ملاصدرا

In the course of history, art has always functioned as a tool for presenting human questions and a scene for posing philosophical discussions. Therefore, various schools have used art as a means of discovering the secrets of being in order to satiate the thirst of man’s knowledge-seeking intellect for the quality of displaying the manifestation of being. However, the art of today, while displaying visual manifestations, allows imagination flow and visualizes metaphysical and other-worldly concepts. The purpose of the present paper is to examine the ways the seventh art approaches immaterial worlds. To accomplish this task, the authors have tried to explore the world of meaning from the viewpoint of the Transcendent Philosophy in order to portray the mind’s processing of the soul’s imaginations based on Mullā Ṣadrā’s view in spiritualist cinema. The motive for this study was rooted in the necessity of presenting a model that could determine the borderline between right and wrong in the world of meaning and suggest a reliable philosophy on the meaning of the world to the addressees. Thus, the main question of this study is which facilities the world of meaning in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy could offer to spiritualist cinema. Accordingly, the Transcendent Philosophy can represent the world of meaning in the light of viewing the perfect man as the source of truth based on a cognitive approach to soulish perceptions of the worlds of matter, Ideas, and intellect. In this way, it would be possible to provide an original image of the duality of meaning and structure on the silver screen through a profound narration of the appearance of phenomena and a dynamic analysis of inner worlds.

One of the most important challenges before contemporary Man is excessive use of natural resources. Technology is harshly destroying environmental elements, and industry has not only revealed Man’s lack of harmony with nature but also completely altered their metaphysical supremacy and is now threatening their health. The problem of environmental destruction and environmental ethics is a novel product of modern life; however, its principles can be inferred from some of the works of Islamic philosophers, particularly, Mullā Ṣadrā. Five principles in the Transcendent Philosophy could be considered efficient in this regard. According to the principiality of existence, the substance of the human soul and the substance of nature are two modes of the same single truth, and the pain of nature is followed by Man’s suffering. Based on the principle of the awareness and glorification of nature, nature is as respectable as a devout person. Moreover, as the principle of Man’s vicegerency suggests, since God is free from any kind of evil, His vicegerent should also perceive the relationship between nature and its true Owner, function as a good representative of His Beauty and Perfection, and glorify and preserve this manifestation of God to the best of their abilities. According to the principle of continuous creation, nature depends on God at every single moment and is illuminated by His Light, thus it does not deserve to be destroyed and abandoned. Finally, based on the fifth principle, Man acts based on their nature; blessed people lead nature towards heavenly forms, and malicious people lead it towards hellish forms. The first group are concerned about preserving nature, while the second group try to destroy it. In Islamic philosophy and, thus, the views of Islamic philosophers there is a right-duty relationship between Man and nature, according to which Man has the right to use nature conditionally and, at same time, has the duty of protecting and improving it.

Explaining the relationship between God’s essence and attributes is one of the most fundamental problems in philosophy and kalām. The objectivity of essence and attributes is one of the most important theories that is used to explain their relationship, which is consistent with believing in God’s simplicity as the most crucial or, at least, as one of the most important metaphysical attributes of God. However, accepting the objectivity of God’s essence and attributes or His simplicity depends on the theory that is presented on the ontology of features and attributes. Several theories have been introduced in this regard in Islamic philosophy and contemporary analytic metaphysics. By discussing such theories, the present paper demonstrates the following points: 1) defending the objectivity of God’s essence and attributes is based on a theory on the ontology of attributes; 2) not all theories on ontological attributes are useful for explaining the objectivity of His essence and attributes; 3) the theories of Brian Leftow and Mullā Ṣadrā can be used to defend the objectivity of God’s essence and attributes.

Human beings and their unique characteristics have always attracted the attention of philosophers throughout history and will continue to do so. Islamic philosophers, drawing from divine sources and philosophical principles, are no exception. Two renowned Muslim philosophers, Avicenna, representing the Peripatetic school, and Mulla Sadra, the founder of Transcendent Wisdom, have offered unique perspectives on this subject. In general, in Islamic philosophy, there is no disagreement about the immortality of the soul after the body, due to the clarity of Islamic sources. Most differences of opinion relate to the qualities of the soul during human life. One of the most precise theories about the soul is Mulla Sadra's theory of the corporeality of origination and the spirituality of subsistence, which posits the gradual perfection of the soul. With the advancement of knowledge today, some findings support his view, including the issue of growth until the last moment of life in developmental psychology and Roger Sperry's experiment based on physiological psychology. However, with the specialization of human knowledge, we witness a phenomenon the famous sociologist Emile Durkheim called anomie, meaning the breakdown of the organic relationship between various branches of knowledge, necessitating interdisciplinary research. This situation has led to the assumption that empirical research is different and separate from philosophical methods. The present research, employing an interdisciplinary approach, utilizes philosophical principles and physiological psychology to attempt to prove Mulla Sadra's theory of the corporeality of origination and the spirituality of subsistence through the usual empirical method, which is Roger Sperry's experiment.

Adopting a Sadraean approach, this article studies the Ayatollah Khamenei’s mental framework as manifested in the Statement Second Step of the Revolution and tries to present a systematic understanding of this framework. To this end, firstly the true existential truth of the human being from Sadraean perspective is discussed. Following that, the anthropologic principles of the Statement Second Step of the Revolution and ideas of Ayatollah Khamenei as manifested in the statement are analyzed using descriptive- analytical approach and finally, a content analysis of the anthropological principles of Statement Second Step of the Revolution is presented using a comparative approach. The results show that Sadra, at least theoretically, managed to lay the foundations of an education system based on his analysis of existence and human being. Inspired by his ideas, his following scholars including late Imam Khomeni and Ayatollah Khamenie tried to bring concepts such as Islamic state, Ethical society and Islamic civilization into reality through Islamic Revolution and Statement Second Step of the Revolution and thus pave the way for actualization of Sadra’s idea of Man as Khalifat-Allah as introduced in Quran.

The philosophical discussion of human action is one of the most important contemporary philosophical topics. Various issues are raised in this issue. One of the issues that has been neglected in the philosophy of action, despite its importance, is the issue of the relationship between action and the body. This study seeks to philosophically explain the relationship between body and action and how the body influences the formation of action. In Islamic philosophy, the issue of action has been raised sporadically in the form of various topics. In this approach, practical reason is the source of action formation. This intellect is related to the body and has powers in the body, and action is performed through it in the body. The action has two arcs of ascent and descent. The arc of action ascends first to the theoretical intellect through the senses through the intermediate stages. The arc of descent from the unlikely origin to the origin involves the near formation of the action, and finally the action is performed through the active force by moving the bodily organs. The connection point of the action in the ascent and descent stage of the action; Is the body. This is related to the longitudinal levels of action. Action in its transverse course takes on a different interpretation in the light of teachings such as the essential motion of the soul, the union of the soul and the body, and the issue of death in transcendent wisdom. The body is effective in the formation of action in various ways: Some of these are: providing the principles of action, the instrumental role of the body in the realization of action, the queen of action through repetition of bodily actions, the realization of perfection through the body, the body's need for action Specifically, ,

The purpose of this study was to find the relationship between active intellect (demiurgus) and the Prophet's power of perception from the perspective of Farabi and Ibn Sina. Farabi considers the active intellect as the same as the Holy Spirit or Gabriel. According to Ibn Sina, active intellect is manifested as the revelation angel. Unlike Farabi, Ibn Sina expresses the imagination and imaginative powers as two separate powers that present different functions. Ibn Sina defines imagination as a materialist power without any abstraction, while Farabi does not explicitly comment on the abstraction and materialist aspects of imagination. Farabi believes that Prophet can inform the divine issues as he is aware of such issues that have been accepted by his imagination due to his active intellect. In the viewpoint of Ibn Sina, because of the power of the common sense of Prophet towards the most severity and pure passivity, He can receive the details of revelation's concepts without ambiguity and keep them in his treasury of imagination. Like Farabi, Ibn Sina pays attention to imagination power in explaining revelation without having any problem with details. He also considers the impact of the Prophet's ego in the world of creation, inactivity (or passivity), and the nature elements' obedience of Prophet's ego, while such features are not found in Farabi's works. In the viewpoint of Farabi, imagination and imaginative powers are the same cases with two functions, while Ibn Sina sees them as two separate powers that act differently.

All theorizing about components of happiness requires determination of some criteria for prioritization to resolve practical inconsistencies. This result is affiliated to separation of dependent components (only instrument), independent components (only purpose), and semi-dependent components , providing the possibility to choose the right action like maintenance, reduction, or elimination in inconsistency situations.Using Mullasadra’s transcendent philosophy, solving this problem doesn't seem difficult. Although he considers the theoretical faculty as the main component of happiness and has strong reasons for it, he organized his theory by the ontological concept of perfection (instead of Aristotelian virtue and function concepts) and based its explanation on unity with active intellect (not only connection). By attaching these thoughts to his other basics, especially on the domain of the study of the soul, a new image of happiness components can be formed that, in addition to development of those components, provides a way for recognition of their relation for gaining the mentioned practical result.By conducting an analytical-descriptive examination of theories such as the profound connection between the soul and the body, the unity of the soul and its faculties, and the equivalence of existence with goodness and perfection, a new theory called "comprehensive happiness" can be inferred from Mullasadra's views using inferential-discursive methods. In this theory, all existential perfections (including bodily matters) are considered as ends by essence, constituting independent or semi-independent components of happiness. These components form a longitudinal and latitudinal network in which relationships and precedence among them are determined based on the ontological system of the world. The position of each perfection in this system provides a clear and practical criterion for determining its independence or dependence, enabling prioritization among the components of happiness and resolving potential practical inconsistencies, thus serving as an advantage of this theory over competing views.

The purpose of this article is to explain the quality of creation and examine the essence of space-time based on Sadra'i philosophy and its comparison with physical propositions. The present descriptive-analytical article explores two issues. One is from an epistemological point of view, and the other is from an ontological point of view. The first looks at the true essence of space-time from Mulla Sadra and Einstein’s point of view in terms of ontology. The second explains their opinions on the essence and objectivity of space-time from an epistemological perspective. Finally, findings showed they believed scientific propositions are not practical and perceptible in terms of epistemology. Indeed, having good mathematical and rational perceptions of space-time is necessary to explain its structure and essence. According to this research, space-time is created from primary matter and is a kind of secondary monster or fundamental particle, and the reason for its expansion rate is its intrinsic movement. So, dark energy is the essence of space and time. Because, in the first place, space-time is imperceptible in nature, and secondly, imagination-driven mathematical perceptions and rational perceptions resulted from cognitive faculty are more accurate than sense perceptions. However, when it comes to ontology, cosmologists have not yet developed any justified priori or posteriori model about the true nature of space-time. Though, according to Mulla Sadra’s bases, space-time is a type of secondary matter completed from the primary matter mode; furthermore, he believed space-time has its origin in the cosmic primary matter.

The essential (ḏātī) nature of the soul's attachment to the body is one of the innovative and new views expressed by Mullā Ṣadrā. Considering that the views of philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā are incomplete, he expressed his innovative theory, namely, "the physical nature of the human soul." Among the consequences of this theory is the essential attachment of the soul to the body, emphasized by Mullā Ṣadrā. In fact, based on this point, he tried to consider the famous definition of the soul as its true definition while showing the shortcomings of the peripatetic (Mašāʾī) perspective. Mullā Ṣadrā raised two objections against the Peripatetic philosophers: (1) the incorrectness of combining an abstract being with a material being; and (2) immutability in the nature of the soul. ʿAllāmih Ṭabāṭabāʾī tried to answer the two objections with a critical view. In this article, the author aims to show the shortcomings of ʿAllāmih Ṭabāṭabāʾī's point of view by using the analytical-comparative method, while presenting and explaining in detail the views of Mullā Ṣadrā and the criticisms of ʿAllāmih Ṭabāṭabāʾī.

Ibn Arabi's mystical and philosophical beliefs in knowing God, including the role of self-knowledge, intellect, heart and intuitive knowledge, etc., have influenced the beliefs of other mystics and philosophers, including Mulla Sadra. This research aims to examine the views of these two Islamic sages and philosophers, namely Ibn Arabi and Mullah Sadra, regarding the ways of acquiring the knowledge of God, and to explain the influence of Ibn Arabi's mysticism on Mullah Sadra's view of knowing God. The views of these two sages show that although Mulla Sadra was not an unequivocal follower of Ibn Arabi in many matters, they both believe in the knowledge of the Supreme Being in the three levels of nature, attributes, and actions, and they believe that human intelligence and existential capacities are abilities and capabilities. He does not understand the nature of God. Mulla Sadra, under the influence of Ibn Arabi, considers limits and boundaries for the intellect in knowing the Almighty and His Names and Attributes. Both Ibn Arabi and Mulla Sadra consider self-knowledge to be a very important way to know God, and in this regard, there is no difference between the two sages; Like Mulla Sadra, Ibn Arabi considers knowledge of God to be a matter of doubt, therefore, everyone is capable of knowing God according to his knowledge and cognitive ability.

The identity and character of an individual are formed through a combination of their thoughts, beliefs, traits, and character (khulq). Through self-knowledge and awareness of these existential attributes, one can strive to overcome personal shortcomings and cultivate their strengths. From a social perspective, understanding personality traits—particularly characters—of individuals within a society allows for the anticipation of their behavior in various social contexts, enabling more effective management and interaction within that society. Thus, the study of character has remained a focal point of philosophical inquiry throughout history.
Among ancient Greek philosophers, Socrates and Plato identified character (ethos) with knowledge (Copleston 2001, 1:130, 253). However, Aristotle distinguished moral virtues from knowledge, defining them as character or habits associated with the non-rational part of the soul. He argued that these virtues are not acquired through instruction and education but, like skills, develop through repeated practice (Aristotle 1964, 1:219–242).
Among Muslim philosophers, al-Kindī was the first to reconcile Plato’s theory of faculties and Aristotle’s theory of moderation. He suggested that the soul consists of three faculties—rational (nāṭiqa), irascible (ghaḍabiyya), and appetitive (shahawiyya)—and, contrary to Aristotle, applied the theory of moderation not to actions but to these three faculties (Atrak 2014). Ibn Miskawayh and al-Fārābī emphasized the role of social interaction in shaping moral character, incorporating the social dimension into the essence of character (Fārābī 1996, 83; Ahmadpour 2006, 111–118). Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) highlighted the role of practical reason (al-ʿaql al-ʿamalī) among human faculties, stressing its transcendent or subordinate status in relation to the animalistic faculties in shaping various characters and moral traits (Ibn Sīnā 1996, 65–66). Mullā Ṣadrā, drawing on the fundamental principles of his philosophical system, offered a distinct analysis and interpretation of the nature of character and its role in the emanation of action, setting him apart from his predecessors.
The main question of this article is: From Mullā Ṣadrā’s perspective, what is the ontological status of character in the emanation of human action? In this context, subsidiary issues such as the nature of character, its developmental stages and influencing factors, as well as the criteria for categorizing character, are also examined.

Absolute and limited interpretations are among the interpretations that are sometimes conceptual and sometimes illustrative in coexistence with each other. In terms of the realization of the three philosophical journeys, according to the first journey, absolute means conceptual scope and limited means conceptual narrowness, and the coexistence between two concepts is formed. According to the second journey and accepting the originality of existence and gradational oneness, and negating the nature, absolute means:  the completeness of the Essence of God and His compass to other beings. Since existence in this journey has stages, absolute also means the compass of the higher stagees of existence on the stages below it. The absolute existence includes the limited existence, but the limited existence does not include the absolute, and there is qāyumî coexistence between them. According to the third journey, absolute means compass in concept, but since existence has oneness and existence cannot even be divided into absolute and limited at the height of the discussion, the relationship between absolute and limited is qāyumî. In this article, we will analyze the three philosophical journeys of Mulla Sadra about the absolute and limited coexistence with a descriptive-analytical method.

The purpose of this article is to examine two seemingly contradictory views on the home of partial souls from Mulla Sadra’s perspective. In the series of discussions on philosophical psychology proposed by Mulla Sadra, the issue of the home of partial souls in the arc of descent does not appear to have a single foundation, and two different views can be identified in his works. According to the first approach, which is based on substantial movement, partial souls originate from partial bodies, and therefore, the material world is the first home of both in the arc of descent. Partial souls have no prior realization before the material world except as a general soul in fixed objects. However, according to the second view, which is based on a specific, skeptical unity, Mulla Sadra holds that man is a single reality with four levels: divine man, spiritual man, heavenly man, and earthly man. In this view, apart from being realized as a general soul in the world of reason (ʿaql or power), man also exists as partial souls in numerical plurality in the world of example (ʿalam al-mithal), and partial souls never descend into the world of matter.

The present study aimed to thoroughly investigates Mullā Ṣadrā’s ontological approach to the classification of virtues and vices. To this end, the historical origins and development of these classifications were examined to detect the historical significance and contributions  of Mullā Ṣadrā’s perspectives. Following the Platonic-Aristotelian paradigm, Islamic philosophers have frequently analyzed virtues and vices analogous to the faculties of the soul. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā’s  classification of virtues was analyzed in correspondence with an ontological approach to analyzing the faculties of the soul. In his work, Mullā Ṣadrā’ adopted three distinct approaches to the classification of virtues and vices: (1) Binary Model, with a focus on the virtues of ḥikmah (intellectual virtue) and ḥurriyyah (practical virtue); (2) Fourfold Model adressing the four human faculties—bestial, predatory, satanic, and angelic; and (3) Platonic-Aristotelian Model, with virtues and vices being classified as intellectual, appetitive, and irascible faculties of the soul, allowing for a systematic tabulation of virtues and vices. Mullā Ṣadrā’s analysis of the faculties of the soul draws on Avicenna’s Al-Shifāʾ and Al-Ishārāt as well as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqiyyah; however, his approach to this classification bears a stronger resemblance to the ethical framework of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. In this regard, as inferre by mystics and spiritual elites, Ṣadrā’s analysis of the faculties of the soul does not functionally align with the tabulated classification of virtues and vices. His classification, to a broader extent, corresponds to the approach of Muslim thinkers such as Ṭūsī; however, it is distinct—despite certain connections—from Aristotle’s classification of virtues.

This article uses a descriptive-analytical method to explain the nature of ignorance and its types in Mulla Sadra's works. Sometimes, ignorance is referred to as (1) lack of knowledge, sometimes (2) lack of true belief, and sometimes (3) lack of knowledge or true belief. Mulla Sadra's view on the relationship between knowledge, imagination, and affirmation shows that, from his perspective, ignorance cannot be limited to a lack of knowledge (imagination) or a lack of belief (affirmation). Mulla Sadra classifies ignorance into three categories: (1) simple ignorance, (2) compound ignorance, and (3) ignorance opposed to reason. In Mulla Sadra's intellectual system, different types of ignorance exist in contrast to justified true belief: (a) false belief, or belief in things that are contrary to reality; (b) unjustified true belief, such as imitative true beliefs without justified reason; (c) disbelief—the failure to acknowledge and denial of justified true belief due to prejudice, stubbornness, or concealment of the truth; (d) suspension of judgment regarding a true belief in a state of doubt and uncertainty; (e) light inattention (negligence) toward a true belief that can be resolved with attention; (f) heavy inattention (negligence) toward a true belief that cannot be resolved with attention (deep ignorance); (g) lack of talent or ability to pay attention, understand, and acknowledge a true belief (complete ignorance). Based on the doctrine of transcendental wisdom regarding doubt, the types of ignorance can be considered as different levels and degrees of severe and weak ignorance.

Today, methodology has been given attention in various sciences in such a way that it has become a serious and separate research field. What method each thinker adopts to express his desired science, helps man in obtaining the system that governs his achievements. One of the great thinkers and philosophers and the founder of the transcendental school of wisdom is Mulla Sadra, whose method governing his philosophy has become a battle of opinions. On the other hand, Allameh Tabataba'i, who is famous as a neo-Sadra philosopher, and paying attention to his methodology is also important; Therefore, the present article examines the methodology of the philosophy of Mulla Sadra and Allameh Tabataba'i with a descriptive-analytical method and it is clear that the philosophy of Mulla Sadra is an independent school and the method that governs his philosophy is the rational and evidential method, and he uses the evidential method or traditions as a judge. is a search; Also, Allameh Tabatabai (RA) used a purely rational method to express philosophy and used narration, revelation and intuition in philosophy as a compilation.

Intellectual perception is one of the most prominent philosophical issues and an arena of conflicting opinions among philosophers. Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi favors Aristotle's view in this regard and holds that it is the most valid position. He considers Mullā Sadrā's view (observing an immaterial being from a distance) as reminiscent of Hume's view (vagueness in sensory perception) and, with the same method and analysis, he argues that both views are questionable. Misbah Yazdi tries to refute Hume's view by presenting criticisms such as the way of abstracting absurd concepts and philosophical secondary intelligibles, and considers Mullā Sadrā's view to be the same as Hume's and completely negates both. He argues that concepts that fail to have an idea in the intellectual world indicate the invalidity of Mullā Sadrā's view, and since these concepts do not exist outside so that their vague individual can result in intellectual perception, Hume's view is also baseless. Therefore, with analyses based on the method of comparing the two perspectives, contradiction analysis (scrutinizing the contradictions of Misbah Yazdi's view in his various works on Mullā Sadrā's position on the perception of universals) and analysis of the word vagueness (in the sense that it is compared lexically in their views), as well as with analysis of the argument of the claim, Misbah Yazdi's argument in this case is evaluated and, by denying the similarity of Mullā Sadrā's and Hume' s views on the perception of universals, this article presents another explanation for comparing the perspectives of the two philosophers.

In an article, four critiques by Misbah of Mulla Sadra's argument of mutual correlation for proving the union of the intelligent and the intelligible, as well as one critique of his regarding the argument of light and darkness—which Mulla Sadra refers to within the context of the argument of mutual correlation without presenting it as an independent proof—have been critiqued. In the present article, which is written using an analytical-documentary method, an evaluation of these critiques reveals that none of them is valid. While Misbah’s statements exhibit some negligence, this can be easily clarified without undermining the essence of his critiques. Consequently, both premises of the argument of mutual correlation are found to be incorrect. The critique of the first premise posits that an intellectualized form, in the absence of an intelligent counterpart, is not inherently intellectualized. If the intellectualized form is considered an accident without its substratum (the intelligent), it cannot exist at all; therefore, an intellectualized form that does not exist cannot be deemed intellectualized. Thus, it cannot be asserted that the intellectualized form is inherently so, regardless of the existence of an intelligent counterpart. The critique of the second premise argues that the two mutually correlated entities are not coexistent. Furthermore, the argument of light and darkness is rejected, as the analogy of the soul to a blind eye is invalid.

This article examines Mulla Sadra’s insights on the health of the soul and its ailments, reconstructing a cohesive theory from his scattered discussions. It explores key aspects of his approach, including (1) the concepts of health and disease, (2) the criteria for spiritual well-being, (3) the causes of spiritual maladies, (4) the different levels of health, and (5) Sadra’s therapeutic solutions for treating spiritual ailments. To provide a broader context, this study also compares Sadra’s views with those of earlier ethical philosophers such as Zakariya Razi, Ibn Miskawayh, Nasir al-Din Tusi, and Dawani, who each addressed the concept of the soul’s health in their works. While many of Sadra’s ideas build upon these predecessors, his theory is distinguished by its unique philosophical foundation, which integrates concepts such as the interrelation of soul and body, the corporeal creation of the soul, the substantial motion of human existence, and the principle that "the soul, in its unity, encompasses all powers and forces." These elements shape his distinctive understanding of spiritual health. Sadra’s therapeutic approach includes precise diagnosis, treatment through opposites to restore balance, cognitive therapies aimed at belief transformation, the role of reward and punishment, and the practice of virtue. By reconstructing his insights, this study demonstrates how his philosophy offers a comprehensive framework for understanding and maintaining the well-being of the soul.