distinguishing between "esse" and "id quod est" in these treatises with a purely Christian and theological nature? 2. The effect of this discussion in explaining God' transcendence through the three attributes "necessity", "perfection" and "to being goodness" of being; 3. The effect of this discussion on God's "creation"; 4. Its effect on God' unity. The study of these cases led to the conclusion that Boethius, by distinguishing between "esse" and "id quod est", considers God to be a simple being in whom "esse" and "id quod est" are one, so being is necessary for Him. God' perfection is also due to His simplicity essence; because He is His own essence and substance, so any quantity and quality that is applied to God will be the carrying of substance. Boethius explains God' simplicity in terms of the originality of being and action, and equates God' being with the Goodness itself, but creatures that are not simple are something else in addition to being good. The Creator and the creature are substantial different, and His Ubiquity goes back to God' substance beyond the two categories of place and time. By distinguishing the abstract number from the concrete number, Boethius believes that the Trinity does not produces plurality, because there is no difference of merit in God and He is nothing but His own essence.

This paper has been written with the aim of answering the following two questions: "Is it possible to know the God’s Essence in view of Alvin Plantinga? What are its strengths and weaknesses in this regard?" The findings of this paper are: In the Plantinga’s vocabulary network, essence and nature are used in the same sense; in view of Plantinga, God has absolute sovereignty over the universe. Plantinga has the following effects on this sovereignty: The simplicity of the Essence, the objectivity of the Essence and the Essence’s necessaries (which, of course, is accompanied by doubts from Plantinga's point of view) and the infinity of the Essence; After this, Plantinga proves the necessity of Essence or Nature for God and considers God’s Essence as the same as God’s Being. The lack of clarity in expressing the relationship between Essence and the necessity of Essence, as well as the lack of clarity in positions on his statements, is criticized. Finally, Plantinga rejects the belief that it is impossible to know Essence and accepts that man has the possibility of knowing God’s Essence; of course, there are other criticisms of his arguments, such as reducing theology to conceptual issues and presupposing the authenticity of the scriptures. This article collect data and analyze and critique them with descriptive-analytical method and uses library tools too.

The present research seeks to answer the two questions from “What does the impossibility of knowledge of the divine essence mean?” and “What are the reasons for this impossibility?” The following conclusions have been obtained in this research: the nonidentity of essence and attributes, and the nonidentity of existence and quiddity in God cannot be accepted; the inconceivability of God essence is true, but there may be other ways of knowing Him. Furthermore, some of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s reasons are similar to like examples than independent reasons. Therefore, the data and results seem to show that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī does not have a consistent manner on the issue and in some cases believes in the knowability of the divine essence. The authors will address the possibility of the knowability of the divine essence from the perspective of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in another independent study.

Being touched by theoretical mysticism, Mulla Sadra used mystical terms for specific meanings and concepts as per his own constituted principles. Throwing light on the limits and scopes of meanings of mystical terms in transcendent theosophy helps us specify Mulla Sadra’s intended meaning and avoid the fallacy of equivocation. One of the mystical terms spotted in Mulla Sadra’s works is ahadiyyat (the Absolute One). Ahadiyyat, according to the most researchers on theoretical mysticism, concerns the manifestation and determination of the One Almighty in His own Divinity. The study of his works proves that, like other mystics, Mulla Sadra considers the Holy Essence as the absolute existence none-conditioned at the stage of division. Contrary to most mystics, however, he does not consider Ahadiyyat as the manifestation of the Holy Essence. Rather, he regards it as a consideration mingled in the Essence, not as a determination outside the Essence. That he unified Ahadiyyat with the Essence made him introduce the Essence of the Mystery of Mysteries none-conditioned at the stage of division as the real existence (Ens Realissimum) negatively-conditioned. He explains “negatively-conditioned” in a way that it is compatible with “none-conditioned at the stage of division” of the One; thus, the prima facie contradiction between “negatively- conditioned” and “none-conditioned at the stage of division” disappears.

Aristotle’s ousia suffered the same fate it had in the West when it arrived in ancient Iran and the world of Islam. Among all the existing appropriate equivalents, the term “substance” was chosen as its nearest equivalent in western philosophical texts. Similarly, the term “jawhar”, which is the Arabic for “gawhar” in Persian and a close equivalent for substance, was accepted by all philosophers in the world of Islam. In previous translated works before and after the translation movement in Baghdad’s Dar al-Tarjumah (Translation House), there were some words such as ayn, inniyyat, huwiyyat, and budish which implied almost the true meaning of ousia as intended by Aristotle. This was because this term has been derived from the verb to be and basically means existent, essence, or being; however, jawhar and substance were the ultimate choices of translators. The dominance of this substantialist view, both in the West and in the East, was partly because of the early translations of Aristotle’s works. This paper aims to, firstly, examine the fate of Aristotles’s ousia upon its arrival in Iran and the world of Islam and, then, discuss the relationships between the meanings of the chosen equivalents in the Islamic world with those of their western equivalents.