زیست جهان

In this article, an attempt has been made to explain the governance of AI based on the perspective of political phenomenologists with Morrow's interpretive approach and theoretical framework. The main question is: How does political phenomenology provide insights into the concept of AI governance? According to the hypothesis, the phenomenology of AI governance has a mathematical and positivist rationality. The results of the research also show that political phenomenologists refer to mathematical systems in the process of forming the rule of artificial intelligence; the formal systems of mathematics that create the mathematical world cause the mathematization of the life-world and its political horizon; and finally, the sovereignty of AI emerges. This process is not related to the philosophical development of existence and human freedom, and it is a kind of forgetting the life-world and is in conflict with the human meaning of phenomenology. They consider this process to be the cause of the attenuation of ancient virtues and the distortion of political action in the sense of the political space of the city-state, and while adopting a cosmic vision, anti-modernism mainly shows its dependence on the virtues and rights and natural law of pre-modern political systems against the modern systems of the mathematical world.

Life-world, means the world as it is experienced and lived, is a concept that was first born in Husserl's phenomenology and later used in various fields. Alfred Schutz, the founder of phenomenological sociology, who sought to establish a theoretical basis for interpretive sociology, applied the concept to study of mental structures in everyday life and used it in sociology. The present article seeks to answer the question, what changes did life-world undergo in Schutz's thought. The result of this study shows that Schutz establishes a dialectical relationship between individual consciousness and life-world, in such a way that each constructs and influences the other. Unlike Husserl, who saw life-world as the only comprehensible reality, he referred to the multiple layers of reality and considered Husserl's term transcendence appropriate for rotation between these layers, while Husserl used “transcendence” only to awareness of another experience. In addition, Schutz does not consider transcendental phenomenology as a proper basis for the social sciences, and instead of the transcendental ego, he uses the mundane ego for his plan.

The role and influence of delta in theories related to the humanities is unique. Dilthey contrasted the "methodic hermeneutics" with the "positivist method" of the natural sciences. Just as the natural sciences have a single method for themselves, so hermeneutics is a method for the "humanities"; Distinguishing between the natural sciences and the humanities, in order to emphasize its independent identity vis the natural sciences and to show that the nature of the humanities works differently from the natural sciences, he emphasized that the humanities lived or experienced with the world of life. The same "life-world" deals with, and therefore the type of encounter and the way we go to the natural world is different from the type of way we go to the living world and lived life. The natural world is a mechanical world. But the living and living world is a living and dynamic world and requires a different method from the one that exists in the field of natural sciences.In this essay, inspired by the concept of life-world in Dilthey, we have gone to Sadra's philosophy and transcendent wisdom and through his philosophical principles such as principality of being, gradation of being, substantial motion, explanation of the concept of will, evolution of the soul and gradational unity of the knower and the known. We have talked about the concept of "transcendent life" in Sadra's philosophy and have tried to show how, given these principles and concepts, the conditions for the possibility of "transcendent human sciences" can be explained on the basis of transcendent wisdom.

Husserl thinks of philosophy as a general, fundamental and apodictic science of world. He set out to found transcendental phenomenology as general philosophy or apodictic science, but he ought to explain the possibility of objective knowledge of world as to reach to this point. Concerning about crisis in modern western culture, Crisis projects his view of philosophy and of duty of philosopher in context of a critics of modern philosophy and science concerns about crisis in modern western culture. So he introduces the original concept life-world that is a novel idea for the philosophy as general science. The paper is to consider the Husserl's point of view on relation between philosophy and crisis of modern culture and to review the question if life-world can introduce Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as a fundamental philosophy and general science. We consider the problem of possibility of objectivity of world, a problem that proposed in late philosophy of Husserl in more extensive and innovative form.

Prior to transformation of actual phenomena to the ideals of scientific abs traction, the life-world points to the ground and foundation of them. The on tology of life-world that is seeking to grasp and unders tand essence of life-world as an a priori, aims at founding “universal science” that Husserl has in mind. On the one hand Husserl thinks of life-world as foundation for entities that is opposed to scientifically true world, and on the other hand he thinks that objec tive science has rooted in life-world. In its concrete uniqueness the life-world is universal and includes of science, predicative-linguis tic and pre-scientific expe rience. Husserl’s universal science should be able to grasp eidetic characteris tic of world, such a science had to concede a priori characteris tic of world as cons tructed through totality of essential possibilities not as perceived through em pirical phenomena. Focus of ontology of life-world is on an a priori that defines s tructure of life-world, has eidetic characteris tic and that is open toward eidetic analysis. This is essence of object of science of life-world that makes such a sci ence possible and necessary. It is possible because universal s tructures rules the life-world and is necessary because focus of science of life-world is on crisis of .meaning that demands a new and radical research

Distinguishing intuitive method from what is called Kantian regressive method , Husserl was sought to original transcendental knowledge. According to Husserlian phenomenology , although Kantian categories pursuit foundations of scientific experience but merely result in formal knowledge that has no concrete content with respect to transcendental domain. that Kant leaves unnoticed that empirical science is resulted from subjectivity lead to positing subjects that , on enduring necessity, act in unknown way to make up world of experience that its validity itself is under suspicion . For Husserl, returning to life-world is the only way to clarification of transcendental domain in order to explain how the subject is part of world and at the same time is involved in constitution of world. But this returning confront him with paradox : if transcendental subject is ultimate and fundamental truth, then world and everything mundane get its meaning from this transcendental subject that from the other side, itself is in world. How can transcendental subject be subject of world and subject in the world? We try to show that how Husserl's analyse of meaning and function of life-world and the ways that ego is disclosed in the course of epoche, clarify transcendental domain.

Several criticisms have been made about Gadamer's position on the natural sciences. First of all, his conception of natural science is positivistic. Second, his image of natural science is caricatured and does not come to our day, and third, Gadamer does not disregard the hermeneutic nature of natural science. This paper will attempt to demonstrate that these criticisms are the result of focusing solely on Gadamer’s "Truth and Method" and disregarding Gadamer's approach to the natural sciences affected by the Husserl idea of crisis. Taking a collection of Gadamer's works into account, the hermeneutical nature of natural science is depicted. In the first step, it shows how Gadamer approach to natural sciences is shaped based on the gap between the “lifeworld” (lebenswelt) and the “scientific world”, and then in the second step, by showing the hermeneutical nature of natural science, linkage of science world into lifeworld is discussed. In other words, both Commonalities and differences between natural science and lifeworld are explored. Finally, it is concluded that the lifeworld has primacy over science world and science must be able to find its place in the lifeworld. Besides, by criticizing Gadamer's on natural science based on the collection of his work, the horizon of hermeneutics of natural science is explored.

The purpose of this article is to representthe obvious understanding of the challenging concept of a science of the life-world in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology and meaning of this project by Husserl. Hereof, first is very important to perpend distinction and yet relationship between the objective science and the life-world then it seems inevitable to reflect on steps to this transcendental science including epochs of the objective science, epochs ofa science of the life-world and transcendental reduction. Here, the main focus lays onthe possibility of a science of the life-world project with tow attitude a reflective and a non-reflective. In the first attitude be accomplished the universal structures of the life-world in format of anontologyofthelife-world and in the second attitude be discovered on Husserl's transcendental turn on the life-world and its manner-of-givenness the transcendental solidarity between the world and the world consciousness.

Edmund Husserl has been called the father of phenomenology. Phenomenology is a method which emphasizes on description and meaning, instead of prediction and measurement which are common in sciences. Primarily, Husserl has consciousness as the main subject of his phenomenology, so many of the phenomenologists consider his phenomenology as a kind of epistemology. This paper maintains that although Husserl takes notice of consciousness in some of his works, he transcends epistemology or Egology in his recent works, and considers the concept of lifeworld, i.e. world as lived by an individual not separated from human being, as the main concept of phenomenology. Accordingly, we will first offer a brief review of phenomenology; then, we will clarify the necessity of proposing the concept of lifeworld as the main subject of phenomenology, in view of Husserl’s last works, Cartesian Meditation and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.

Husserl believes that under the impact of modern science as inaugurated by Galileo, the Life-world - i.e., the world of common experience - has been replaced by the objectively true world of science which, in the thinking of modern western man, passes for reality. On the one hand, Husserl in opposition to the objective view of the world insists that the Life-world is the meaning-fundament of scientific thinking and the sphere of original evidences. On the other hand, he maintains that the theoretical results of science take on the character of validities for the Life-world, adding themselves as such to its own composition. Husserl, at first, considers the Life-world in the context of the objective science critique, but describing the subjective-relative Life-world, which includes science, it would not remain as a partial problem within the general problem of the objective science. The invariant and common structures that abstract from the subjective-relative Life-world yield the universal Life-world a priori. Therefore, the Life-world which firstly appeared as a partial problem within the general problem of the objective science, namely, functions as the foundation of sciences. Eventually, it is disclosed, in terms of Husserl, as a universal and genuine problem for philosophy. This paper deals with the view of the relationship of the Life-world and science, and demonstrates the Life-world conception as a universal problem

The theory and method of phenomenology has been formed in the West by Edmund Husserl after the philosophical crisis. He tried to release himself from the common presuppositions and explanations and present a method for the intuition of intrinsic meanings while he emphasized on cultural awareness, functions and obligations. Suspending the natural approach which he considered as the root of this misunderstanding, he tried to achieve a kind of pure awareness. Alfred Schutz who followed this perspective and method, also tried to transmit this theory from philosophy to sociology and presented a kind of descriptive and non-experimental research regarding exterior phenomena. The concepts he used in the explication of his theory has drawn the attention of sociologists. Although this theory has some flaws, but is close to some of the theoretical accomplishments of the Islamic thought including the suspension of the natural world and reduction of its role, presenting a dialectic image of the individual and the structure, and …; yet there are some basic differences from some perspectives as well.

Rationality is considered as one of the main elements of modernity. Habermas is among the thinkers of Frankfurt Critical School who believes that critical rationality dominates communicative rationality. He proposes communicative rationality as a means for removing the restrictions of modernity. As for his criterion for removing these restrictions and gaining freedom in communicative rationality, due to his limitations, it can be no more that public culture or common sense. This is because he does not rely on the criteria of sacred intellect which the highest form of intellect and is unable to provide value and normative criteria based on practical intellect derived from sublime human values and ideals. So, we could not help accepting Habermas's criteria to free ourselves from these limitations if Islam had not provided a criterion which goes beyond common sense, based on divine teachings. Using the cognitive and ontological principles of Islam and applying principal methodology, the present paper criticizes Habermas's principles of communicative action and tries, through an overview of the principles of his theory to find what, according to Islam, position it has. In other words, does Islam accept the criteria proposed by Habermas in his critical ideas by using communicative action for obtaining freedom?

Transcendental Ego is the principle of principles that philosophizationof great philosophers such as Husserl has been based upon it. Husserl,too, as a follower of Descartes meditations and philosophy withattemption in intentionality of transcendental ego accepts it as the baseof principles of philosophization and declares himself as a NewCartesian. In this study, the author develops an original reading of theCartesian Meditation. This text, far from giving rise to a“Transcendental solipsism”, leads to a constitution of intersubjectivityon various levels (“primordial”, “Intersubjective” et “Objective”). In itscenter, a “Phenomenological Construction” operates, i.e. amethodological piece that masters the genetic approach ofintersubjectivity. Closely following the “almost mathematical” rigourof this crucial text of Husserl’s phenomenology, in this way equallytackles the issue of the constitution of the experience of the other andthe truly intersubjective structure of transcendental subjectivity. Thisstudy concludes with the metaphysical results of the analysis of theexperience of the other.