conception

Conception and assertion have always been considered as two basic and systematic parts of logic. The basis of two-partite logic is the discussion of conception and assertion; so, from the time of Avicenna until today, and according to the modern logic of the West, various issues have arisen in this regard. Two-partite logic is based on dividing the knowledge into knowledge by representation (ʿIlm Ḥuṣūlī) and knowledge by presence (ʿIlm Ḥuḍūrī). Given the nature of the division and the difference between the species, the issue of the relationship between conception and assertion is the most important of all these issues. The nature of this relation has a direct effect on the "logic of division", "dependence of one of them on the other", "possibility of the mental realization of each without the other," and other related issues. Avicenna, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and Mulla Sadra (in an independent work) are among the thinkers deliberated on this issue. The present article has reflected on analytical problems in the division of the knowledge by representation into conception and affirmation in the works of the three thinkers. So it aims to obtain the relationship between conception and assertion, the role of each one in achieving the other, and finally a comprehensive view of the three philosophers on the nature of conception and assertion. In this research, by separating the status of language (word) from the status of quiddity, the knowledge by representation has been explained and analyzed: in the status of quiddity, only assertion arises, and through the status of language and the relationship between language and thought, conception is obtained. If the knowledge by representation is of merely one core, logic will in fact be one-partite.

According to Avicenna's philosophy, it is the type of our conceptions that leads to the assent of the nature of the world in the way we understand it. Avicenna states two types of conceptions: those whose source is the cognition of the intelligible, and those whose source is all the levels of human's cognition other than the intellectual faculty. These two types of conception pave the way for the construction of two types of worlds: rational and imaginative. Man acts in the world based on his cognition of it. The action based on rational cognition of the world is rational and forms a moral world for us. But the action based on irrational cognition of the world forms an immoral world for Avicenna's audience. This article seeks to clarify how these two moral and immoral worlds are formed in front of Avicenna's audiences and show that their formation depends on their cognition of the world. The development of various imaginations in mind and how they are formed are different in different people due to their level of cognition. This leads to the formation of two types of the moral and immoral world in different people.

One of most important issues discussed by philosophers is the nature of man’s happiness and its relationship with the pleasure. St. Thomas Aquinas in Christian tradition and Sadr al-Muta’allihin Shirazi in Islamic tradition has discussed in details this issue. Both of them maintain that man attains happiness when his intellect, as the Characteristic of human being, fulfills its potentials and apprehends the highest intelligibles. Also because they consider pleasure as the conception the things which are pleasant and agreeable to powers, man can reach the excellent and the most perfect pleasure through the perception of the highest intellects. Nonetheless they differ in that St. Thomas considers pleasure as concomitant to happiness and Mullasadra believes in the identity of the happiness and the pleasure. To put it in a different way, while St. Thomas categorizes the happiness and the pleasure respectively as action and affection, Mulla Sadra holds that these two concepts, though different with regard to their meaning, denotes a unique reality which is simultaneously both happiness and pleasure, so they are not included among the categories.

expanding some of Ibn Sina’s (Avicenna) innovations, he has certain logical views. Adherence to Ibn Sina’s system of logistics, simplification of affirmation (assertion) or negation of the composition of affirmation (assertion), solving the whole problem of false theology, distinguishing between different instances (referents) of the necessity of description and dividing it into three types, adding mental condition in negative conversion (even conversion or converse) in inversion of subject which is nonexistent attribute or affirmative inversion of attribute (predicate) which is nonexistent subject is one of the logical thoughts of Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī. The present article, while mentioning and examining these opinions, in discussing the simplicity of affirmation, mentions and examines Allāma Tabataba'i’s innovative view on the number of parts of the proposition, which in his view is not the Hokmieha (order, verdict ratio of the main parts of the proposition.

Allameh Tabatabai, in his Principles of the Philosophy and Methodology of Realism, considers the reality as the apprehension of the Divine essence; but he has represented a various conception from reality and the Divine essence (restricted to the attributes or necessities etc.). This paper, seeks to analyze the selected conception of the Divine essence from the viewpoint of Allameh Tabatabai. This conception is the same reality that is beyond any absoluteness and determination; but considering the Divine essence as a conditioned reality, absolute reality versus absolute and conditioned reality, is not compatible with the selected conception of the Divine essence of Allameh Tabatabai. Although, these conception are compatible with each other based on different conception. Finally, by analyzing the quality of formation of absolute reality in mind, the abstract method of Allameh will be subordinated to the negative concept and negation of concept.

John Hick, a contemporary philosopher of analytical philosophy of religion, discusses about the reasons for the existence of different conceptions of God and impossibility of accessing the concept of God, which is reviewed in the present paper. First, the paper mentions the differentiation between the concept of God and conception of God, and basic features of different conceptions of God, based on Hick's principles, i.e. differentiation between Kant's noumen and phenumen, New Wittgenstein's "seeing as", and ineffability of God. Then it proves that Kant's differentiation can only help us to justify the differentiation between the concept of God and conception of God, not to defend accessibility of the concept of God, because there is no way to grasp the noumen of God, according to such differentiation. Furthermore, there is no pure experience to help us to talk about the concept of God; rather, we always have some conceptions of God, based on New Wittgenstein's view. God's ineffability also multiplies the problem of our experience of Him and causes different conceptions of God. Finally, the paper refers to the results of Hick's view such as his success in differentiating between the concept of God and conception of God, justifying the existence of different conceptions of God, opening a way to criticize and study Christian teachings, defending religious plurality, and his approximation to the panentheistic conception of God.

The Starting point in this article is the distinction among three main terms “Concept of God”, “Conception of God” and “Image of God” that most of researches have not paid attention to it. In addition to semantic difference, each of these phrases belongs to an aspect of “God in our mind” differs from others; however, considering to this point could be so productive in a systematic research. There is only one “concept of God” that everybody conceives it in different ways; however “Conception of God” is a comprehensive phrase which includes all kinds of perceptions, without any limitation. Whenever we employ the phrase “image of God” implies imaginative elements such as metaphors, symbols and so on. In a systematic imaginative thought, some metaphors convert to the models that have allegorical relation to the concept of God, but they suggest new ways of understanding and conceiving God. Models of God could be evaluated according to pragmatism and coherentism, but not depending on objectivism.

Imaginative creation and persuasion in Farabi’s thought in concept and judgment are very important.This issue beside his affirmation of argument of superiority and truth concept depend to explanation. Most of people in his views not arrive to intellectual cognition. Farabi’s purpose of imaginative creation is appearing unit and constant facts that is potency cognition of human and persuasion in his view’s is a generic of dominant opinion that be probably in it animus and malice. By use of the imaginative and concept nature’s reasonable to be able to degrade in propriety cognition of human. So by considering thise qualification we able to speak of necessary of imaginative knowledge. This functions are being if persuasion be adherence of certification and imaginative creation be adherence of conception’s natures. According to persuasion and imaginative creation are efforts for approximate in nature so are valid as source of knowledge.

The position of knowledge of God in Spinoza’s theory of knowledge has provided one of the most distinct theories of knowledge. In Spinoza’s philosophy, knowledge is particularly interwoven with knowledge of God. For Espinoza, method, conception and knowledge are all based on the conception and knowledge of God. Espinoza bases the method on conception: a perfect method is based on a perfect conception and the most perfect method is based the most prefect conception, i.e. the conception of God. The conception of God is the only real conception and no other conception can be a real conception. Spinoza’s theory of knowledge is also based on the knowledge of completeness which is God in his philosophy. On the other hand, knowledge of God is the basis of differentiation between intellectual and intuitive knowledge and, as a result, the basis of third kind of knowledge called perfect knowledge. Knowledge of God is a factor through which intellectual knowledge transcends into intuitive knowledge.

In addition to the discussion about the criterion of truth, there have been different theories explaining and analyzing its reality in contemporary epistemology. Focusing on the preferred view concerning the correspondence theory of truth, the present article would try to explain it by first dealing with statement-truth and narrator-truth among other topics. It further discusses the sphere of truth as well as whether truth and falsity are peculiarly applicable to propositions, and non-applicable to intuitive knowledge, ideas and concepts. Stating the three foundations of truth in the correspondence theory of truth, the article concludes with explaining the quality of realization of correspondence in author’s view.

How can we define and describe God and his perfect attributes? Can human being comprehend the meaning of the attributes assigned to God just like he comprehends the meaning of the attributes assigned to himself such as existence, knowledge and power? This article will try to answer these questions and will investigate and analyze six theories in this regard (univocality and equivocality, indescribability, meaninglessness, theology of negation, analogy); criticizing these theories, the author's hypothesis (univocality) will be defended.