معرفت شناسی

Beauty and its nature are of the most controversial philosophical topics among philosophers. Among the ancient Greek and medieval philosophers, beauty, goodness, truth, and justice have been raised. Some Western thinkers have raised beauty and its truth in such a way that it led to the emergence of one of the arguments for proving the existence of God. The nature of beauty and how to prove the existence of God through the beauties of the world and the relationship between beauty and successful sciences is an issue that Robin Collins has addressed, and this research attempts to examine and analyze his views. Accordingly, the author attempts to study and examine the dimensions of this issue by raising minor questions and using a descriptive-analytical method. The research findings show that this argument attempts to prove the existence of God through two epistemological and ontological methods. These methods focus on our ability to recognize beauty or on the existence of beauty itself. Collins's view on beauty is particularly rich and prominent, and it has become clear that he considers simplicity with variety to be the criterion of beauty. Collins also puts epistemology and ontology together and believes in the alignment between human aesthetics and successful theories of science. By recognizing the world as the work of the Creator and emphasizing that beauty is human-centered, he proves the existence of God, the Creator of beauty. Although challenges such as hasty action and lack of clarity of reasoning have come to this argument, this argument is still the center of attention as a new innovation in the contemporary century.

This article uses a descriptive-analytical method to explain the nature of ignorance and its types in Mulla Sadra's works. Sometimes, ignorance is referred to as (1) lack of knowledge, sometimes (2) lack of true belief, and sometimes (3) lack of knowledge or true belief. Mulla Sadra's view on the relationship between knowledge, imagination, and affirmation shows that, from his perspective, ignorance cannot be limited to a lack of knowledge (imagination) or a lack of belief (affirmation). Mulla Sadra classifies ignorance into three categories: (1) simple ignorance, (2) compound ignorance, and (3) ignorance opposed to reason. In Mulla Sadra's intellectual system, different types of ignorance exist in contrast to justified true belief: (a) false belief, or belief in things that are contrary to reality; (b) unjustified true belief, such as imitative true beliefs without justified reason; (c) disbelief—the failure to acknowledge and denial of justified true belief due to prejudice, stubbornness, or concealment of the truth; (d) suspension of judgment regarding a true belief in a state of doubt and uncertainty; (e) light inattention (negligence) toward a true belief that can be resolved with attention; (f) heavy inattention (negligence) toward a true belief that cannot be resolved with attention (deep ignorance); (g) lack of talent or ability to pay attention, understand, and acknowledge a true belief (complete ignorance). Based on the doctrine of transcendental wisdom regarding doubt, the types of ignorance can be considered as different levels and degrees of severe and weak ignorance.

Possibility of knowledge and its essential nature, often in response to skeptics who denied its attainability. The central issue in these discussions has been identifying the key components of knowledge. The traditional view, rooted in Plato's thought, defines knowledge as "justified true belief." While this perspective dominated Western epistemology from ancient Greece until the 20th century, some scholars have argued that knowledge alone is insufficient to capture the full range of human cognitive capabilities. Instead, they have emphasized the concept of "understanding."
This study aims to differentiate understanding from knowledge, presenting them as distinct cognitive capacities that address different aspects of human curiosity and intellectual engagement. Using a descriptive-analytical method with a critical approach, the research demonstrates that understanding is neither equivalent to knowledge nor a subset of it. The key argument is that, ontologically, understanding is non-transferable, whereas knowledge is transferable.

Metaphysics has a long-standing history in philosophy. Although it does not date back as far as philosophy itself, it has always been a fundamental part of philosophical systems and is regarded as "first philosophy", the highest domain of rational knowledge. At times, metaphysics has been considered synonymous with philosophy, addressing fundamental questions about the essence and reality of things, or pure being. However, as intellectual developments have progressed, metaphysics has faced serious criticism and even outright rejection. Immanuel Kant and Rudolf Carnap, two prominent philosophers from distinct philosophical traditions, adopted critical stances toward metaphysics, resulting in profound transformations within this field. Kant, through his Copernican Revolution and his distinction between analytic/synthetic propositions and a priori/a posteriori concepts, examined the conditions under which metaphysics could be considered possible. In contrast, Carnap, a leading figure of the Vienna Circle, developed theories on analytic/synthetic judgments and their relationship to experience, establishing an epistemological framework that dismissed metaphysical propositions as meaningless. This article seeks to address the following questions: Which aspects of Kant’s philosophy revitalized philosophical thought and influenced Carnap and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle? How did Kant critique and redefine metaphysics? How did Kant’s rationalist philosophy shape the empiricism of the logical positivists? A comparison of these two philosophers’ perspectives reveals that Carnap drew significant inspiration from Kant’s philosophy. Nevertheless, a fundamental difference exists between them: Kant sought to liberate metaphysics from its traditional framework and redefine it in a scientific and rigorous manner. In contrast, Carnap, emphasizing empiricism and dismissing metaphysics as futile, aimed to abolish it entirely and pave the way for the scientific advancement of human knowledge.

One of the main topics in the science of the principles of suspicion, such as single news, the authority of appearances, etc. Most of the issues raised in the authenticity of suspicion are raised with a principled approach, and its epistemological value has been given less attention. The main problem of this article is to analyze this issue. This article, which is written with a descriptive-analytical method, expresses the views of Usulians on the validity of suspicion and then tries to find a way to explain the reality of suspicion, which according to the chosen point of view of this article, it is proved that these suspicions have discovery and reality. And the credibility of rational Emirates, including the news of Wahad, is not something outside of their essence, and they do not need to forge authenticity. In addition to opening a new path in explaining the validity of suspicion, proving the reality of suspicion has numerous benefits in non-jurisprudential descriptive sciences, especially humanities. Especially, this method can be used in the three areas of "existing human being", "ideal human being" and "transformation method from the existing situation to the desired situation".

In classical logic, the rules of inference allow any conclusion to be deduced from the premises of an argument if they are inconsistent, just as they allow the conclusion of the deduction to be deduced from any premise if it is a theorem. In the book "A New Outlook on the Elements of Logic", 2nd edition, 2023, Hajihosseini introduced a revised definition for the validity of an argument by adding two new conditions to known criteria for validity. According to this definition, an argument is valid if and only if, in addition to the conditions of validity in classical logic, if the conclusion of the argument is not inconsistent, its premises together do not form an inconsistent set. Moreover, if all the premises of the argument are not axioms or theorems/ logical truths, its conclusion is not a theorem/ logical truth.Asadollah Fallahi, in his article Logic and Informativeness in Hajhosseini's Systems, Existence and Knowledge, Vol.9, No.1, criticizes the foundations of logical systems of this book and claims that the new conditions for the validity of an argument are epistemological and not logical conditions. In the forthcoming article, we address these critiques and demonstrate that they are susceptible to numerous fallacies. Furthermore, we show that Fallahi's proposal to transform the new conditions into epistemic conditions is based on unaccepted assumptions.

Dealing with cyber epistemology is important and necessary due to the fact that cyberspace has gradually become a source of human knowledge and will undoubtedly become a part of the human brain in the future. Today, we turn to Google for information, not to specialized books and encyclopedias and specialists. Internet and social networks are the foundation of today's information society. Without them, there would be no information society. But the human mind gradually expands and becomes an expanded mind through the Internet. The extended mind interacts with information processing. This mind will process information in certain ways. Cyber knowledge or knowledge that users gain in cyber space, or virtual knowledge that they find in cyber space can have different forms. In this case, we base the discussion on the phenomenological division of cyber (virtual) knowledge. From this point of view, cyber knowledge is divided into two types: passive cyber knowledge, extra manual cyber knowledge. This article aims to discuss this.

The theory of nature has a privileged position among monotheistic thinkers in both Christianity and Islam. In Christianity, the theory of nature became prominent because the teachings of Christianity lacked the capacity of reasonableness. Therefore, Christian thinkers tried to address this shortcoming by establishing the theory of nature. According to this theory, they could make many Christian teachings seem reasonable. In the Islamic world, many contemporary thinkers were committed to the theory of nature according to some Islamic verses and traditions. However, what is important is that this theory, in the last few decades, has gained traction among Muslim thinkers, according to Motahari's scientific point of view.. Motahari in opposition to the anthropological theories of materialist schools, such as Marxism and existentialism which considers the essence of human existence to be material, proposed the theory of nature to negate the view of human materialism, and established a new framework in Islamic anthropology. The purpose of this research is to critically examine Professor Motahari's opinions regarding the theory of nature, which is derived from the epistemology of his religious belief. He examines religious belief through the relationship between reason and faith, advocating for  the theory of nature. In this research, according to the reflections and criticisms that can be directed at the theory of nature, it becomes clear that this theory does not have the desired function. Therefore, those who hold opinions on this matter should build a foundation characterized by the  reasonableness of religious belief(s).

Many believe that the problem of imagination was propounded after Suhrawardī and later by Mullā Ṣadrā in a more systematic form. However, the truth is that many of the important ideas concerning imagination were presented by Fārābī, who deliberated over them among his ontological and epistemological discussions. Unlike the Greek tradition, in which imagination lacked an epistemological aspect, and unlike Plato and Aristotle, Fārābī was the first to pay particular attention to its epistemological aspect and explained and analyzed several domains in unity with imagination. Therefore, imagination has various functions in Fārābī’s epistemological system, including protecting sensory forms; the analysis and synthesis of forms; comparison; contrast; imitation; metaphorical thought; education and punishment; provoking act; leading people towards happiness; perception of meaning particularly in relation to the problem of dreams, and revelation and unveiling. Some of these functions are presently receiving great attention in various sciences. Although Fārābī had a negative approach to imagination when it prevents intellection or replaces the intellect, he viewed its other functions positively in his works.

Imagination is a mental activity with which we can imagine an event free from its temporal and spatial characteristics. This function of the mind provides us with the necessary conditions for secondary and internal observation of primary external observations. In a way, it can be said that imagination plays a fundamental role in human perception and not only makes a person capable of advanced theoretical understanding, but also gives a person the necessary ability to capture the outside world and achieve their goals. Farabi and Spinoza both paid attention to the importance and use of imagination. In a way, it can be said that for both, imaginative cognition is an important pillar in human perception. Farabi considers the re-summoning of the sensory form after its absence and the ability to analyze and combine sensory forms after the absence of sensory observation as the primary role of the imagination, which not only gives a person the ability to go beyond sensory perception and recognize external observations and their similarities, but also It prepares the human mind to understand the general perception. In a way, it can be said that the power of imagination is the link connecting sensory perceptions with intellectual perceptions. Spinoza considers the perception caused by the body's impressions from the outside world as vague experience or imaginative perception because this type of perception does not give us knowledge about the truth of objects and their relationships, and only gives us vague ideas that are useful for our living. Therefore, although Farabi accepts the realism of imaginary sensory perception, Spinoza places practical value on them and does not place theoretical value on them, and considers imagination to include sensory, experimental, and imaginary perceptions, knowledge resulting from the frequency of general concepts and even false notions.
 
 

This research was done with the purpose of explaining and investigating the epistemological foundations of philosophical counseling.

The type of this research is theoretical in terms of purpose and qualitative in terms of approach. Various methods were used to collect data and to achieve the objectives of the research. The main method used in this research is the analytical method. For this purpose, the method of conceptual analysis and interpretation and conceptualization was used to explain the research question.

In philosophical counseling, acquiring knowledge is a human achievement that is obtained as a result of constructing meanings and evaluating human realities. Hence, the subject is human knowledge and human knowledge can always be re-considered and evaluated. This approach is based on eight epistemological foundations including: the inseparability of knowledge and human existence, genuine knowledge against false knowledge, the experimental and cross-cultural nature of knowledge, going beyond discursive knowledge and the fundamental transformation of references, direct and critical knowledge, the impartiality of a consultant in The process of acquiring knowledge is based on self-awareness and human's innate desire to realize knowledge. The most important source of acquiring knowledge in philosophical counseling is the senses of ontology and the most important means of acquiring knowledge are dialogue, formal logic, phenomenology, examination and analysis of clients' experiences, and language analysis.

In this research, we are using a descriptive-analytical method to answer that why does Ghazali establish an epistemological system with a taste of phenomenology to deal with the truth of the doctrines of religious life? It seems that Ghazali's skepticism about the validity of the doctrines of religious life and the falsifiability of theoretical reason in this regard leads him to the doctrines of this type of life. This causes Ghazali to deal with Sufism in the context of practical reason to achieve certain knowledge. Therefore, Ghazali's skepticism in the field of common sciences of religious life and deviation from theoretical reason in the context of dogmatic metaphysics leads him to the perceptions of practical reason and ethics and ultimately Sufism. Sufism became a means for Ghazali's serious entry into the field of anagogical exegesis and interpretation of the world of religious life and common texts in this type of life. Therefore, his tendency towards sufism and anagogical exegesis prepared the ground for the phenomenological approach to the aforementioned sciences to organize an intuitive epistemological system in order to prove the truth of the doctrines of religious life.

This study addresses the separation and lack of alignment between truth and the various levels of human knowledge. The levels of knowledge referred to here are the types of cognition Ayn al-Quzat discusses, namely: sensory, imaginative, rational, and mystical knowledge. The aim of this study is to assess the extent to which each type of human cognition corresponds to reality and the ultimate truth of the world. For this purpose, a descriptive-analytical method has been used. Ayn al-Qadat primarily views rational and mystical knowledge as the core forms of human cognition, whereas sensory and imaginative knowledge serve mainly as preliminary steps towards rational cognition. With respect to correspondence to reality, rational knowledge is capable only of grasping sensory objects as they appear, while its understanding of the metaphysical realm and human states remains allegorical and cannot be considered to truly correspond to reality. With respect to mystical knowledge, while it enables the perception of truths beyond the sensory world, this correspondence is from a human perspective and does not fully coincide with the ultimate truth of the world. This misalignment can be seen in Ayn al-Quzat’s discussion of the relation between divine attributes and God’s essence, the evaluation of the attributes, the status of Iblis, and the perception of God’s love for His servant. Exiting this human perspective and reaching the stage of annihilation (fana) leads to the perception of the truth of the world, although in this state, attributing cognition to the human being becomes very difficult.

Nasr criticizes the crisis caused by Western epistemology and considers it the result of distance from tradition and creating a distance between being and knowledge. Like the traditionalists, he considers the lack of attention of new philosophers to intuitive intelligence and the ignorance of the sacred knowledge based on it, which is rooted in the human heart, the disconnection with the unseen world and the degradation of intellect to reason are the cause of the current situation. Nasr has explored the role of existence in the great Islamic philosophers from Ibn Sina to MullaSadra and speaks with the aim of showing sacerdness of attention to its existence and coexistence with knowledge. Now that knowledge is devoid of its sacred content and the relationship of Truth or intellectual intuition with the sacred is neglected and the secular world is alien to the memory of God and the presence of the sacred, only by reviving theosophy and connecting intuitive intelligence with the light of Intellect, which is the light of Revelation and the Quran, as well as the practical commitment of man to the knowledge issued by God, can the authentic truths of Being be achieved.

This paper aims to examine the role of rational impressions in general, and a specific type of them, namely cognitive impressions, within the epistemology of early Stoicism as essential for attaining knowledge. To achieve this, the process of forming impressions in the ruling part (hegemonikon) of the soul, from a natural perspective, is first clarified. The discussion then turns to how human impressions, as those of a rational being, inherently possess inseparable, non-material content, distinguishing them fundamentally from the impressions of non-rational beings, including children. Thus, the claim made by some commentators that these impressions are similar in their initial stage of formation in the soul is not accurate. To further this argument, the place of concepts in Stoic thought and the difference between their approach and that of other ancient thinkers, including Epicurus, is examined. Finally, with reliance on the Stoic causal approach and the role of expertise, an analysis is conducted on the inadequacy of focusing solely on apparent characteristics to distinguish cognitive impressions from non-cognitive ones.

The production of religious science is a very important prerequisite for the realization of Islamic civilization and has always been a concern of Islamic thinkers. Various strategies have been proposed for the production of religious science. One of the centers that has a long history of special attention to this matter and has presented significant productions and theories about it is the “Islamic Sciences Academy of Qom.” Studying the identity of the religious science proposed by this center before explaining and examining its foundations, is erroneous and leads researchers to numerous fallacies. The Academy believes in six foundational principles for determining the “identity of religious science”: the study of the West, sociological study of the science production process, epistemology, philosophy, logic, methodology, and the study of religion. One of the Academy’s unique theories, considered a renaissance in epistemological discussions, is the “Directionality of Knowledge” theory. This theory is one of the Academy’s innovative and highly influential foundations in analyzing the identity of religious science. In this study, utilizing library research methods and rational examination of discussions, we have elucidated various aspects of the theory of the directionality of knowledge and critiqued it. Addressing this theory is of particular importance due to its fundamental nature and the possibility it creates for critiquing other views and scientific works of the Academy. Another unique feature of this study is the use of works available in the Academy’s repository, some of which have not been published.

In Islamic tradition, man is defined as an intermediary and liminal being, situated between the animal and the angel, with the constant potential for ascent or descent to either of these ontological spheres. This paper endeavors to provide a philosophical interpretation of this intermediary and liminal position of man based on the concept of the imaginative faculty in the philosophies of Al-Farabi and Kant. The central question of this essay is to examine how, in the works of these two philosophers, epistemology serves as a platform for offering an ontological interpretation of man's liminal position. This paper represents an initial exploration of this topic. Given the prominence of the imaginative faculty in Kant's philosophy, particularly in his discussion of transcendental deduction, this paper will begin by tracing the trajectory of transcendental deduction, highlighting the role of the imaginative faculty and its two levels of productive and reproductive imagination. It will then proceed to examine these two levels of imagination (productive and reproductive) in Al-Farabi's thought, without resorting to simplistic comparisons or equating the two philosophers' perspectives. Employing an analytical approach, the paper will seek to establish an anthropological foundation for the imaginative faculty in the philosophies of both thinkers. The intermediary role of imagination in the realization of knowledge in the works of these two philosophers provides the basis for such an endeavor.

Definition of "knowledge" is one of the most important and at the same time the most challenging problems in the history of "epistemology". Farabi -heavily influenced by Plato's epistemological system, especially in the treatises "Theaetetus", "Meno", "Republic", "Euthyphro" and "Phaedo"- considers the possible and desired knowledge as "certain knowledge" in the field of worldview and theoretical and non-evident propositions. His definition of "certain knowledge" or "logical certainty in its most specific sense" includes the four pillars of "firm, true and stable belief". Almost all Muslim philosophers, logicians and epistemologists, including the ancients, the late ones and the contemporaries, have embraced the above definition and made their efforts to confirm and complete it. Leaving out the term "truth", however, Avicenna apparently turned to present a "tripartite definition" of knowledge. Regarding the absence of the term "truth" in Avicenna's definition of "knowledge", two hypotheses can generally be imagined: renunciation and deviation, or his adherence to the celebrated definition. Researchers of philosophy and epistemology have accepted the second hypothesis and have proposed at least two interpretations and justifications in order to prove their claim. In their research and by accepting the second hypothesis, the authors have critically repudiated the arguments for other authors presenting a third and novel interpretation. Having cited four evidences from Avicenna's own works, the authors have vindicated the main claim (i.e. Avicenna's commitment and adherence to the Quadruple definition of Farabi and celebrated philosophers and the fact that Avicenna's omission of the term "truth" in the definition of knowledge is merely a matter of formality).

In many works of ancient and contemporary logicians, there is no clear distinction between logic and epistemology, and this causes them to mix up the rules of one with the other. In this paper, I will deal with Gholamreza Zakyani and specially Mortaza Hajhosseini, among contemporary thinkers in Iran. Gholamreza Zakyani claims that contradictory propositions do not yield any results. In this article, we show that this claim is actually a confusion between logic and epistemology. On the other hand, Mortaza Hajhosseini has developed non-standard logical systems based on specific philosophical foundations in the second edition of his book Two Non-Classical Logic Systems, A New Outlook on Elements of Logic. In our opinion, he imposes epistemic principles on logic. Some of the explicit or implicit theoretical foundations of his logical systems are: 1. Contradiction only entails contradiction. 2. A logical theorem only comes from a logical theorem. 3. Knowledge cannot be had of a contradiction. 4. Knowledge of theorems is independent of knowledge of other propositions. 5. Logical theorems are the most superior propositions and since the result depends on the inferior premises, a logical theorem cannot be inferred from other propositions. 4. The contradiction is the most inferior proposition and since the result depends on the inferior premises, contradictory premises can yield only a contradictory result.