ماهیت

The discussion of existence and quiddity and the relationship between them is one of the fundamental debates in philosophy, and various portraits of this relationship can be shown in distinct natural, logical, and philosophical molds. The word “distinct” is a homonym in these cases and has a particular meaning in each one. However, these meanings have been frequently confused with each other in the history of philosophy. One of the innovations of Islamic philosophy is the theory of the distinction of existence from quiddity, which was only possible in the light of understanding the meaning of the truth of existence. Islamic philosophers, particularly Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, tried to perceive existence differently from Aristotle and not to reduce the question of being to the whatness of objects because of their epistemological distance from the Greek tradition in philosophy. Nevertheless, this approach has also had its own critics. One of the philosophers who criticized the distinction of quiddity from existence is Ibn Rushd. He accused Ibn Sīnā of misunderstanding and heresy regarding the relationship between existence, quiddity, and accidents of existence and believed that Ibn Sīnā had confused the different meanings of existence and the one and had fallen in the trap of sophistry due to homonymy. Ibn Rushd maintained that the origin of the formation of objects is substance and considered existence to be merely a concept that can be abstracted from existing objects. His main criticism of Ibn Sīnā concerning this problem was that viewing existence as an accident for quiddity leads to several misconceptions such as equating existence with substance. However, Ibn Rushd himself had in fact failed to understand the meaning of existence as an accident in Ibn Sīnā’s view. He believed that Ibn Sīnā had equated existence and accident in the sense of a quiddative affair with each other, while Ibn Sīnā’s intention of occurrence of existence to quiddity as an accident was its addition to quiddity.

According to the prevalent view, Suhrawardi is believed to advocate for the primacy of essence. Although this issue is not addressed in his works under the explicit title of the debate on the primacy or contingency of existence and essence in the same way it was later discussed by Mulla Sadra and his successors, Suhrawardi's thought still reflects concepts related to this debate, which can be traced in his significant works. This paper attempts to reassess Suhrawardi's views based on his prior awareness of the contingency of existence in the thoughts of earlier philosophers, as well as the necessary subsequent implications of defending the primacy of essence in shaping the belief in the contingency of existence and its consequences. The aim is to evaluate Suhrawardi's views and clarify the true meaning of this inclination, considering the definitions found in his writings and the words of notable figures like Mulla Sadra. In conclusion, the article explores the real roots of his dispute with the proponents of the primacy of existence, emphasizing the differences in the intellectual and terminological frameworks of Illuminationist philosophy and Peripatetic philosophy. Additionally, it highlights the lack of attention to the distinction between the "verbal meaning" and "nominal meaning" of existence as a key to resolving the issue.

The problem of the ontological primacy of existence or quiddity was mentioned in the works of philosophers before Mulla Sadra, but not as a distinct and independent problem. It is said that the Illuminationist Philosophers insisted on the ontological primacy of quiddity but the Peripatetics emphasized that of experience. In his commentary on the Qushchi's commentary on Tajrid, Sadr al-Din Muhammad Dashtaki (d. 1524), the founder of the Shiraz Philosophical School, repeatedly implied the primacy of quiddity. things. Following Shahab al-Din Yahya Suhriwardi, Dashtaki provides arguments in favor of existence to be mentally posited. In other words, the real created thing is quiddity. The reality of God (the necessary existent) is neither existence nor quiddity. The real things are united with essence not existence. In addition, individualation is based on the mode of our conception, not on existence. In this paper, first, I examine his arguments in this relation, and then I show that neither those arguments nor their implications are valid.

The primacy of existence (Asalat al-Wujud) is the foundation of Sadraian transcendent philosophy. Among Sadraian scholars, there are differing interpretations of this concept. One significant source of disagreement lies in their diverse understandings of "quiddity" (Mahiyyah). Some consider quiddity to be the limit of existence, others regard it as an imaginary conceptualization of existence, and yet others see it as the very reality of existence.This article studies the interpretation of existence-quiddity identity and refers to it as the "interpretation of identity." Using an analytical-descriptive method, it seeks to explain the Sadraian doctrine of the primacy of existence by analyzing one of the foundational principles underlying the interpretation of identity in Sadraian philosophy. The study concludes that in this interpretation, existence is compared to quiddity. One of the premises giving rise to such an erroneous comparison is the assumption that existence is the analytical-causative aspect for quiddity. However, this premise is rejected due to a mistake of the realm of analysis with that of external reality, it also regards all contingent beings as necessary being inherently self-sufficient, which is logically untenable.

The primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd) serves as the basic and fundamental pillar of transcendent philosophy, and all the ingenuity of Mullā Ṣadrā is a direct result of it. Various interpretations of Mullā Ṣadrā about the posteriority and unreality of quiddity (māhiyyah) have led to the formation of a range of interpretations by the proponents of transcendent philosophy. This article examines the correct interpretation of the role and position of quiddity in four stages. At the first stage, the locus of conflict between the primacy of existence and the primacy of quiddity is elucidated. At the second stage, by accepting the primacy of existence, various interpretations of the position of quiddity are examined. The third stage addresses the impact of different interpretations of the primacy of existence on the theory of substantial motion. The fourth stage demonstrates which interpretation the theory of substantial motion fundamentally supports and endorses. The findings of the article, based on a descriptive-analytical approach, indicate that in the issue of the primacy of existence, considering quiddity as a mental concept (i'tibārī) is akin to a mirage, as interpreted by ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. It appears that the theory of substantial motion, while confirming this interpretation, has a greater compatibility with it. Some researchers have suggested that accepting ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's interpretation somehow negates nativism and leads to falling into idealism or perhaps nominalism. However, it must be noted that: Firstly, in this interpretation, the external existence of physical universal is not only not negated, but it also has a greater compatibility with the foundations of the primacy of existence. Secondly, the interaction of the mind with objective reality demonstrates that quiddity is not solely a construct of the mind, but due to existence of a real source of abstraction, it signifies the external reality.

The issue of Imamate and Caliphate in the cultures of Imami Shi'a and Sunni Islam is considered one of the key and contentious topics. This article presents a comparative analysis of the nature, foundations, and characteristics of Imamate from the perspectives of two theologians: Qadi Abd al-Jabbar al-Baqillani from the Ash'ari Sunni tradition and Allama Hilli from the Twelver Shi'a tradition. After examining and comparing their views, the findings indicate that the interpretations and beliefs of these two theologians differ significantly regarding the issue of Imamate. Qadi al-Baqillani considers the obligation of the Imam to be a religious duty rather than a rational one and fundamentally views the discussion of Imamate as a subsidiary jurisprudential matter. In contrast, Allama Hilli asserts that the discussion of Imamate is a theological issue and that the appointment of the Imam is divinely ordained. Consequently, from al-Baqillani's perspective and that of most Sunnis, the Imam is a governmental figure with both worldly authority and the responsibility to preserve and implement religion. This leads to differences in the nature, theoretical foundations, and specific instances of Imamate as reflected in the personal characteristics and attributes of the Imam. The present article, employing a documentary method along with data processing and aimed at elucidating the true concept of the Imam's existential reality and examining their attributes as the successor of the Prophet Muhammad, has been collected and organized.

Philosophers and theologians before Mullā Ṣadrā had diverse views about the ontological status of existence. Paying attention to their opinions is very important to understand Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine of ontological priority of existence. On the other hand, philosophers and theologians have dealt with this issue in different positions, and in some cases, there seems to be an apparent inconsistency. In contemporary works, there is no comprehensive examination about these diverse views. This article seeks to shed light on this issue. Peripatetic philosophers considered existence to exist and most likely considered it to be an accident. Suhrawardī and his followers criticized this opinion and considered existence as a secondary intelligible and non-existent. Many later philosophers and theologians also preferred Suhrawardī's viewpoint. While denying that existence is an accident, some theologians considered it to exist outside but to be identical with quiddity. They thought that their view is immune to Suhrawardī's criticisms. According to this opinion, for existence to exist, it does not need to be an accident to quiddity. Another related problem was that philosophers maintained that the universal concept of existence has external instances called particular beings. This is incompatible with existence being a secondary intelligible. ʿAbd-al-Razzāq Lāhījī tried to resolve the inconsistency. According to Lāhījī's solution, existence is external, but does not exist in external reality. This solution can be criticized.

In the fourth chapter of Pointers and Remarks (Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt), Avicenna draws conclusions from the univocality of extension within a certain category, positing the existence of an immaterial entity alongside materialistic extensions. Avicenna’s treatment of the relationship between universals and their extensions often resembles the familial bond between fathers and sons (plurality within plurality). However, in the fourth chapter of Pointers and Remarks, he introduces a novel model akin to the relationship between a single father and his sons (unity within plurality). By examining interpretations and comments on Pointers and Remarks, we delve into this conceptual tension. While Avicenna’s argument establishes the existence of universals in the external world, it falls short of proving their immaterial nature. His perspective aligns with realism, yet it also echoes Hamedani Man (al-Rajul al-Hamidānī)’s stance on universals—a viewpoint that necessitates reform and reconstruction. Employing a historical approach, we critically assess these ideas to arrive at a more coherent perspective.

The issue of distinction between existence and quiddity has been openly raised in Islamic philosophy; but there is not agreement regarding the origins of this issue. This article claims that in Uthulujiyya, in the topic of "intelligence", we can find the traces of “distinction between existence and quiddity". In the fifth Mimer of Uthulujiyya, he equates the term "Ma howa")ماهو))what question) with "Lema howa") هو لم)) why question) in the intellect and in other beings it is considered entirely different questions. What is meant the identification of these two sort of questions: the "Ma howa")ماهو)and "Lam howa") هو لم) in Intellect? Is it possible to consider the two terms "Ma howa")ماهو)and "Lema howa") هو لم) in Uthulujiyya in the subject of reason as "existential" in which the root of the problem of distinguishing "existence and nature" can be investigated? In this article, we intend to examine this issue conceptual-extensional and creatively. In terms of concept, let's explain it through definition, and its examples in the world of reason and matter, and in terms of innovation, we should examine the problem with complete innovation. Therefore, it is necessary to first explain the terms and words used for "existence" and "essence" in the Enneads Uthulujiyya and the understanding these books have of "existence" and "essence" and then to examine "Ma howa")ماهو)and "Lema howa") هو لم) and the issue of existence and essence in the intellect in terms of concept and examples. The method of this research is descriptive-analytical.

In his divine hiddenness argument, John Schellenberg argues that God's Intentional negligence to provide convincing evidence has put some of his sincere seekers in a state of reasonable nonbelief. According to Schellenberg, this is violate evidence of the absolute love of God, and further concludes from the absence of such an attribute, the absence of that essence. According to him, reassuring religious experiences and providing more empirical evidence can prevent such a situation. But Mulla Sadra, in his transcendental wisdom, by analyzing the characteristics of existence and essence and finally proposing the argument of the “Sedighin”, believes that God is existence and not existent, and according to the causal relationship between existence and existent, all beings are manifestations of existence. Analyzing the negative rules of existence such as not having other, not having essence not having opposite, and not have the same and some positive rules such as simplicity, limitlessness and conceptuality of existence, can reveal the secret of divine Hiddenness. Therefore, contrary to Schellenberg's view of orginality of essence, human beings are faced with a multitude of evidences and manifestations of the existence of God and Presentation of some arguments such as divine Hiddenness argument due to the lack of proper knowledge of God's attributes and consequently incorrect epistemological expectations about Him. The advantages of Sadra's view include explain the divine appearance at the same time as his hiddenness, Using self-evident and rational foundations, matching with the traditional theology of religions, introduce some positive and negative attributes of God, presenting a proper picture of the relationship between God and the world, correcting and modifying human epistemological expectations from God and ease of understanding. In this article, an attempt has been made to present two novel deductive interpretation based on Mulla Sadra's views so that based on their results.

The essential substance (nature) by itself only consists of its own essence according to the principle of “existence distinction from nature”, which is considered among the most important principles of Avicenna’s metaphysics and the metaphysical element of existence in order to exist must be occurred on it from the outside and from the determinant cause. Ibn Sīnā (Arabic: ابن سینا, Avicenna) also, based on this principle, establishes the important principle of “the necessary existent distinction from the potential existent” and he explains the issue of creation and the proof of existence of God on the basis of these two principles. Some of Avicenna’s phrases in explaining the distinction of existence on nature have led to different interpretations of his word. Ibn Rushd (Arabic: ابن رشد, Averroes)’ reading is one of the most important of these readings which has become popular among medieval thinkers through translating his works and his followers. Avicenna considers the distinction of nature and existence to be external according to Averroes’ view and believes that existence, like accidental categories, affects the nature. However, attention in Avicenna’s phrases shows that his purpose of considering ascription of existence to subject as accidental means that existence is not a part of essence and essentials and it is occurred from external over essence and nature and not that the existence is occurred to the nature like categorical accidents. Thomas Aquinas, though influenced by Averroes, considers his principle of distinction to be different from Avicenna’s and in some minor cases is different from Avicenna but the examination of his works shows that he is influenced by Avicenna in the main framework of the principle of distinction and its explanation is not significantly different from Avicenna’s.

The main aim of the present research is to examine and criticize the Theory of Two Originalities. This topic is fundamental, yet it has received less attention. According to famous philosophers, originality means having objectivity, exteriority, being the source of works, and forming the reality of the text. Therefore, those who claim that existence and essence have an external reality, believe in the theory of two originalities. The neglect of this theory has led some of its major supporters to introduce the Theory of Two Originalities under different names such as the originality of essence or the originality of existence, and various interpretations have been made based on the relationship between the existences and essences. In this study, three interpretations of the two originalities are presented: Rajab Ali Tabrizi considers existence as an external affair, but regards it as secondary to essence; Ahmad Ahwazi believes that existence and essence have an external combinatory unity; and Gholamreza Fayyazi believes that existence is realized in essence, and essence is considered as the existence's attribute in the exterior, and there is no external difference between them. After presenting these three interpretations, the arguments of the supporters of the theory of two originalities are examined and criticized, and finally, the most important criticisms of the supporters of the originality of existence are interpreted and evaluated.

Frazer and Wittgenstein had a completely different approach to the nature of religion and rationality arising from science. In Frazer's view, scientific rationality is the standard of everything; therefore, he puts religion aside. The result of Frazer's comparison between magic, religion, and science leads to the denial of religious rationality. Frazer's anthropology is based on scientific and rational explanations. According to him, after centuries of displacement in history, science has finally obtained the golden key that opens the doors of nature's treasure. Wittgenstein criticizes Frazer's opinions based on his fundamental thinking about the meta-rationality of faith. He rejects any rational and scientific explanation of religion. According to Wittgenstein, the language game of religion and the language game of science differ. Frazer cannot compare the rationality of believers' religiosity with the criteria of rationality in science and sees and despises the believers as completely wrong. This study, by analyzing Frazer's and Wittgenstein's opinions and after examining the conflict, will reveal why Frazer's criticisms of scientific rationality failed and how Wittgenstein, using metaphors such as language games and the form of life, freed religious rationality from the trap of Frazer's narrow-minded scientific criteria.

Mulla Sadra has demonstrated "The Principality of Existence" as the basis of the Transcendent Philosophy based on solid arguments and by studying the scholars before him, he considered the peripatetics to believe in The Principality of Existence and the Ishraqi in the principality of Quiddity. Although the question of the principality of Existence or Quiddity has not been raised in this way by early scholars, by examining their works and expressions, one of the parties to the issue in question can be attributed to them. This research seeks to find the opinion of 'Ghias al-din Mansur Dashtaki' on this matter. By examining his texts and expressions in a descriptive-analitical method based on Sadra's philosophy; while providing convincing evidence, the belief in the 'The Principiality of Quiddity' can be deduced from Ghias al-din Mansur. The above evidence will be presented and the claim will be explained in this research. Ghias al-din considers the concept of 'Existence' as one of the validations of the secondary intelligible and redundant on quiddity, denying the realization of any individual and external instances for it.

Extracting multiple concepts from a single instance is one of the philosophical issues that are used in philosophical subjects and argumentations. Is it possible to extract multiple concepts from a single instance? Some believe that this is possible and some believe that this is not possible. In this study, using the analytical-rational method, it is concluded that it is possible to extract multiple concepts from a single entity, and extracting multiple concepts from the simple instance occurs in some cases since it has a single dignity, and this quality is one of the properties of the mind that creates multiple concepts; Of course, from the qualities that exist outside and do not cause pluralism in their subject although this process relies on the degree and order of existence of the instance; That is, the more complete and robust the instance is, the more concepts the mind will extract from it, inasmuch as the opposite concepts, like  the First and the Last, can be extracted from the most complete instance and attributed to them. This selected view has effects and consequences that are discussed in the paper.

For a long time, the question of God's quiddity has been discussed in the words of philosophers and theologians. Most of the theologians have been positive about God's having a quiddity and most of the philosophers have opposed it. Both groups have presented several proofs for their claims, some of which are based on specific foundations. Examining these arguments shows that the interpretation and explanation of the truth of the existence and essence of the Necessary can be so decisive in this debate. Noticing the concomitants of quiddity can also help to reach a conclusion in the discussion. If we consider quiddity to be completely dependent on existence or if we consider the limitation as one of its concomitants, then we must negate quiddity from the Necessary, but if both of these are refuted, then we cannot negate quiddity from Him. In this article, the first claim is proven to be true and the second to be incomplete. The evidence supporting the necessity of quiddity for God is not sufficient, and therefore, because quiddity is essentially dependent on existence and cannot precede existence in any way, quiddity is negated from God.

Comparing the intuitions and thoughts of Muslim mystics and Suhrawardī regarding the existence of God and the Light of lights and extracting the differences and commonalities of their views provide the ground for promoting their thoughts and also the optimal use of their works. This article, with a descriptive-analytical method, tries to prove the states of inclusive unity (wāḥidiyya) and exclusive unity (aḥadiyya) in the essence of the Light of lights and argue for the ontological primacy of existence in the Illuminationist philosophy of Suhrawardī. Two questions are dealt with in this article. The first is whether, despite his lack of explication, the intuitive divine states of inclusive and exclusive unity of mystics' God can be ascribed to Suhrawardī's Light of lights, too. The second issue is whether according to Suhrawardī's implicit endorsement of the primacy of existence, the existence of Suhrawardī's God is the same as the existence of mystics' God, and according to his endorsement of the primacy of quiddity, they are not the same. The result is that Suhrawardī has implicitly accepts the mystic states of inclusive and exclusive unity of God and renders the existence of God and the Light of lights identical, not their quiddities.