Ṭūsī

Although the fourth dimension has gone beyond the boundaries of philosophy and is now a major concern in physics, the exact origins and history remain a mystery. Therefore, it should be investigated in the context of which philosophical problems of the Islamic world the fourth dimension was formed and then, how it developed. We will see that in the philosophical society of Iran, it has been traced back to Mullā Sadrā; we will show that, however, in the Islamic world prior to him, there are quite explicit statements in the works of Naṣīr al–Dīn Ṭūsī, Ibn Kammūna, Quṭb al–Dīn Shīrāzī, Mīrak Bukhārī, Qūshchī, Mīr Dāmād and others. In Western philosophy, the fourth dimension has been arguably traced back to the opinions of some medieval thinkers such as Anselm; but some western thinkers have correctly shown that there is no explicit statement about this in their works. In short, in this article, we will collect the views of the mentioned thinkers in a historical way and analyze them rationally. In the end, we will take a glance at the history of Ibn ʿArafa’s relevant opinion about reductional four–dimensionalism.

The present study provides a description and analysis of the historical development of the notion of Aristotelean-Platonic agape (love) in the philosophical thoughts of Fārābī and Khwājah Nasīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. Following a historical method, the author deals with the reasons behind this development in addition to describing it. The discussion of friendship (agape) in Aristotle’s philosophy is propounded in his Nichomachean Ethics, where some traces of Platonic notion are also observable. This discussion was transformed in Islamic Philosophy in certain respects, including the variety of the beloved (and the most beloved), individualistic or socialist aspect, and selfishness or selflessness aspect. Regarding the variety of the beloved, the discussion has moved from virtue-based friendship (agape) to the love of the Wise (God). As to its range, one can observe a change of dialog form social-political friendship to agape as an internal characteristic with individual and social effects. Moreover, it has moved beyond selfishness and selflessness and, in conformity with the principle of congruence, reached the love from Him (Godly). The influential views of such thinkers as Plotinus; the role of religion, culture, and gnosis, and the ideas of Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Miskawayh, and Suhrawardī are of great importance in explaining this development. The particular philosophical and Kalāmī principles of Fārābī and Ṭūsī as well as some of their ethical views are the most important factors in the interpretation of the underlying reasons of the mentioned development.

To clarify the reason why presentism is preferable to four–dimensionalism, we have to see what serious criticisms have been posed against four–dimensionalism throughout history. Several criticisms have been raised by some contemporary western thinkers the most important of which is the fact that the four–dimensionalism denies movement and therefore it is highly counterintuitive. Some Muslim thinkers, too, have sometimes tried to intensely criticize it in a similar way since the four–dimensionalism was proposed by Naṣīr al–Dīn Ṭūsī. For instance, ʿAllāmah Ḥillī maintains that we self–evidently know that the past and the future, e.g., yesterday and tomorrow, are nonexistent and it is not the case to say that they are fixed in their own context. In other words, since the fourth dimension denies the movement and change, it is counterintuitive and even leads to sophism. Therefore, Muslim thinkers’ objections to the four–dimensionalism must be studied historically and analyzed rationally to see whether they are plausible.

We know that the fourth dimension has extended beyond the borders of philosophy and it is today one of the main problems of physicists. Nonetheless, the precedence and exact history of the fourth dimension is still obscure. Some scholars, in Western Philosophy, have problematically found some kind of precedence for it in such mediaeval thinkers as Anselm – while there is no explicit passage about it in their works . It is said in our philosophical society that the fourth dimension originated from Mullā Ṣadrā ( 980 - 1050 AH ) . But we will show that there are , previous to Mullā Ṣadrā , completely explicit passages about it in the works of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī ( d. 672 AH ) . As for previous to Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī , although we have found no explicit passage about it in the firsthand resources , but views have been attributed to some theologians in Muslim world – i .e . Naẓẓām , Ibn Rāvandī and ʿAbbād – in the secondhand resources content of which is the very four-dimensionalism . So , we will collect the views of the above-mentioned Muslim thinkers in this paper using historical method and will analyze them rationally .

Analyzing Health of soul and characteristics of a pure soul has been an important anthropological issue for Muslim thinkers. In his moral treatises, Nasir al-Din Tusi has developed a particular model on human soul`s health. The current research tries to depict this model and then give a comprehensive analysis of the issue on the basis of his writings. In the view of Tusi, purity of soul is a preliminary step toward human transcendence. In the transcendence-based theory of Tusi, decontaminating soul from vice and rascality exerts an important effect on the purity of soul. According to this thinker, virtue is a critical component for this purity. In this model he employs flexible indices aimed at a righteous Man rather than an ideal perfect or Gnostic human being. Such an analysis is different from other theories put forward on the issues including the view adopted by Zakariyyā al-Rāzī. Maintaining a spiritual therapeutic stance which is adopted from the moral theory of Tusi, the current research has depicted the spiritual disorders of soul and suggested remedial solution. Furthermore, considering the weight of “virtue” in the purity of soul, the nature of the concept, as well as faculties of soul, is explained and different interpretations are given.

Both Muslim and Christian theologians have put forward some solutions in order to solving problem of " speaking about God" from Silence theory to negative theology and from considering Divine attributes as Equivocal to considering them as Uni vocal .in this research it is supposed to compare two theory that are belonging two contemporary Philosophers and theologians i.e. Thomas Aquinas and Khajeh Tusi. First it is discussed specific and innovated theory of Aquinas that is Analogy and its foundations , its dimension its divisions and its usage in Divine attributes also some divisions about Divine attributes then we discuss the theory of Khajeh Tusi that is hierarchy uni vocal attributes and its alternatives, its fundamental theological basis( like transcendence of God) and also some divisions about Divine attributes from his viewpoint .the last chapter will be the comparative study between the two theories and their common aspects and their differences that may be considered as the innovation of this article.

How important is history among the Shiites? What historical issues have drawn their attention in the early times? What has been the course of compilations over time and role of the hadith areas in their formation? These questions are dealt with in the present study which seeks to clarify the Shiites’ historiography and their views on this subject. The findings of this study indicate that for Shi'i authors and historians, the history of Shi'a (i.e., the life of the Imams) has mostly had priority over the history of the Muslim world. Thus, the events closely related to Shiite history were chosen as subjects for Shi'i scholars' compilations and work. The historical course of the compilation of works indicates that the formation of each historical subject over time has gone through a different process and has either been welcomed or rejected by the scholars. Also, Shi'i hadith areas have played different roles in shaping these works. Generally, Shiite
historiography in the first five centuries has been indebted to the efforts of the scholars in the scientific centers of Iraq, especially the Kufa school.

Avicenna’s Kitāb al-ishārāt wal-tanbīhāt is a densely written philosophical compendium which he composed towards the end of his life. Ever since the publication of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s (d. 606/ 1209) al-Inārāt fi sharḥ al-Ishārāt wal-tanbīhāt, the Ishārāt has enjoyed the avid interest of post-Avicennan thinkers. Over the centuries, this resulted in the emergence of a vast literary corpus around this work (commentaries, paraphrases, glosses), of which Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s Ḥall mushkilāt al-Ishārāt wal-tanbihāt constitutes the actual center-piece, while most of the other works revolve one way or another around him. If one looks at the number of copies of each of the Ishārāt and the Ḥall mushkilāt al-Ishārāt that were preserved in Iran, it is clear that the Ishārāt was always studied on the basis of the commentary of Ṭūsī, which was regarded as a reliable and authoritative work. Avicenna explained his dynamics in various works, such as his detailed acount in the Cure (Kitāb al-shifāʾ) or his summary exposition of it in his Elements of Philosophy (ʿUyūn al-ḥikma). From among these various accounts, the one of the Ishārāt stands out in that it is probably his last and also, possesses by far the largest amount of commentaries on it. In this article, the focus will be on Avicenna’s account of motion in second section or namaṭ (chapters six to eight) of his Kitāb al-Ishārāt wal-tanbihāt, Ṭūsī’s Ḥall mushkilāt al-Ishārāt and, notably, some of the commentaries on this latter work which have so far not been studied or published in print: Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, (d. 710/1310), Sayyid Burhān al-Dīn al-Bukhārī (fl. early 8th cent.), Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Asʿad al-Yamanī al-Tustarī (ca. 707/1306) and ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Jurjānī al-Sayyid al-Sharīf (d. 816/1413). If anything, these commentaries show the vigour and importance of the commentary tradition around the Ḥall and the Ishārāt.

Contrary to Sunny scholars, Shia scholars believe that infallibility and immunity of Holy Prophet's successors (peace be upon him and his progeny) from any mistake, sin, error, and fault is a necessary and essential condition. Therefore, Imams (peace be upon them) must be infallible and immune from any sin and error. Shia theologians and scholars, particularly Khawja Nasir al-din Tusi, have provided several transmitted and rational arguments for the necessity of infallibility of Imams (peace be upon them) who are the successors of Holy Prophet. Therefore, any neglect of divine injunctions and commands, whether intentionally or unintentionally, overt or covert, is inconsistent with taking the position of Imam and succeeding Holy Prophet. Fakhr Razi and his followers, however, cast doubt on and even denied the necessity of the condition of infallibility for Holy Prophet's successors and finally reduced infallibility into justice. The present paper elaborates on the most important arguments of Muslim theologians, particularly Mohaqqeq Tusi, for the necessity and exigency of infallibility of Imams, criticizes and rejects Fakhr Razi's most important doubts and objections, and finally concludes that infallibility is a necessary and essential condition for Holy Prophet's successors.

As same as many other philosophical principles, the rule of al-Wahid have been subjected to a great criticism and cavil by scholars and authorities throughout ages. This rule has, despite the celebrated point of view, been challenged by not only the theologians but also some philosophers and mystics as well– at least, in the extensional aspects. Having taken the background of this rule into consideration and the purpose of philosophers who had in presenting it, this article has endeavored to analyze the prominent statements regarding the rule of al-Wahid and also point out each of their main presumptions in order to show that the expositions made by Muhaqiq-Tusi are the most comprehensive comparing to those scholars before or even after him; other statements presented by other authorities contain specific ambiguities in regard to al-Wahid on the effect side. Therefore, thanks to the more accurate expositions provided by Khajeh and the resolution of the ambiguity, the conceptual contradictions involved in the rule mentioned above due to the formation based on the principle of the resemblance become evident. Presuming that the rule of al-Wahid is theoretically accurate, the author has analyzed the extensional criticisms made by some thinkers in regard to this philosophical principle. Thus, it has been shown that the rule of al-Wahid lacks outer extensions in terms of compatibility with the external world regarding the principle of resemblance, unity on the causal side, unity on the effect side, and the concept of emanation.

Analyzing the problem of happiness, its essence, norm, degrees and objective components are to be studied. With analysis of the components, Tusi`s model of happiness and his value pyramid of degrees of happiness would be made clear. For Tusi, happiness consists in comprehensive pleasure and attaining perfections. On the basis of gradual nature of perfection and pleasure, happiness would be gradual also and longitudinal pyramid of values for the degrees of happiness would appear in mind. As is understood by Tusi,hapiness in Aristotlian theory has not been limited to the perfection of rational soul`s accidental powers; rather, he theorize on such a high level of happiness that includes other degrees. Objective and bodily perfections, deliverance from vilenesses, attaining perfections, justice and knowledge are, for him, longitudinal components of happiness actualization; though their effects in its actualization are not of the same level.

The theory of the principiality of existence or quiddity lacks a systematic model in pre-Sadrian thoughts; however, it is based on certain presuppositions the discovery of which can illuminate Muslim thinkers’ approach to this problem. Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi has explained his epistemological ideas regarding these presuppositions. This paper deals with some of the presuppositions underlying the principiality of existence or quiddity as presented by Tusi. Some of them are as follows: 1) the problem of the addition of existence and quiddity and its quality; 2) detecting the relationship between existence and quiddity; 3) the mind or the outside as the place of the realization of this relationship, and 4) evaluating the referents of the mentioned analysis and the realization of quiddity and existence in the outside or emphasizing the exclusive realization of one of them. Through his analyses of each of these presuppositions, Tusi adopts an approach which can represent his agreement or disagreement with the principiality of existence. Accordingly, although the theory of the principiality of existence did not occupy his mind as a problem, his epistemological presuppositions regarding existence and quiddity are consistent with it. The development of the relationship between the ideas of Tusi and Mulla Sadra can be analyzed through explaining the former’s standpoints regarding the above-mentioned presuppositions and his influence over Mulla Sadra.

Every ethical theory is based on its ethical components. Tusi as an ethic theoretician has provided some systematic analyses of the ethical components such as felicity. Tusi has two approaches to felicity: (1) general approach that regards felicity in both humans & incorporeal beings (in interpretation of Isharat). (2) Special approach that study just human felicity. Studying the latter, Tusi believes that felicity is pleasure of manner of theosophical living (in Naserian ethics). Tusi’s analysis of felicity emphasizes on the components of perfection and pleasure; therefore, it is important to discover their relationship in order to have a comprehensive understanding of felicity. Tusi’s various moral models have linear relationship with one another, and from this perspective the pyramid of perfection degrees is drawn which begins with purifying the soul and in high degrees is ended to annihilation in Allah. Analyzing pleasure, this article firstly provides a comprehensive classification of pleasure definitions and then discusses Tusi’s triple analysis of pleasure. From Tusi’s point of view degrees of human perfection & grades of pleasure are coherent with degrees of felicity. Examining two definitions of felicity is going to clarify their distinction and their relationship.

This paper presents a critical-comparative analysis of Tusi’s writings on ethics. Research on various dimensions of his ethical theory requires a comprehensive knowledge of his works. Therefore, prior to any study of his works on ethics, it is necessary to critically analyze them and compare them with each other. Moreover, it is also a must to identify Tusi’s contribution to research on ethics among his written works. It is not possible to provide an extensive report of all of his works in various fields in this paper; therefore, the writer has contented herself with referring to those books, treatises, and articles that he exclusively wrote on ethics including some scattered discussions of this field. Moreover, because of the importance of Tusi’s independent works on ethics, the writer has also referred to the date of each work, the purpose behind writing it, the approach of the work, the structure, method, and references used in writing it, its publication status, its place in the history of ethical works, its bibliography, the ethical school it represents, and its Table of Contents following an analytic-critical approach. This paper also examines the relationship between Tusi’s ethical writings, particularly his three important works including Akhlaq-e Muhtashami, Akhlaq-e Nasiri, and Awsaf al-ashraf.

The question of the concept and referent of “happiness” is rooted in Man’s nature. A comparison of the ideas of two authorities in this field, one from ancient Greece and the other from among the Islamic philosophers who were contemporary with Ibn Sina, is of great importance in appreciating the innovations of Muslim thinkers in comparison to those of Greek thinkers in various fields of philosophy. This short paper, which is based on an analytic-comparative study, after explaining the philosophical and ethical principles of each of these two schools, inquires into the similarities and differences between their ideas concerning happiness. Aristotle defined the theory of virtue and happiness based on the concept of “golden mean” with reference to some components such as the intellect, joy, and friendship. However, given his non-monotheistic view of God and the world and heedlessness of resurrection, he was not capable of providing a successful model for the concept and referent of happiness. In contrast, Ibn Miskawayh tries to explain the same concepts on the basis of the knowledge of the soul, the intellect, and the divine rule in the light of his monotheistic worldview. He divides happiness into two worldly and other-worldly types and introduces divine proximity as the true referent of happiness. Both of them define happiness as the transcendent good (supreme good); however, since the basic principles of their ethical philosophies are different from each other, their philosophical concomitants are also different from each other.

This study intends to analyze scientific and ethical perfection from the viewpoint of Tusi. In analyzing perfectionism, we begin with analysis of the concept of perfection. Dimensions of human perfection (scientific and ethical ones), stating the degrees of human perfection and practical procedure and process of human perfection from Tusi other issues discussed in this paper. Dimensions of human perfection in accordance with human soul forces (theoretical and practical forces), Tusi ions from the function of these forces are different in his works. According to him, with regard to various functions of the forces, scientific and practical perfection will also be various. Scientific perfection is knowledge-based while constitutional facts (insights) and ethical perfection are from particular cases of knowledge and practical effects. In fact, Tusi it is indicative of high-level ideals, i.e. soul ethics, perfection has degrees which could be shown by horizontalhierarchy of perfection. Tusi believes that regarding the stages of perfection in philosophical works the focus is on nonessential forces of soul and in mystical works, the attention is directed towards manners of soul and its horizontal existence shields. The process of perfection has two scientific and ethical dimensions and Tusi has proposed a practical procedure for perfection and has not merely theorized.

In the philosophies of Mulla Sadra and Tusi, the intellect is the most supreme faculty of the soul, and intellectual knowledge is the highest level of knowledge. Both of them agree that rationality is the most fundamental of all human characteristics, with the difference that the main criterion for Mulla Sadra is theoretical rationality, while for Tusi it is practical rationality. The present paper is devoted to a comparative study of the two concepts of the intellect and knowledge from the viewpoints of these two philosophers.Although Tusi believed in the relationship between the rational soul and the Active Intellect and considered it as the mediator of the soul’s moving from potency to actuality, he does not accept its union with the Active Intellect. However, Mulla Sadra stipulates that the human rational soul unites with the actual intellect and maintains that the perception of this problem, like believing in the union of the intellect and the intelligible, is a divine gift. He has faith in the unity of human intellect and is also aware of the nature of knowledge and its end and subject. In fact, his belief in the connection of sciences and their correlation in certain aspects is rooted in the same awareness. Mulla Sadra believes that the reality of knowledge is the same as existence, as knowledge means the appearance of known things and their affixation in souls or minds. Unlike Tusi, he considers perception and knowledge as a kind of a multi-level and graded existence and argues that all of its levels and grades, including sense perception, imaginal perception, and intellectual perception, are immaterial. In his view, the intellect consists of all intelligible things. In contrast, Tusi maintains that in acquired knowledge man’s relationship with the external object is through the form developed in the human mind. However, Mulla Sadra is of the view that, like ignorance, knowledge is divided into simple and compound types. Through referring knowledge to being and existence, he has transformed the domain of the common disagreements concerning the quiddative nature of knowledge.

Since according to many philosophers, the human soul is an immaterial and simple entity, the problem of its motion has always occupied the minds of thinkers. Aristotle attributed this motion to many of the philosophers preceding him, which, given their naturalist approach, could be justified. Unlike Plato, Aristotle considers the problem of the immateriality of the soul to be unclear and ambiguous. In his view, the soul is a moving agent; however, he considers its essential motion to be absolutely false and has some unclear and inconsistent ideas concerning its accidental motion. Apparently, the first seeds of the theory of motion in the soul’s substance were planted by Tusi based on one of Ibn Sina’s statements. This theory came to fruition by Mulla Sadra, the great philosopher. He does not consider himself as the innovator of this theory and traces it back to Qur’anic verses and the ideas of gnostics and philosophers. However, he was the first to base this theory on such philosophical and, particularly, ontological principles as principiality, unity, and gradation of existence and introduce it as a foundation for propounding some innovative theories in anthropology and epistemology. In fact, it can be said that this theory is at the center of Mulla Sadra’s psychology and, in the light of its centrality, the fields of anthropology, eschatology, and epistemology have undergone great changes and given rise to some new problems following a different approach. Here, Mulla Sadra presents the art of thinking in the best way possible.