جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "روش" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Intellectual education has been one of the most fundamental topics throughout the history of human thought. Great philosophers have tried to provide appropriate guidance for character education with a comprehensive understanding of man and his dimensions. The condition for success in social, political and... rational education is. Cultivating the intellect is a big concept. The current research aims to explain the concept of rational education from the perspective of the two thinkers in question (Maulana and Dewey). In this passage, some interesting points have been expressed in the works of these elders. The research method is qualitative content analysis with emphasis on the conceptual model. To first explain rational education from the point of view of two thinkers, then by citing examples, educational suggestions based on their rationality are presented. The field of research includes Masnavi and Dewey's first-hand sources and all related texts. The findings of the research include: the purpose of rational education and educational principles according to John Dewey: deep learning, reconstruction, practicality of the method, organization of experience. Discipline, thinking, continuity, mutual influence, continuity, social control, freedom. And from Rumi's point of view: Cultivating the intellect, preserving the language and avoiding mocking others, keeping promises, establishing justice, the influence of circumstances on a person, Sa'ah al-Sadr, change of position, bounty, forgiveness, generosity, consultation, learning lessons, loyalty, justice. Also, the results of the method of rational education from Dewey's point of view: identifying the problem, building a hypothesis, creating a hypothesis, testing hypotheses, evaluating. And from Rumi's point of view: hypothesizing, self-calculation, suffering, learning a lesson, following an example, patience, calculation, mutual thinking, affection and love, the effect and effectiveness of experience. The last point is that in order to reach the gates of enlightenment and intellectual education, the stages of cultivation and refinement of existence must be followed correctly and the necessary insight and purity must be provided to acquire knowledge and cultivate intellect.

Intrinsic monotheism is the first level of monotheism. Contrary to the majority of commentators' views derived from philosophers and theologians, from the perspective of Allama Tabataba'i, the true meaning of monotheism in the Quran is the pure and unlimited existence of God. This descriptive-analytical article uses the rules of interpretation and library resources to discover, examine and explain the types of methods for teaching intrinsic monotheism in the Quran based on the view of Allamah Tabataba'i. The research results show that from Allamah's view, teaching intrinsic monotheism in the Quran has two main methods " explicit declaration and induction to the audience" and "argumentation". The method of argumentation has the following three sub-types: reasoning to the unity of the nature "God", reasoning to the limitlessness of the "likeness" of God, and reasoning to the omnipotence of God. Using these two methods in teaching intrinsic monotheism in the Quran, we realize that this level of monotheism must be explicitly declared both in order to induce and instill it in the audience. Besides, in order for people to reason and think, argumentations must be presented to them in various ways.

Science in Islamic civilization, despite some progress, could not create any serious change or revolution in itself, and according to some authors, it eventually faced stagnation and decline. In this article, we examine and evaluate Ash'arism, lack of material support, and Aristotelian philosophy (methodology) as obstacles to the scientific revolution. We try to show that, contrary to what is generally thought, the Ash'arism were not opposed to reason in the natural world; perhaps, if their intellectual framework were really followed in science, we would witness some remarkable developments in the science of Islamic civilization. While we accept the importance of material support in the advancement of science during the Islamic Golden Age, we try to pay more attention to the methodology of science as other determining factor. By giving some historical examples from Ibn Haytham and the "Zouraghi" astrolabe, we will reconfirm the destructive role of Aristotelian philosophy, and at the same time we will corroborate our contribution in denying the destructive role of Ash'arism.

Studying the intellectual foundations and the position of philosophy and theology in the conceptualization of God among philosophers and theologians, can clarify their approach regarding the issue of God. How is the issue of God studied in the view of al-Ṭūsī and ʿAllāma Ḥillī- two "Ḥilla" theologians- according to their intellectual and philosophical-theological foundations and the position of philosophy and theology in their conceptualization of God? To what extent is their approach to the issue of God similar or different? In this article, we will study this problem from two aspects of form and method-content. As for the form, we will deal with the arrangement of the contents in their works according to their philosophical and theological foundations and the perception they have of God accordingly, and as for the method and content, we will discuss the method of knowing and proving God and explaining His attributes (both method and content). Al-Ṭūsī believes in a philosophical God and ʿAllāma Ḥillī, with a more inner-religious perspective, speaks of a religious-philosophical God. Regarding the content, in the method of proving the existence of God in the conceptualization of God, their opinions are similar, while in the formal structure and the issue of knowing God, they are different according to their intellectual foundations.

Based on Tabatabai’s theory and the method of logical analysis, the present research has dealt with the methodology of defining conventional concepts and presented fifteen methodological rules. The method of defining these concepts is the method of conceptual analysis, and some of the presented rules are dedicated to the basics of definition, some to its types, and some to methods for discovering the conceptual components of conventional concepts. According to these methods, it is possible to discover the components of these concepts and use these components in the definition using the method of conceptual analysis. Of course, it should be noted that the most important component of a conventional concept is its purpose, which must be used in any definition. The use of other components in the definition may vary according to each concept.

Methodology of Islamic wisdom is one of the most important and influential topics in the understanding and progress of Islamic philosophy. A detailed understanding of Islamic wisdom methodology helps to show Islamic wisdom to be original and different from other philosophical schools; Unfortunately, the methodology of existing schools in the flow of Islamic wisdom has received less attention, reading and research. This article using library resources and using historical and logical-epistemological approaches and descriptive, explanatory, analytical and reasoning methods; It seeks to answer this question, what is the methodological structure of Islamic wisdom - with an emphasis on the ontological field - and what are its components? Scientific methodology is a process that is made from the stages of philosophical foundations, paradigms, strategies, techniques, methods, approaches and Attitudes in philosophy. Paradigms of Islamic wisdom include Masha, Ishraq, Masha'i-Ishraqi, Yamani, Sadrai and Neo-Sadrai, and the strategies of philosophical research are also divided into two parts, simple and combined.

Assessing the permissibility or impermissibility of the impact of unscientific values ​​on the knowledge process and its consequences has become an important issue in the philosophy of science in recent decades, and many arguments have been put forward to defend or reject this influence. One of the prerequisites for analyzing this issue is explaining the course of scientific research and drawing the contexts and pores of the involvement of values. It seems that each scientific activity has three major parts: entry, main process (preliminary and inference) and application, each of which includes several more detailed steps, and the inclusion of unscientific values ​​can be effective in choices and preferences and thus in the fate of scientific activity. The first and last stages of science are often valuable, and this does not interfere with the mission of scientific activity, that is, scientific objectivity. The middle and main stage of scientific activity in cases such as data analysis, method selection, weighting of evidence and selection of hypotheses, is pregnant with the influence of values ​​and arguments in the impermissibility of values ​​also indicate the slippage of scientific progress in these stages and avoidance of scientific and mental objectivity. It is personalization. In this research, by dividing the process of scientific research into three stages, the involvement of unscientific values ​​is outlined and shown that science is prone to be influenced by unscientific values ​​in different sections; The extent to which this influence is normatively permissible is a secondary issue.

Method and style of using epistemological resources in each sciences has an important role in the validity and territory of that knowledge. Sadr al-Muta'allehin and Allameh Tabatabaee, despite using axiomatic premise and argumentative method to prove philosophical propositions, also use other epistemological sources, but they are not the same in the way of using them. The present study uses a descriptive-analytical method to compare the method of Mulla Sadra and Allameh Tabatabaee in using "non-public epistemological sources" and answers the question that what commonalities and differences do the two philosophers have in the way of using the mentioned sources? The research approach shows that Mulla Sadra and Allameh Tabatabaee share in using non-public sources of knowledge to problem making, clarify the problem, and discover the middle term of the argument, But they are not the same in using these sources as the premises of the argument and argument confirmation. Mulla Sadra uses revelatory and intuitive sources and tools in these two positions, while Allameh Tabatabaee does not use these sources not only in the preliminaries but also in the confirmation of philosophical arguments. In this way, in addition to avoiding interpretation by the verdict of revelation, he offers a mathematical system capable of achieving logical certainty.

Focusing on Lukacs’s and Adorno’s ideas, this paper aims to clarify how the philosophical attitude of critical theory relates to the essay genre as a method. It firstly elaborates on essay as an emergent genre of modern philosophy, indicating that philosophy is extremely interwoven with its form of presentation. Accordingly, form, language, and stylistic features are irreducible to chimerical or ornamental appearances; it includes various methodological and epistemological implications. The genre first appeared closely linked to the emergence of modern observing self, became critically self-conscious in the 20th century, increasingly engaged with the question of methodology. In doing so, interpreting Lukacs’s essay “On the Nature and Form of Essay”, indicates essay is a proper form of expression for lived experience and it is inherently an ironic form. For Lukacs, irony has the same relation to essay as doubting has to science. Afterward, by reading Adorno’s “Essay as Form”, this paper shows how he employs essay as a methodological tool to realize the negative dialectics thesis. Adorno formulates essay against the four rules that Descartes’s Discourse on Method sets up, contends that it proceeds methodically unmethodically. This method makes it a force field in which concepts come together in an open, dynamic network. So essay is a privileged form of philosophizing, allowing for the resistance to identifying, totalizing tendencies in a philosophical system. Therefore, both Lukacs’ and Adorno’s descriptions of essay are largely informed by their broader philosophical outlooks. Combining its epistemological and aesthetic aspects, they have also extended beyond the modern science-art dichotomy.

The reduction of the field of science to the limits of experience from the eighteenth century and the monopoly of its methods and tools in quantification and material senses, as well as the use of reason as a concept, has limited the scope of human beings; in such a way that the attainment of indulgence was increasingly considered as his goal in the material world. The purpose of this article is to provide another definition of science by considering the courts of Ibn Sina’s (Avicenna) philosophy in the fields of ontology, anthropology, epistemology, and methodology; a definition that fits the principle of human end and happiness. Comparing the components of the above-mentioned vertices in Ibn Sina's philosophy, science finds an intensifying range from the second level (sensory cognition) to the highest level (Frost science) and each time in comparison to the levels of love. And happiness corresponds with this; in such a way that man becomes more in love and closer to ultimate happiness by intensifying his knowledge. Intensification science, with the permission of multiple understandings, closes the way to the monologue logic of dogmatism, and on the other hand, according to the monotheistic system in Ibn Sina's philosophy, it never leads to unbridled relativity and skepticism arising from the new hermeneutics. According to thinkers in this field, a definition of science that is appropriate to Muslim societies should have several characteristics and these characteristics are not discussed at all in experimental science: It should: Have a divine origin. Have a longitudinal, not transverse, view of the hierarchy of existence; because neglecting the longitudinal hierarchy leads to neglecting the fit between metaphysics and physics, in which case metaphysics is either marginalized or considered ineffective on physics. Be based on discovering the truth and not just material usefulness. Its language is sometimes cryptic and symbolic and is not limited to the dictionary of mathematics and statistics. Now that we see these characteristics clearly in the ontology, anthropology, and epistemology of Muslim philosophers, including Ibn Sina, we seek to answer the following question: How can Ibn Sina, as a Muslim philosopher, deduce another meaning of science? The findings of this study are summarized as follows: Love has many levels, and each of these levels corresponds to different levels of human happiness. On the other hand, the level of human happiness is completely in line with the level of human perception. This includes multiple levels, from the lowest to the highest. That is, sensory perception - which is the lowest kind of perception - corresponds perfectly to the lowest kind of love as well as the lowest kind of happiness. This type of science is called intensification science and unlike experimental science, it does not limit and confine science only in the field of experience. Thus, the science of intensification in the school of Ibn Sina has characteristics that are appropriate to the life of Muslim societies; because in the coordinates of this science, the system of existence has a longitudinal hierarchy and in this hierarchy, transcendence is the source of beings and true happiness is achieved by reaching and maximum likeness to it by passing the levels of sense and appearance. By discussing the true happiness of human beings in the science of intensity, unlike empirical science, the absurdity of life is reduced and its meaning is increased, and it is by the promotion of this science that true happiness is achieved; something that empirical science can never do.

The main background of this research is the study of Descartes' method in our knowledge to the sensible world and its relation to the ideal theme of axiomatic knowledge. I do not accept the objection that Descartes deviated from the axiomatic method in the knowledge of the material world, and therefore I have argued that he continued to axiomatic method by developing the rules of inference and breaking the monopoly of syllogism in his Tree of knowledge. One of the most important rules of non-deductive inference developed in his work is the method of inference to the best explanation (I.B.E). Through documentary analysis, I have shown that in addition to the basic formulation of the inference to best explanation (I.B.E), its extensive formulation can be clearly traced both in Preliminary design such as Discourse on Method and in the empirical sections of the principles of philosophy. Studying this development of inferential rules in Descartes's work not only illuminates some aspects of his important and deep idea of replacing the method with logic, but also provides a model for combining empirical knowledge with the axiomatic method. This model inspires knowledge and rational encounter with creative and constantly changing experimental and human events, and based on it, a window can be opened to get out of epistemic anarchy and even value anarchy in such areas.

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the methodological richness of religious sciences in matching Western disciplines to comparative study of cross-cutting issues.

In this descriptive-comparative method, parallel ideas in two methodological schools are discussed.

Attention to methodological science has a long history in non-Islamic sciences. Although second-hand knowledge has also been dealt with in Islamic science, and the outline of Samanieh is one of the most important aspects of the "philosophy of science" that has been considered in Islamic science, but the discussion of method as an independent chapter in theorizing, Islamic scholars have not received serious attention. Martyr Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Baqir Sadr is one of the scholars who in his important interdisciplinary jurisprudence points to and uses a rather rigorous methodology.

The concept of school and its method of discovery is the most central one in the field of economics jurisprudence and have been adapted to the concept of paradigm in the methodological discussions of the ancient American physicist Thomas.

Methodological critique in philosophical systems, especially in the philosophy of Sadr al-Muta'allihin as the last philosophical system in the Islamic world, has received less attention yet. Critical research, meanwhile, has focused on judging and theorizing and little attention has been paid to the method of research and collection, which is one of the important pillars of philosophical systems. Therefore, this paper studies the methods of Sadr al-Muta'allihin in collecting and researching. The objections to Sadra's method of research and collection are divided into four sections, which may be considered as the main drawbacks of his method in this position including, replacing the position of philosophical discussions, lack of discipline, lack of order in expressing issues, lack of attention to the design and expression of the problem, lack of attention to proposing the issues and neglecting the sources. Using a descriptive-analytical method this paper is proposed.

The objective of this paper is to clarify that the distinction Malkam Khan makes between natural (ordinary) and scientific reason, is crucial to his entire thought, and he makes this distinction because he is aware of the critical status the idea of method has in the formation of the scientific reason. So, I try to prove that the idea of method and the distinction he makes between these two reasons are the same idea which is to be considered as his central idea. According to Malkam Khān, following the principles of this reason is the key to prosperity and progress. So, he believes that in order not to be colonized, we should progress, and in order to become prosperous, we should act according to the principles of scientific reason. On the basis of this analysis I claim that he thinks like a strategist, therefore, whenever we want to interpret his thought as a consistent whole, we should consider this particular approach. My own approach in this paper is in harmony with the main argument of Malkam Khān, trying to interpret his thought not on the basis of his personal character, his concealed intentions, or simple political events in which he was a part, but on the basis of seeing his thought as scientifically (objectively) as possible by focusing on his own writings in different stages of his thought-life, and analyzing them structurally.

Putting forward methodological discussions requires a vivid and common comprehension of the conception and reality of ‘method’. This is while scholars in various scientific fields have offered a variety of definitions for that conception, in a way that it seems difficult to find a common aspect among them. Thus, the precise analysis of that conception and recognition of its fundamental parameters is an inevitable necessity. Accordingly, it is first clarified that the conception of ‘method’ is a philosophical one whose most important accessories are the agent, orientation, the existing and favorable situations, the model and the territory. In view of these points, a descriptive-analytical investigation of definitions of this conception and paying attention to their weak and strong points made it clear that those definitions are not complete. Thus, defining ‘method’ as ‘the quality of human’s transfer from unfavorable situation to favorable situation’ is a definition without the aforementioned defects and committed to the type of that conception and its accessories.

Thinking which is a distinctive aspect of mankind from other human beings is a reason to call human culturally. Thinking is not merely a closed step, but is a coherent »way», and yet is a deep-seated process. When the need to »being-in-the-way», not to be institutionalized and spontaneous in the presence of the scholar, cannot be exploited by its brightness and its deep consequences. Originally phenomenology is a way to think and goes beyond that summariz merely as a philosophical school or »method».  Phenomenology is a decisive attempt to enrich the world of human experience, a world in which the various aspects of being considered less, or has been put in the shadow, and gradually had been lost its shape. The mission of the »way» is to retrieve and disclose some of the other things that exist in the world and we have neglected to do so. In present article, the author, with an ontological concern and familiarity with the damages in the field of research, addresses the phenomenology as steps of the »way» of thinking (not as a method) to have a multifaceted and comprehensive perspective to the phenomenon in order to abide to them and through this, enters into clarify the differences between »way» and »method» based on the intellectual foundations of phenomenology.

This essay deals with Descartes' Provisional Morality and some of its epistemic requirements. Here, we shall introduce two rival readings of these principles, one of which does not give a plausible position to these principles and does not consider them to be an essential part of Descartes's system, and the other assumes these principles to be both permanent and universal, and then present our explanation to the epistemic realm and also the human realm of these principles. First, we have presented our account of the relation between these Maxims with Cartesian key elements, namely Doubt and Method. Then we discuss the basic nature of Provisionality of these Maxims; a concept that is apparently normal but has relatively different results and requirements. I argue that the moral code has an epistemic character, not a time; time also depends on the events of Reason. Also, while we argued that these principles cannot be considered temporary, we have shown that the idea of some Descartes commentators that these principles, from the very beginning, were permanent and universal is a misconception that can't be imposed on Descartes. Based on our argument, these principles can be transformed into permanent principles in certain epistemic conditions that we have explained, but at the same time, in certain circumstances, they may also be disaffirmed and, as a result, become temporary principles. When these maxims count as the product of an argumentative process, then a non-argumentative description such as the conservatism of these principles will be an abnormal description that is unrelated to Descartes' will.