contemplation

"Contemplation"(Gaze) is used in contrast to "action" in the new discourse, it is used in Uthulujiyya and Enneads in cosmological and existential discussions. The problem of this writing is the analysis of the use of " contemplation " in Uthulujiyya and Enneads with an existential approach. The question is, is the use of "contemplation"(Gaze) in the Uthulujiyya and the Enneads the same and in the same sense, or is it different in the two works? How is " contemplation" expressed in these two books? The answer is, they are not different in terms of meaning; But they are different in terms of application and method of examining the subject. in the theology of Uthulujiyya, "contemplation" (Gaze) can be attributed to both God and the intellect and soul. "contemplation" is raised in the theory of grace and issuance and is connected with cosmology and theology. And in the Enneads, there is an "contemplation" in all hierarchy of life about God, intellect, soul and nature, and it has a creative aspect. The important difference between these two works is that in the rendering of the Enneads, it pays attention to "contemplation" both in the existential aspect and the epistemological aspect as opposed to "action"; and examines contemplation against action; While there is no such view in Uthulujiyya. Therefore, in this article, we will explain the term "contemplation " in Uthulujiyya and Enneads and examine its position in the cosmological system of these two works. The method of this writing is descriptive-analytical.

Belief in or a lack of belief in the existence of the world of images (Arabic: عالم المثال 'alam al-mithal) which is, in reality, the intermediate realm and barzakh (highest heaven) between the realm of intellect (Arabic: عقل aql) and the material universe is of the important issues and basics which is originated from the philosophical notion and particular method of every philosopher. Some of the philosophers believe in the existence of this world and some others have negated and have been about to deny it. Allamah Hasanzadeh Amoli is of the philosophers who believe in the existence of the mithal world and tries to prove it. He like Mulla Sadra has believed that the reason which Sheikh Eshraq has presented for proving’ (ithbat) this world is inadequate and incomplete. Moreover, he has tried to answer some contradictors (deniers) of this world. This is understood from his meeting with Mulla Abdul Razzaq Lahiji’s opinion. In this respect, this paper has tried to present a perfect and clear image of Allamah Hasanzadeh Amoli’s opinion around the mithal world meanwhile determining some problems and, in some cases, his statements have been analyzed and studied.

Aristotle defines happiness as virtuous activity in both Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics. By his discussing on psychology and considering the virtues of the parts of the soul, he attempts to attain the final definition of “happiness” and “the virtuous activity”. His research in Nicomachean Ethics leads to the conclusion that ultimate happiness is contemplation. But in Eudemian Ethics happiness is defined as “the activity of a complete life in accordance with complete virtue”. In other words, in Eudemian Ethics happiness contains all the virtues, including contemplation and the moral virtues. These two apparently different definitions of the “happiness” show that moral virtue does not have the same status in those two ethical treatises. In this paper, we first express Aristotle's ethical thought in both treatises, and then we show that Aristotle considers moral virtue, at the end of the Nicomachian Ethics, as a necessary condition for happiness and contemplation, but in the Eudemian Ethics, he considers the moral virtue together with contemplation as the constituents of happiness. This difference on the stutus of moral virtue in the happiness issues from Aristotle's different viewpoints on the life of happy man in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics. In the first treatise, Aristotle concerns with human beings in “the domain of God-like activity”, but in the second treatise, he concerns with human being in “the domain of human activity”.

According to his existential authenticity, Sadr al-Mutawla'in established an existence in the levels of existence and called it a special formulation, but there were various interpretations of what he meant in terms of existence. Some of the unity of the existence of existence is a modest doctrine of transcendental wisdom to bring the philosophers' minds closer to the ultimate vote of Mulla Sadra, the personal unity of existence. Some others believe that the existence of the existence is a philosophical version and an accurate interpretation of the unity of the witnesses of the mystics. But some believe that the unity of the mystical existence means the existence of all beings in the same vein and Sadra's arrangement is exactly the same. On this basis, matrix means that there is only one supernatural existence, and many, despite being, exist without the existence of a supreme, absolute and unified entity. In other words, in the opinion of the proponents of this interpretation, Sadr al-Muta'l-اīni sought to prove the existence of all being in the presence of God, or in other words, to prove the existence of God for all beings. In this article, the recent interpretation of Mulla Sadra's ultimate view assumes And with this principle, we have narrated and reviewed some of his arguments to prove this interpretation.

Diotima’s speech in Plato’s Symposium is one of the most important parts of his works. The present paper exclusively examines the last of Diotima’s speech, where Plato uses some words and phrases focusing on the relationship between happiness and contemplation of beauty. Diotima claims that, only when a philosopher or lover (here, in love with Sophia) reaches the peak of his love and begins his contemplation of beauty, he could attain knowledge, happiness, and true eternity, but the question is, “How could this claim be interpreted?” The purpose of the author in this paper is to attract the attention of readers to the interpretive point that Plato’s understanding of the meaning of contemplation of beauty should be perceived in the context of an ethical and political program and in relation to the practical life of a citizen rather than within a purely abstract and theoretical inferential framework. The first part of this paper explains the intended problem through an investigation of different sections of Diotima’s speech. In the second part, with particular attention to Alcibiades’ speech, the author demonstrates that, in order to learn about Plato’s understanding of this problem, one must pay particular attention to the various dimensions of this speech. Finally, he concludes the paper by presenting an interpretation of Diotima’s last words based on a general reading of Symposium and, specifically, Alcibiades’ character and words.    

Avicenna suggests an argument about immaterial soul which was based on intellectual concepts. Gazzali criticized the argument and then restudied it. After that he developed it by another method. The first proposition of Gazzali's argument is different from Avicennas. In fact, Avicenna's argument is based on intellectual concepts and includes all the universal concepts. While Gazzali's argument is based on the concept of God and the divine knowledge .Both arguments, however, have the same second proposition that is "every intellectual concept is indivisible". Avicenna believed that intellectual concept is divisible in mind. While Gazzali held divine knowledge isnt divisible neither regard to quantity nor regard to conceptuality .Both thinkers have the same problem about the second proposition of the argument, Gazzali criticizes the second proposition but he couldnt solve it and again used it as the second proposition of the argument. This argument obtains a method which consists of reason and gnosis.

Plato seeks for a special knowledge that leads human being to the moral virtues and happiness, but his epistemology ends in a negative conclusion at times. It only indicates that knowledge can neither be attained by dialectic nor by any other method pertinent to vocabulary and language, it is also unattainable while the soul is imprisoned in the body. Plato’s solution to this epistemological problem is contemplation (θεωρία). In his middle dialogues, Plato proposes three principal ways of contemplation each of which could be reached by a kind of transcendence. The most important contemplation – described in the Phaedrus- is the one which discarnate soul can achieve through ascending to the realm of divinity. This contemplation is possible for the soul which has already achieved a certain extent of knowledge and has eliminated the mundane concerns with the help of moral virtues. The second way is the contemplation of Beauty as described in the Symposium and the third way is the foregoing contemplation in the allegory of the cave in the Republic VII. In addition to these three ways, there is a hint of contemplation in dream in the Republic IX. It appears that the second and the third and the contemplation in dream depend on the foregoing contemplation in Phaedrus, since they will be obtained in this world and any kind of obtaining knowledge is the recollection of contemplation which the separate soul has gained before its reincarnation (ἀνάμνησις).

The present paper is concerned with the semantic meaning of ‘reason’ and ‘contemplation’ and their relationship with ‘the self’ and ‘human nature’. Although the term reason has been frequently used in its two philosophic meanings of ‘extended essence’ and ‘judicial self’, the Quranic and lexical meanings of the term that is ‘modesty’ and ‘keeping’ needs to be taken into consideration. The Quran’s constant appeal to reason does not just refer to the quest for wisdom and knowledge; it further manifests an adherence to truth and the innate knowledge and their application in practice. The basic meaning of contemplation is the internally generated movement of the self to make a distinction between the wrong knowledge and the true one. The Arabic term for contemplation contains the meanings of ‘obedience’ and ‘hard work’. These meanings refer to the innate attempt of the self to investigate, discover and identify the indigenous knowledge with the aim of regaining the innate insights and the knowledge of the self. In this process of returning to the true nature, the self is to face the orientation obstacles and the resistance of its natural dimension. This confrontation is usually referred to as ‘jihad with the self’. The conclusion is that contemplation with the above-mentioned conditions can be the first step toward the jihad with the self.