action

Rationality, in addition to describing theoretical matters, is also a description of actions. Every action that originates from a human arises from their practical reason; however, if the focus of practical reason is excessively directed toward one of the lower faculties, such as desire, anger, or illusion, human reason follows that faculty, leading to invalid rationality. If practical reason, in its attention to the animate faculties, follows the judgment of theoretical reason, valid rationality is formed. In the former state, practical reason may follow desire, anger, or illusion and lead the actions align with them. The action arising from rationality directed toward desire, anger, and illusion consists, respectively, of attracting pleasant and compatible matters, repelling unpleasant ones, and striving for conventional matters such as possession. In sound rationality, actions aligned with desire, anger, and imagination are limited to an extent that does not hinder the ultimate perfection of reason. This extent is determined by practical reason in accordance with the judgment of theoretical reason.

Human action and its process of realization are fundamental issues for the human and social sciences. This research employs an analytical-deductive method, and by analyzing Sadrian philosophy, it deductively presents the answer to the research question. This article aims to utilize Sadrian philosophy to identify the internal and external factors involved in the realization of human action, to extract the process of action realization based on the relationships between these factors, and to depict its conceptual model. Research findings indicate that internal factors involved in action include human faculties of the soul, innation, character of soul, knowledge and accumulated experiences, infution, and creditable. External factors involved in the action are also related to the actor's society and ecosystem, and influence the action in three ways: the impact of the prevailing social spirit on the formation of the individual's character, facilitation, and the direction of the action under social pressure and the cognitive information of the community. Among these factors, some of them become the basis for the realization of the action, in the absence of which the action does not appear in the action. These factors include; Cognitive information of the person, character, accumulated knowledge and experiences and society. Finally, the conceptual model of the process of action is drawn Keywords: action, character, society, belief, conceptual model.

Various historical events led to the emergence of theological movements such as the Khawārij, Ashʿarīs, and Muʿtazilīs, each with numerous branches and distinct characteristics, which gave rise to diverse interpretations of faith (īmān). Religious scholars, who were influential figures in the intellectual currents of their time—like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, known as the "Head of the Skeptics" (Imām al-Mushakkikīn) and a prominent figure of the Ashʿarī school, and Qāḍī al-Quḍāt ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadānī, a representative of Muʿtazilī thought—positioned the concept of īmān as a fundamental element within the religious discourse, developing detailed views on the nature, characteristics, and rulings of faith. This study compares ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s perspective, which defines īmān as encompassing both affirmation (taṣdīq) and the performance of obligatory and recommended acts, with that of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who considers īmān to be purely a matter of inner affirmation of the heart. The research examines the differences in their views regarding the nature, components, and attributes of īmān in order to understand its role within their respective intellectualtheological frameworks and to highlight the distinctive features of their perspectives.

Methodology is the corrector of understanding in any science; There are methods that cause extensive changes in science; Among them is political sociology, which follows a special approach in the analysis of social and political actions. The purpose of this research is to answer the question of what is the political approach in the face of political and social actions. Although researchers have noted some points in this field, the approach of this research, which will come in the form of five levels, is an innovation that has been made in this article. This research methodically explains the approach of political sociology in the face of various political-social actions with an analytical-descriptive method. The findings of this research indicate that the political sociologist must first understand the action correctly in analyzing and confronting the various actions of the society, then explain it in detail and take into account the origin and causes of its occurrence as well as the effects and consequences of the action and provide an analysis at the end.

The central focus of this article with an interdisciplinary approach revolves around the common concern shared by Hannah Arendt and Milan Kundera: the perils of history for the individual. A general question to ask in this research is why Arendt and Kundera in their books distrust History’s forces. This implies that the individual, under the influence of impersonal appeals and invisible hands, erases oneself from memory and surrenders to suprahuman forces. Totalitarianism has consistently drawn the individual into submission through the support of these suprahuman historical forces. Hence, according to Arendt, Eichmann, for instance, was corrupted by history, as he was stripped of any personal decision-making and choice, solely entrusting himself to the quasi-divine voice of history. Beyond these historical strategies, any transformative action becomes impossible. Returning to action (in Arendt's terms) and guarding the legacy of the novel (in Kundera's terms) constitute resistance against such historical overreach. In Arendt's view, every action initiates its narrative, while, according to Kundera, the novel's memory records experiences forgotten by official history. As a result, Arendt and Kundera prefer personal history over public history, action over reaction, and decision over command. Therefore, Arendt emphasizes the significance of action, and Kundera underscores the independence of the novel against history. Both advocate loyalty to a poetic individuality that is increasingly fading into oblivion in the modern era.

One of the most important aspects of our mental life, in terms of the quality and meaning of our existence, is emotions; Because emotions can guide our perceptions, thoughts, and actions in a certain direction. To explain this category, the differentiation of passions, rational tendencies, instincts, and the role of each in human actions should be investigated. Leibniz in his philosophy of mind highlights these different inclinations of the mind well and by focusing on dynamic forces, transforms the understanding of the human mind specially. He tries to explain how these types of emotions affect the body and mind based on the approach of psychophysical parallelism and the experience of states such as pleasure and pain based on his metaphysical background. Although Leibniz never wrote a separate treatise on passions like Descartes, he deeply cared about the appetent dimension of the human mind, and his ideas in this regard can be found in the work new essays on human understanding. In this article, an attempt is made to explain his approach to emotions and, more specifically, human passions by focusing on new essays on human understanding.

According to Aristotle, the character of tragedy must be morally good, that is, virtuous, and in order to be on the path to happiness, it must observe the rule of moral moderation through selective and conscious action. Accordingly, this study raises the question of how to explain the link between action and moral character. To ponder and explain the answer to this question, the Poetics is read and interpreted alongside Nicomachean ethics. The aim is to show the various aspects of action and its relation with character and morality, both positively and negatively, by relying on the relationship between action and moral character in the Poetics. The importance and necessity of this research is that it will help to clarify important parts of the Poetics, relying on its place in the system of Aristotle's moral philosophy. The conclusion to be drawn from this research is that the Poetics should be read in the context of Aristotle's philosophy - especially the Ethics - and also the action, in the thought that governs the Poetics, while it is related to moral character but also takes precedence on it.

This article discusses psychological actions and qualities and their mutual influence from the perspective of the philosophical system of Transcendent Philosophy. It reveals that the relationship between actions and qualities is bidirectional, and they mutually influence each other. Mulla Sadra considers the issuance of voluntary actions to be based on specific principles and believes that in humans, practical reason is the primary source of actions, while in animals, and imagination and fancy serve this function. Qualities are realized through the repetition of actions and practice, and after their realization, they play a role in the issuance of actions. In fact, actions and qualities each influence the creation of the other. Of course, actions and qualities have different types and degrees and, like the soul itself, are subject to intensity and weakness. The human soul at each level has its own specific actions and qualities and is capable of performing tasks according to its existential status, and through extensive practice, it internalizes ethics corresponding to that level of existence. Using an analytical-descriptive method, the essence, formation process, types of action and quality, and their mutual influence are discussed and explored. Certainly, attention to the human soul in terms of actions and qualities will highlight different aspects of the essence of the soul, especially since there has not been a direct study or article on this matter, thus making the discussion of this topic necessary.

Focusing on the interconnection between belief, character, and behavior can yield a novel understanding of the concept of 'action'. This research aims to formulate a definition of 'action' based on this relationship, employing a descriptive-analytical methodology. Sadra distinguishes 'action' from a mere doing by positing that 'awareness precedes action'. Practical intellect is responsible for cultivating this awareness, which is facilitated by theoretical intellect's grasp of universal concepts. Each of the three components of religious stations—knowledge, states, and actions—can be viewed both as consequences and antecedents. The repeated performance of actions preceded by awareness, derived from practical intellect, gives rise to acquired dispositions and ethics within the soul. Subsequently, these dispositions foster knowledge. The outcome of this knowledge is a state and a disposition that catalyze actions. Actions preceded by deeper knowledge result in more solidified dispositions, which, in turn, influence the soul's knowledge-based functioning. From this perspective, actions are preparatory steps towards attaining wisdom and serve as precursors to knowledge. Both actions and dispositions are ultimately linked to the purification of the heart, a process of negation that involves removing the obstacles imposed by the sensory realms to reach the ultimate truth. Consequently, the role of action in this relationship is secondary and incidental rather than being the intrinsic or primary objective.

Instilling attitude has consistently been a focus of various scientific and philosophical schools of thought. Examining this concept within the context of contemporary Western persuasion studies, alongside tracing the implications of the process from perception to behavior in Ṣadrā's anthropology, highlights significant untapped potentials in these two domains. Using an "implication-analysis" method, this article seeks to answer the question: What implications can be derived from Ṣadrā's psychology regarding key aspects of attitude inquiry in persuasion studies.The hypothesis of this study posits that Ṣadrā's philosophy of the soul explains psychological states ontologically, making it impossible to equate the attitude and its components with the empirical findings of contemporary psychology on persuasion inquiry. Fundamental differences exist, stemming from the divergent ontological perceptions of scholars of the two fields about soul-mind and their methodological approaches. Nonetheless, similarities (such as the constituent components of attitude) can be identified between the two fields about attitude. The findings propose enriching implications from Ṣadrā’s psychology for interdisciplinary attitude studies, carrying innovative research proposals and theoretical frameworks for Islamic attitude studies.

The essential Will of God can be discussed from two perspectives (ontological and conceptual perspectives), which is the subject of this article. The majority of thinkers are against the appearance of expressions. Theologians have generally denied the essential Will and philosophers have given it to the attribute of knowledge, which is also a denial. In response to the truth of the essential Will of God, the author, after many reflections, has reached a new reading of the essential Will of God (interpreting it to God’s Essence in terms of the fulfillment of the generative meaning of lead, demand, desire to act - equivalent to generosity and grace). In this paper, its foundations and proofs (the will as the description of perfection and existence, the lack of the essential will (the existential perfection), conflict with the purity of God’s Essence, the necessity of the end of all accidents to the substantive, the negation of the essential Will, require the denial of God’s Will, the invalidity requirement of denying the essential Will and narrative proofs), criticism of the doubts and achievements of the theory (the eternity of Divine agency and the universe of the unity of Divine will, conformity of Divine Will and the system of causality and the impossibility of Badā'(alteration in the divine will)), have been explained and presented.

This research seeks to explain the relationship between thought and action according to Allameh Tabatabaei. The aim is to clarify this important principle of practical wisdom from the viewpoint of this neo-Ṣadrian philosopher which, with descriptive and analytical method, analyzes his works, and in cases where there is no explicit discussion, reconstructs it based on the principles accepted by him. The conclusion is: from the perspective of Allameh Tabatabaei, knowledge is the origin of all human actions. Knowledge and action are existential matters, and as a result, the intensity of knowledge causes the intensity of action. There is a two-way interaction between thought and action. Putting a special emphasis on the concept of concern, Allameh has been able to connect the infallibility of the infallible and the realization of moral habits with the nature of knowledge.The innovations of this search are as follows: organizing Allameh's scattered words in this discussion, finding four readings of the interaction process between thought and action, presenting an innovative interpretation of the effect of action on thought, completing Allameh's view with an existential approach and also involving the truth of conventional concepts, showing the consequences of this view in Humanities.

In the Middle Ages, after the divine monotheism, one of the most important issues in the Islamic sect was the discussion of the nature of the divine word, which both the Mu'tazilites and the Ahl-al Hadith considered sound and words, with the difference that the divine word was an event and a creature of God and in Ahl-al Hadith, was ancient . The end of conflict led to the hardship of the Qur'an, not with the logic of reason, but with power and force. The ideological end of this story left many questions unanswered, and addressing it will solve many issues. The theory of the divine word for the Mu'tazilites is based on a special metaphysics that can be achieved by explaining the type of metaphysical approach to a better understanding of the divine theology. What is the nature of the divine word? Is it ontological or epistemological and semantic? has real meanings? Is it human or divine? What does the divine word have to do with history? How do religions relate to each other? In short, the divine word is the verbal act of God, which in terms of actuality, two-member and in terms of verb, is multi-actual, which is human in terms of the source of the issuance of intention, and human in terms of the source of the word, and it is an event and a historian in three aspects: linguistic, philosophical and theological. And according to it, the relationship between the Abrahamic religions is essentially independent

"Contemplation"(Gaze) is used in contrast to "action" in the new discourse, it is used in Uthulujiyya and Enneads in cosmological and existential discussions. The problem of this writing is the analysis of the use of " contemplation " in Uthulujiyya and Enneads with an existential approach. The question is, is the use of "contemplation"(Gaze) in the Uthulujiyya and the Enneads the same and in the same sense, or is it different in the two works? How is " contemplation" expressed in these two books? The answer is, they are not different in terms of meaning; But they are different in terms of application and method of examining the subject. in the theology of Uthulujiyya, "contemplation" (Gaze) can be attributed to both God and the intellect and soul. "contemplation" is raised in the theory of grace and issuance and is connected with cosmology and theology. And in the Enneads, there is an "contemplation" in all hierarchy of life about God, intellect, soul and nature, and it has a creative aspect. The important difference between these two works is that in the rendering of the Enneads, it pays attention to "contemplation" both in the existential aspect and the epistemological aspect as opposed to "action"; and examines contemplation against action; While there is no such view in Uthulujiyya. Therefore, in this article, we will explain the term "contemplation " in Uthulujiyya and Enneads and examine its position in the cosmological system of these two works. The method of this writing is descriptive-analytical.

From Ibn Sina's point of view, the estimative faculty is one of the most important cognitive principles of action. The prior perception of action, the use of composite imagination for action, the emergence of desire and anger through the perception of profit and harm, helping practical intellect, creating some psychological qualities such as fear or hope, producing false statements, influencing outside the body and mediating between physical states and action are among the functions of this faculty. This faculty needs to be accompanied by other cognitive faculties to have its functions. Due to its association with intellect, human estimation has achieved another function such as dogmatic judgment and making universal propositions. Similarity, experience, needs of other faculties, and the merciful inspirations of God are among the ways through which estimation reaches its perceptions without the help of intellect. In most cases, estimation perceives benefits and harms without judgment but with conceptual perception. Ibn Sina's statements about image eliciting propositions and the passivity of the soul from imaginations prove this claim. Despite Ibn Sina's attention to various dimensions of estimation and its role in action, his thought is incoherent and ambiguous in some cases. For instance, attributing universal perception to estimation in some cases and the impossibility of explaining some functions of estimation

Man’s volitional action is a critical subject in humanities. Realizing the process and structure of this action and understanding its relation with humanities result in a precise knowledge in the humanities itself. The current study has been an endeavor to explain the relationship between the constituents of Man’s volitional action and humanities by delving into the structure of Man’s volitional action and its associated theories. The findings of this study that utilized a descriptive-analytical method reveals that Man compiles the results of his volitional actions in forms of some experiences. Accumulation of these sciences and experiences, then, reveals the necessity of their division, classification, and categorization. The content of humanities entails a continuum of different sciences and experiences resulted from Man’s volitional actions that are categorized in form of scientific divisions and disciplines. Thus, explaining the structure and constituents of human volitional actions results in an accurate understanding of humanities, the relation of disciplines in humanities and the way they are allied with human needs. This, not only facilitates scientific endeavors in the field but also expands the domain of humanities.

Explaining actions through cognitive and motivational components such as cognition, desire, intention and etc. is amongst the most important issues in the philosophy of action. The main goal of this research is studying the qualities that convert Man’s behavior into action. Defining action and explaining the basic factors involved in it are two interconnected issues, i.e. the identified factors involved in action exactly correspond the criteria (qualities) which convert behavior into action. In Western intellectual tradition belief, desire and will are the most critical factors determining action while in the Islamic intellectual tradition more emphasis is laid on the concepts of might, choice and will. The present study examined the aforementioned concepts in the views of Islamic philosophers and theologians in the light of Allamah Tabatabaei. It was concluded that knowledge, above all, practical knowledge is the most critical factor involved in Man’s action. According to Allamah Tabatabai, compared to might, desire, will and choice, it is the practical knowledge that carries the most critical role in determining action and distinguishing it from behavior.

Due to such a disjointed situation, the modern subject has not been able to reconstruct the value order of the past, nor has it been fully able to emerge a new semantic order, at least until now. The horrific nature of such conditions has prompted many political thinkers, including Hannah Arendt, to think of a solution and propose an alternative model to solve the crisis of meaning. Although Arendt is loyal to his subjectivity and free action, he avoids falling into an anarchist and self-centered abyss by proposing some aspects. The main question of the present article is that in a world where the previous meaning-giving orders have collapsed or suffered from a crisis of meaning, and at the same time some new views and ideologies have created a deeper crisis with their totalitarianism, what possibilities does Arendt have for intellectual and practical creation, and what normative requirements should he consider in this direction? In response, the article argues that instead of giving originality to nature or a specific nature for man, Arendt considers human beings as situational beings who create their desired meaning in their interaction with others. Regarding the background of the research, it should be noted that Hannah Arendt's thought on the issue of subject and her activism has been reread and interpreted from various perspectives, including Sila Ben Habib (2003), Jürgen Habermas (1977), Willa (1999), Sophie Lewidolet (2018), etc. have investigated this issue.

What has been considered in this article as a novel aspect is the attention to the human condition as the point of support for the subject's action in a situation that can be explained by Gianni Vattimo's view under the concept of hermeneutical nihilism based on the disappearance of metaphysical values and original and transcendent beliefs of the past, in which man achieves a new interpretation of his position in the interaction of the past and the future.

The originality of the subject is interconnected with two principles and is inevitably linked to each other. One is consciousness and the other is action. Arendt pays attention to the human condition and considers it impossible to achieve a correct definition of human nature. According to Arendt, morality cannot be considered as following a series of eternal and eternal rules or principles that are valid for all times and places. On the contrary, ethics should be related to thinking and acting in certain situations that arise from our understanding of our lives and our hope for the future. Arendt sees politics not as an essence or a priori attribute, but as a kind of relationship that occurs in the interaction between human beings. In his view, in the realm of action, man is not completely trapped and subordinate to what he has previously thought in the mental realm, but action, which is the realm of performance, is a sign and manifestation of the unique realities of a particular field and realm, many of whose results and consequences inevitably remain unpredictable and accompanied by danger, and do not submit to determinable and precise calculating requirements. In Arendt's view, in the tradition of Western political philosophy from the beginning, politics was conceived on the basis of the concept of creative labor, not on the concept of free action. By denying and denying Western philosophy from Plato's Republic to Heidegger's existence and time, which focused on death and mortality, Arendt argues for new beginnings in order to save the essence of humanity. In other words, action and even reflection and thinking have inevitable consequences in themselves. For example, thinking in itself is threatening. In his view, action is the most political aspect of human activity and in a sense is his distinctive attribute and characteristic in comparison with other creatures. Arendt's pathological reflection on modern man has been concerned with the loss of the political aspect and dimension of man and its reduction to a mere toiling and struggling being. Arendt's contemplation of judgment, which is based on a combination of the partial (imagination, taste, and common sense) and the general (situationality and spatiality), and at the same time imagination as a prominent feature of the intersubjective subject that helps to transcend the bottleneck of time and space, indicates the adoption of aesthetic arrangements for understanding the world and, as Watimo says, a kind of hermeneutical act to make sense of the inanimate world. In other words, the act of judging in Arendt's view is done by relying on meaning-giving propositions that eliminate meaninglessness and nihilism.

Arendt is one of the thinkers who considers the individual subject in an inevitable and permanent continuity with the other in the public sphere and at the same time considers the support of the subject to prove its position in the field of action. In his thought, the mysterious aspects of the subject are less visible. Also, some stable, extra-temporal, and extra-spatial concepts in thought such as friendship, loyalty to promises, etc. As seen in Jaspers' thinking as common human desires along with attention to context, it seems that Arendt does not pay attention to those concepts because of the emphasis on the situationality of the subject.

Regarding the analysis of voluntary action, there are two general attitudes in Western philosophy: causal explanation and non-causal rational explanation. The first view has been the classic and common theory in the history of Western philosophy and thought, but the second has been formed in the contemporary century. According to the first view, the inner elements of the agent, i.e., desire, intention and belief, have a causal relationship with his action, and the explanation of the action based on them is an example of causal explanation. John Searle, a famous contemporary philosopher who defends the second view, lists six assumptions for the first theory and criticizes them. Based on the words of Searle and other proponents of the first view, this article explains, rationally analyzes and evaluates Searle's six assumptions and his criticisms.The mentioned assumptions are: the causality of beliefs and desires for rational actions, rationality as following certain principles and rules, rationality as a separate cognitive faculty, weakness of will caused by disturbance in the psychological antecedents of the action, denial of desire-independent reasons for action and realization of rationality in the assumption of consistent collection of previous desires. Searle believes that these assumptions are incomplete. Some of Searle's criticisms and his positive views are debatable, including that the agent himself is the cause of action, not his beliefs and desires, and that Searle's idea of the desire-independent reason is incomplete and there is a desire in this kind of reason. The rationality includes primary goals and beliefs.

The philosophy of action is a trend in contemporary philosophy that has a close relationship with the fields of philosophy of mind, ethics and human sciences, and the pursuit of its issues about human action and what it is will have implications for the scientific and philosophical discussions of these different fields. Despite the extent of the discussion of action in the history of Islamic thought, the study of Allameh Jafari's works shows that few Muslim thinkers like him have analyzed human action in detail. Realizing the necessity of this discussion for human sciences, Allameh has followed this issue and during his discussions, he has examined the points that are important for the philosophy of action today. In Jafari's theory of action, action is introduced from the category of action (or, in other words, event) and its attribution to the human "I" has a special place. Also, Jafari considers the three components of will, decision and discretion as the means of "I" to realize action, among which the component of discretion is considered the most important component. Finally, the action is defined based on the causal relationship between these components with the human soul, psyche and body in such a way that the basic action is the movement of the soul and after that, the change in the psyche and then the nervous system of the body.