موجود

The theory of "graded terms" (alfāẓ-e mušakkik) has been a subject of considerable debate among Muslim philosophers. The roots of this theory can be traced back to Al-Farabi and Avicenna. This article investigates whether or not the theory of graded terms is a legacy of Aristotle and identifies the problem it seeks to address. Aristotle's perspective on terms, especially the term "being", is examined through his works and then compared with the views of Al-Farabi and Avicenna. Additionally, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi’s claim that this theory was also articulated by Greek philosophers is critically analyzed. Aristotle categorizes terms exclusively as either homonymous or synonymous and makes no mention of graded terms (mušakkik). Al-Farabi categorizes graded terms under synonymous terms, while Avicenna, in his Logic of the Healing (Mantiq al-Shifāʼ), places them under homonymous terms. Nonetheless, Avicenna does not consider graded terms to be purely homonyms. This study demonstrates that Aristotle’s categorization of terms proves inadequate in addressing certain terms like “being.” The theory of graded terms emerges as a solution to this challenge

I argue that al-Farabi and Ibn Sina have a significant dispute regarding the analysis of the logical form of the subject matter of metaphysics: existence. al-Farabi asserts that "exist" has a disjunctive meaning, while Ibn Sina contends that it is a fundamental notion. I propose an explanation for this disagreement rooted in their differing views on the nature and structure of theoretical sciences. al-Farabi claims that theoretical sciences are mutually dependent, whereas Ibn Sina believes that higher-order sciences do not depend on lower-order ones, either in their subject matter or propositions. Based on these interpretations, I argue that the distinction between essence and existence poses a substantial problem within Ibn Sina’s framework, while it is considered trivial in al-Farabi’s metaphysics. This significant challenge in Ibn Sina’s thought elucidates the subsequent controversies in Islamic philosophy regarding this issue and the interpretation of Ibn Sina’s perspective. If my arguments hold, it suggests that Ibn Sina does not merely follow al-Farabi in metaphysics; rather, the evolution of Islamic philosophy marks a fundamental shift from al-Farabi to Ibn Sina.

Philosophers and theologians before Mullā Ṣadrā had diverse views about the ontological status of existence. Paying attention to their opinions is very important to understand Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine of ontological priority of existence. On the other hand, philosophers and theologians have dealt with this issue in different positions, and in some cases, there seems to be an apparent inconsistency. In contemporary works, there is no comprehensive examination about these diverse views. This article seeks to shed light on this issue. Peripatetic philosophers considered existence to exist and most likely considered it to be an accident. Suhrawardī and his followers criticized this opinion and considered existence as a secondary intelligible and non-existent. Many later philosophers and theologians also preferred Suhrawardī's viewpoint. While denying that existence is an accident, some theologians considered it to exist outside but to be identical with quiddity. They thought that their view is immune to Suhrawardī's criticisms. According to this opinion, for existence to exist, it does not need to be an accident to quiddity. Another related problem was that philosophers maintained that the universal concept of existence has external instances called particular beings. This is incompatible with existence being a secondary intelligible. ʿAbd-al-Razzāq Lāhījī tried to resolve the inconsistency. According to Lāhījī's solution, existence is external, but does not exist in external reality. This solution can be criticized.

Abstract
In his al-Asfār, Ṣadrā attributes an argument to al-Suhrawardī against the existence of existence, which goes as follows: “existent” means that which has existence. Now, if existence is existent, it will have existence. The repetition of this argument implies a regress of existences. Therefore, existence is not existent (Shīrāzī 1981, 39-40). Advocates of Transcendental Philosophy after Ṣadrā, such as al-Sabzawārī in his al-Manẓūma (1386 Sh/2007, 182), and all contemporary philosophers have attributed this argument to al-Suhrawardī, following Ṣadrā. Here is the question: Did al-Suhrawardī really present this argument? If not, who presented it? Furthermore, what is al-Suhrawardī’s real argument? The methodology employed by this research is a combination of historical and analytic methods. Research findings are as follows: I begin with historical evidence that this argument was not presented by al-Suhrawardī. By providing a classification of al-Suhrawardī’s arguments, I demonstrate that none of these arguments rest upon a premise regarding the concept of “existent.” Instead, they are all founded upon substantial metaphysical assumptions concerning existence: if existence is existent, then at least in some cases, it will be a contingent existent; possibility, unity, and necessity are objectively realized (that is, existent); and so on (Suhrawardī 1375 Sh/1996, 1:340-364; 2:64-72). Moreover, al-Suhrawardī attributes various versions of these arguments to the opponents of the followers of Peripatetics, particularly Ibn Sahlān, asserting that they (the followers) already were aware of these arguments and presented plausible replies to them (Suhrawardī 1375 Sh/1996, 1:354). I provide evidence from al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya (Rāzī 1411b AH/1990b, 29) and al-Maqāṣid (Taftāzānī 1409 AH/1988, 323-324) to show that al-Suhrawardī’s attributions to the followers of Peripatetics are correct, although there is no evidence for attributing the argument to Ibn Sahlān, except al-Suhrawardī’s own text. From these findings, I conclude that the regress argument mentioned by Ṣadrā is a misinterpretation of al-Suhrawardī’s text in Ḥikmat al-ishrāq (Suhrawardī 1375 Sh/1996, 2:64-65). This misinterpretation can be traced back to Quṭb al-Shīrāzī’s Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq (an exposition of al-Suhrawardī’s Ḥikmat al-ishrāq), where he mentions a similar argument, although he does not explicitly attribute it to al-Suhrawardī. It is not unlikely that, in his commentaries on Quṭb al-Shīrāzī’s work, Ṣadrā was under the impression that Quṭb al-Shīrāzī’s account was indeed an interpretation of al-Suhrawardī’s text, even though he does not explicitly mention this in his commentaries (Shīrāzī 1392 Sh/2013, 2:243-263). I then proceed to provide a plausible interpretation of al-Suhrawardī’s argument in Ḥikmat al-ishrāq (Suhrawardī 1375 Sh/1996, 2:64-65). I offer reasons to show that the argument is more complex than it initially seemed. In particular, in his reply to this argument, Ṣadrā argues that, first, existence does not fall under any category, although the necessary existent does not either (Shīrāzī 1392 Sh/1996, 2:250; Shīrāzī 1981, 52-53). Second, the criterion for being a category is, to some extent, epistemological (Shīrāzī 1981, 49). This implies that the class of existences cannot be considered a metaphysical categorization of things, and hence no shared metaphysical status could be assigned to them unless we acquiesce to the unity of existence. It seems that al-Suhrawardī’s regress argument compels advocates of “existence having existence” to believe in the unity of existence. Contrary to his usual practice, Ṣadrā ultimately acknowledges the unity of existence (Shīrāzī 1981, 71). However, al-Suhrawardī presents a third way: existence is not existent.

In his divine hiddenness argument, John Schellenberg argues that God's Intentional negligence to provide convincing evidence has put some of his sincere seekers in a state of reasonable nonbelief. According to Schellenberg, this is violate evidence of the absolute love of God, and further concludes from the absence of such an attribute, the absence of that essence. According to him, reassuring religious experiences and providing more empirical evidence can prevent such a situation. But Mulla Sadra, in his transcendental wisdom, by analyzing the characteristics of existence and essence and finally proposing the argument of the “Sedighin”, believes that God is existence and not existent, and according to the causal relationship between existence and existent, all beings are manifestations of existence. Analyzing the negative rules of existence such as not having other, not having essence not having opposite, and not have the same and some positive rules such as simplicity, limitlessness and conceptuality of existence, can reveal the secret of divine Hiddenness. Therefore, contrary to Schellenberg's view of orginality of essence, human beings are faced with a multitude of evidences and manifestations of the existence of God and Presentation of some arguments such as divine Hiddenness argument due to the lack of proper knowledge of God's attributes and consequently incorrect epistemological expectations about Him. The advantages of Sadra's view include explain the divine appearance at the same time as his hiddenness, Using self-evident and rational foundations, matching with the traditional theology of religions, introduce some positive and negative attributes of God, presenting a proper picture of the relationship between God and the world, correcting and modifying human epistemological expectations from God and ease of understanding. In this article, an attempt has been made to present two novel deductive interpretation based on Mulla Sadra's views so that based on their results.

Mulla Sadra has demonstrated "The Principality of Existence" as the basis of the Transcendent Philosophy based on solid arguments and by studying the scholars before him, he considered the peripatetics to believe in The Principality of Existence and the Ishraqi in the principality of Quiddity. Although the question of the principality of Existence or Quiddity has not been raised in this way by early scholars, by examining their works and expressions, one of the parties to the issue in question can be attributed to them. This research seeks to find the opinion of 'Ghias al-din Mansur Dashtaki' on this matter. By examining his texts and expressions in a descriptive-analitical method based on Sadra's philosophy; while providing convincing evidence, the belief in the 'The Principiality of Quiddity' can be deduced from Ghias al-din Mansur. The above evidence will be presented and the claim will be explained in this research. Ghias al-din considers the concept of 'Existence' as one of the validations of the secondary intelligible and redundant on quiddity, denying the realization of any individual and external instances for it.

This article examines Suarez’s theory of analogy. Suarez, on the one hand, believes in the unity of the concept of “being” (ens) and considers it to preserve the unity of the subject of metaphysics, because, according to an Aristotelian principle, every science must be about one subject, and because Suarez considers God, intellects, and creatures under the concept of “being qua real being” as subjects of metaphysics, there should be a unity of the concept of being. On the other hand, the analogy in scholastic and especially Thomistic philosophy maintains that the ontological distance between the God of all good and the world, which is the fruit of original sin and inherently evil, because it holds the concept of being about God and creatures, is not the same concept, but merely analogical. Suarez, therefore, abandons Cajetan’s traditional reading in order to maintain both such unity and not to reject the analogy. He chooses the analogy of intrinsic attribution, according to which, first, one concept is analogous to another concept and not two concepts to the third concept, and second, the concept of ens is intrinsically present on both sides of the analogy. In this article, we prove that this causes Suarez’s analogy of intrinsic attribution to be the same as Ibn Sina’s graded unity and Scotus’s univocity and that Suarez, while using the characteristics of univocity in his metaphysics, such as the unity of the concept of being, considers analogy only formally and in the title, and completely avoids it.

Farabi's Kiitab Alhoroof is the first direct philosophical encounter of a Muslim thinker with Greek philosophical thought. Discussions on the analysis of the concepts of "existence-existent" and " Essence " as the main elements of Aristotle's philosophical thought are among the most important parts of this book. Farabi's purpose in writing this book is to lay the groundwork for a fundamental understanding of Greek philosophical thought in the Islamic world. He begins the discussion with the linguistic analysis of "existent" as a non-derivative word (first example) in Arabic and proposes three meanings (“Categories” and “Truthful” and “Individual external thing by essence) for "existent." He combines three meanings into two meanings and focuses on the third meaning (Individual external thing by essence). Al-Farabi tries to offer a way to justify the multiplicity of beings in the universe by proposing categories for the third meaning of "existence" and "essence" as identifiers of external and mental beings, while emphasizing the external union of "existence" and "essence"; Accordance to the author's view, this way is incoherent without assuming the discussion of the "metaphysical distinction of existence from essence"; Farabi's argument on dividing the existence into rich and poor and designing the concept of (Individual mental thing by essence)  in contrast to the concept of "no existence" does not seem understandable except by assuming the metaphysical distinction of existence and essence. His plan paves the way for designing the rules of ontological distinction of "existence" from "essence" are prepared by Ibn Sina.

One of Heidegger's major citations in explaining the process of forgetting Being in the history of metaphysics is the lack of attention paid to ontological differentiation by metaphysical companions, according to which one should avoid reducing Being to a particular being. According to Heidegger, due to the lack of attention to ontological differentiation throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have often neglected a careful study of the "meaning" and "truth" of Being. But as we know, one of the clever considerations of Muslim philosophers is to pay attention to the distinction between Being and quiddity. Serious attention to this distinction, which is first reflected in Farabi's philosophical views, has become one of the main foundations of ontology for Avicenna. The fundamental question here is whether the distinction between Being and quiddity and related issues can be considered by Muslim philosophers, especially Avicenna, as an example of Heidegger's desirable ontological differentiation. The results show that in Avicenna's intellectual system, Being is considered as an object; In such a way that even in mental analysis, the latter is considered to be what a being is and is not considered as a component of its identity. This way of dealing with the problem of Being, in addition to ignoring the question of the meaning and truth of Being, forgets it as a presence, ambiguity, and opening horizon and thus refuses to pay attention to Heidegger's desirable ontological differentiation.

Aristotle’s ousia suffered the same fate it had in the West when it arrived in ancient Iran and the world of Islam. Among all the existing appropriate equivalents, the term “substance” was chosen as its nearest equivalent in western philosophical texts. Similarly, the term “jawhar”, which is the Arabic for “gawhar” in Persian and a close equivalent for substance, was accepted by all philosophers in the world of Islam. In previous translated works before and after the translation movement in Baghdad’s Dar al-Tarjumah (Translation House), there were some words such as ayn, inniyyat, huwiyyat, and budish which implied almost the true meaning of ousia as intended by Aristotle. This was because this term has been derived from the verb to be and basically means existent, essence, or being; however, jawhar and substance were the ultimate choices of translators. The dominance of this substantialist view, both in the West and in the East, was partly because of the early translations of Aristotle’s works. This paper aims to, firstly, examine the fate of Aristotles’s ousia upon its arrival in Iran and the world of Islam and, then, discuss the relationships between the meanings of the chosen equivalents in the Islamic world with those of their western equivalents.

Aristotle’s discussion of the Ousia are diverse and confusing since there are various definition of the term especially in Metaphysics, Physics and Categories. He refers to it sometimes as the underlying layer, sometimes he means something similar to the meaning of being, and sometimes as essence and quiddity. Hence, the difficulty and disagreement among the translators and interpreters on the best equivalent for Ousia in other languages. In the present paper, after a short historical discussion about Ousia, I examine some common equivalents for the Ousia in Latin and English and attempt to discuss the different reasons for and against each equivalent. My argument, in general, goes for the term Substance, and I will bring 8 reasons to establish the argument.

The important German thinker Heidegger and the great Iranian philosopher Mulla Sadra have both made "existence" and the way it is perceived central to their thinking and philosophy. Heidegger argues that the period of Western metaphysics from Plato to the modern age is entirely a period of neglect of existence; because existence in it, find a conceptual and categorical form, and its reality is hidden. Mulla Sadra also believes that most of the earlier philosophers were involved in the discussion of essence and somehow marginalized existence. In this respect, the way they both look at the issue of existence is in many ways the same; In particular, both thinkers emphasize the need for a non-conceptual and presential view of existence and deny conceptual and categorical understanding of it, or at least do not consider such a view to be an accurate and complete view. Of course, due to the difference in specific culture and intellectual space of each of these two thinkers, there are some differences between their thinking in the discussion of existence and its perception, as the difference between the two in the issue of nothingness is also significant.

Being centeret in Aristotle philosophy and followed by that in Farabi’s philosophy revolted to existence in Mullasadra’s transcendent philosophy. Accordingly the main issue of this research is evolution explanation in philosophy issue from Being to Existence. In the next level, the issue factors of this evolution is noted. The result of this comparision study is although Farabi could take some distance from Aristotle’s commentator comment variety (about Aristotle’s quadruble posision) by being qua being selection, but he didn’t find a way to reality of existence through interconnectendness meaning of existence and essence. Then mullasadra presented different explaning of philosophy subject by exploitation of primacy of existence fundamental doctrine, existence graded unity, and thereupon identity and unity adoption of existence and essence, and passing through Avicenian existence of essence distinction and the reality of existence separation of it’s concept, therefor he putup the reality of existence as philosophy subject and this way philosophy subject moved from being to existence. Although in sadra’s philosophy, through primacy of existence and ideality of quiddity, often being and existence (in philosophy subject issue) use in a sence and both indicate to the reality of existence.

Being is the first basis of recognition and the first issue for the metaphysics. Aristotle has said in different pages of the metaphysics on "being qua being" means “to on” and emphasized," Being has various meanings." He, rather than 'Being', has used "being" or existent. He, in the seventh book, has said: What has long been a source of confusion is that “what is being?” What does “being” mean? These meanings of existence, what effect does have on Aristotle's metaphysical system? Whether these meanings can be delivered to each or not? The meanings of "being” in Aristotle’s thought are controversial issue among scholars. Someone like Thomas Aquinas takes five senses and Farabi three senses and Avicenna five meanings for the existent. In this paper, while analyzing Aristotle's view based on metaphysics and looking at Thomas Aquino's perspective, we have delivered four meanings for "being" in Aristotelians. (Being of per accident, being of per true, being of potentiality and actuality, being of categories) And in fallowing, for the adventure of the meaning of "being", we will pay attention to the peripatetic philosophers, especially Farabi and Avicenna, according to their philosophical principles who have considered various meanings for the existent which are very different with Aristotle's meanings.

Aristotle’s theory of being and existent have been interpreted and investigated throughout the history of philosophy. Among the important and influential commentators of Aristotle in this issue (in Christianity and Islam) are Boethius and Farabi. The distinction between being and existent in Boethius is a commentary of Aristotle’s theory with a Christian approach which can be said to be an attempt to justify Trinity; and the distinction between being and quiddity in Farabi is a basis for the distinction between necessary existent and contingent existent, to prove then the existence of necessary existent, i.e. God, and to justify the creation by the theory of emanation. In this article, after the explanation of the issue of distinction, we will try to show the motivations of these two philosophers for establishing these distinctions and the consequences of them in their philosophy and in the history of philosophy.

In the contemporary literature on Mullasadra there is a controversy on his view on the reality of quiddity; on whether, according to his texts, quiddity is in-the-World or just in-the-Mind. This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. Among Mullasadra’s expressions about quiddity, these are mostly supposed to be against quiddity’s being in-the-World: first that quiddity is abstract; second that quiddity, in itself, is non-existent; and third that quiddity is a predicate of existence. In order to show that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, quiddity is in-the-World, I will argue, based on textual evidences, first that if the context is considered, those texts that normally are supposed to be counter-evidence for quiddity’s being in-the-World from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, are just apparently so; and second that if all relevant texts are examined, there is just one possible reading of Mullasadra’s view about the reality of quiddity: he constantly takes quiddity in-the-World.

The fundamental reality of existence is the most important innovation of Mullasadra and the most essential philosophical principle of his transcendental philosophy. This principle has many derivatives and philosophical outcomes with the potential of theological originality which have taken the attention of Sadrist theologians. However, these outcomes have been discussed in the works of Mulla Sadra and his followers in an unsystematic manner. In this respect, it is Allameh Tabatabaee in "Nehayhat al-hekmah" who correctly and explicitly discusses these outcomes precisely after delineating and providing proof for the fundamental reality of existence. The present paper examines the propositions which are presented as the derivatives and outcomes of fundamental reality of existence. This way, it is shown that their focus is not exactly similar to that of fundamental reality of existence itself, and therefore they cannot be considered as universally applicable to all forms of existence. An issue that can have an effect on the degree of originality of these derivatives is their potential to be derived from the principle of fundamental reality of existence. This issue is related to the distinction mentioned above.

Aristotle considered being neither univocal nor equivocal, but as the third kind i.e. Pros hen because he believed that being is said being in relation to one point.  In other words, this term is applied to the beings for their priority and posteriority in being.   The first usage of the term signifies the substance and other beings are said "being" as they are in relation to substance. Reviewing Farabi's thoughts reveals that unlike Avicenna that believed in Tashkik of the concept of "being", Farabi followed   Aristotle's' thoughts and his argument about focal meaning which doesn't refer to equivocality or univocality of "being". Farabi was of the opinion that the term isn't applied equally to all beings, but based on their priority and posteriority in being. In addition, he extended the account of Aristotle's doctrine of the different senses of being in the different categories beyond Aristotle's own use to cover the relation between sensible substances and the First and Second Being.

In his books of al-Qabasat and al-Ufuq al-mobin, Mir Damad has presented two arguments against the annexed nature of existence. In this paper, the writer deals with two questions regarding these arguments. The first is whether Mir Damad’s arguments have a historical background, and the second is whether their consequences support his theory on the derivation of “existent”. Here, the first question is answered briefly by presenting two of the most famous arguments of philosophers and mutikallimun (particularly, Suhrawardi’s famous argument and that of the commentator of Maqasid). Next, the writer provides some reasons indicating that not only are Mir Damad’s arguments different from them but they are also logically and polemically superior to them. Nevertheless, a complete response is given to the second question by arguing that if we take one of Mir Damad’s theories of existence (non-precedence of existence to the object) for granted, the non-annexed nature of existence would result in the non-derivation of the “existent”.