راسل

The confrontation of Islamic philosophers with Western philosophers can be examined from different angles. Allameh Ja’fari pays a lot of attention to the opinions of Western thinkers; among these figures is Bertrand Russell, who has analyzed by Allameh Ja’fari through his intellectual personality and some of his opinions. In the beginning of his works, he quotes and criticizes some viewpoints of Russell. Russell's views on the supernatural, God, the order of the universe, the evil of the world, the purpose of creation, the role of God in the world, and the roots of the tendency towards God, are among the theological topics that Ja’fari has discussed and analyzed in his works. According to Ja’fari works, Russell expresses important points about the universe and its relationship with the supernatural, and on the other hand, about God, which indicates conflicts in his thought. Russell's misconception of God is the root of many of his illogical statements in some theological topics.

This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents, or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work. This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work. This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work.

Nowadays modal logic is one of the important areas of logic, but at the beginning of the emergence of modern logic, there was not much attention to this branch of logic, and even the founders of modern logic, including Russell, had an anti-modal position. One of the factors that led Russell to adopt such a position was the belief that logic is truth functional and extensional, and this is something that the introduction of modality destroys.Of course During the long period of his philosophical work, Russell has taken many and varied positions about modal notions. From the beginning, he did not have an anti-modal position. At first, he considered necessity as a description of an implication, and after some time, he introduced it as a primitive, basic and indefinable concept. Then, in some of his works, following Moore, he considered necessity as a kind of logical priority of propositions, but in the end he took an anti-modal position and tried to completely discard the modal notions. He said that these concepts are properties of propositional functions, not properties of propositions. But Russell has used second-order logic for explaining the modal concepts and explaining the difference between possibility and existence (which declares both of them to be properties of propositional functions), but even with this, he is not able to completely remove the modal notions from language and logic.

Huduth Cosmological argument is one of the proofs of Divine existence, which mostly applied by theologians. Believing in the createdness of the universe, theologians support the argument, while philosophers reject it because they think that the universe is eternal. A prominent philosopher in the west tradition is William Craig, which put forward philosophical and natural arguments, some of them are new. On the other hand, the argument has well known opponents such as Wallace Mathson, Josh Dever, Quentin Persifor Smith and Russel which some philosophers followed them, rejecting Huduth argument through the sequence of causes, positivism, and the eternality of the universe. Examining the most important critiques on the minor premise of the Huduth argument by Western philosophers, this study, by critical analytical method, has shown that their arguments are not sufficient to prove their claim. Although it seems that Craig's arguments for the existence of the universe are not certain and he has used indefinite hypotheses, but considering his set of reasons and also using various arguments such as the arguments of Islamic thinkers can accumulatively justify the theory of createdness against rival theories.

This research, which is practical in nature, and an analytical-descriptive method of document review (content analysis) was used to conduct it. In this research, along with the introduction of educational literature and a brief reference to its background in Iran, Bertrand Russell is mentioned as a person whose educational views are the criteria of content analysis. To analyze the content of the books, the text of the books, sentence by sentence, in all parts of each lesson (even exercises and explanations) were analyzed based on the available components.In this essay, Russell's educational components in the individual field, which include; Cultivation of intelligence, cultivation of scientific spirit, free thinking, cultivation of wisdom, avoidance of dependence, emphasis on independence of thought, strengthening of active aspect, strengthening of sense of rationality, strengthening of internal discipline and thinking have been manifested.The results of this content analysis were shown in the form of frequency distribution tables, Shannon's entropy technique, bar graphs, and importance coefficients in order to determine the level of attention of educational content designers to Russell's educational components and to determine the most and least used of them in Persian books of the first year of high school. to be In explaining and drawing conclusions from the analyzed information, the opinions of experts have been cited in the field of some components in order to increase the credibility of the researcher's statements.

The theory of “knowledge by presence” has a special place in the Sadra system. “Knowledge by presence” is both a theory of knowledge in Sadra's philosophy and a theory for explaining self-knowledge. Reflecting on this important theory will immediately make us realize its complex and mysterious nature. The present paper intends to provide an accurate and clear reading of this theory in a clearer language in the form of a comparative approach between this theory and one of the most important theories of self-knowledge in the analytic philosophy, namely the theory of “Knowledge by acquaintance”. At first glance, Russell's theory of “Knowledge by acquaintance” is one of the most similar to Sadra's theory. Such characteristics as the condition of presence, immediacy, and infallibility are examples of the similarity of these two theories. But the discussion of “unity of the knower and the known” in Sadra's theory is the point of separation between the two theories, and in fact, it is a place that will seriously challenge the claim of closeness between these theories. Finally, perhaps with some tolerance, Russell's theory is a primitive and incomplete picture of Sadra's theory. Furthermore, it should be noted that understanding these two theories in the context of the different philosophical systems of these two philosophers -namely Sadra's theory of Unity and originality of existence and Russel's theory of Knowledge by Acquaintance- makes it more difficult to claim the deep closeness between these two theories.

One of the goals, or perhaps the most important goal of Bertrand Russell’s prominent attempts in his philosophical and logical works was to establish a sort of Ideal or Perfect Language in order to be used to deal with the varieties of complexities, ambiguities, and paradoxes which in one way or another appear in natural languages. Such a project is built on the central notion, or better methodology, of Logical Analysis. Russell by using his logical analysis can distinguish between (genuine proper) names and definite descriptions, which further helps him to cope with three main problems: informativeness of identity claims, negative existentials, and non-existents, that is, those expressions which have no reference whatsoever. In this paper, I will introduce and explain Russell’s view in two parts: The Conceptual Aspect of his analysis, which involves the definition of logical analysis, and the Extensional Aspect, which brings in his famous Theory of Descriptions.

The aim of this article is to compare and examine the relationship between Reason and Religion from the view of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli and Bertrand Russell .moreover Russell’s views were criticized and evaluated with relying on the views of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli.

The method of this article was a library study which performed by analyzing data from the works of professor Javadi Amoli and Russell.

Russell introduced Reason as opposed to Religion and he had a historical view of the relationship between Reason and Religion, but Ayatollah Javadi Amoli considered Reason and Religion to be in harmony and in interaction with each other.

Despite of the obvious differences that exist in the views of these two philosophers on the comparison of Reason and religion, there are also similarities, including believing in the limitations of Reason, and acceptance of Reason was considered as a way to reach perfection and so on. Also, the source of many of Russell's mistakes about the relationship between Reason and religion has been due to his neglect of Islam Religion and his attention to Christianity religion.

Russell's philosophy can be divided into two distinct periods. In the first period, under the influence of his predecessors, he endeavored to preserve foundationalism and in the second period, he tries to minimize foundationalism. In his early works, he accepts induction because of its inherent intuition and widespread use in life and considers inductive inferences as probable, not certain. But in the second period, by analyzing empirical phenomena, he likes what a pure empiricist would do, infer the postulates that are the bases of empirical sciences. These postulates have a supra-logical nature, and interestingly, induction is not among these postulates. In fact, according to Russell, the science and the ordinary understanding that are resulted by non-demonstrative inference require these postulates. In this paper, we try to understand Russell's notions on induction, therefore, we investigate it in detail in the mentioned two distinct periods. For the first period, Russell's notions and one of the examples of probabilistic proofs presented for it will be presented. And for the second period, his reasons for changing his approach and his new perspective, as well as the supra-logical postulates governing the non-demonstrative, along with some of their properties, are presented. And finally, though briefly, some of the criticisms are discussed.

This paper is concerned with a general account of logicism as developed within Russell’s philosophy of mathematics. At first Russell’s approach in metaphysic was idealistic and he relied on this point of view for extending his platonic atomism. To expound this account it will be demonstrated that after developing platonic atomism, Russell attempted to present his logicism in The Principles of Mathematics as a view opposed to an idealistic account of mathematics. However, a number of paradoxes arose had their roots deep in Russell’s metaphysical views. At this point he was forced to moderate his realistic extreme approach. Afterward it is shown that to evade these paradoxes, Russell adopts a view that allows for ontological distinctions and then introduces a full-fledged theory of types in Principia Mathematica. Nevertheless, the new framework yields problems of its own that pose a threat to Russell’s object-centered metaphysics but also deprives him of handling truths of unrestricted generality. Then to present a final version of his logicism, Russell’s way out of these issues will be set forth which comes in form of axioms of reducibility and infinity. Although these axioms represent a solution to remove paradoxes, actually those are too complicated to use.

One of the most basic doctrines in the predicate logic is that existence can never be a predicate; rather, it is the particular quantifier. Here Ill try to explore the views of the founders of Fregean logic on the structure of the proposition, and why it does not take existence as a predicate. Then Ill state their explanation and solution for existential propositions. Finally, Ill investigate the shortcomings of their analysis. Many analytical philosophers, including Moore, Kneale, Wisdon, Ayer, etc, who have denied 'existence' as a predicate, have done so as part of their refutation of the ontological argument for the God's existence. However, here Ill deal only with Frege, Russell, and Quine. The other philosopher's stance can more or less be found in one of these three.

The essay tries to evaluate Wittgenstein's resolution to the riddle of Russell's negative facts. That is, when we say, for example, "Tehran is not the capital of Ireland" is true, what kind of truth–maker should we consider for the negative proposition because of its truth? Surely, a negative truth–maker is so problematic and counter–intuitive. Therefore, Wittgenstein has tried to show how it can be returned to the positive truth–makers. Thus, the paper first analyzes Wittgenstein's general resolutions to the nonexistent. Then it focuses on his special resolution to the negative facts riddle, i.e. Tractatus 2.05: "The totality of existent atomic facts also determines which atomic facts do not exist". Finally, after refuting some philosopher's criticisms, it shows his resolution's positive points and possible lacks.

Focusing on language and attempting to derive the hidden meanings is one of the most important aspects of analytic philosophy to solve or resolve philosophical problems. All of the three founders of analytic philosophy، i. e. Frege، Russell، and Moore، trace this road differently. Ludwig Wittgenstein as the follower of them has his own ideas. In this paper، we will firstly explore theories of those founders briefly and then show that Wittgenstein، in some respects، such as; pitcher theory، logical atomism، and respecting to ordinary language is in agreement with them. However، he، in other respects، has own specific ideas: the meaning of states of affairs، critic of metaphysics and insisting on the ordinary language in a different manner.

In this essay I try to analyze briefly the claim and proofs of Mu‘tazilite’s nonbeing objects (thubūt)، Russell''s earlier view in Principles of Mathematics، and Russell''s later view on negative facts. I، then، indicate that since these claims have been defended and reconstructed even in the recent years، it is necessary to reevaluate such views. Since we should not regard their counter–intuitiveness as sufficient in criticizing them، I attempt to show some of their logical unacceptable consequences: if they are true، they ontologically will result in an infinite regress.

The dilemma of induction is one of the most difficult philosophical problems that if solved many philosophical problems could be explained and many conclusions could scientifically be justifiable. Bertrand Russell، one of the greatest analyzer philosophers of the twentieth century، has tried to solve the problem of induction. From the Russell’s point of view the dilemma of induction is a question of how to justify the general provisions، causal laws، and indirect knowledge. He appealed that the principle of uniformity of nature is not enough to solve this problem، and then he suggested the reception of induction as a principle. Based on the principle of induction، the more the number of concurrences of A and B the greater is the possibility of perpetual coincidence between them and when the number of concurrences is enough constant conjunction of A with B is almost certain. According to Russell، the principle of induction is neither rationally provable nor empirically verifiable، but the principle should be accepted because of its natural evidence and finally because of its consequences. According to Russell the metalogical principles cause the probability of generalization lean toward certainty. Finally he notes although induction can’t provide us with theoretical certainty (logical and mathematical) but its near certainty probability is more than that of a metaphysical dogma.

By introducing two counterexamples, Gettier claims that it is possible that a person S has true justified belief that P but fails to know that proposition. The proposition P in Gettier’s first counterexample includes a “definite description”. We try, in this article, to refute Gettier’s first counterexample by means of what Russell, Strawson and Donnellan have said on the analysis of the propositions contained definite descriptions. More precisely, we will show that S doesn’t know that P because either he don’t believe that P or P is not true. It means that Gettier’s first counterexample cannot refute tripartite definition of knowledge

Referriing to causation and raising the question whether a single meaning is intended by the term "cause" in its various usages, Parkinson deals in the present article with the context, background, and the way of raising "Four Causes" of Aristotle. He also refers to the development occurred in understanding this issue due to the translation of Greek texts into Latin. Further, he surveys various usages of the term "cause" as Hume states, and examines the latter three criteria for the recognition of the relation of cause and effect. Thus he refers to two significant differences between Hume and J.S. Mill,s explanations. Finally, he surveys Collingwood,s view on three different meanings of "cause" in detail, and compares the historical cause of Collingwood with the final cause of Aristotle, thus mentioning teleological explanation and distinguishing the two types of internal and external teleology. At the end, he examines the views of Russel, Davidson, Taylor, Bennett, and Woodfield, and comes to the conclusion that presentation of teleological explanations requires not only recognizing the effect of a cause, but establishing the goodness of the effect from a particular perspective. Therefore, the type of explanation involves both causal and value indices.