knowledge

This article explores the concept of "perception" (idrāk) in Islamic philosophy, particularly analyzing the contributions of renowned philosophers such as Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), Suhrawardi (Shaykh al-Ishrāq), and Mulla Sadra in this field. From the perspective of these philosophers, perception is defined as a means of attaining truth, and its methods establish a profound connection between the material and immaterial worlds. Avicenna views perception as a layered process that begins with sensory inputs and culminates in intellectual comprehension. He emphasizes abstraction in perception, whereby individuals, through their rational faculties, can access higher truths. Suhrawardi introduces the concept of "light" (nūr) and "illumination" (ishrāq) as central to perception, asserting that light inherently enables the human soul to directly access truths, rooted in the intrinsic mediation of the epistemic apparatus. Mulla Sadra proposes a dynamic structure of perception, employing the theories of "the primacy of Being" (aṣālat al-wujūd), "the unity of Being" (waḥdat al-wujūd), and "gradation of Being" (tashkīk al-wujūd). This article divides perception into four stages: sensory perception, imaginative perception, estimative perception, and intellectual perception. Ultimately, the article presents perception as a dynamic synthesis of the soul and reality, inviting the reader to reconsider human cognition beyond material limitations. The significance of perception in the advancement of knowledge and the emphasis on metaphysical Being are illuminated through the analyses of Mulla Sadra and the rich tradition of Islamic philosophy. These investigations greatly contribute to understanding the depth of human interaction with the world and provide a deeper comprehension of Being and understanding.

Investigating the place of knowledge in the theory of divine proximity by descriptive-analytical method is the aim of this research; Many Islamic thinkers consider divine proximity as the goal of morality and consider God's knowledge as its necessary condition. But some apply the meaning of God's closeness to God's in-person knowledge; Therefore, they don't consider divine resemblance, dignified proximity, and developmental proximity as the ultimate goal of morality; It seems that although face-to-face knowledge of God is the highest level of divine nearness, and in this case some kind of knowledge can be considered as the goal of ethics, but considering divine proximity to mean face-to-face knowledge of God will cause many people to do not reach the levels of divine nearness. Because many people who perform moral behaviors with the knowledge of attaining God and with the goal of reaching heaven and staying away from hell, will not be in the range of divine proximity; In the event that these people have achieved the limit of morality with their good behaviors, and with the knowledge of God, which is a necessary condition for reaching this level of divine proximity, they have been able to achieve a level of the goal of morality.

One of the key topics in Shiite studies is the study of Shiite sects. Like other Islamic denominations and sects, Shiism has experienced internal divisions, one of which is the Zaydi sect. The Zaydiyya remains a significant Shiite sect in the contemporary period, and the differences between the Imāmiyya and the Zaydiyya can be analyzed from various perspectives. However, the primary divergence between these two sects lies in the doctrine of imamate, particularly regarding explicit designation. naṣṣ), armed uprising. qiyām), and attributes such as the Imam’s knowledge. This study addresses the concept of the Imam’s knowledge from the perspectives of the Imāmiyya and the Zaydiyya, as it is a fundamental and essential characteristic of the imam. The significance of discussing the Imam’s knowledge is evident in that, if established according to the Imāmī perspective, it affirms one of the distinctive features of Twelver Shiism. This study first explores the Zaydi perspective on the source of the imam’s knowledge, followed by an examination of its nature according to this sect. In the final section, the concept of the Imam’s knowledge of the unseen. ʿilm al-ghayb) is scrutinized. A key finding of this research is that the Imāmī view on the Imam’s knowledge aligns with both reason and religious principles. The study employs a library-based, analytical, and descriptive methodology.

Knowing the human rational soul and its capacities as the closest way to knowing God the Exalted has a special place in the network of religious knowledge and in philosophy and mysticism. The "goal" of this article that is carried out by "descriptive analytical method" and by relying on library sources, and is based on the noble hadith  of the "Container"(وعاء) that issued by the reliable center of religious knowledge, Hazrat Ali (AS)., is to examine the scope of human existence through the connection between the reality of knowledge and the human rational soul as a container of knowledge and the quality of the union of scientific forms with the soul and the station of nonstop-progress of the rational soul and the optical identity of science. How far is the scope of the reality of the human rational soul as a developmental reality? And what capacity does it have? What is the relationship between concepts such as the embracing reality, the manifestation of the name of all-Embracing, and divine caliphate with existential capacity of human? These mystical, ontological knowledge are studied and explored with the inspiration of the hadith of Container, which indicates the capacity and various fields and scope of human existence.   From the point of view of the "history" of the issue, we are faced with the fact that although in the field of theology and philosophy, long-term research has been done on the nature of the soul and its various dimensions, but the analysis shows that the connection of this research with the precious hadith of "Container" has not been investigated so far.

Reason is one of the key sources of knowledge in Islam, discussed in Nahj al-balāgha alongside other epistemological sources such as experience, intuition, and revelation, defining the scope and limits of human understanding. The present study explores how reason is described as a source of knowledge from ʿAlī’s perspective in Nahj al-balāgha. The objective is to classify, analyze, and delineate the boundaries of reason based on ʿAlī’s teachings in this text. The findings indicate that ʿAlī considers reason a crucial source of knowledge but acknowledges its limitations. In various statements, he warns against engaging in matters such as divine decree and predestination, the essence of God, and His names and attributes, as reason is incapable of grasping them and may lead to misguidance. While recognizing reason as an epistemic source, ʿAlī presents revelation as the highest and ultimate source of knowledge in areas beyond the reach of human intellect. This study follows a descriptive-analytical approach and employs a library-based research method.

Possibility of knowledge and its essential nature, often in response to skeptics who denied its attainability. The central issue in these discussions has been identifying the key components of knowledge. The traditional view, rooted in Plato's thought, defines knowledge as "justified true belief." While this perspective dominated Western epistemology from ancient Greece until the 20th century, some scholars have argued that knowledge alone is insufficient to capture the full range of human cognitive capabilities. Instead, they have emphasized the concept of "understanding."
This study aims to differentiate understanding from knowledge, presenting them as distinct cognitive capacities that address different aspects of human curiosity and intellectual engagement. Using a descriptive-analytical method with a critical approach, the research demonstrates that understanding is neither equivalent to knowledge nor a subset of it. The key argument is that, ontologically, understanding is non-transferable, whereas knowledge is transferable.

It can be said that the most important component of the propositions of any religion is its doctrinal statements, while propositions related to ethics and laws occupy a secondary position. This is because it is through the formation of correct beliefs that one finds the path to happiness. It is also evident that the means of attaining knowledge are not limited to the acquisition of science; rather, restricting these means solely to scientific knowledge might make the formation of a doctrinal system for the general public difficult.With this in mind, when we study the words of the great osul scholars and rational thinking, we clearly observe that most scholars do not assign significant value to the knowledge derived from conjecture. However, these conjectures have become a central focus in jurisprudential issues. The question then arises: what’s the reason for this distinction or in other words, why are conjectures disregarded in doctrinal matters?Ultimately, we concluded that in matters of belief where the acquisition of knowledge is not required, a general belief suffices, and the reason of closure does not work. However, in doctrinal matters such as the knowledge of God, where acquiring knowledge is necessary we may regard knowledge as a necessary precondition. If one is unable to acquire knowledge, then there is no obligation to seek conjecture.

In Indian mystical schools, the epistemic ability of reason is doubted. By utilizing the skepticism of the Upanishads, Buddhist materialism, and the method of the slippery eel while weakening and denigrating reason, Nagarjuna offers a unique method for discovering the truths of existence. The question is whether Nagarjuna's skepticism leads to nihilism. By following the roots of Indian skepticism in the Rig Veda, the Upanishads, and early Buddhist texts, and by analyzing Nagarjuna's polemical arguments, we find that while criticizing epistemological foundationalism and rejecting the principle of causality and emphasizing the distinction between the product of the intellect and the heart and the importance of practical conduct, he distances himself from nihilism and achieves a specific mystical realism. This mental and spiritual conduct causes the seeker to be granted divine gifts (Ibn ʿArabi) or chosen (Nagarjuna). Therefore, Nagarjuna's skepticism about the cognitive capacity of reason is a prelude to achieving wisdom derived from a faculty that Ibn ʿArabi calls the heart. A wisdom associated with a realist metaphysics according to which the entire world of phenomena is considered to be ontic qualities of the Almighty

The specific metaphysical attitude governing fuzzy logic places principles such as fluidity, fuzzyness, existential continuity, and multidimensional knowledge as the basis of the above rules. Mulla Sadra's point of view on the issue of science can be concluded in accordance with fuzzy logic: in terms of the method of discussion in the form of a series of Zumratbi definitions and also its return and parallelism, even though from this point of view, the rules of the single truth of Zumratb apply to it; The soul is the unity of all power, the physicality of the occurrence, and the spiritual existence of the soul, which is justified in the shadow of its movement in transcendental wisdom; These are the same rules based on which one should wait for a new logic with new approaches and rules. A logic that, far from the essentialism and stability of the Aristotelian worldview, introduces the world based on Sadra's special view of reality. The continuous movement of time that leads to doubt in the levels of perception and, conversely, the soul; Infers the principles of fluidity, fuzzyness, continuity, correspondence, knowledge with levels and accuracy in fuzzy logic. On the other hand, in the framework of fuzzy rules, to describe the complexities and ambiguities in determining the effect of the degree of human existence on his science, a model can be presented in which conditions are applied in determining the degree of membership in each of the fuzzy sets according to Mulla Sadra's philosophy.

ʾAmīr al-Muʾminīn- peace be upon him - in the Monotheistic sermon of Nahj al-balāgha, in a purely metaphysical way, has placed the levels of knowledge of God Almighty in five levels, each of which is placed above the other, and the highest level of all of them is the level of negation of God’s attributes. This passage from his statement is one of the most brilliant and profound statements in the knowledge of God Almighty, which has opened a chapter in monotheism, and throughout history, after its issuance, it has astonished philosophers, mystics, researchers, and commentators in its understanding, and hence, the source of various explanations and analyzes have appeared. Allāma Tabātabāī has thought deeply about this statement, the result of which has been reflected in his multiple works. According to this view, reflection into the meaning of monotheism leads to the sincerity of monotheism, and the complete sincerity of monotheism is when no attributes other than essence are proven in it. This paper has been extracting, analyzing, explaining, and investigating Allāma Tabātabāī’s point of view in this field.

Ibn Sina, In several parts of his books, when he is talking about perception or perceptive powers, has mentioned the word mind, which indicates the special importance of the mind in the realization of perceptions; Because of this reason, it seems correct to say that on necessary precondition to understanding many issues of Ibn Sina's philosophy , including epistemological issues, is to have a detailed understanding and insight into what the mind is and its relationship with all kinds of perceptions; This is despite the fact that Avicenna, in his works, did not independently explain what the mind is and its characteristics; As a result, this research aims to explain and solve the mentioned problem by considering the various phrases mentioned in Ibn Sina's works and their analysis. Some of the important findings of this research have been that unlike many philosophers and also contemporary cognitive science who consider all cognitive abilities to be attributed to the mind, Avicenna does not consider the mind to be the cause of all type of cognitions. In his works, the existence of mental abilities is only limited to the human type, which of course is caused by the absence of nonmaterial soul in other types of animals. Although all animals have some special cognitions, which are called the first cognition, but according to Avicenna's philosophy, they cannot be considered mental.

Dealing with cyber epistemology is important and necessary due to the fact that cyberspace has gradually become a source of human knowledge and will undoubtedly become a part of the human brain in the future. Today, we turn to Google for information, not to specialized books and encyclopedias and specialists. Internet and social networks are the foundation of today's information society. Without them, there would be no information society. But the human mind gradually expands and becomes an expanded mind through the Internet. The extended mind interacts with information processing. This mind will process information in certain ways. Cyber knowledge or knowledge that users gain in cyber space, or virtual knowledge that they find in cyber space can have different forms. In this case, we base the discussion on the phenomenological division of cyber (virtual) knowledge. From this point of view, cyber knowledge is divided into two types: passive cyber knowledge, extra manual cyber knowledge. This article aims to discuss this.

The quality of the realization of knowledge in Man’s rational soul is one of the central discussions in the field of epistemology. This discussion has been explained following a novel approach based on Sadrian principles, particularly the principle of the unitary system of essence-manifestations or the same individual unity of being. The doctrine of unveiling is the newest doctrine in this respect; however, some objections have been raised against it, including the confusion of universal soul with particular souls, contradiction of simplicity with innermost and manifestation, the soul’s incompletion, inexplicability of undifferentiated and differentiated knowledge, and the contradiction of simplicity with existence of veils. In this paper, through an accurate reading of Sadrian works and particular attention to his innovations regarding the problem of the soul, the authors present a new doctrine called “cleaving”, while trying to respond to the criticism advanced against the doctrine of unveiling. The doctrine of cleaving generally indicates that, based on the ontological immateriality, simplicity, and gradation resulting from the trans-substantial motion, existence is a continuous glowing entity that is involved in becoming at each “moment” exactly in the same way that existence itself is a kind of becoming and manifestation of the universal divine soul. Each level of this becoming, is a kind of knowledge acquisition that, given the kind of facilities, is called acquired or presential. Unveiling depends on “being”, but cleaving represents “becoming and flourishing”.

Today, although the debates related to knowledge have expanded, the question of the possibility of knowledge and certainty is still the starting point of epistemological debates. Wittgenstein and Moore are two influential philosophers of the 20th century who stand in an important position against each other. Moore is the only philosopher that Wittgenstein mentions in the book On Certainty and it was Moores view on knowledge that is the basis of the Austrian philosopher for further discussions about knowledge and certainty. In response to the problem of the possibility of knowledge and the problem of skepticism, Moore claims that there are facts that we know and have knowledge of. He lists a list of propositions whose knowledge is certain. Wittgensteins approach to this claim has a negative and a positive side. According to Wittgenstein, Moores propositions such as here is a hand are not correct examples of knowledge or knowing Moore does not use them correctly. There is a difference between knowledge and certainty. Knowledge and certainty belong to different categories. On the other hand, Wittgenstein is with Moore in attributing a different role to the mentioned propositions in the epistemic system. Wittgensteins criticism of Moore does not weaken the epistemological status of Moores propositions, but gives a more fundamental basis to such propositions.

Lyotard identifies the crisis of legitimacy in grand narratives as a characteristic of the "postmodern condition." Metanarratives are systems of thought that present themselves as the ultimate criteria for truth, legitimacy, justification, explanation, and judgment. Among these metanarratives are the "speculative narrative" and the "emancipatory narrative," both of which are based on the "representational theory of knowledge," upon which modern knowledge and rationality are founded. This paper aims to demonstrate how Lyotard’s critique of the "representational theory of knowledge" sets the stage for his critique of all metanarratives and modern science and rationality. By emphasizing the relationship between science and power on the one hand, and the plurality of language games on the other, Lyotard reveals the paralogical (fallacious) basis of legitimacy and justification in the domain of "knowledge and reason." The paper also addresses how Lyotard’s critique of disbelief in metanarratives paradoxically encompasses his own claim, which could be seen as a new metanarrative emerging from the postmodern condition. Furthermore, Lyotard discusses the diversity of language games and simultaneously rejects the grand narratives that illegitimately attempt to assert their superiority, without distinguishing between them. This prescriptive critique of Lyotard’s, alongside his claim of diversity in the realm of language games, is another criticism of his thought in this paper, particularly in his critique of science and rationality in the postmodern condition

Human salvation and redemption are among the most important topics that Islamic philosophers have addressed. Mulla Sadra, as a philosopher who is based on the religious and intellectual tradition of Shia, is looking for how to realize the salvation of man in the theological and philosophical system that he designs in the book of the Al Asfar AlArbaa. According to the studies done, we see that Mulla Sadra believes that the salvation of man depends on two components, which are: angels and the Prophet of Islam. This approach of Mulla Sadra leads to the conclusion that angels, according to their ontological and epistemological position in both scientific and practical fields, provide the two main wings of human salvation and identify the redeemed human identity and make man an angelic being. They make a change. At the same time, in the field of practical wing, we are faced with the two elements of transmission of revelation and general assistance to humans, which the role of the Prophet of Islam in the field of revelation is very visible and effective. According to Mulla Sadra, angels are in charge of creating a human identity, and salvation is the realization of the believer's scientific and practical perfection, which is achieved by connecting and uniting with the active intellect and practicing the Sharia. In this research, in an analytical-descriptive way and based on Mulla Sadra's works, we investigate the issue of what is the role of angels in the salvation of man in Mulla Sadra's thought and how is it achieved.

Studying the intellectual foundations and the position of philosophy and theology in the conceptualization of God among philosophers and theologians, can clarify their approach regarding the issue of God. How is the issue of God studied in the view of al-Ṭūsī and ʿAllāma Ḥillī- two "Ḥilla" theologians- according to their intellectual and philosophical-theological foundations and the position of philosophy and theology in their conceptualization of God? To what extent is their approach to the issue of God similar or different? In this article, we will study this problem from two aspects of form and method-content. As for the form, we will deal with the arrangement of the contents in their works according to their philosophical and theological foundations and the perception they have of God accordingly, and as for the method and content, we will discuss the method of knowing and proving God and explaining His attributes (both method and content). Al-Ṭūsī believes in a philosophical God and ʿAllāma Ḥillī, with a more inner-religious perspective, speaks of a religious-philosophical God. Regarding the content, in the method of proving the existence of God in the conceptualization of God, their opinions are similar, while in the formal structure and the issue of knowing God, they are different according to their intellectual foundations.

Death is a human issue. Since the beginning of human life, this issue has had a deep connection with the thought system of philosophers and has become a basic concept in the thought of thinkers. For this reason, different interpretations of this concept have been made in philosophical schools. Plato and Sadra have provided reflections on this concept. By examining the works of Plato and Sadra, we find out that in the works of these two philosophers, another death called voluntary death is planned along with natural death, which is realized by human effort and creating a separation between soul and body. It seems that this concept has a deep connection with knowledge and ethics in the thought of Plato and Sadra. The main issue of this article is to deal with what voluntary death is and to examine the ruling relationship between this concept and knowledge and ethics in the thought of Plato and Sadra. The writer is trying to analyze the concepts of what was said by comparative analysis and in a descriptive-analytical way. The result of the present research shows that in the eyes of these two philosophers, voluntary death, knowledge and ethics have a single function. The importance of these ancient writings is that the abstract state of the metaphysical concepts of the philosophy of Plato and Sadra is explained in the form of concrete concepts such as death and morality.

While belonging to two different intellectual cultures and adopting different philosophical principles Suhrawardi and Descartes emphasize the role of self-knowledge in acquiring knowledge. In Descartes' philosophy, Cogito, ergo sum is considered as the basis of knowledge, from which the knowledge of other levels of Being, such as God and the world, are deduced. In Suhrawardi's philosophy, the human soul is a light of divine lights, which in the light of self-knowledge can apprehend the superior lights, the light of lights and material things. Of course, Suhrawardi and Descartes pay attention to the issue of soul and self-knowledge from two different viewpoints. Suhrawardi deals with this issue from the viewpoint of intuitive knowledge and Descartes from the rational-reasoning viewpoint. Now, according to this introduction, important issues arise: What is the difference between Suhrawardi's and Descartes' viewpoints on self-knowledge? How do the different viewpoints of these two philosophers on the issue of self-knowledge affect their views on other knowledge? This article, with a descriptive-analytical method, tries to explain how the different perceptions of Suhrawardi and Descartes about the human soul and self-knowledge cause these two philosophers to have a different view of the way to pass from self-knowledge to the knowledge of others.