نوخاستگی

Panpsychism, as opposed to physicalism and dualism, offers a third way to explain consciousness. According to panpsychism, some fundamental physical entities have conscious states. One of the important arguments for this view is the refutation of the emergence of consciousness. According to emergentism about consciousness, the consciousness of human beings and other beings is a property that emerges at the non-fundamental physical level from the fundamental physical nonconscious level. In the contemporary era, Galen Strawson first argued in detail for panpsychism through the refutation of the emergence of consciousness. Strawson divides emergentism into two types, true and inexplicable emergentism; he takes the true emergence of consciousness to be impossible, and inexplicable emergence to be fundamentally incoherent. The claim of this paper is that according to the historical background of emergentism, it turns out that a third type of emergentism can be assumed, which is, firstly, coherent and, secondly, the emergence of consciousness based on it is possible. In this type, the emergent property is only partially dependent upon the fundamental level. The dependence of the emergent property upon the fundamental level is nomological, and the laws of nature are fundamental (nomism), not reducible to powers (powerism).

In the division of theories of the philosophy of mind, all kinds of physicalists, whether reductionist or non-reductionist, are considered Monist; because they believe in the physicality of everything. Reductionist physicists, on the other hand, believe that in addition to knowing everything as physical, everything can be reduced to lower levels of physics; But non-reductionists in physicalism, although they consider everything to be physical, believe that in the field of physics we are confronted with "emergent" things that cannot be reduced to the fundamental particles of physics and given a microphysical explanation of Have them; Because we are basically dealing with something new; But "property dualism", by acknowledging the non-physical nature of mental features, believes in two kinds of things in the universe and, as a result, has fundamentally rejected both Monist physicalist theories. Moreover, although in feature dualism, as in non-reductionist physicalism, we encounter a genus of non-reductionism and novelty, non-reductionism and novelty in property dualism are "species" and "species," respectively. Is "fundamental", not "typical" and "superficial". The present article prevents further sputum by clarifying the exact boundaries of the dualistic nature of property with physicalism, especially its non-reductionist type.

Throughout history, human beings have always explored their existential angles in various dimensions and ways. The interaction of the soul and the body is one of the issues that has been introduced from philosophy to the empirical sciences with the development of various sciences such as Cognitive Science. Mulla Sadra has answered this question in an innovative way by proposing the corporeal origination of soul on the basis of the principles of the gradation in existence and the substantial motion. Gazzaniga, as a neuroscientist, is also trying to answer the question of how the interacts of brain / mind by studying the brain and its structure in the form of a Emergentism perspective. In this article, first the Emergentism perspective is expressed, then it is attempted to provide a reading from the perspective of Mulla Sadra in the framework of theory of Emergentism and to compare it with the emergentism perspective of Gazzaniga, and finally, after comparison and analysis, their views are evaluated.

The fundamental question of the difference between living and non-living remains unanswered to date. Unlike most physical and chemical systems, living systems must, at the very least, be endowed with function, a concept that to this day remains indispensable to biology, yet is effectively missing from the vocabulary of physics and chemistry. Accordingly, we need an account of the evolution of function out of simple physical and chemical dynamics, which we do not as of yet have. Evelyn Fox Keller's argument requires the fundamental transformations of the conventional approaches in both physics and chemistry fields. John Dupré argues that the properties of constituents cannot themselves be fully understood without a characterization of the larger system, which they are a part of. This claim is elaborated through a defense of the concepts of emergence and of downward causation; causation acting from a system on its constituent parts. Although much of this argument can be read as having only epistemological or methodological forces, the final section of this paper defends a more robust metaphysical reading: even purely metaphysical understandings of reductionism such as are commonly represented by supervenience theses are misguided.

The traditional problem of soul-body emerges when we consider the two as being different by essence. The questions of the nature of soul and its relation to body are two questions for which replies should be provided. Dualism (a series of dualist doctrines) puts emphasis on the distinction between the two. In the present article, the author will say that Mulla Sadra is not a dualist. Monist (but non-reductionist) view is based on three ontological presumptions: (1) principiality of existence, (2) gradation of existence, and (3) substantial motion. The impact of this ontology on Sadra's psychology may be found in the following doctrines: (4) immateriality of the faculty of imagination (the middle point between reasonable and sensible); in its simplicity, the soul contains all faculties; and (6) in its origination, the soul is corporal, and in its permanence it is spiritual. The conclusion of these premises is manifest in the essential (and not accidental) relation between the soul and body. In conclusion, the author has made a comparison between Sadrean view and emergentism. The author is of the opinion that some readings of emergentism may be useful to provide a new formulation of Sadrean view.