husserl

Heterophenomenology is a term that Daniel Dennett coined against Husserl's phenomenology, and its purpose is to study the problem of consciousness from a third-person perspective, as it is common in natural sciences. Dennett criticizes Husserl's phenomenology due to its reliance on introspection and first-person perspective, as well as the impossibility of creating consensus. The result of this is skepticism, solipsism, and relativism. According to Dennett, the only appropriate and agreeable method for studying consciousness is to focus from a third-person point of view on the processes that go on in the brain and are not available through introspection and from a first-person point of view. Accordingly, Dennett proposes the model of multiple drafts in opposition to the Cartesian Theater to investigate consciousness, according to which all types of perception, thinking, and mental activity in the brain are accompanied by multi-directional processes of interpretation, description, and development within sensory data. In this article, the claim is defended that the criterion of essentialism to distinguish introspection from the phenomenological method, considering Dennett's opposition to any essentialist approach to studying consciousness, is not effective. In addition, the priority of the third-person approach leaves no room for a phenomenological science based on the third-person perspective.

In the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl has tried to disclose the origin of psychologism in the history of modern philosophy. Phenomenological psychology not only provides a basis for empirical psychology but can also function as an introduction to transcendental phenomenology. In his philosophical narration of the historical development of the concept of psychologism, Husserl refers to John Locke and states that Barkley and Hume advocated Locke’s views. Locke’s psychological studies come at the service of transcendental concept, which had been formulated by Descartes in his Meditations on First Philosophy for the first time. In his view, metaphysics can show that the whole reality of the world and everything that exists is nothing more than our cognitive acts. It is at this point that it is necessary to pay attention to transcendental affairs. Descartes’ methodological skepticism was the first method used for posing the transcendental subject, and his description of cogito ergo (I think) provided the first conceptual formulation for it. John Locke replaced the pure transcendental mind of Descartes with the human mind. Nevertheless, he continued his study of the human mind through intrinsic experience because of an unconscious transcendental-philosophical concern. However, knowingly or unknowingly, he fell in the trap of psychologism. Following a historical and, in a way, completely philosophical approach, Husserl showed how the rays of attention to transcendental affairs emerged for the first time in Cartesian philosophy and, then, in the conflict between rationalism and empiricism. He also demonstrated how, after the growth of this attention in Kantian transcendental philosophy, it came to fruition in Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy.

n most of his writings about the influence of Husserl’s views on his thought and his indebtedness to his works. He considers the clarification of his philosophical meaning to be the main problem of Phenomenology and characterized his work in terms of Phenomenology in the style of “thinking with Husserl against him”. On the other hand, intentionality doctrine, which is Brentano’s great and important legacy, is the main part of Husserl’s Phenomenology. Intentionality means that consciousness is focused on something and every thought or idea is directed towards something. By transcending the issues of consciousness, Heidegger’s intentionality ties it to lived experience and transforms it into “life toward something”. This article is an analytical account of Heidegger’s critique and rethinking of Husserl’s intentionality; and discusses how Heidegger, according to the works of his master in his lectures and writings about intentionality, extends his ontological circle, and also thinks against him while his progress is in line with Husserl’s plan. The result of Heidegger’s rethinking is to replacement the Dasein by consciousness and intentionality, the path to understanding Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Accordingly, in order to develop Heidegger’s method, intentionality explains Husserl’s narrative as “being-with”, and emphasizes the understanding of intentionality based on the transcendence of Dasein’s role.

Life-world, means the world as it is experienced and lived, is a concept that was first born in Husserl's phenomenology and later used in various fields. Alfred Schutz, the founder of phenomenological sociology, who sought to establish a theoretical basis for interpretive sociology, applied the concept to study of mental structures in everyday life and used it in sociology. The present article seeks to answer the question, what changes did life-world undergo in Schutz's thought. The result of this study shows that Schutz establishes a dialectical relationship between individual consciousness and life-world, in such a way that each constructs and influences the other. Unlike Husserl, who saw life-world as the only comprehensible reality, he referred to the multiple layers of reality and considered Husserl's term transcendence appropriate for rotation between these layers, while Husserl used “transcendence” only to awareness of another experience. In addition, Schutz does not consider transcendental phenomenology as a proper basis for the social sciences, and instead of the transcendental ego, he uses the mundane ego for his plan.

Some objections to the mental existence that are proposed by the western thinkers are unknown to Muslim philosophers. For example, Husserl says that if we accept the mental existence, then there will be an infinite regress in object:object  “idea of object”  “object of “idea of object””  “idea of “object of “idea of object”””  “object of “idea of “object of “idea of object”””” ⁞We will try to find a resolution to the objection – that refutes the mental existence – by means of a rational method and based on some of the principles of Muslim Philosophy. Although Muslim philosophers have not been engaged in the very infinite regress objection, they have been done in similar ones and said that: such infinite regresses are found due to the consideration of our minds and therefore they would cease to exist following the cessation of the consideration of mind. Thus, based on the very principles, here too, outline of the resolution is as follows: except for the first object, the rest are found when the infinite regress is found in our minds by means of the consideration of our minds. So, whenever we stop our consideration, they would stop as well and therefore there will be no infinite regress. Finally, we will have a glance at the infinite regress in object objection of some Muslim philosophers that refutes the active intellect to be the truth-maker. We will show that this infinite regress in object objection too is an unsatisfactory criticism.