جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « فهم » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

An important philosophical question concerning artificial or machine intelligence is whether it is essentially possible to develop AI that achieves human-level intelligence, or maybe even beyond? In other words, is it possible for AI to attain every aspect of natural human intelligence (or even higher) during its development? Alan Turing, a pioneer of AI, in response to the question "Can machines think?" believes that if a machine can pass the test of answering a human interrogator's questions in such a way that the interrogator is deceived and confuses it with a human, it should be concluded that the machine is thinking (at a human level). But will passing the Turing test really mean that AI has reached the same level of intelligence as human intelligence? Will the realization of fully human-like responsiveness mean that the machine has (independently) acquired all the mental, epistemic, and inferential abilities that human intelligence has? Regardless of Turing's point and belief, is it essentially possible for a machine, as a purely physical object, to achieve true human-level intelligence? What conditions should artificial machine intelligence meet in order to be genuine intelligence? For this purpose, should it also be able to perform complex inferences like "abduction", commonly known as “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE)? If so, can a machine essentially afford to perform non-formal inferences such as IBE? In this article, we try to address such philosophical questions regarding artificial intelligence.

In the present article, we are faced with two phenomenological philosophers who, in two different intellectual traditions, namely philosophical hermeneutics and moral phenomenology, have referred to the concept of the Other as the fundamental possibility of the individual. The other, as an ontological and common concept in the thought of Gadamer and Levinas, is the turning point of the condition for the possibility of understanding and ethics. Focusing on the concept of the other, while addressing the points of difference and commonality between Gadamer and Levinas, this article will show that Levinas’s preoccupation with the other as a philosopher refers to the foundations of ethics, and the condition for the possibility of foundations of ethics is encountering the other. In Gadamer, the turning point is the determination of the possibilities of understanding in dialectical and dialogue-oriented relationships. Without the other, in Levinas’s thought, ethics, and moral matter, and in Gadamer’s thought, the process of understanding will not occur in the form of a fusion of horizons. Therefore, this article shows that the other is a common concept between these two philosophers, which both of them cannot avoid in their philosophical analyses of ethics or the process of understanding.

In the upcoming research, relying on the descriptive-analytical method, we are trying to answer the question that does the Heidegger's phenomenology of religious life have an epistemological infrastructure? It seems that the basis of the phenomenology of Heidegger's religious life is based on the understanding of Dasein from the reality of religious life and gaining awareness of the essence of religious life based on the mechanism of Dasein's understanding. Investigating the role of human existence (= Dasein) in reaching the truth of religious life in the form of Heidegger's phenomenological approach to religious life is the main motivation of the researcher, which introduces us to the epistemological basis of Heidegger's phenomenology. Based on the evaluation, Dasein is a conscious agent in confronting religious life, and the knowledge that is produced in this way is a certain knowledge that depends on the essence of religious life through the understanding mechanism of Dasein.

The focus of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is the issue of understanding, and more precisely, the way understanding occurs in our encounter with the world as a "text". Gadamer tries to phenomenologizing the understanding, to express the conditions of the possibility of understanding and how it occurs. His provocative claim is that "any" encounter with the world, is mediated by language. The process of interpretation is the same our linguistic understanding of the world. The universality of this linguistic understanding of the world is to the extent that, even when language seems to be "suspended", we still have to take refuge in language itself to discuss this inadequacy. This is one of the "mysterious" aspects of human linguisticality. Another aspect comes back to the fact that language, like the world, never fully acquiesce to "objectification" and is not given to our consciousness as a unified whole, because language is preceding any understanding. The main questions of this article are as follows: By emphasizing the interconnectedness of language and understanding, Gadamer simply is trying to remind us the same long-standing claim about the relationship between language and thinking, or does he have a more fundamental claim? Does he, by focusing on the linguistic nature of human understanding, want to show us the limitlessness of the boundaries of language, or emphasize on its limitations? In this article, while clarifying the meaning of language and understanding and their relationship in Gadamer's thought, we have tried to answer the mentioned questions implicitly by emphasizing that the significance of language in Gadamer's hermeneutics is not simply limited to putting experiences into words, but this is the mere external and concrete manifestation of the linguisticality of our understanding.

The involvement of presuppositions in the process of understanding is one of the most fundamental issues of philosophical hermeneutics. In the opinion of those who believe in philosophical hermeneutics, according to the phenomenological view and analysis they present of the way of human existence, first of all, man is a being thrown in history and time, and secondly, he is full of understanding and perception; An understanding affected by the presuppositions that is not in his control and choice due to the historical nature of man. Therefore, in a philosophical research, with an epistemological approach and with an analytical-descriptive method, relying on the theory of reference to “the knowledge by presence” of Professor Misbah Yazdi, it was shown that in examining the types of human perceptions and the distinction between acquired and present perceptions, although a series of presuppositions in the process of understanding they interfere, but these interferences are necessarily at the discretion of humans. Thus, by presenting the analysis of the process of human understanding with the help of the method of referring to the knowledge by presence, the claim that understanding is not methodical and as a result, considering the involvement of presuppositions and its results as non-optional, such as multiplicity of readings and relativity, was invalidated.

Nowadays, we have to rely on experts in many theoretical and practical matters. We consider them reliable and rely on them. To justify many of our beliefs, we have no other reason but the testimony of experts. Nonetheless, to trust the experts, it is necessary to recognize them and know their distinctive characteristics. In doing so, epistemologists proposed some definitions for experts and expertise. In this paper, First, we will explain the truth-based definition and then the justification-based definition and describe the criticisms of it. we show that the best definition is that S is an expert in domain D if and only if S has more understanding and ability than most people in domain D at his time. In the end At the end, we explain the five necessary conditions of belief, coherence, ability, efficiency and time.

Philosophical hermeneutics claims that understanding is born of historical conditions in various ways and is necessarily affected by it, and with its change, the conditions of understanding change and are formed according to new conditions. According to Gadamer, understanding is subject to various historical conditions, such as the interpreter's semantic horizon, his presuppositions, and the applicability of understanding. According to Heidegger, understanding is subject to fore-Having, fore-Sight, foreconception, which are all aspects of human existence. Dignity determines how a person understands; These are the main form of subsequent understandings and they are also fluid and influenced by historical conditions. Understanding is always the result of the fusion of historical horizons and as a result, the production of new meaning, not the reproduction of the author's meaning; Therefore, it is not possible to reach the author's intention. The above-mentioned dignity and the factors involved in self-understanding cannot be considered and studied independently, because whatever is chosen to be understood, it is understood through the channel of these virtues.

This article tries to deal with this issue with the method of inferring the verses of the Quran and inferring from them and with a critical view.

The findings of the article are summarized below -What is obtained from several verses of the Qur'an is not a criticism of historical foundations, because the Qur'an has no entrance to these new specialized topics; Rather, the denial of the result of these foundations means the denial of the inherent historicity of understanding, and when the result is denied, the original foundations are also questioned. Different categories of verses with implied implication can the negation of the inherent nature of all the dignity of understanding, which in Gadamer's view has caused the inherent historicity of understanding. -The verses informing about the occurrence of education, which comes along with the mention of education, imply that the understanding has been realized in accordance with reality and is permanent, and it implies with implied implication that the understanding of fact has occurred without the interference of the historical assumptions of man and his historical horizon; While in philosophical hermeneutics, all understandings are necessarily historical. -All different categories of verses that indicate the possibility of knowledge are incompatible with the inherent historicity of understanding. -There are many verses in the Qur'an that indicate, contrary to the claim of philosophical hermeneutics, that man has the ability to look independently at himself, his mind, his thoughts and ideas.

Consideration in the verses indicates that the meaning of different categories of verses independently or by adding some rational considerations does not agree with the view of the inherent historicity of understanding; Rather, the opposite can be inference from the verses.

In all periods of history, human has been trying to "understand". In order to understanding the natural world, scientists first observe samples and then classify them based on similarity. To figure out the actions of people, the matter seems different. To achieve this, we need to understand the intentions of people. Because intention has psychological nature, there is always a concern from empiricists that it may not be perceptible by third-person people. To some extent, many human actions are perceptible from a third-person point of view, and this causes them to be the subject of scientific investigations (with common scientific methods). However, there are cases that show the understanding of human activities from the third person of view has limitations.Stephen Grimm introduces a type of understanding and believes that by realising the specific goals of the person being understood as a desired action, we will achieve a deeper understanding. In this article, an attempt has been made to clarify the discussed issue first by proposing and interpreting Stephen Grimm's point of view, and then by proposing the problems and explaining the ambiguities of Grimm's idea, as an alternative formulation, we will show that the agent's decision for understanding or not understanding the actions of others, plays an important role. Empathy is known as a psychological capacity that can be understood in a different way by simulating the structure.Investigating and looking deeper into this issue will help us to judge it better as a method or an idea in social and human sciences.

The hermeneutic function and rational interpretation of the teachings of religion with an ontological approach is one of the most basic functions of Mulla Sadra's philosophy. The main issue of this article is how to understand the teachings of religion with philosophical arguments from Mulla Sadra's point of view. Let's deal with the theory of the adaptation of the worlds and the evolutionary motion of the soul. In this explanation, true theologians, and at the top of them the perfect man, with the intuition of the fact that the existence of God Almighty is in the highest order of existence and all the worlds are various manifestations of his single existence, reach a higher understanding of the teachings of religion and other human beings. In proportion to their existential order, based on the essential movement of the soul, they use the sea of ​​truth of the Qur'an and the teachings of religion;But the true understanding of the word of the Almighty is only those who, as a result of existential promotion and union with the higher worlds, with the help of revelation, intuition, and intellect within the limitations of the material world, have been able to achieve a correct interpretation of the revelatory text. Correct interpretation begins first with the understanding of words (apparent interpretation), then in the next stage, the interpreter, by using intuition, establishes a spiritual union with the soul and the interior of the world, and as a result, reaches the esoteric truths of the sublime system. In accordance with it.

“What is understanding” is an important question in Later Wittgenstein's works. To examine what understanding is and his positive discussion of understanding, Wittgenstein first shows what understanding is not. According to him, in common sense, understanding is a special mental state that is the source of correct use. But he believes that understanding is not a matter of the mind. He means that understanding is not a mental experience, not a mental state, not a mental process, not a brain disposition. In this article, I examine Wittgenstein's view of why understanding is none of the three mental things (mental experience, mental state, mental process) mentioned above. Also, I will evaluate Wittgenstein's view and show that it is possible to challenge the claim that understanding is not a mental experience, not a mental state, not a mental process. In other words, I will show that Wittgenstein has failed to show that understanding is not a matter of the mind.

Hermeneutics has been defined as "interpreting". Hermeneutics has faced many differences and conflicts in its tumultuous history, and the views of theorists on the mission of hermeneutics and its realm have varied widely. One of the most controversial issues in hermeneutics, which has even led to a fundamental shift in hermeneutic issues, was the ontological view of understanding, as regarded by Heidegger and Gadamer. They did not know the truth, as in previous periods, through the presentation of methods can be achieved. Philosophical hermeneutics believed in subjectivism; Prior to the emergence of this view, hermeneutics such as Schleiermacher and Delta sought to find a way to understand and to understand the correctly in terms of author and objectivity will be possible. Although ontological approach to the understanding of discourse are considered by many of twenty century philosophers, It also has been faced the criticism. Emilio Betty Warrick Hirsch defended objectivism in understanding texts with a critical and methodological view of understanding. This methodological approach is called methodological hermeneutics and the ontological approach is called philosophical hermeneutics. In this article, we try to explain the objectivist methodological hermeneutics through a library method and, referring to Heidegger and Gadamer's views, address the most important critiques of Hirsch in the subjective approach of philosophical hermeneutics.

Jacques Derrida was one of the few philosophers who seriously became involved with architecture. Despite his innermost desire, Derrida seems to have never made a proper connection with architecture. As soon as Derrida's theory of deconstruction was developed in architecture, it was thought that a practical way to translate and represent an idea was found. Concerning the output of the deconstruction style, the feedback of that opinion in the design of architectural spaces demonstrates that it was a complete failure. It showed the reflection of Derrida's idea on architecture was based on a poor understanding. The aim of this study is how accurate and complete the style of deconstruction in architecture represented Derrida's opinion on deconstruction? Derrida entered the deconstruction style project in architecture to show that arts are the best objectives to represent the manifestation of deconstruction. Although other studies accepted the formation of the deconstruction style in architecture as the fact of Derrida’s deconstruction, Parc de la Villette’s project really contradicts his hypothesis. Not from an architectural point of view, but from a philosophical point of view instead, this study emphasizes the philosophical basis of Derrida's views on deconstruction according to his thought on texts. Accordingly, as a strong and steady connection, Derrida's deconstruction is a kind of exposure to our relationship with the world, while the architecture's deconstruction style breaks the connection and even disrupts our relationships with this surrounding world.

The most basic intellectual basis of Salafieh is the reliability (hojjiyat) of the predecessor’s (salaf) understanding. They believe that the predecessor’s understanding [of sunnah] is more correct, wise and valid in comparison with the descendent’s (the khalaf) understanding , due to factors such as better understanding of the texts, being closer to the Prophet, and being close to the time of the Qur’an’s revelation. The Salafieh have argued in favor of their view by various verses of Qur’an. One of their most important arguments for this claim is verse 100 of surah Al-Tawbah. Relying on the general sense of this verse and connecting obedience and understanding, they have sought to prove the authority of the predecessor’s understanding. Although a predecessor who obeys the Prophet’s teachings in his/her thought and practice is more virtuous, but there is no reason to claim their absolute obedience. Proving this claim by verse 100 of surah Al-Tawbah has many drawbacks including: confusing the meaning of practice with understanding, lack of generality of the verse, lack of connection between consent and authority of understanding, lack of the absolute meaning of obedience and narrations indicating the superiority of successors over predecessors. In addition to explaining the Salafieh’s claim, I have tried to examine and critique their arguments in this article.

The involvement of presuppositions in the process of understanding is one of the most fundamental issues in philosophical hermeneutics. According to the followers of philosophical hermeneutics and given the phenomenological and analytical view they offer about human existence, firstly, man is a creature that is thrown into history and time; and secondly, he is full of understanding and perception, an understanding influenced by assumptions that are not voluntary due to his historical nature. Therefore, relying on the theory of reference to intuitive knowledge proposed by ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, this philosophical study follows an epistemological approach and uses an analytical-descriptive method to show that in examining different types of human perceptions and distinguishing between acquired and intuitive perceptions, a number of assumptions are involved in the understanding process, but these involvements are necessarily at the discretion of man. Thus, by presenting the analysis of the process of human understanding through reference to intuitive knowledge, the claim that understanding is non-methodical and, consequently, the involuntary involvement of presuppositions and its results (multiple interpretations and relativity) were rebutted.

Understanding is not matter of mind in Wittgenstein view. But this position is met with a protest called "scientific objection" as if the philosopher is simply ruling out something that neurologist or psychologist could discover. In this article we show that Wittgenstein did not resent the position of science and only denies the claim that science can provide an a priori account of understanding. In the general reading of Wittgenstein's view, understanding is seen as an ability. But this is at odds with the fact that understanding happens in an instant, and that is why we explained in this article the position of understanding is like the "beginning of ability" which considers both understanding in relation to ability and its occurrence. However, the denial of the subjectivity of understanding attributes an anti-realist stance on understanding to Wittgenstein. Therefore, with the help of McDowell's interpretation of Wittgenstein, we try to show that Wittgenstein considers the linguistic understanding as a certain state of mind in the language game. McDowell's interpretation, however, contradicts some of Wittgenstein's points, especially in Zettel.

Hermeneutics is the battleground of new theories in the field of understanding and interpretation. The study of the principles of hermeneutic theories is important because it provides a suitable ground for critique and analysis. Understanding and interpretation as the central point of hermeneutic discussions is founded on the four pillars of author, text, interpreter and context. The distinction of hermeneutic approaches depends on the role of each of the four pillars in the process of understanding and interpretation. In this article, the foundations of the hermeneutical views of the contemporary Islamic thinker, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, and the contemporary Western hermeneuticist, Hans-Georg Gadamer, are scrutinized and analyzed. A comparative study of the four pillars of understanding and interpretation shows that the difference between Shabestari and Gadamer’s views in the first pillar, i.e., the role of the author, is definite and absolute; the principles of their views in the other three pillars, however, have both commonalities and differences. The most important commonalities are pluralism in text interpretation, the fact that understanding is affected by history, the necessity of interrogating the text, the hermeneutic cycle and the effect of presuppositions in the process of understanding and interpretation, and their main differences are over the effect of the role of the author’s intention or its elimination in the process of understanding and the methodicalness or unmethodicalness of the process of understanding.

By insisting on the complexities of our particular type of understanding, Jacques Derrida focuses on how and why we do not understand each other. At the same time, most philosophers emphasize how we know each other. Derrida does not deny the truth but believes that we are living in a world with a stable suspension that prevents us from having a complete understanding of its truth. The truth is not only unstable, but it is even more unstable in the works of art. Thus, because of that the reflection of the truth becomes at the highest degree of diversity and instability, it is necessary for the creation of a work of art. Without this instability, the work of art becomes a mathematical formula that everyone can do. This instability and suspension allow the art to be unique and irreplaceable. Accordingly, the primary purpose of this study is to investigate why the audience will never get rid of an active and permanent interpretation of the work of art and how any perception will lead to more instability in understanding. These are the basic principles that any art needs to survive.

When we encounter with literary texts, works of art and films which are full of the relations of metaphors, narratives and actions, this important question maybe asked that how is their relationship and how it could be related to our understanding? In the present article, we will discuss Ricoeur's ideas concerning this problem.. Our thesis is that understanding in Ricoeur's thought is metaphoric, narrative and actual in nature. The metaphoric character of understanding will be shown on the basis of the "as" structure and seeing similarities simultaneous with differences. In his idea narration and plot are, like metaphor, gathering the differences with similarities and regulating them as unity. Ricoeur believes that narrative innovation with its referral to reality could be the origin of action and indicate the relation of action to understanding. Thus metaphor, narrative and action are the intrinsic aspects of understanding which are closely and fundamentally related to each other. As, In the area of hermeneutics, he extends the concept of text and its understanding beyond just writing, analyzing this theme will inform us the importance of the way of encountering different kinds of texts.

abstract Undubtly, One of the most influential movements in the world today is hermeneutics. This approach has been changed from the beginning to the present, due to the advent of various thinkers. Gadamer is the most intelligent and most radical advocate of a bunch of heroines, from which it is referred to as philosophical hermeneutics.in the other side, derrida Represents a stream of metaphysics challenging the western presence of the metaphysics, which does not trust the hermeneutics and the centrality of the understanding it derives from. This article will take a brief look at the history of hermeneutics, while examining the paradigms of thought of the two thinkers in question, focusing on the famous Gadamer and Derrida debate at the Goethe-Institut de Paris, using descriptive-analytic methods and using library and Internet resources, challenge The most important lies in the debate. The main question of the paper is as follows: The Challenge between "Understanding" and "Other" How is this debate analyzed? Such readings can serve as methodological guides to other epistemic areas in order to develop unconventional reading approaches.

Relying on his hermeneutic and interpretive perspective, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari regards the Holy Quran as "prophetic words" and the Prophet's monotheistic reading of the world in the light of revelation. In this paper, we have used a library-research method within the descriptive-analytical approach to criticize his interpretive perspective to illustrate the weaknesses of this view so as to indicate the weakness of his theory of the prophetic origin of the Qur'an. In addition to the fact that his interpretive theory leads to the denial of prophethood and Islam, there are also other weaknesses in that theory. These involve ignoring the other meaning of interpretation, not paying attention to all kinds of presuppositions, not paying attention to the degrees of understanding and implications, integrating two perspectives as well as two methods which are incompatible, generalizing the doctrines of the age of modernity and philosophical hermeneutics,  confusion of part and whole, not adhering to one of his foundations, introducing a loose criterion as a criterion for the examination and evaluation of presuppositions, and ignoring the most important use of language.