ماینونگ

This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents, or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work. This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work. This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work.

The Unity of the Encoding PropositionAbstract: There is a family of problems under the rubric of “the unity of the proposition”. They ask how is it that (ordinary) propositions are unit wholes over and above their constituting parts, how is it that they are representational and have truth values. In this paper, we propose the very same concern regarding the Meinongian encoding propositions; those propositions that contain the encoding mode of predication rather than the ordinary exemplificational predication. Embracing such a dual mode of predication lets us interpret propositions such as “the round square is round” not only as meaningful but also as true propositions. We demonstrate how to reduce exemplification to encoding. This should dissolve the classical problem of the propositional unity, yet providing a rather new formulation of it.

Austria has had some important philosophers which the greatness of their thought، led some to speak of the existence of an Austrian school in the philosophy. And since these philosophers had important role in the history of analytic philosophy، some، pursuing the first group and relying on their idea، believed in an Anglo-Austrian version of analytic philosophy، and of course they confronted some opposition. Beside English philosophers، contribution to the analytic philosophy، they defend of Austrian philosophers، contribution to it، while their opponents defend of German philosophers، contribution instead. In addition to the Anglo-Austrian and Anglo-German versions of analytic philosophy، there is a third version، named Anglo-American version which because of its neglecting Austrian and German philosophers، contributions is not considerable. This paper aimed to express specifications of Austrian philosophy at the first، then to assess the Anglo-Austrian version of Analytic philosophy and some of criticisms against it.