فیزیکالیسم غیرتقلیل گرا

According to Rorty the problem of our philosophical tradition to be the Platonic notion that man has the Glassy Essence by which we reflect the world around us, and this view of man results in the duality of mind and body, and ultimately the separation of human from the world. This paper is a descriptive method and content analysis and the main issue of this paper is how the nature of man and the world is described in Rorty's thought which leads to monism and Mulla Sadra's critique on what basis. The findings of this study indicate that in Rorty's Non- reductive physicalism, all lines between human and the world are removed and only the causation is established, which is a materialist view of man and the world. But Mulla  Sadra does not accept the dualism of body and soul on the basis of the principality of existence, substantial motion, the gradation of being, and finally with theory of ”Theophany”, and assumes a kind of human existential relation with the universe where the soul is nothing but the perfected body and the body is the cheap of soul.

In the division of theories of the philosophy of mind, all kinds of physicalists, whether reductionist or non-reductionist, are considered Monist; because they believe in the physicality of everything. Reductionist physicists, on the other hand, believe that in addition to knowing everything as physical, everything can be reduced to lower levels of physics; But non-reductionists in physicalism, although they consider everything to be physical, believe that in the field of physics we are confronted with "emergent" things that cannot be reduced to the fundamental particles of physics and given a microphysical explanation of Have them; Because we are basically dealing with something new; But "property dualism", by acknowledging the non-physical nature of mental features, believes in two kinds of things in the universe and, as a result, has fundamentally rejected both Monist physicalist theories. Moreover, although in feature dualism, as in non-reductionist physicalism, we encounter a genus of non-reductionism and novelty, non-reductionism and novelty in property dualism are "species" and "species," respectively. Is "fundamental", not "typical" and "superficial". The present article prevents further sputum by clarifying the exact boundaries of the dualistic nature of property with physicalism, especially its non-reductionist type.