کل

Friedrich Waismann regards the definition of analytical judgments, which are very similar to the predication of the essential of the essence, as contradictory. His word is based on denying the unified combination of subject and predicate and on the constructiveness and nonexistence of the whole. This paper mainly focuses on the problem of predication; because Weisman's criticism is based on the difficulty that the components are not predicated of the whole and also on considering the whole exclusively as the constructive one. Comparatively studying the problems based on the opinions of Muslim philosophers and logicians, we show that such a problem has long been prominent in their works, especially in Ibn Sīnā, and received a satisfactory answer as well. Apart from the denominative predication resolution of a few of Peripatetics, they, due to distinguishing the real and the constructive whole, believe that, when components are combined, another object is also generated in such a way that the predication in some cases is possible and in some cases is not. Wisemaan's problem is only related to the second. Also, predication discussions of Muslim thinkers are related to the discussion of the unified and adjacent (inḍimāmī) combinations. Studying the historical roots of the problem, we will show that the content of Ibn Sīnā's words is the very unified and adjacent combinations, which is expressed by the conditioning no (bisharṭ lā) and unconditioned (lā bisharṭ) considerations. Weisman's problem applies to the first, not to the second.

Evidently the greek terms καθόλου and καθ’ ἕκαστον appeared first in Aristotle’s works as meaning respectively universal and particular. In Plato’s works καθόλου is rarely used as synonum to ὅλον, meaning “whole”, and nowhere indicates “universal” in the logical sense. To be “whole” is a characteristic of ideas, implying a very high degree in the hierarchy of unity, ordered between the One and maltitudes. Aristotle uses καθόλου in several and even inexact meanings. Sometimes it means “universal” in an exactly logical sense, but often and specicaly in criticizing Plato’s theory of ideas, it indicates “genus” and doesn’t include any universal unconditionally. He criticizes Plato for conceiving universals as separate beings, however, contrary to the common view, καθόλου in such contexts means inclusively “genus”and doesn’t refer to species or any other logical universal. In the like manner καθ’ ἕκαστον occasionally in his works implies “particular”, but criticizing Plato’s ideas, it appears often as a synonym of species. Universal and particular, at the same time have some relation to “whole” and “part” and in that regard genus and species are considered as part and whole respectively. In this article we are going to explain the logical, as well as the lexical relation between “whol” and “universal”, on the one hand, and “part” and “particular”, on the other hand, but lastly there seems to bo no relation at all.

Many believe that one of Hegel's serious critics is Kierkegaard. In this article, we first try to show that some commentators believe that Kierkegaard's criticism is more related to Danish Hegelians than to Hegel himself. Second, when he meant to criticize Hegel himself, to what extent was he able to criticize the Hegelian system correctly, thirdly, was this anti-Hegelian thinker able to separate himself from the context of Hegel's thought, or is he still criticizing Hegel in the Hegelian Atmosphere? Of course, in this article, only some of Kierkegaard's criticisms have been examined and criticized; Like his critique on the position of the individual, theoretical reason, and historical necessity in Hegel's philosophy. We will also take a look at Kierkegaard's statement about the paradoxical field of faith and compare it with the Hegelian contradiction, and we will look at how much Kierkegaard is influenced by Hegel in expressing this concept. The purpose of the article is to examine Kierkegaard's criticisms, however, Hegel's ideas are also mentioned wherever necessary.

Since early times, Plato’s ideas have been assumed as universal entities as opposed to the particulars. More exact analysis of Plato’s terminology, however, shows the contrary. There is no term for “universal” and “particular” in his terminology at all, and he rather uses the words “whole” [کل] and “part” [جزء], which, considering their similitude to “universal” [کلی] and “particular” [جزئی], have been extremely mistaken for the two latter. These terms are developed in the middle Dialogues being closely related with the controversial issue of ideas. Plato regards each idea as one and simple; however, Parmenides’ criticisms urge him to reconstruct his views. To resolve this problem, he makes use of the term “whole” which implicates a middle state between the One and the multitude in the hierarchy of unity. There is nothing absolutely simple and with the exception of the One, all things include parts. In a sense, however, the idea can be considered as one, for although it includes parts, it cannot be reduced to them and so it is somehow independent of them. Such a kind of unity, lying inferior to the absolute One and higher than the multitudes, is called the whole and belongs to the ideas. Every idea is a whole and possesses the highest possible unity after the One. So “wholeness” is almost a synonym for unity or a second unity. It is not the case that the wholeness appertains to ideas, but the particulars also participate in it.

David Bohm, One of the greatest quantum physics, relying on the ontological interpretation of quantum physics as well as the holistic approach and believe in hidden variables, he disagreed with the common interpretation of quantum physics, i.e Copenhagen interpretation; as a result, He adopted a different approach with a philosophical taste.
In this approach, declaring quantum physics as flawed and believing that it is dominated by subjective idealism, He called the indifference towards philosophical and metaphysical foundations as the major challenge of quantum physics. So, he founded particular metaphysics foundations which included Holographic Universe, Implicate and Explicate order, The field of Quantum potential and Interconnectedness of all Beings, The originality of undivided whole, Holomovement as well as denying dualism between consciusness and matter.
The basic tenet of David Bohm's quantum physis is the Holographic Universe Idea. On this basis , Holomovement is original and the foundation of all beings. In other words all beings in the explicate order is considered as manifestations of implicate order. This manifestations depend on the whole and there fore, incompleteness rather independent. The new Holographic universe Idea, inspired David Bohm to think of denying the Cartesian thought and matter dualism and division of these two. Due to their lack of independence, he consider them as derivations of ageneral becoming. Considering the Holographic universe Idea as well as his own particular metaphysical foundations specially the originality of undivided whole, David Bohm comprehensively criticizes the idea of fragmentation and dualism . He calls for a new turn in the approaches that sciences, including physics take.

There is a shared premise in Avicenna’s Sidiqin Argument (and its formulation in our previously published papers) and one of the arguments against the possibility of regress (Taftazani, 1049). This premise is a metaphysical presupposition: for any contingent existent there is a chain that consists of its possible causes, and the chain, as a whole, is an in-itself contingent existent. In Asfar, MullaSadra quoted Taftazani’s argument and criticized this premise. He argued that the existence of the chain is not consistent with the equivalence of real existence and real oneness. If MullaSadra’s objection were penetrating, it would destroy Avicenna’s Sidiqin Argument (and our formulation). We shall argue that not only MullaSadra, in a sense, begs the question, but also his position in this objection is not consistent with its comments on ash-Shifa under the subject of number and his general view about the relation between a cause and its effect.