مقولات

One of the issues that has preoccupied the human mind from the beginning and has instinctively sought an answer to is the expression of the relationship between phenomena. Each philosopher, according to their own foundations, perspectives, and different theories, has discussed and attempted to answer it. These discussions are usually gathered under the topic of causality. In this article, the author has tried to use the library method to, after stating the general preliminary foundations, conduct a comparative study of the views of two of the world’s great philosophers, namely Immanuel Kant and Sadra al-Din Shirazi. Ultimately, the writer concludes that Kant, given his cognitive view and mental structure, speaks of causality as one of the categories of understanding and mind, and Mulla Sadra, given the realistic view that he has set as his intellectual background, presents causality as a real relationship between longitudinal levels in the form of hierarchical existence. 

Porphyry's work titled Isagoge is commonly seen as an analysis of Aristotle's Categories, focusing on universal concepts, with the five predicables considered as different types of universals. Often, the same view is ascribed to Aristotle, but in fact, it is an approach arising from a confusion between universal and whole, as well as a confusion between particular and part by Porphyry in the Isagoge. In Categories, Aristotle does not refer to "whole" and "part" as synonyms for "universal" and "particular. Porphyry, however, in some cases distorting this distinction, uses “whole” and “part” to mean “universal” and “particular”. Moreover, they disagree on the essence of the five predicables and their relation to the universal. Aristotle views genes and species as universals and their connection to individuals as universal to particular, but he distinguishes them from the concept of universal and does not believe every universal is a genes or species. Porphyry, on the other hand, reduces genes and species to mere universal conceptions and consider them as synonyms for universal. It appears that there are two approachs in the philosophical tradition that started with Porphyry. These approachs were perpetuated and broadened by later thinkers. Initially, he altered the understanding of whole and part to universal and particular. Furthermore, he reduced genes and species to mere universal.

Causality and time are the most central subjects in Kant's philosophy. He considers phenomena as objects of experience that are possible only with the law of causality and determines them in temporal relation. Kant responded to Hume who considered causality to be purely empirical and habit-based, and saw the causality to be a priori. For Kant, there is an order among human representations; the current state in this order is correlated to a prior and past state, and this correlation is still undetermined. Determining the current phenomenon from the past phenomenon is possible through time; so this mental sequence becomes an objective sequence, and phenomena are determined through their temporal determination. This process for Kant makes possible an empirical understanding of the time sequence. Causality does not occur through sensory perception and comparison of phenomena by repetition, uniformly, and through a succession of previous phenomena; rather, causality is an a priori concept. Kant introduces time in any transition from one state to another state and thus deals with the empirical determination of time. From Kant's point of view, the relationships are not in the phenomena, but the links of time have an empirical structure, according to which we determine objectively these phenomena as perceptual objects of a single experience with the help of A Priori Principles.

Substance is one of the fundamental concepts in the history of philosophy that has a history as long as the history of philosophy itself. Although this concept has underwent profound developments and assumed different layers during the centuries, because of its firm linkage with common-sense, never lost its significance. Since the birthplace of the concept of substance is ancient Greece and Greek philosophy, this essay intends to narrate an analytical history of the genesis of the concept in ancient Greece; then to trace its course of development in Christian and Islamic middle age; and finally, to investigate its remnants in modern philosophy. The purpose of this essay, however, is not merely a philosophy-historical narrative, but its secondary purpose is to place the concept of substance under a critical light and to report its fundamental critiques. Hence, we will consider the most important critiques, mostly proposed by Anglo-Saxon philosophers, and will conclude that this concept in order to have a legitimate presence in philosophy, must submit a fundamental reformulation.

 In his Copernican revolution, Kant changed the centrality of cognition from the external world to the knowing subject. In this way, human mental structure provides the context of experience; And based on that, he acquires aesthetic and imaginary knowledge and finally reaches the understanding of the external world. Although Kant proposes this theory and goes as far as the schematism by imagination, it seems that his views are confused in explaining categories as pure concepts that are completely independent of experience, sense and time. According to Kant's doctrine, every concept and therefore categories must be referred to an intuition. But on the one hand, if categories are returned to sense and experience in any way, then they are not pure concepts of understanding; Although Kant does not accept it, he cannot explain his opinion successfully; On the other hand, if categories are pure and beyond experience and sense, then they must be referred to something; And Kant refers them to the "objective in general" intuition; But in this case, he is caught in the transcendental object; Especially, the characteristics that Kant enumerates for the "object in general" create the suspicion that the understanding perceives the categories with intellectual intuition from the "object in general" or in other words from "Being". 

It is a universal and partial of the issues discussed in philosophy and logic. Whereas, in order to avoid intermingle the issues of each science, their boundaries are Located through their subjects; The question arises why in both the sciences of logic and philosophy, both universal and partial are discussed? The present article seeks to find the distinguishing feature of this discussion in this scientific field. By studying the historical course and using the analytical method, it is concluded that from the beginning of the formation of this discussion in Aristotle's system of thought, there is no significant difference between his metaphysics and logic. Muslim philosophers, including Ibn Sina, although at first acting in the method of Aristotle as a commentator, later considered some issues, such as the categories in which the Five Universals as an entry of categories, to be outside the scope of the science of logic. On the other hand, the discussion of the Five Universals is one of the inevitable issues in logic due to the need for it in the subject of notions and definitions. There are also differences of opinion among philosophers regarding the source of division of the five generalities, which indicates the intermingle of the issues in philosophy and logic. Some views, in distinguishing this discussion in the two mentioned areas, have proposed different considerations and modes, and some have relegated the ontological discussion of generalities to philosophy and the study of its rules to the field of logic.

I examine the philosophical and historical merits of Avicenna’s Dānešnāmeh-ye ʿAlāyī. With this aim, I briefly discuss the structural characteristics of the Dānešnāmeh and situate it within Avicenna’s oeuvre in respect to his other summae. I argue that in the Dānešnāmeh Avicenna takes serious steps towards the ideal order and pedagogical sequence of the philosophical sciences, the foundation of which he has laid in the Kitāb al-Šifāʾ. For supporting this claim, I concentrate on Dānešnāmeh’s expositions of the two doctrines of the categories and body and show how the development of Avicenna’s views on them reaches its climax in the Dānešnāmeh. Arguing for the significance of Dānešnāmeh as a comprehensive summa and its constructive role in the post-Avicennan tradition, I will draw attention to its neglect and marginalization by contemporary scholarship, and suggest reasons for this regrettable underestimation. I provide an overview of the editorial genealogy of the Dānešnāmeh, and then relying on the previous discussions, reason that Mawlā’s earnest edition of it is informed by a major structural error which has entirely ruined one of its most significant philosophical innovations, and is consequently unusable for research purposes. I conclude my piece by suggesting that the Dānešnāmeh still stands in need of a new critical edition based on sounder editing techniques, and informed by consideration of a wider range of manuscripts. If we are to gain a more comprehensive picture of the development of Avicenna’s philosophy, I urge the scholarly community to pay this work the careful attention that it deserves.

Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms is one of the theories that offers a new possibility to rethink how human knowledge has evolved, especially in primitive human minds and mythical thought. The stages of knowledge, according to this philosophy, start from mythical thinking, and pass through religion and mysticism into art and science and reach Kant's transcendental perspective. But despite his emphasis on the importance of art in his works, Cassirer had no specific explanation of artistic knowledge. For this reason, the present article seeks to examine the characteristics of mythical thought, including its categories and perceptual forms and by focusing on Cassirer's disputed views on art, defines art as one of the symbolic forms. This paper is written in a descriptive-analytical method and with a library-attribute checklist in the theoretical framework of philosophy of symbolic forms. By trying to explain or compare the data, it examines the possibility of the continuity of mythical categories and forms of perception in artistic thought or the possibility of reconstructing them. Finally, based on the results, the work of art is introduced as a concrete emergence of mythical thought which, with the need to make such a transformation, extends the categories and perceptual forms of mythical thought in artistic thought with necessary modifications.

Being is the first basis of recognition and the first issue for the metaphysics. Aristotle has said in different pages of the metaphysics on "being qua being" means “to on” and emphasized," Being has various meanings." He, rather than 'Being', has used "being" or existent. He, in the seventh book, has said: What has long been a source of confusion is that “what is being?” What does “being” mean? These meanings of existence, what effect does have on Aristotle's metaphysical system? Whether these meanings can be delivered to each or not? The meanings of "being” in Aristotle’s thought are controversial issue among scholars. Someone like Thomas Aquinas takes five senses and Farabi three senses and Avicenna five meanings for the existent. In this paper, while analyzing Aristotle's view based on metaphysics and looking at Thomas Aquino's perspective, we have delivered four meanings for "being" in Aristotelians. (Being of per accident, being of per true, being of potentiality and actuality, being of categories) And in fallowing, for the adventure of the meaning of "being", we will pay attention to the peripatetic philosophers, especially Farabi and Avicenna, according to their philosophical principles who have considered various meanings for the existent which are very different with Aristotle's meanings.

Aristotle considered being neither univocal nor equivocal, but as the third kind i.e. Pros hen because he believed that being is said being in relation to one point.  In other words, this term is applied to the beings for their priority and posteriority in being.   The first usage of the term signifies the substance and other beings are said "being" as they are in relation to substance. Reviewing Farabi's thoughts reveals that unlike Avicenna that believed in Tashkik of the concept of "being", Farabi followed   Aristotle's' thoughts and his argument about focal meaning which doesn't refer to equivocality or univocality of "being". Farabi was of the opinion that the term isn't applied equally to all beings, but based on their priority and posteriority in being. In addition, he extended the account of Aristotle's doctrine of the different senses of being in the different categories beyond Aristotle's own use to cover the relation between sensible substances and the First and Second Being.

For understanding origin and grounds of Hegel’s Logic, in addition to Science of Logic as main source employed by interpretations, we need to analyze First Hegel’s logical Treatise in his Jena period. There is no interpretation of this treatise available in Farsi while the English sources on the interpretation of the text are also scarce. The current paper will try to provide an account on process of the genesis of Hegel’s Jena Logic for the first time in Farsi. Thus, at first, it will consider the system as a whole briefly and then it will analyze three constituent parts of Jena’s Logic – ‘Simple Connection’, ‘Relation’, and ‘Proportion’, depending on English translation of the text (translated by Hegel Society of America). Finally, the study deals with a comprehensive outline of the remaining parts of the Hegel's System of Jena (such as Metaphysics, Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit).

Kuhn’s world change claim has some problems; whether this change is an objective change (change in the world itself) or a subjective one (change in the mind)? Does objective ‘world change’ conform to the stability of sense stimulus? Whether subjective change is compatible with the incommensurability of perceptions of rival paradigms? Kuhn through his Darwinian- Kantian framework argues for the priori conditions of world perceiving and changing. As we will see، these conditions are the taxonomic structure of paradigms. We will argue that Kuhn can speak of the change of world itself in a commonsensical manner.

Nowadays، many scholars refer to humans as social actors. These scholars believe that the realization of humanity and، thus، flourishing of individuality depend not on divided action and abstract reflections of individual people but on responsible participation of each member of human society in his interactions with the world and other humans. The scholars see humans not as individual subjects but as social subjects. This article is an attempt to explain the theoretical basis of this approach. For this purpose، it will consider this ideain one of its most fundamental modes of occurrence، i. e. Hegel''s thought. Hegel''s notion of the individual subject in thethought of his intellectual ancestors and then his approach in showing men as social subjects will also be addressed

Cause and effect, essence and accident, existence and nonexistence, unity and plurality and necessity and contingency are among the concepts which do not enter the mind through senses. This has caused controversies among the philosophers. Some consider them to be innate. Others seek to justify their acquisition through senses. A third group believes them to be rooted in the nature and mankind’s soul and, thus, illusive. Muslim philosophers consider them to be secondary intelligibles and real concepts. As a Muslim philosopher, Allameh Tabataba’i holds a noble theory about the acquisition of knowledge. Moreover, Kant has a theory about the said concepts. He considers them to be mental categories or a priori forms of knowledge. This paper investigates the possibility of Kantian and non-Kantian a priori forms of knowledge and concludes that they do not exist at all.

The controversial division of the existent into substance and accident is the primary divisions on the contingent being. Although philosophers like Aristotle, Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra, Descartes, Kant and… altogether defined the substance and the accidents into “existent without subject matter” and “existent in need of subject” respectively, there are disagreement about their types and numbers. However, some sensationalist and empiricist philosophers have denied the existence of substance altogether. Philosophers say that the diagnostic criteria for substance and accident are in the understanding of the essentials and the accidentals and their differential diagnosis come back in to the realm of epistemology and attitudes toward existence and that what is the origin of the knowledge. Expressing opinions and views about the categories, this paper has dealt with the criterion of the being substance and accident of categories.