avicenna

The debate of whether existence, or being, (wujud) is a synonymous term (ishtirak ma’nawi) or homonymous term (ishtirak lafzi) appears in numerous philosophical and theological works. Some believed in its homonymous term and established other theological issues on such basis. The followers of the synonymous term for existence provided reasons as proof for their belief which appear to be distorted and invalid. The title of the reasons are، the consistency of knowledge or comprehension (‘ilm) of a thing despite having doubt towards its properties (khususiat), the first imaged thing as being (wujud), non - existence (‘adam)—the opposite of being—  as a synonymous term, the accuracy (sihat) of the categorization of being, the denial of synonymous term requires its acceptance, the division of being to necessity and contingency , which necessitates difference between the two, generalization of the properties of a relational or  copulative existence (wujud rabit) and independent existence (wujud mustaqil), a singular meaning in the rhyme of poetic verse. With a precise reading and analysis, it is clear that all provided reasoning contain the fallacy of ‘Begging the Question’. With that said, none of the mentioned reasons have the ability to be used towards its claim. Although it should be noted that a negation of the reason does not require the negation of its claim. As many acclaimed scholars have said, the assertion towards the synonymous term of being, in and of itself is self - evident (badihi) or close to it, and its verity is certain. In this article, we will only be discussing reasons in proof of this claim, and not in relation to its integrity or inaccuracy of the primary claim.

The theory of "graded terms" (alfāẓ-e mušakkik) has been a subject of considerable debate among Muslim philosophers. The roots of this theory can be traced back to Al-Farabi and Avicenna. This article investigates whether or not the theory of graded terms is a legacy of Aristotle and identifies the problem it seeks to address. Aristotle's perspective on terms, especially the term "being", is examined through his works and then compared with the views of Al-Farabi and Avicenna. Additionally, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi’s claim that this theory was also articulated by Greek philosophers is critically analyzed. Aristotle categorizes terms exclusively as either homonymous or synonymous and makes no mention of graded terms (mušakkik). Al-Farabi categorizes graded terms under synonymous terms, while Avicenna, in his Logic of the Healing (Mantiq al-Shifāʼ), places them under homonymous terms. Nonetheless, Avicenna does not consider graded terms to be purely homonyms. This study demonstrates that Aristotle’s categorization of terms proves inadequate in addressing certain terms like “being.” The theory of graded terms emerges as a solution to this challenge

One of the primary crises facing Muslims today is the question of personal identity. While many contemporary Islamic thinkers have addressed this issue, their focus has often been on the collective dimensions of identity. Meanwhile, some have sought to analyze the crisis on a deeper, individual level. This topic, historically explored by philosophers, is now revisited within the framework of analytical philosophy, where emerging approaches provide critical distinctions and insights. Notably, thinkers like Dariush Shayegan have examined the crisis of identity by linking it to the emotional structure of Muslims. Building on Shayegan’s perspective, this research aims to analyze the identity crisis within the Muslim world by integrating contemporary theories of emotion. Recognizing the profound connection between religion and emotion, the study begins by exploring the nature of emotions in Islamic philosophy, with a particular emphasis on Avicenna’s contributions. Avicenna’s theory of emotion and its role within his broader philosophical system serve as a key foundation for this analysis. By revisiting his approach and adapting it to address the challenges of the modern world, this study proposes an alternative path for revitalizing the Islamic intellectual tradition and confronting identity-related crises in the Muslim world.

The topic of the "afterlife" is one of the fundamental issues in philosophy and theology that has deeply intrigued Islamic and Western philosophers alike. This paper provides a comparative analysis of Avicenna's (Ibn Sina) and Descartes' perspectives on the afterlife based on their theories of the soul. It aims to identify the similarities and differences between these two prominent thinkers in understanding the fate of the soul after death. The central question of this study is how the differing philosophical foundations of Avicenna and Descartes have influenced their views on the afterlife. The research method is descriptive-analytical and comparative, utilizing primary sources and related studies to describe and analyze the theories of these two philosophers. The findings indicate that Avicenna, relying on the Islamic philosophical system and Peripatetic metaphysics, views the soul as an independent substance that reaches perfection through the active intellect, with its fate depending on its connection to the intellect. In contrast, Descartes, employing the dualism of mind and body and emphasizing divine will, sees the immortality of the soul as guaranteed. The fundamental differences in the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of these philosophers lead to differences in defining the soul, its quality of survival, and its interaction with the afterlife. The results of this study highlight the strengths and weaknesses of both perspectives and suggest that a comparative examination of these issues can foster interdisciplinary research in philosophy and theology, offering a deeper understanding of the concept of immortality and the meaning of the afterlife.

Avicenna in two parts of the book of Al-Shifa (کتاب الشفاء) or The Book of Healing reports the theory of Platonic Ideas or Forms: first account is in the chapter 10 from the second book in the Demonstration Treatise (رساله البرهان) and second account is in the chapter 2 from the seventh book in the Theology Treatise (رساله الالهیات). Both reports have explanations of the theory of Platonic Ideas and then some critiques of the theory. Here we will discuss only Avicenna's description and explanations of the theory of Ideas; what is Avicenna's understanding from Plato's Ideas? At the present essay it is necessary to investigate the range of familiarity that Avicenna has with Platonic Ideas, Aristotle's role in this familiarity and the philosophical functions of the Ideas in Avicenna's understanding and identification of them. First of all, Avicenna thinks that Platonic Ideas are universals and, on this description, he erects other descriptions of their truth. It is vital to know that Avicenna's familiarity with Platonic Forms is essentially mediate; that's by way of Aristotle's works including both descriptions and criticisms of those forms. Review and analysis of Avicenna's texts brings us to the three arguments of Platonists for the existence of Ideas: the argument from the sciences, the one over many arguments and the object of thought argument.

Since Avicenna considers the main function of the estimative faculty to be the apprehension of intentions (maʿānī), other functions of this faculty must be understood in light of this form of apprehension. His primary and well-known meaning of intention is something inherently non-sensible that nonetheless exists within the particular sensibles. These intentions can generally be categorized under the duality of agreeableness (muwāfaqa) and disagreeableness (muẖālafa). Thus, a connection can be established between this class of intentions and particular accidents of existent qua existent. However, intentions never lose their relational aspect to the sensibles neither in the actualization nor in conceptualization. Avicenna also considers another kind of intention apprehended by estimation. This type of intention is nothing but the relation among the sensible forms, which is perceived from the external sensible objects and entities. Although this intention is non-sensible, unlike the first type, it is derived from and reducible to sensibles. Based on this second kind of intention, one can explain how, in estimative propositions (wahmiyyāt), judgments about sensibles are generalized to non-sensible objects. Furthermore, this generalization, if applied to the sensibles and their attributes, leads to the formation of induction. Given that Avicenna considers methodic experience (tajriba) to be the result of the conjunction between sensory induction and syllogism, it can be concluded that the estimative faculty and its apprehended intentions play a central role in the formation of empirical method and knowledge.

The explanation of the possibility of the reality of the primary intelligibles in the realm of habitual intelligence is an important epistemological issue. Two perspectives on explaining this matter are noteworthy: first, the speculative intellect at the level of habitual intelligence possesses the primary (non-acquired) intelligibles, and these intelligibles themselves (independent of anything external to the intellect) are valid. Second, verifying the reality of the primary intelligibles is not possible without relying on presential sensory perception. In the tradition of Islamic philosophy, this dependence has been emphasized more in the discussion of the "levels of speculative intellect." However, in the reinterpretation of Avicenna's epistemology, attention has generally been paid to expressions that demonstrate the independence of the intellect from the senses or any matter external to the intellect. In the forthcoming paper, after expounding and criticizing the first perspective, we will show that Avicenna's views support the second perspective. Any kind of reinterpretation of Avicenna's epistemological perspective in this regard, without considering his views on the "levels of speculative intellect" and the intellect's dependence on presential sensory perception, is not in line with his perspective. In general, according to the selected perspective, "sense intuition" is the first psychical reality to which the self is connected. The prior connection of the self to the psychical reality is the origin of actualization and the basis of the validity of the primary intelligibles; therefore, the speculative intellect relies on presential sensory perception while being independent in other respects.

Thought is a fundamental and intrinsic characteristic of humans, setting them apart from other beings. For this reason, one of the influential factors in education is the cultivation and strengthening of the rational faculty. In Islamic philosphy, rational education has also been given serious attention. The main purpose of this research is to explain the methods of rational education in Ibn Sina's philosophical system. To achieve this goal, a descriptive-analytical method has been used. The research population includes the works of Ibn Sina, from which materials related to philosophical and educational foundations and methods of rational education have been purposefully selected. The findings indicate that the methods of rational education should be in line with the goals and principles and in accordance with them, and should guide the learners to choose the correct rational path and enrich the levels of reason until they reach the ultimate goal of rational education -which is divine proximity. These methods include cultivating creativity (creating a creative space), cultivating reason (through play and argumentative dialogue), question-based dialogue, participation, controlling the excesses of the soul, intellectual intuition, and the method of asceticism, which have been identified and explained. The application of the aforementioned methods can be effective in creating a foundation and smoothing the path for rational education in the educational system.

Undoubtedly, Ibn Sina is the most important philosopher in the Islamic world. Understanding his thought requires new readings that can enable us to comprehend and explain philosophy in the Islamic world more accurately. To this end, in the first step of this research, the concept of philosophy in Ibn Sina's view has been analyzed. This analysis is refined in the reading of the idea of philosophy as a way of life, whose architect is the French philosopher Pierre Hadot. Hadot's work on ancient philosophy challenged the understanding of that period by contemporary philosophers. It seems that such a reading can also be applied on the philosophy in the Islamic world. This can be better understood in light of the Muslim philosophers' view of happiness. To this end, by presenting a holistic view of Ibn Sina's thought, we will show that Ibn Sina's existential view is consistent with his philosophical system. It seems that such an explanation offers a more useful reading of Ibn Sina in Hadot's idea. Therefore, to achieve this goal, this research has attempted to briefly explain the importance of the question of what philosophy is among contemporary thinkers and then present a theory of philosophy as a way of life. In the following, an attempt has been made to examine the concept of philosophy in Ibn Sina's thought with the aforementioned idea and an analysis of the necessity of accepting Ibn Sina's holistic system.

The question of the relationship between the rational soul and the body, and the mediating role of the vaporous soul, has led to the formation of many philosophical discussions in this area. One of these cases is the causes and symptoms of mental illnesses, such as melancholic depression, which, from Avicenna's perspective, the most important reason for its occurrence and the most effective method of treatment should be sought in the relationship between the rational soul and the body. Melancholic depression means the deviation of human thoughts and mental images from the correct path, in which case the correspondence of cognitive concepts with the external world is disrupted, and therefore the person is immersed in their own incorrect thoughts and beliefs. This mental illness has different levels, and in its most severe form, mania, the patient's perceptions are greatly deviated from the real world, they constantly think about the dead, and may consider themselves dead. From Avicenna's point of view, the main cause of this disease should be sought in the weakness of the vaporous soul, which weakens the connection between the soul and the body. The root of this weakness is also the predominance of the melancholic temperament in the brain, which disrupts the function of the vaporous soul as the link between the soul and the body. Overall, Avicenna's approach to melancholic depression shows his comprehensive approach to mental disorders, an approach that is rooted both in his philosophical foundations and in empirical evidence and studies.

The argument of possibility and necessity is one of the arguments to prove the existence of God. In addition to Muslim thinkers such as Farabi and Avicenna, Western thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz have also presented interpretations for this proof. In this article, we examine which of the existing interpretations for the proof of possibility and necessity possesses more mastery compared to the criticisms expressed. In total, sixteen different criticisms on various interpretations of the proof of possibility and necessity will be presented and analyzed. Some of these critiques can be answered based on all three interpretations, while some can only be answered based on Avicenna's interpretation. By analyzing these criticisms, it is clear that among the various interpretations expressed for the argument of possibility and necessity, Avicenna's interpretation stands out due to this thinker's reference to more accurate foundations, such as considering eidetic possibility as the criterion for the effect's need for a cause and starting the argument from the concept of possibility. This interpretation demonstrates more strength and mastery than the interpretations of other thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz. Furthermore, with Avicenna's philosophical system, we can respond to all the criticisms directed at this interpretation.

From the perspective Islamic of Philosophers, particularly the Peripatetics, cognition is primarily an act of the soul rather than the body. While conventional philosophical approaches often view cognition as entirely separate from the body, this article employs an analytical-descriptive methodology to explore how the body might influence cognition within Avicenna's philosophical and medical frameworks. Despite Avicenna's dualistic view that soul and body are distinct entities and his identification of the soul as the primary agent of cognition, his understanding of the soul-body relationship allows for a form of embodied cognition. In this view, variation or changes in the body at any level of perception can affect the soul, thereby altering the cognition of a single known object. However, Avicenna's concept of embodied cognition is fundamentally different from physicalism, as the soul retains its role as the essential principle in the emergence of cognition.

The main issue of this paper, which has been analyzed and described using an analytical-descriptive method, is to identify the position of revealed teachings in Islamic philosophy, with an emphasis on the philosophical texts of the three major schools of philosophy. The findings of the research show that revealed teachings can be examined in philosophy from two perspectives: As the origin of an argument or as a function unrelated to the origin of an argument.  Sayings of the infallible cannot serve as the origin of an argument, because in addition to the issues related to their chain of transmission, they must have certain and clear meaning, that the circumstances of their issuance must be clear, and ultimately, their truth must be proven through a valid syllogism. Therefore, they require efforts to establish a sound argument. In the process of compiling philosophical issues, revealed teachings have assisted in formulating questions for philosophy, presenting an accurate picture of certain philosophical matters, and providing general guidance and orientation to Muslim philosophers. In the position of judgment, philosophers have made use of revealed teachings in discovering certain arguments or fallacies in philosophical reasoning that appeared to be sound or were used as supportive evidence for their own philosophical arguments.

What role did Avicenna play in the evolution of philosophical thought regarding the recognition of presential knowledge? The clearest example of presential knowledge is human awareness of their own essence (self-awareness), and Avicenna used this self-awareness as the basis for his argument to prove the soul in the "suspended man" argument. However, what type of knowledge is this self-awareness: presential or acquired? Avicenna's statements about this self-awareness sometimes suggest it is presential knowledge and sometimes align with it being acquired knowledge. This article, using a descriptive, analytical, and critical method, examines and analyzes his statements, especially in the book "Mubahathat," where he defends the suspended man argument and addresses questions related to self-awareness. The aim is to clarify the connection between his concept of self-awareness and presential knowledge and to determine the position of his teachings on self-awareness in the development of the division of knowledge into presential and acquired in Islamic philosophy. The result of this research is that Avicenna's concept of self-awareness should be considered presential knowledge, even though he did not use this term and sometimes explained it using terms and concepts related to acquired knowledge. Therefore, he can be regarded as the pioneer in drawing philosophers' attention to this type of knowledge in the history of Islamic philosophy.

There are some discursive arguments that justify the proposition that the intellect and the intelligible are one unified thing. One scholar who has paid attention to this proposition is Avicenna. The examination of this proposition is one of the key principles of Avicenna’s epistemology. In his al-Mabda’ wa al-Ma’ad, Avicenna agrees with the justifying arguments for the proposition, but in his other works he seriously disagrees with it. As a prominent researcher, Lahigi deeply looked into the issue and after the description of Avicenna’s view, he criticized Avicenna’s propositional justification in al-Mabda’ wa al-Ma’ad. Viewing the importance of the earlier study in the light of the later study, the author has reported Lahigi’s view and criticism of Avicenna. In the course of his study, Lahigi has demonstrated that Avicenna’s true view on the intellect-and-intelligible union is to disagree with it and his agreement in al-Mabda’ wa al-Ma’ad along with his suggested arguments is only on the face of it. The approaches of the two philosophers to the issue reveal how they have conceived the concept of union. Accordingly, they have sought for the union of two concepts, rather than two modes of existence.

According to the view based on physical closure, the natural world is self-sufficient in terms of causal interaction. Therefore, any external and partial interference in the world entails the violation of this physical principle, which is not believable based on this view. From Avicenna's point of view, this principle cannot contradict divine agency; Because in the causal system he considers and also in accordance with the rule of the causality of the incident which governs the world of nature; Divine activity is established in the world in a consistent manner. In this view, there is no need to divide divine action into general and specific to justify miracles and answering prayers. By explaining Avicenna's philosophical foundations and examining his view of the causal system in existence, we show that by accepting the mind() and its place in the chain of causes and the quality of the causal relationship between the levels of extants, he presents a systematic explanation of the relationship between the world and divine effectiveness. Therefore, in Avicenna's philosophical system, the acceptance of dualism in the relationship between mind and body is the basis of the possibility of metaphysical intervention in the physical world.

Mystical ethics constitutes one of the three tiers of Avicenna’s Neoplatonic ethical structure. Like his other works on mysticism, Avicenna presents mystical ethics within the intellectual framework inherent in mystical thought itself. In other words, Avicenna's discussion of mystical ethics cannot be fully understood without considering the intellectual tradition of Sufism. However, due to the particular place of scientific ethics in his work, the volume of Avicenna’s writings on mystical ethics is quite limited. Therefore, in this article, other texts written within this intellectual framework are also employed to elaborate on some of the mystical aspects of his ethics. Through additional explanations of these texts, Avicenna’s brief statements are further expanded. Furthermore, the ethics presented in mystical texts encompasses a broad range of concepts, and Avicenna’s mystical ethics also briefly touches on many of these concepts. This article aims to focus solely on the concepts shared between Neoplatonic ethics and mystical ethics. The research will demonstrate that the source of these shared concepts is Sufi thought, although Avicenna found no conflict between them and the Neoplatonic structure of his ethical thought.

Divine love stands as a pivotal aspect of the intricate relationship between humans and God. Despite its multifaceted presence in theological and mystical traditions, achieving consensus on its nature remains challenging. The inherently personal essence of divine love introduces a level of ambiguity when considering it in the context of an impersonal God, as exemplified by Avicenna's Necessary Existent Deity. Avicenna portrays God as a metaphysical entity characterized by pure transcendence, devoid of personal emotions and passions. In contrast, he positions love as the pinnacle of the human-God connection. This article seeks to elucidate the significance and realization of this love through a semantical lens. While Avicenna provides a comprehensive definition of love as a "propensity for goodness," constructing a cohesive semantic system, the culmination suggests that human love for The Pure Good ultimately sheds any personal attributes. Instead, it transforms into a form of inner metamorphosis, encompassing rational-practical perfection. Hence, articulating divine love in a literal sense seems implausible for The Necessary Existent. Avicenna, in his elimination of dialectics, metaphorically applies divine love to convey a metaphysical rationality and an inner transformative process.

Understanding the reality of entities can be approached through two methods a) positively, to discern the essence of the object, and b) negatively, to delineate what the object is not. This study investigates Avicenna's perspective on the essence of the soul. While previous research has extensively explored the positive attributes, this study delves into the less organized negative attributes, shedding light on the soul's distinctions from nature, the Spirit of vapor, temperament, body, corporeality, intellect, and vitality. The significance of the soul's divergence from corporeality lies in its implicit deviation from temperament, the Spirit of vapor, the physical body, and other material elements. Notably, disassociating the soul from intellect is essential to prevent misunderstandings, avoiding the misconception of the human soul as a purely abstract concept. Furthermore, examining the soul's connection with vitality elucidates shared attributes and encompasses a diverse spectrum of entities characterized as living.

Two general perspectives have been proposed regarding the existential realms of human beings. Proponents of the first perspective believe in two existential realms: the immaterial essence (soul) and the material body, attributing human actions primarily to the immaterial essence. Followers of the second perspective consider humans to be unidimensional and confined to physical existence, reducing all human actions to their physicality, especially the brain, and denying any immaterial essence. The present study aims to elucidate the first perspective by examining Avicenna's notion of the soul's immateriality in the context of critiquing the second perspective. The research method is descriptive-analytical. The findings and results indicate that Avicenna, by presenting elements of proof and various arguments, has endeavored to substantiate the immateriality of the soul through an explanation of the soul's actions. Accordingly, in Avicenna's paradigm, the immateriality of the soul is based on three pillars: intellect, immanence, and independence. Physicalists believe that the belief in an essence independent of the body to explain and understand human perceptions arises from a lack of sufficient awareness regarding the brain's and nervous system's functions and complexities. Furthermore, the claim that bodily changes are due to the body's instrumental relationship with the soul is unprovable. Thus, the denial and critiques of physicalists are formed around three axes: the capability of the brain and nervous system, the ambiguity of philosophy in logically explaining the soul-body relationship, and cognitive ignorance. Avicenna, with seven arguments in proving the immateriality of the soul, responds to the corresponding physicalist critiques. However, two physicalist objections remain ambiguous in Avicenna's paradigm: the inexplicability of the soul-body connection and the objection based on the premise of intuitive understanding.