conditional mode

Despite agreement among Neosadrāie philosophers on the primacy of existence, they have provided different accounts of the existence of essence. Some view essence as an external entity, while others do not consider it to be external. The external realization of the essence has also been explained by a group with the causative mode and others with the conditional mode. Among the philosophers who do not consider essence to be external, some consider the truth of nature to be real and others virtual. The main issue of this article is the manner in which essence is realized in the external world, and in response to this question, it is shown that essence not only does not exist in the external world but also its reality outside is virtual as well. The article further critiques opposing views and proves the superiority of the proposed theory. This is a fundamental-analytical study using library-based research methods.

The concepts mind makes after encountering external objects are of these types: accidental essential concepts, substantial essential concepts and finally philosophical concepts. You can have your distinctive characteristics when you are existent. The origin for the emergence of 'existence' is knowledge by presence (immediate knowledge). These concepts emerge from a single 'realization' and this single realization is indicated by all of them. However the object of one of these indications is the trunk whereas others are the branches. Philosophically speaking, the real is a prerequisite for the unreal. Essential concepts enter into one's mind before existential concepts and that is why mind considers them as real. Careful analysis shows that the object indicated by 'existence' is the same of the objective realization and the object indicated by essence is the limit of that realization in a specific domain. Conditional modes are of three types; nafadi, shani and indimaji. Since the realization of accidents is the extension of the realization of substance and is thus united with it the fact that accident is nafadi (terminable) can be attributed to substance. Thus the object indicated by essential concept turns into nafadi characteristic for existence. Here the relative meaning of nafad is taken into account rather than its absolute meaning. This is because possible identity owing to its limitation does not include anything beyond its essence. [In other words] it is not available beyond its essence, though there are other beings over there, for it is not empty over there.

In this paper, I will try to present a comparative examination of Avicenna’s and Mullā Sadrā’s views of analyzing the concept of the Necessary Being. According to Avicenna, “the Necessary Being” is an entity which is Pure Being, but according to Mullā Sadrā, Necessity of Being requires that the existent besides being real and not having conditional mode and accidental intermediary has not causative mode. According to the separability of these two modes, the Necessary Being is a being which is both “by-itself” and “for-itself”; hence, Mullā Sadrā considers these two qualifications in his definition of the Necessary Being. Therefore, the arguments of the two philosophers for Necessary Being will be different.