سوژه

Emmanuel Levinas is considered one of the most important philosophers of the modern era. The importance of his philosophy is evident in ethics. In Levinas's moral philosophy, the subject-centeredness is removed from priority and the "other" and their "face" are prioritized, in such a way that the other's face indicates moral messages and the subject, upon receiving these moral messages, feels a duty to consider themselves accountable and responsible to the other. But the question is, what is the meaning of "face" in facing the other in Levinas's moral philosophy? And on what basis can its moral aspect be justified? In the structuralism and semiotics of philosophers such as Ferdinand de Saussure, external matters in the real world are signs, and these signs take on meaning within the scope of the subject's mental concepts and categories. This meaning is ultimately reduced to ontological issues. Levinas's moral philosophy, however, is a kind of deconstruction and rebellion against the structuralism and semiotics of philosophers like Saussure. In Levinas's moral philosophy, the face of the other is a moral sign that invites the subject to accept moral messages and take responsibility towards the other. In such a situation, moral messages and commands are not reduced to ontological issues. It seems that Levinas is trying to justify the moral aspect of the face on the basis of linguistics.

The concept of the subject is very important for the contemporary French philosopher, Alain Badiou, and it is discussed in works such as the Theory of the subject, Ethics, Being and Event, and the Logic of worlds. Paying attention to the changes and developments in Badiou's thought leads us to the conclusion that his perspective on the subject has also undergone changes. For the first time in his book Theory of the Subject, he examines the concept of the subject. A time still under the influence of Althusser and Mao, Therefore, the basis of the subject is social actions and purely political functions and the ontological foundations of the subject are not examined by him. While, later in the last course of his thought, He writes the book "Being and Occurrence" with an ontological subject as his focus, and his attention to subtractive ontology leads him to a mathematical subject. finally, in the Logic of Worlds, it continues its evolutionary path, one we believe transforms the subject from a purely human and political awe to a finite and abundant part of an infinite truth in subtractive situations. In this article, while examining the above path, we mentioned some criticisms in this regard because we believe that Badiou's explanation of the subject contains flaws that are in conflict with the logic of subtractive ontology.

Immanuel Levinas is considered one of the most important philosophers of the new age. The importance of his philosophy is shown in ethics. In the moral philosophy of Levinas, the central subject is left out of priority and his "other" and his "face" are given priority in such a way that the other's face indicates moral messages and the subject feels duty upon receiving these moral messages. consider himself accountable and responsible to the other. But the question is, what is the meaning of "face" in facing the other in Levinas's moral philosophy? And on what basis can its moral aspect be justified? Can it be based on ontology and epistemology, or psychology and linguistics? Levinas, when Western philosophers tried to give priority to the subject and reduce all issues to ontology and epistemology, provided a redefinition of another concept and another face. The author believes that the moral foundation of another figure can be examined based on four bases: 1- ontology 2- epistemology 3- psychology 4- linguistic so that finally the moral foundation of Levinas's thought can be discovered in his linguistic basis.

In his text Subject and Power (1982), written two years before his death, Foucault stated that the central theme of his research was not "power" but the "subject." His lecture series Subjectivity and Truth (1980-1981) and The Hermeneutics of the Subject (1981-1982) also confirmed this emphasis, particularly as he considered the overarching problematic of these lectures to be "subjectivity and truth," demonstrating that the subject must become problematized in relation to truth. Finally, in the preface to The History of Sexuality (1984), eight years after the first volume was published, he provided a general outline of his intellectual trajectory and explained why he shifted toward "genealogy." Based on this introduction, the present article, after explaining how the subject relates to the network of power and truth, concludes that the method and approach to studying the subject are "genealogy and problematization." The domain of inquiry into the recognition and construction of the self as a subject is the history of the desiring human and, consequently, sexuality. In fact, the "techniques of the self" associated with the system of sexuality maintain the individual's constant relationship with themselves, which results in the continuous production of subjectivity. Therefore, by studying the history of these techniques, one can arrive at the history of subjectivity. However, this history only leads to the genealogy of the subject when we analyze the intersection of techniques of the self and domination, which is essentially the meaning of "governmentality"—the governance of behavior and the management of possibilities through various truth games. Thus, it is concluded that sexuality is not only an appropriate domain for genealogical study of the history of subjectivity and techniques of the self but also a rich field for understanding governmentality and the more complex ways in which power functions.

This article examined the emergence of the human subject as the central focus of modern thought, tracing its origins from the Renaissance period through the Enlightenment. Using a descriptive-analytical approach, it explored the philosophical foundations of Orientalism and the underlying principles it shared with modernity. The analysis revealed that the rise of the human subject in the modern era was accompanied by a shift in perspective. Pre-Renaissance religion and culture were approached with an "objective understanding" by the modern subject. This same subject then went on to apply an "Orientalist understanding" when engaging with non-Western cultures and belief systems. The nature of Orientalism could be located in this novel relationship between the subject and the object of knowledge. The "objective understanding" embodied the Kantian epistemology, wherein the subject, relying solely on its own prior information and independent of any external or divine referent, did not recognize anything beyond itself. By subsuming objects within its own framework, the subject imposed its own understanding upon them. This process of objectification and imposition characterized the Orientalist worldview, which emerged as a core feature of modern thought. The article thus elucidated the deep historical linkages between the ascendance of the autonomous human subject, the principles of modernity, and the rise of Orientalist modes of understanding non-Western cultures and belief systems.

Kant argued that in order to bring about validity for knowledge we have to make a paradigm shift. The paradigm shift which was well known as copernican revolution was based on this assumption that the one who observing could be able to determinate objects. For Kant subject as observer has the ability to determine the world transcendentally. For Hegel the Kantian paradigm shift count as subjetivising the objectivity. He blames Kant for not seeing this basic fact that, subject himself become in the objectivity and the relation could not be as Kant was assuming. Hegel by replacing the transcendental I with Giest attempts to instead of making objectivity, subjective, do the reverse. In this article we argue that by objectivizing the subjectivity, Hegel not inly became able to overcome the problems posed by Kantian philosophy but also assumes subjectivity as intrinsically intersubjective

Heidegger believes that the subject of representation is essentially a subject that wills the represented in every representation in a way that the expansion of the domains of human representation and going through the reality and determining it as a subject is directly related to the expansion of his will and expression of his will in the world. When Nietzsche answers the question of what is the being of beings with the will to power in fact he expresses the hidden source of all representational tradition which was unsaid to him. For Heidegger, the will to power brings subjectivity to its end. and end which culminated in our technological age of reducing humanity to be a representation of a greater will that Heidegger calls will to will. But the article approaches the problem just mentioned not as a distinguished phenomenon but treats it totally in the tradition of the west as emerged in the light of the essence of truth as dominant in Rome. Having this in mind, we argue that the technological age is the reversal of representational relation which delivers man over the darkest night of his destiny and consequently decentralizes him in favor of a bib picture of the world which is able to give a coherent narration from everything. It is this inhuman and also technological narration that extracts the subjective will of the representing subject.

Immanuel Levinas is considered one of the most important philosophers of the new age. The importance of his philosophy is more apparent in the field of ethics. Levinas's moral philosophy revolves around the "other". In the structure of Levinas's moral philosophy, one central subject is out of priority and another is given priority. For Levinas, the other is not a passive person, but an active person whose face indicates messages and moral commands, and the subject, by receiving these messages and moral commands, feels the duty to be accountable and responsible to the other. to know The continuity of this accountability and responsibility leads to a moral life. But the problem is that the approach to moral life in the structure of Levinas's moral philosophy is based on what basis? And in other words; What are the components of a moral life in the structure of Levinas's moral philosophy? Levinas believes that the subject finds an inner desire and pull towards the other when facing another's face. This internal desire and tension towards the other, which originates from the subject's desire for infinity and perfection, is a fundamental and metaphysical desire and leads to the subject's moral relationship and interaction with the other and ultimately to moral life. Within the moral life, the subject finds his true identity, which is a moral identity, and by cultivating his moral talents, he steps on the path of becoming infinite and achieving perfection.

In Kant's philosophy, the concept of "transcendental" is so important that he has coined such a term as a core index for his philosophy to distinguish his in contrast to other philosophical systems. Professor Fatemi has tried to base his view about the theoretical principles of human rights on Kant's philosophy considering the concept of "transcendental man" as the fundamental condition for the realization of contemporary human rights. The concept of "transcendental man" in professor Fatemi's system of thought seems far cry from that in Kant's philosophy. Accordingly, his efforts to do that are open to a major objection. Failing to consider the wide range of this concept in the light of Kant's Copernican Revolution and system of transcendental idealism, professor Fatemi has adopted a pre-Kantian approach to use the term which entails an approach of substance to man neglecting the transcendental conditions of the subject. This is while, the concept of "transcendental" in Kant's philosophy concerns terms of the possibility in the light of subjectivism and has no relation to professor Fatemi's attitude towards "transcendental man" as an abstract man along with no accident.

The main topic of the present article is whether the theory of intertextuality - in its classical form and narration formulated by Julia Kristeva, the author of the word intertextuality - can be used as a way to understand the meaning of language and religious texts? And that using intertextuality can achieve a single, complete and final meaning? And assuming meaning, what will be the state of objectivity in understanding the language of religion and religious texts? We have also answered the question that by emphasizing the intertextuality of texts, such as the dynamics and continuous processing of texts, during intertextuality, can the meaning of the text be equated with the author of the text? To gain meaning, Kristeva emphasizes the two components of subject and language alongside structure. Based on these two important components of Kristeva, which form the basis of the formation of intertextuality, the discussion is examined in two axes. Given that meaning is the result of cooperation and connection between language and subject, what is the purpose of understanding the meaning of religious propositions and basically the language of religion in both written and spoken forms? Does intertextuality provide a way to understand the meaning of the language of religion? As a result, we find that the use of intertextuality in the Valley of the Language of Religion cannot achieve a single meaning due to the dynamics of the language and the subject matter of Kristeva.

It is widely known that Kant refers all the three basic problems of philosophy to the single ultimate question “what is man?”, the task of finding a solution for which is assigned to the philosophical anthropology. One considers Critique of Pure Reason in this regard, however, one surprisingly finds that this question is entirely absent from Kant’s own magnum opus. By its very nature indeed, transcendental philosophy is incapable of arising this question thus formulated, since it eventually leads to a subject, not to a human being. Heidegger’s exegetical reading of Kant notwithstanding, one should not simply conclude, however, that the question of the essence of man eventuates by Kant in the formation of a metaphysics of subjectivity. Kant’s doctrine of transcendental unity of apperception is not so much a subject-centered metaphysical theory, of the sort that Heidegger assumes, as it denotes a transcendental formulation of Kant’s general anthropological conception. What lies at the core of this anthropological view is the twofoldness of human place in cosmos, in terms of which the tension between the marginality and, simultaneously, centrality of man in relation to the world can be articulated. We refer to this anthropological conception as “anthropological tension”, due to the irreducible duality that lies at its core.

Husserl in his method of phenomenology casts a new light on the discussion of experience through a new definition of cognition and avoids the error of preceding philosophers, classic empiricists, in particular; thus the cognition is no longer based on the immediate experiences of the world but it is based on intentional experience which relies upon immediate intuition of objects. The result of this perception is a live experience. Therefore, for Husserl, knowing the world around us is based on the lived which is based on the intentionality of consciousness. For Husserl, talking about this intentional world happens through ideal meanings and this group of meanings rests around the axis of a transcendental ego which is the center of intentional actions and moods. Therefore, the analysis of the speech act of this “ego” is done through semantics and based on transcendental logic and it is separated from syntactic theory. Husserl makes this new change to move the transcendental subject into the intersubjective world. In the present research, the objective is to analyze the effect of logical semantics on speech and transition to the intersubjective world.

The twentieth-century French philosopher Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973), in her philosophical work, distinguished between "decision" and "mystery", the interrelationship of love from the mysteries of mystery. In his view, "mystery" is something that cannot be solved by common methods in science and the realm of early thought; rather, it must be acknowledged that it must be considered in the realm of a secondary thought. In Marcel's view, too, the secret of love belongs to the realm of "being," not to the realm of "having." In this article, in a descriptive-analytical way, we have tried to express the general lines of his thought in this regard and its epistemological implications from the perspective of human relations and acceptance of the existence of others in the romantic network between human beings and acceptance of the existence of a transcendent being in supernatural love. Let us also discuss the negation of skepticism and the proof of the existence of the world and the abandonment of Descartes' belief in subjectivity and subjectivism.

What is the role of Time in Heidegger's ontological interpretation of Kant? Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is a controversial and different one in current interpretation of Kant's philosophy. In the light of understanding the meaning of Being, Heidegger works out Kant and intends to consider Kant's project as an ontological one. Now with regard to the main question of this article, we want to show essential and basic role of Time in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant. The role which, in our view, is a connective thread in Heidegger's idea about Kant as far as we can't understand mechanism of Heidegger's interpretation without it.

For Zizek, considering Hegel's philosophy as the culmination of absolute systematization and idealism which ultimately dissolves the diversity of reality into absolute idea and knowledge, is a cursory judgment of his philosophy. Zizek argues it is possible to remove the stains of absolutistic perception from Hegel's thought by using Lacan. Accordingly, Zizek’s reading of Hegel's subject, unlike his predecessor and contemporary thinkers, takes place in the space of Lacanian concepts and the context of the real. In this respect, the Hegelian subject is not a pre-predicative thing and it doesn’t have a priori coherence, but it is always bounded by the conditions of the external occurrence. The existence of the subject is the product of an abstract totalitarian negation that challenges the authoritarian and totalitarian structure of the substantial order. Lacan's excuse for rereading Hegel is not because Zizek assumes Hegel is trapped in a kind of semantic and structural self-referential subjugation. Rather, he always identifies a kind of surplus in Hegel's philosophy of spirit which can only be analyzed by using Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts. Zizek takes Hegel's dialectic from the level of the logic of the signifier, in which desire is recognized through the other and the subject is digested as the subject of a sign in the symbolic order, to the level of Lacan's logic in which there is no big and perfect other. It is always incomplete, barred, and not-all structured around a fundamental lack. According to Zizek, there is the real in the subject which is not impossible, and a desire does not fit in the framework of the production of fantasy, signifier and big other, and this is exactly the point where the subject is formed.

Nietzsche and Levinas are the most prominent contemporary philosophers who have emphasized on the necessity of passing over rational subjectivity. They tried to rethink the meaning of ethics in a world where neither religion nor other moral philosophies could create a strict and reliable source for the crisis of the contemporary human being. In an attempt to overcome rational subjectivism, Nietzsche and Levinas redefined concepts such as morality and the subject. The purpose of the paper is to describe the attitudes of Nietzsche and Levinas towards their critiques of rational subjectivism. Then examine Nietzsche’s naturalistic reading and Levinas’ transcendental reading of the subject and their encounter with the other and also introduce their critiques of traditional ethics and propose a new kind of ethics in their thoughts. We will then evaluate their alternative concepts in the problem of overcoming rational subjectivism and finally, we will compare these two attitudes. Although Nietzsche and Levinas initially adopted common points of view for the critique of subjectivism and traditional ethics and common criticisms in the field, they presented different results, goals, and methods. Based on these approaches, each has proposed different principles and conclusions about ethics and overcoming rational subjectivism. Nietzsche’s problem is the genealogy of values, and Levinas’s question is the possibility of a moral condition. The answer to the first question is not related to the second question. The present paper shows that both Levinas and Nietzsche have presented different insights into the meaning of subjectivity. Their efforts to find the meaning of subjectivity have also been accompanied by the necessity to destruct the meaning of morality. Accordingly, by focusing on the overman (Nietzsche) and the other (Levinas), they have sought to reevaluate values ​​(Nietzsche) and asymmetric moral responsibility (Levinas). In this regard, they have adopted a completely different view from the traditional view of ethics. Although both of them start with a common point of view, their methods, interpretations, and results are different. With a genealogical approach, Nietzsche considered the will of power in the active subject and the birth of the overman to be desirable and practical to end the history of the development of nihilism. And Levinas, with a phenomenological approach to the concept of asymmetric responsibility in the passive subject, has put an end to the history of neglect of the other and rational subjectivism. The final suggestion is that Nietzsche and Levinas are both looking for a new meaning of morality that resides not in the mind but in the body. In Levinas, the relationship between the body and morality is evolving and transcendental, with concepts of responsibility and suffering, but in Nietzsche, this kind of connection fluctuates between naturalistic and transcendentalist views and considers the concepts of power and instinct important. Nietzsche’s attitude about the human being is a combination of a naturalistic and over-humanist approach, and with the precedence of selfhood, he has expressed a negative view of the other. However, Levinas’ philosophy is more humanistic and inter-subjectivity because of ethical ideals, and ethics begin with recognition of the priority of the other.

This article, focusing on the inclusion- in- notion principle in the philosophy of Leibniz and its reading by Gilles Deleuze, claims that Deleuzian approach in the philosophical critique of the philosophy of Leibniz leads to recreation of the concept of the fold and the subject of fold in Leibnizian thought. To achieve this goal, we initially provide an in-depth study of this principle and its related principles in his philosophy and place emphasis upon their ontological aspect. Then we organize Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz’s philosophy around the inclusion-in-notion principle and picture the world of foldings as the outcome of such reading. We make an effort to clarify how the reading of this principle by Deleuze creates new possibilities in the philosophy of Leibniz and gives birth to the Leibnizian- Deleuzian subject of the fold. Therefore, in the last step, we study this Leibnizian- Deleuzian subject and its characteristics, which is the result of the inclusion- in- notion principle.

Nietzsche's version of deconstructing the concept of the Subjectivism is based on the epistemological gap from classical and modern understandings of knowledge, truth, language and awareness. To reinterpret the human being as a being perpetually evolving within the web of physiological processes, he presents a new framework in which tries to interpret and evaluate such phenomena as knowledge, truth, language and thought, again. Nietzsche's aim is setting aside knowledge and the will of absolute truth as its main drive, and instead, introducing another drive that employs knowledge as an instrument. For him, the discovery of truth is an illusion originated from focusing upon the two inseparable constituents of the Subject, to say, language and awareness. Instead of the ideal of knowledge and the discovery of truth, he places the concepts of interpretation and evaluation; the former determinates the meaning, usually particular, of the phenomenon, while the latter specifies the hierarchy of meanings with no bearing on their plurality. Our core question in the present paper is ‘how can Nietzsche deconstruct the concept of the Subject in spite of his breaking with its modern epistemological aspects’. And our main claim is that the deconstruction of the Subject can only be understood if we understand Nietzsche’s criticism of such concepts as truth, knowledge, language and awareness.

The current reading of Cartesian subject has taken it as a turning point in human "self-fundamentalism". An essential part of twentieth-century philosophy, following Heidegger, defined his highest effort a critique of Cartesian subjectivity, as if the Cartesian subject had been the main factor diverting the path of philosophy from considering being qua being. Many critics have found the crisis of modernity a result of subject self-fundamentalism, insofar as it has distorted not only philosophy but humanity as well. While presenting Heidegger's critiques of the Cartesian subject and those by philosophers influenced by Heidegger, this paper attempts to return to the modality of Cartesian subject construction and to understand Cartesian reflection ratios with potentiality, duality, and self-fundamentalism. It also shows that we, given the fundamental lack of Cartesian subject, cannot make such a criticism of Descartes' subject' fact. Among this philosophers, there have been thinkers who have a different reading from the Cartesian subject, one that does not lead subject to forgetfulness of being, humanity's self-fundamentalism crisis, and so on. This paper, while digging out the concept of the subject in Greece and its Hellenic and mystical gene, provides readings contrast to the usual Cartesian ones and shows that the Cartesian subject is, in fact, the void that allows truths to be tested.

The present study will investigate some thoughts of Habermas, German sociologist and philosopher, which in Persian texts, less attention has been paid to it. One of the main aims of his research program has been approximating knowledge and life or Life-world, and this article attempts to present a systematic review of this effort of Habermas and his intellectual confrontations with other philosophical-social disciplines. The concept “Quasi-transcendental” plays a key role in this regard and it converts the Cartesian knowledge from the transcendental subject into a historical process arisen from the practical necessities. Therefore, this article has tried to clarify the meaning, roots, and functions of this concept. Accordingly, two books have a crucial stall: Knowledge and Human Interests and The Theory of Communicative Action. The findings show that: 1. the questions that Habermas in his book seek to answers in fact are the questions of Kant: (the common conditions of recognition possibility) 2. Quasi-transcendental interests are rooted in human life, which is a fundamental change in critical theories. 3. Habermas's epistemology seeks to revive the values of enlightenment and liberation from domination. 4. Habermas enters into debate with other intellectual disciplines through the formation of cognitive interests (transcendence of the Frankfurt School, a critique of postmodernism, and other philosophical disciplines).