kripke

To examine Putnam's views on the application of quantum logic is the aim of this paper. Hilary Putnam defends quantum logic in his works. According to him, classical logic cannot answer the problems arising in quantum mechanics. Therefore, we need to present a non-classical logic, namely quantum logic. Putnam argues three main reasons for the transition from classical logic to quantum: I. to be false some of the necessary truths of logic, II. have to change of logic, III. the pattern of three-valued logic. Putnam's views about this transition to quantum logic can be considered from several points: First, despite Putnam's criticism of classical logic, he defends quantum logic through the rules of classical logic. Second, it is a bulky claim to know of quantum logic as “true” logic. Third, the conclusions of the Cartesian product have changed in Putnam's analysis. Fourth, in his logic system, Putnam pays attention to “intuition” instead of relying on “axioms.” Fifth, the middle value of truth is ineffective and erroneous in quantum logic. Despite these criticisms, many of them can be answered analytically.

One of the important questions about definite descriptions is the difference between referential and attributive uses of these descriptions. Donnellan objects Russell and Strawson's theories of definite descriptions because they both fail to explain referential use, but nowhere do they give us a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing any use. Kripke also believes that the difference between referential and attributive uses is in fact the difference between the speaker's reference and the semantic reference. The speaker's reference and the semantic reference coincide in attributive use, but in referential use, they may be different. According to the theory of speech acts, Kripke's account may not be quite correct, however, the difference between speaker's reference and semantic reference is similar to the difference between the speaker's meaning and the meaning of the sentence, although Kripke adopts a strange way of expressing it, because reference, contrary to meaning, is a speech act. But Searle's solution is based on his theory of indirect speech acts; That is, the speaker says something, he means what he says, but he also means something else. In Searle's account, the speaker's primary illocutionary act which is not literally expressed in his utterances, is done indirectly by performing his secondary illocutionary act which is expressed literally. According to Searle, all Donnellan's referential uses are mere uses where the speaker uses a definite description that expresses the secondary aspect under which the reference is made.

In this paper, I will argue against certain criticisms of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument and sceptical solution, made especially by Baker and Hacker, McGinn, and McDowell. I will show that their interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s view is misplaced. According to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument, there is no fact as to what someone means by her words. For Kripke, this conclusion, combined with Classical Realist view of meaning, leads to the Wittgensteinian paradox, according to which there is no such thing as meaning anything by any word. Wittgenstein presents this paradox in paragraph 201 of the Philosophical Investigations. As Kripke reads Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein is in agreement with his sceptic on the sceptical conclusion of the sceptical argument, that is, that there is no fact about meaning, and builds his sceptical solution on an endorsement of that. McDowell, McGinn, and others have objected that Kripke has failed to properly understand Wittgenstein’s main remarks in 201, that is, that the paradox is the result of a misunderstanding of the ordinary notion of meaning. Wittgenstein does not accept such a sceptical conclusion. I will use the distinction George Wilson draws between two different conclusions of the sceptical argument and show that Kripke has respected all of the remarks that Wittgenstein has put in section 201.

According to Kripke, someone who fixes the referent of the term "one meter" with the definite description "the length of stick S in Paris at time t" can know a priori that one meter is the length of S in Paris at time t. Scott Soames has reconstructed Kripke's claim as an argument and shown that this argument is based on three principles. He then claimed that the third principle assumes a meaning of the concept of a prior that is inconsistent with the traditional meaning of that concept. So if Kripke's argument is based on the traditional meaning of the concept of a priori, his argument does not work. In this paper, I first provide a detailed formulation of the different interpretations of the meter example and similar ones. This formulation helps us to understand under which interpretation Soames' reconstruction of Kripke's argument should be understood. I then try to show that the main conflict between Soames and Kripke is not about the traditional meaning of the concept of a priori, but about what empirical evidence is. If my claim is true, I conclude that Soames's criticism of Kripke's argument is question-begging at best.Music, Philosophy of Music, Greek Music, alFarabi, Plato

Kripke’s modal argument against the descriptive theory of names (descriptivism) is based on the idea that descriptivism cannot explain the intuitions arising from the rigidity of proper names. One answer to the modal argument is widescopism. In this paper, I first introduce the modal argument and widescopism. I, then, explain how Kripke and Soames argue against widescopism. In the next stage, I reconstruct Sosa’s answer to Kripke’s and Soames’s. After that, I turn to Caplan's argument against Sosa's solution. According to Caplan, Sosa's solution leads to the loss of the main and primary intuitions of descriptivism. I try to show that Sosa can defend his solution against Caplan.

The necessity is one of the most important topics in logic and philosophy. And the correct expression of the concept of necessity plays an important role in solving many philosophical problems. And the correct expression of its meaning plays an important role in solving many philosophical problems. In Kant's Analytic Philosophy and after the Copernican Revolution, Necessity was used in a linguistic sense related to propositions. Kripke critiques traditional theories about the concept of necessity And provide new ideas in this regard, he was believed that some aspects of necessity (such as metaphysical necessity) are metalanguage and transmental. In this paper, the concept of necessity from Kripke's point of view Will be compared with the views of Allamah Tabatabaie. Both Kripke and AllamAh Tabatabaie consider the concept of necessity as a metaphysical and philosophical concept, And they take the concept of necessity for granted But they have different views on determining instances and types of metaphysical necessity. Kripke considers metaphysical necessity to be valid only in limited cases, such as the necessity of the same Similarity theorems and propositions containing intrinsic attributes, But Allamah Tabatabaie considers all beings in the universe to have a metaphysical necessityphilosophical system. The views of the two philosophers, despite their similarities, are fundamentally and paradigmatically different.

Arguments in favor of dualism (and against materialism) typically seek to move from the epistemological distinction of physical facts and the facts of consciousness (conscious mental states) to the metaphysical distinction of physical processes and consciousness. These arguments often accept that epistemological premise requires ontological results. The idea of conceivability is one of these types of arguments. According to this argument, it is conceivable that there is an organ called a zombie that is the same as the conscious being in all physical matters, but is completely devoid of conscious mental states. In this article, I intend to compare Kripke's (1980) conceivability argument with Chalmers' (1997; 2010)'s conceivability argument. According to Kripke's argument, if "pain" and " the firing of cfibers" are the same, then this identity must be necessary. But this identity is possible, so one can imagine a possible world in which pain occurs without any brain state at all (the world of pain apart from the body), and one can imagine a possible world in which " the firing of cfibers" occurs without any pain (zombie world). As a result, in those possible worlds, " the firing of c-fibers" is not. One of the objections to Kripke's argument is that the principle of conceivability is incompatible with the phenomenon of Kripke's posterior necessity. According to the objection through a posteriori necessity, there is a difference between the conceivable (logical possibility) and the (metaphysical) possibility. The conceivability argument merely shows that the zombie world is logically possible, but the logical possibility of the zombie world is quite different from its metaphysical possibility; For conceptual possibility, mere conceptual coherence (or impossibility) suffices, but we need something more to show that the zombie world has a metaphysical possibility. Chalmers seeks to respond to this objection with the idea of twodimensional semantics. Chalmers, of course, tries to formulate the same Kripke's conceivability argument against materialism based on the idea of two-dimensional semantics. He argues that we can go from epistemological premise (logical possibility) to ontological conclusions (metaphysical possibility). To do this, we need an intermediary. We must first infer justified epistemologies (ideas of conceivable things) from epistemological premise (ideas of necessary and possible things), and then arrive at ontological conclusions from justified premise. He clings to the idea of two-dimensional semantics for the connection between epistemological and modal premise.

In this article, first-hand and original sources have been used and an attempt has been made to obtain the desired results by using the method of conceptual analysis and the conventional method of philosophical reasoning.

In this article I have shown that 1) Chalmers formulates Kripke's argument based on the idea of two-dimensionalism. 2) Kripke's argument was based entirely on the identity of conscious states and physical states, while Chalmers relied on the concept of supervenience of facts about consciousness on physical facts. 3) Chalmers, unlike Kripke, does not rely on essentialism about phenomena. 4) Chalmers argues that Kripke's arguments against token identity are not conclusive, but that arguments against type identity work. 5) Chalmers, unlike Kripke, tries to justify the transition from the primary conceivability to the primary possibility. But Kripke takes this transfer for granted.

Both Kripke (1980) and Chalmers (1997; 2010)'s argument are based on the assumption that conceivability requires possibility. In other words, both resort to the logical possibility of separating physical states from phenomenal states. Keywords: Kripke, Chalmers, The Idea of Two-Dimensional Semantics, conceivability Argument, Dualism, and Materialism.

Having attracted the attention of thinkers for a long time, the theory of the sameness of mind and brain is one of the oldest and most important issues in the philosophy of mind. In simple terms, this theory holds that the mental states and phenomena of a person at a given time are the same as the states and processes of his brain at the same time. In this research, some of the most important principles of this theory have been discussed. Using the descriptive-critical method, this paper directs many criticisms to this theory in terms of both Western and Islamic views. Considering these criticisms, especially in the field of Islamic thought, an attempt is made to prove the abstraction of the soul and the negation of its physicality. By proving the abstraction of the soul, it seems that one cannot believe in the sameness of mind and brain, and the indefensibility of this theory is proved.

The open-question argument is a connecting point in contemporary Analytical Ethics, in response to which many new views were addressed as positive or negative reactions to this argument. In this article, we strive to study and critique the open-question argument and its semantic suppositions and to show that this argument is an application of paradox of analysis and descriptive theory of meaning on ethical concepts. According to the paradox of analysis, the constituents of things contribute to their concepts and therefore, the real definitions which include the constitutents elements are tautological and lack new information. Going forward, we address the semantic views of Frege, logical positivism, Suhravardi-Locke and Kripke-Putnam in order to resolve the paradox of analysis and show that none of these views can be applied to ethical concepts and cannot be considered as a satisfactory answer to open-argument paradox. Finally, we have explained that another solution can be suggested for the paradox of analysis by taking inspiration from the Kripke-Putnam theory and linguistic inspiration. According to this solution, the primary reference of ethical terms to external instances happens without the mediation of concepts and through common intuitions of the linguistics and the precise concept of these terms is gradually addressed and formed in the process of analysis and by considering primary intuitions

Paul Horwich has criticized Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s (KW) rule-following argument. In this paper, I shall explore one of Horwich’s multiple objections to KW and argue that it is not effective. In section 2 I will discuss KW’s meaning skepticism. Of various candidates that KW explores for the facts that meaning-ascription sentences are meant to correspond, I will explain exclusively dispositional facts. In section 3 Horwich’s explanation of KW’s “rational guidance argument” against dispositionalism about meaning-ascription sentences. This will be followed by a discussion of Horwich’s objection to the argument in section 4. By introducing the idea of “self-correction disposition,” as it will be explained, Horwich tries to save the dispositionalism. In the final section of the paper I shall try to show that Horwich’s appeal to the disposition to self-correct faces the problem of “rational guidance argument” again

In Gottlub Frege's theory of the meaning of particular names and his descriptions of the meaning-making process of that, and subsequently, the process of conformation and fixing the references through the proposed meaning, Kripke introduces criticism. By misrepresenting the dual processes of Frege's theory, and consequently Russell's, Kripke argues that this theory is ineffective and misleading.My main purpose is to discuss Kripke's most important description of the theory, which is reflected in "naming and necessity" and to challenge Kripke's critique. Accordingly, I believed that Kripke's criticism of Frege for the confusion between the two processes of fixing and meaning-making in a sense in the theory is incorrect, and Kripke created this view and mistakenly attributes this idea to Frege at first. Actually, Kripke made this idea for Frege and from his theories in Sence and Reference. But Frege never mentioned this misleading in the process of fixing the sense for the references. Kripke after this creation began to critique on Frege in this.For this conclusion, we first need to explain Frege's theory of meaning and then we will research in terms of two processes of references and meaning fixation. This article claims that the two cannot be traced in the Frege's views, and Kripke has not used sufficient precision, deliberately or inadvertently, in his description of this theory.

The present article briefly explains Frege’s theory of proper names and investigates the objections presented by Kripke to that theory. The writers distinguish the two different versions of Frege’s theory – also acknowledged by Kripke – and hold that the first version is defeated in facing with Kripke’s objection regarding the necessity in possible worlds. Then, they state two readings (subjective and objective) of the second version of Frege’s theory, and accept Kripke’s objection to the objective reading by adducing the errors of the speakers in connecting one group of attributes to an external referent. The writers, however, offer Kripke’s various objections to the subjective reading to defend it against those objections; except for the existential statements (affirmative and negative), they answer all other objections regarding the puzzles of ‘identity’ and ‘substitution’ and so on. The article concludes that the subjective reading of the second version of Frege’s theory has the least drawbacks and the most power to explain, and seems more justified in comparison to the two groups of ‘denotation/ direct reference’ and the ‘first version of Frege’s theory’.

This article is aimed to rephrase and critique the arguments presented by Joseph LaPorte about the truth of theoretical identity statements in natural sciences. LaPorte is classified as an essentialist who accepts the real kinds, but he denies the essence of the kinds to be discovered. His arguments are based on the vagueness of the terms of kinds. In his view while science progress we convention (not discover) what is related to the kinds. I evaluate LaPorte's arguments and show they can be applied only for the border terms in scientific theories and so the generalization of the claim is not defensible.

The main purpose of this article is the Horwich arguments in "Meaning, use and truth ", which is published in the Mind journal (1995). In this article, he defends the idea of Wittgenstein, use theory, in contrast to the arguments raised against the approach. Horwich focus specifically on Kripke's criticism. Kripke in his famous article "Wittgenstein on rules and private language: An elementary exposition " is trying to show that the application cannot provide the meaning. Horwich refuse Kripke argument. For this purpose, he offers both strong and weak interpretation of the premises of Kripke argument and then criticizes both. After review Horwich Criticisms on Kripke we evaluate his criticisms.

Some areas of Philosophical Investigation lay prey to relativistic interpretations. Some of the most important are language games and Kripke’s reading of the concept of rule following. In addition, contemporary philosophers discuss the possibility of dialogue and comparison between forms of life and their independency. Some of these philosophers concentrate on differences of forms of life and deny the possibility of comparison and understanding of each other, stressing on special paragraphs of philosophical Investigations. On the other hand, another group emphasizes other parts of philosophical Investigations and invokes Wittgenstein’s approach to various forms of life. They don’t accept relativistic readings of philosophical Investigation. They argue that when forms of life are completely different and independent, people living in one form of life cannot recognize any other forms of life and therefore cannot even speak about them or name them as a “form of life”. Similarly, Interpreters have adverse views concerning Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein. On the one hand, a group believes in an objective criterion for determination of the sense. On the other, a group thinks that following a rule according to what language users do, is the only criterion we have.

My aim in this paper is to show an inconsistency in Umberto Eco's semantic of fictional names as presented in his latest book: Confessions of a Young Novelist. To prepare the ground for my intervention, I first of all give a summary of Kripke's view on proper and fictional names, then I retrieve and record Ibn-Sina's view on proper names as purely denotative and his version of so-called causal theory of proper names. At the end I show, hopefully, a way out of Eco's seemingly conflicting views.

Semantic stipulations, i.e. the principles which are the main constructors of the meanings of words, have different forms for each category of words. Kripke`s theory is the most suitable model which identifies the appearance of the stipulations. In general, semantic stipulations are some usages of a word that has been accentuated. So, as long as the stipulations remains fixed, discoveries and inventions do not change the meaning of a word. Also, to justify the way which any meaning engender from semantic stipulations and how the meanings of the words in one sentence affect each other, radial model is very suitable one. Radial model, unlike those models which concentrate on the conceptual and obstruct definitions of words, shows a dynamic way of producing meanings.

Through his own reading of Wittgenstein's teachings in Philosophical Investigations, Kripke develops a skeptical argument on the basis of the concept of "rule-following". Then, he refers again to the later Wittgenstein's teachings, and provides a skeptical reply. It seems that the argument is aimed to challenge the realistic approach to "meaning" and, generally speaking, to provide an alternative picture of the way that "meaning" is attributed and statements are acknowledged. Skeptical argument is based on the thesis of normativity of meaning. Assuming such a thesis, Kripke's skeptic concludes that "if I believe in semantic realism, I will not be able to find a fact showing that, using various words, I have intended (and intend) to communicate some meaning; for, there is no such a fact at all, thus there is no meaning". According to the realistic approach to meaning, only if we can find the truth-condition of the said sentence, we will be able to speak of its truth, falsity, and meaning. In the present writing, skeptical argument, its consequences, and presumptions will be posed; and then Kripke's skeptical reply will be introduced. In this regard, the author has tried to, at first, provide a proper formulation of his argument, and then he introduces, on the basis of this formulation, possible solutions for such a skepticism. Then, he will discuss the conflict between this skepticism and semantic realism. In what follows, he will try to discuss some of the most important characteristics, consequences, and threats of this argument in some fields; in doing so, he will show some possible defects in Kripke's non-realism.