فلسفه تحلیلی

Metaphysics has a long-standing history in philosophy. Although it does not date back as far as philosophy itself, it has always been a fundamental part of philosophical systems and is regarded as "first philosophy", the highest domain of rational knowledge. At times, metaphysics has been considered synonymous with philosophy, addressing fundamental questions about the essence and reality of things, or pure being. However, as intellectual developments have progressed, metaphysics has faced serious criticism and even outright rejection. Immanuel Kant and Rudolf Carnap, two prominent philosophers from distinct philosophical traditions, adopted critical stances toward metaphysics, resulting in profound transformations within this field. Kant, through his Copernican Revolution and his distinction between analytic/synthetic propositions and a priori/a posteriori concepts, examined the conditions under which metaphysics could be considered possible. In contrast, Carnap, a leading figure of the Vienna Circle, developed theories on analytic/synthetic judgments and their relationship to experience, establishing an epistemological framework that dismissed metaphysical propositions as meaningless. This article seeks to address the following questions: Which aspects of Kant’s philosophy revitalized philosophical thought and influenced Carnap and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle? How did Kant critique and redefine metaphysics? How did Kant’s rationalist philosophy shape the empiricism of the logical positivists? A comparison of these two philosophers’ perspectives reveals that Carnap drew significant inspiration from Kant’s philosophy. Nevertheless, a fundamental difference exists between them: Kant sought to liberate metaphysics from its traditional framework and redefine it in a scientific and rigorous manner. In contrast, Carnap, emphasizing empiricism and dismissing metaphysics as futile, aimed to abolish it entirely and pave the way for the scientific advancement of human knowledge.

In recent decades, before the decline of the star of analytical philosophy of religion in the 21st century, the philosophy of religion faced the important challenge that philosophizing about religion is not exclusive to the analytical philosophy and exists in other philosophical systems as well. In this case, what is the difference between it and other systems? The answer that the article has reached is that in analytical philosophy, the principle is with questioning about the Christian religion, and this questioning in most cases leads to the suspension of the answer or damage to the knowledge of religious beliefs. In this article, it is discussed that questioning is not all philosophical activity and the truth of the meaning of philosophizing about religion is when we reach a philosophical interpretation of an opinion. On the other hand, in systems such as Islamic philosophy, after questioning, an interpretation of Islamic teaching and beliefs is presented, in which internal consistency, rationality, and religious truthfulness are assumed and followed. The type of religion and philosophical system is very decisive here. Of course, these two types of approaches have systematic differences and do not fundamentally contradict each other, but they differ from each other in the issue of completeness.

Willard Van Orman Quine, one of the dominant figures in the 20th-century Anglo-American philosophy, is said to have joked that “there are two sorts of people interested in philosophy, those interested in philosophy and those interested in the history of philosophy”. Quine seems to suggest, in a humorous manner, that the history of philosophy lies completely out of the realm of real philosophy. If taken seriously, philosophy would have nothing to do with the history of philosophy. I argue in this article that Professor Quine and others of his mindset are wrong in that they mix up things that should be discriminated.As is well known, attitudes toward philosophy may be categorized in a variety of ways, among them is the familiar division of schools of “Analytic” and “Continental” in the Western philosophy, and the schools of “Peripatetic”, “Illuminationist” and “Transcendental” in the Islamic tradition of philosophy. In the same line of drawing contrast between different modes of philosophical thought and according to their relation with the history of the enterprise of philosophy, this article differentiates between two kinds of philosophizing, namely “trendy” and “historical”.Those loyal to the trendy way of philosophizing see their professional practice as independent from philosophy’s past, and rely solely on the ability of their “presentist” reason to address the currently existing challenges. This may be called a memoryless way of philosophizing, as there would be no need from this outlook to be concerned with philosophy’s past or to keep a memory of what has already happened in the enterprise. Philosophy as expected to be practiced now may be said to be detached from philosophy’s past, just as is the case in sciences. Those people who may be interested in the historical issues may of course refer to the history of philosophy, but this would not be philosophy proper. One could regard the contemporary Analytic philosophy which is the mainstream in Anglo-American circles as an exemplar of this attitude, whose pioneers give a demeaning look at the history of philosophy. As Wittgenstein has put in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, “most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical.” If this is the case, why should philosophers bother themselves with the history of philosophy at all?Adherents of the historical way of philosophizing, on contrary, turn to philosophy’s past seeking philosophical truth, and shape their philosophy in exchange with it. According to this outlook, history of philosophy is like a precious mine of problems and ideas that were explored partially by some brilliant minds in the past. We may take benefit of their efforts by taking their philosophical concerns serious and move forward the enterprise by engaging with their problems and ideas. Many updates from different aspects would be needed for sure, but the essence of philosophical problems remains the same through the history of ideas. We would therefore need to do philosophy historically, that is to master the past as the key to understand the present. This type of philosophizing seems to have been realized by Islamic philosophers, who typically position themselves within a lineage of preceding thinkers. Just take the example of Mulla Sadra’s Asfar, a masterpiece in transcendental school of Islamic philosophy, and see the vast amount of discussions devoted to the thought of past thinkers.The way of philosophizing adopted by the advocates of each camp would have crucial impacts on their philosophy’s pedagogy and writing style, as well as on their historiography of philosophy. Especially, both are very susceptible to historical anachronism, namely to shape a distorted narrative of the past as viewed from the supposed vantage point of the present. Moreover, each attitude has also its peculiar characteristics. On one hand we see that the writings of trendy philosophers are typically overwhelmed with philosophical jargon; i.e., expressions that have gained very specialist and narrow meanings. On the other hand, the relations of ideas explored by historical philosophers and their development over centuries are usually very complicated to be captured, so the need for long years, even decades, for a scholar to be able to enter the circle of interlocutors.The present article characterizes trendy and historical ways of philosophizing separately, details their implications, and finally put them in comparison against each other. This problem falls within the scope of what is usually called metaphilosophy, and would make salient some features in the enterprise of philosophy that otherwise would have remained obscure. Another metaphilosophical issue is the probable unnoticed effects of the history of philosophy on the work of philosophers, whether trendies or historicals. This issue remains to be investigated further in a subsequent research.

Thomism has had a continuous history from the 13th century and some think that in this regard it is quite unique. In each time, it experienced different forms and took different approaches, as in twentieth-century there are also transcendental Thomists and existentialist Thomists. However, it took longer until for analytic philosophy and Thomism to have interaction and it did not happen until the attempts by Peter Geach, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Anthony Kenny. Then, in the 1990s, John Haldane, drawing on these works, coined the term "Analytic Thomism". Here I explore this movement by focusing on some of its aspects. First, we will see the historical phases of Thomism. Then, we review the roots of analytic Thomism as we know it now. After looking at some examples of the works done in this tradition, some challenges for analytic Thomism are presented and discussed. At the end, by way of conclusion, a few remarks about “Analytic Islamic philosophy” are discussed.

According to some philosophers, not heeding historicity is one of the characteristics of analytic philosophy in comparison to other philosophical schools. That is why analytic philosophers are always being accused of ignoring historicity and blamed for this charge. Continental and traditionalist philosophers are unanimous in this regard. However, the question is whether the critics of analytic philosophy can support this accusation with sufficient and convincing arguments, or whether not taking heed of history is a baseless claim rooted in an incorrect perception and insufficient knowledge of this philosophical movement. This paper is intended to explain the critic’s claims, arguments, and proofs as to historical ignorance in analytic philosophy, on the one hand, and to describe the attention and accuracy invested in analytic philosophers’ view of history of philosophy and their arguments. The authors emphasize that, firstly, one must distinguish between essential, instrumental, and weak types of historicity. Analytic philosophers might reject essential historicity but accept a kind of weak historicity. Secondly, an emphasis on the distinction of the history of philosophical problems from history of philosophy should not be understood in the sense of anti-historicity or equating the past and presence.

The idea of ideal language is one of the most important and central issues in analytic philosophy. The major philosophers of the first stream of analytic philosophy, which began with Frege and developed in Russell and early Wittgenstein and logical positivists, not only welcome this idea, but also pursue its realization as a central goal. But the idea of the ideal language was declined by the second stream of analytic philosophy, which is also inspired by Frege's work and ideas and developed in Moore and later Wittgenstein. Here I will try, first, to show the influence of the classical modern philosophers (Descartes, Leibniz, and classical empiricists) on the philosophers of the first stream in development of the idea of the ideal language, and second, to explain how both streams -the first in supporting and the latter in rejecting the idea of the ideal language – were under the influence of aspects of Frege's thought about sense and its relation to reference, and finally to show the role of later Wittgenstein's view on the meaning and his concept of "family resemblance" in declining the idea of “ideal language”.

Abstract Aesthetics is the epistemological view of beauty and Pragmatic aesthetics is considered as a kind of aesthetics and a second-degree knowledge, which deals with art and beauty, and discusses its features from a philosophical knowledge perspective using a pragmatic method. Since pragmatism appeared in response to analytic philosophy, pragmatic aesthetics also makes sense only in contrast to analytic aesthetics. Functionalism, experimentalism, monism, and contextual relativity are among specific features of pragmatism, which are common in various branches of this school. Pragmatist aesthetics is also recognized and presented as against analytical aesthetics through these features. With the help of Richard Schusterman and based on the fundamental opposition of pragmatism and analytic philosophy, , this paper sought to pave the way for the discovery of the features of pragmatist aesthetics, and meanwhile, to distinguish, as the aestheticist in this field, a pragmatist philosopher who has had the most fruitful epistemological viewpoint.

Dialogue between Dreyfus, as the biggest American commentator of Heidegger and Merleau- Ponty, and Searle, as one of the biggest analytic philosophers, started at the seventies. According to Searle, phenomenology is superficially and blind and has systematic errors. Additionally, in his view the concept of non-representational intention as center of Dreyfus’s phenomenology is inconsistent. But, in our opinion, Dreyfus introduces a consistent concept of non-representational intention, and proposes that Searle does not have a sound understanding of phenomenology. Dreyfus draws a distinction between two interpretations of Searle: Searle as phenomenologist and Searle as analytic philosopher. Dreyfus believes Searle’s approach as a phenomenologist is wrong because ignores non-representational intention; He also criticizes Searle’s approach as analytic philosopher because this approach accepts causality for an abstract structure. However, we believe that Dreyfus himself fails to go beyond the subject-object dualism. Moreover, we show in this paper that introducing non-representational intention is not sufficient for rejecting Descartes dualism.

Analytical philosophy which developed in the late 19th century and culminated in the middle of the 20th century is based on three basic approaches: empiricism which is centred on the principle of verifiability, considering logic as a tool, and linguistic analysis. Concentrating on these three approaches, Carnap, one of the brilliant scholars, has played a pivotal role in the development of analytical philosophy. The present paper aims at examining the effect of such great scholars like, Ferge, Russel, Vitgenschtien on Carnap`s analytical philosophy and showing the effect of his approach on the development of analytical philosophy. This paper seeks in its last part to offer a new no-nonsense approach to analytical philosophy by presenting a Carnap`s detailed exposition and innovations in these three areas.

In the classification of contemporary philosophy into analytic and continental philosophies, pragmatism has a middle place, while its affinity to the former is more than its affinity to the latter. In the first part of the 20th century, the relationship between analytic philosophy and pragmatism can be seen in the impact of the founders of pragmatism (notably William James) on analytic philosophers such as Wittgenstein. Some similarities can be found between James’ words and Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblance. In the second part of 20th century, the connection between the two schools has increased and thanks to this, some of the great analytic philosophers such as Quine, Kripke, Putnam, Rorty and Sellars are all pragmatists; thus the concept of analytic pragmatism has been introduced. This article will first discuss the relationship between the ideas of James and Wittgenstein, and then will assess the ideas of Rorty and Sellars to have an overview of the relationship between the two schools in the second part of the 20th century.

At the beginning of the twentieth century، when other philosophical tendencies were in the ascendance، two important movements emerged which rapidly came to dominate the intellectual domain: analytic philosophy and continental philosophy. The prominence of these two traditions caused the most famous classification of contemporary philosophy into analytic/continental. But this division created problems such as: Is it a comprehensive and exclusive division and could it cover all trends of contemporary philosophy? What are the features of each school which distinguish it from the other? This article tries to explain the relation between analytic philosophy and continental philosophy، and to evaluate the efforts which have been done to justify the division.

Any attempt to establish the main features of a philosophical school that the unity of its members brought about by means of which is very difficult. In this respect, analytic philosophy as one of the most important schools of the 20th engaging in different fields such as logical realism, logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy is not an exception. This study by taking “the place of metaphysics in analytic philosophy” as its title seeks to portray the unity of analytic philosophy as well as its metaphysical dispositions through finding a key distinguishing feature of analytic philosophy. It seems that none of the major philosophical schools as analytic philosophy agree with the idea that “language is misleading or deceptive”. So the claim is that we can establish the place of metaphysics in analytic philosophy through considering how analytic philosophers deal with the deceptiveness of language.

Austria has had some important philosophers which the greatness of their thought، led some to speak of the existence of an Austrian school in the philosophy. And since these philosophers had important role in the history of analytic philosophy، some، pursuing the first group and relying on their idea، believed in an Anglo-Austrian version of analytic philosophy، and of course they confronted some opposition. Beside English philosophers، contribution to the analytic philosophy، they defend of Austrian philosophers، contribution to it، while their opponents defend of German philosophers، contribution instead. In addition to the Anglo-Austrian and Anglo-German versions of analytic philosophy، there is a third version، named Anglo-American version which because of its neglecting Austrian and German philosophers، contributions is not considerable. This paper aimed to express specifications of Austrian philosophy at the first، then to assess the Anglo-Austrian version of Analytic philosophy and some of criticisms against it.

Searching for human’s specific perfection, Islamic philosophers has tracked his intellectual aspect dividing to practical and pure intellect. They believe that the result of practical intellect’s perfection and it’s dominance over animal faculties is only to open the way for human’s real perfection which occurs in the pure intellect. After passing material intellect, intellectus in habitu and actualized intellect, human being arrives at acquired intellect stamping the form of the universe on him. But Mullā sadrā holds that first after the arrival at acquired intellect’s stage the soul identifies with active intellect, then continues his perfection to arrive at “annihilation in God” which is very the knowing that the reality of the soul is pure relation to it’s creating cause. In this stage by knowing of his relational reality, gradient toward God attains intuitive knowledge of God. And because of knowledge of his pure poverty and God’s infinite independence in amount of his existential width it is called “annihilation in God”.

To explain the relation between language and external reality, the founder of symbolic logic and father of the contemporary philosophy, Gotlob Frege believes that, in addition to the mental meaning and external reference of the word, there is a third thing corresponding to the word which shows how the word relates to the external reference, and he calls it sense. Unlike meaning which is a mental and personal thing, sense is an external and objective reality of which all people may enjoy; and in this way a knowledge shared by all human beings may be acquired. Frege's view may be studied from various perspectives. In addition to incoherencies in Frege's arguments to the effect that sense is both objective and subjective, his argument is unable to prove objectivity of sense; and even the claim that sense is external is itself false. Even if we accept his claim, he has not managed to eliminate the problem of psychologism in the path of human knowledge, which he seeks to solve.

In this article, the author shows the way to bring analytic philosophy close to phenomenology through raising well-proportioned questions. For this reason, at first, he tries to bring analytic philosophy and phenomenology close to each other, so that, finally he may be able to show that the implanted organ resulted in phenomenology is able to be a beginning for a relation between analytic philosophy and existentialism. According to Husserl, outline of the problem, at least from a formal point of view, is very similar to the outline of Frege's main question. He tries to show development of the two in parallel through acquisition of formal syllogisms, taking into account simultaneously of difference of phenomena in terms of contents, and with the help of understandable tools in solution of the problem. Two final points are that, in Husserl's theory, "ego-constitution" has many common points with existentialism; and according to him, the task of phenomenology is to study structures of "bioworld" and rules governing it.

Analytic philosophy is a movement, and not a theory, or methodology or school of thought. Analytic philosophy, the main rival of the continental philosophy, has been the prevalent philosophical movement in the 20th Century. This writing is the first part of Hacker's article "Analytic Philosophy: What, Whence, and Whither?". In the first part of his article, he presents analytic explication as a means to describe analytic philosophy. To describe analytic philosophy, firstly its distinction from other philosophical movements and schools and secondly unifying root of its branches should be explained. For analytic explication of analytic philosophy, he provides special parameters. Then, he argues that none of them by itself or a combination of them or otherwise considering the concept of analytic philosophy as a concept of family resemblance is the most successful method to describe analytic philosophy. In the second part of his article, Hacker regards the historical methodology as the most suitable one to describe analytic philosophy.