metaphysics

From Whitehead's point of view, each human discipline, whether scientific, religious, moral, artistic, or philosophical, abstracts part of integrated reality and then sometimes erroneously equates it with the whole reality. This abstraction being taken for concrete reality is what Whitehead calls a Fallacy of misplaced concreteness. A fallacy which philosophy and new science suffered from it. Now, what is the function of philosophy? And what alternative does he introduce? This article, in view of these two questions, first analyzes the components of Whitehead's definition of metaphysics, such as experience as point of departure coherence, internal consistency, being necessary, attention to all experience, and so on. And then it was pointed to the Whitehead metaphysical method, which has similarities to the science method. Second addresses the main function of philosophy in Whitehead's view, which is "abstract criticism" or a critical examination of the boundary of the abstract from the integral. A prominent example of this criticism is about the fallacy of "simple location", which made the scientific materialism become the cosmological paradigm governing the minds of scientists of the new age. In the end, Whitehead's organismic attitude is introduced as an alternative to scientific materialism; and it is explained that instead of the scientific materialistic understanding of the world as if it is composed of independent material particles, Whitehead refers to the process based on the organism.  The world that consists of interconnected entities which are always experiencing or have been experienced.

Metaphysics has a long-standing history in philosophy. Although it does not date back as far as philosophy itself, it has always been a fundamental part of philosophical systems and is regarded as "first philosophy", the highest domain of rational knowledge. At times, metaphysics has been considered synonymous with philosophy, addressing fundamental questions about the essence and reality of things, or pure being. However, as intellectual developments have progressed, metaphysics has faced serious criticism and even outright rejection. Immanuel Kant and Rudolf Carnap, two prominent philosophers from distinct philosophical traditions, adopted critical stances toward metaphysics, resulting in profound transformations within this field. Kant, through his Copernican Revolution and his distinction between analytic/synthetic propositions and a priori/a posteriori concepts, examined the conditions under which metaphysics could be considered possible. In contrast, Carnap, a leading figure of the Vienna Circle, developed theories on analytic/synthetic judgments and their relationship to experience, establishing an epistemological framework that dismissed metaphysical propositions as meaningless. This article seeks to address the following questions: Which aspects of Kant’s philosophy revitalized philosophical thought and influenced Carnap and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle? How did Kant critique and redefine metaphysics? How did Kant’s rationalist philosophy shape the empiricism of the logical positivists? A comparison of these two philosophers’ perspectives reveals that Carnap drew significant inspiration from Kant’s philosophy. Nevertheless, a fundamental difference exists between them: Kant sought to liberate metaphysics from its traditional framework and redefine it in a scientific and rigorous manner. In contrast, Carnap, emphasizing empiricism and dismissing metaphysics as futile, aimed to abolish it entirely and pave the way for the scientific advancement of human knowledge.

Henri Corbin (1903–1978), a distinguished French philosopher and orientalist, dedicated much of his academic career to exploring Islamic and Iranian thought. As a scholar deeply inspired by mysticism, Corbin introduced the concept of hiérohistoire (sacred history), which transcends traditional historical boundaries by emphasizing the spiritual and metaphysical dimensions of historical events. A key question arises: How did Corbin integrate insights from Shiʿa Islam into his formulation of sacred history? Specifically, how are the teachings of Imam ʿAlī ('a), as exemplified in Nahj Al-balāgha, reflected in Corbin’s framework?This research aims to trace the conceptual roots of sacred history in the thoughts of Imam ʿAlī ('a). By employing hermeneutic and comparative methods, it analyzes the intersections between Corbin’s hiérohistoire and the philosophical and theological dimensions present in Nahj al-balāgha. The study reveals that Imam ʿAlī ('a) provides a profound and comprehensive perspective on the interplay between divine order and human agency, which significantly informs Corbin’s ideas, albeit with differing emphases.

Literature Review:

The field of hiérohistoire has attracted attention for its potential to reinterpret spiritual traditions. Studies on Corbin, such as Wekili and Kazempour (2018), highlight his reliance on Shiʿa notions of walaya (spiritual guardianship) to construct a transhistorical view of religious authority. Corbin regarded walaya as the quintessential element of Shiʿism, emphasizing its enduring metaphysical presence over historical contingencies.Parsanian and Vekilian (2014) explored Corbin’s conception of spiritual culture, asserting that he rejected historicism in favor of a metaphysical paradigm rooted in Islamic illuminationist philosophy. Similarly, Alimolhoda and colleagues (2017) analyzed Corbin’s approach to meta-history, revealing how his methodology was influenced by phenomenology and Heideggerian hermeneutics. These studies collectively underscore Corbin’s aim to transcend conventional historiography, yet they often lack a direct comparative analysis with Islamic primary texts, such as Nahj al-balāgha.Moreover, scholars like Gassimi (2013) emphasize Corbin’s efforts to foster interfaith dialogue by applying philosophical hermeneutics to uncover the esoteric dimensions shared by diverse religious traditions. This study builds on such works by situating Corbin’s hiérohistoire within the theological and ethical teachings of Imam ʿAlī (‘a), thereby filling a critical gap in the discourse.

This research adopts a twofold methodological approach:Hermeneutics: Drawing from Corbin’s hermeneutic principles, the study interprets key sermons from Nahj al-balāgha, particularly the first sermon, to identify themes aligned with sacred history. Comparative Analysis: By juxtaposing Corbin’s hiérohistoire with Imam ʿAlī 's ('a)discourse, the research evaluates the extent to which the former resonates with or diverges from the latter’s theological vision. Primary sources, including Nahj al-balāgha and Corbin’s writings, are supplemented with secondary analyses from both Western and Islamic scholarship to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the subject.

Spiritual Hierarchy and Sacred History Imam ʿAlī ('a), in the opening sermon of Nahj al-balāgha, articulates a divinely ordered hierarchy that governs the cosmos. He emphasizes the role of intermediaries—angels and prophets—in conveying divine knowledge. This perspective aligns with Corbin’s view of a spiritual chain (silsila) that transcends material temporality, linking the earthly and heavenly realms. However, while Corbin focuses on the mystical and esoteric dimensions, Imam ʿAlī ('a) integrates these with ethical imperatives, emphasizing human accountability in fulfilling divine:will.

Beyond Temporal Constraints:

Imam ʿAlī's ('a) depiction of history as a living testament to God’s will challenges linear conceptions of time, presenting a cyclical and eternal dimension. Corbin similarly envisions history as an ongoing spiritual narrative, yet his framework, shaped by phenomenology, often abstracts historical events into symbolic representations. In contrast, Imam ʿAlī ('a) grounds his metaphysical vision in practical and moral realities, offering a more holistic integration of material and spiritual realms.

The Role of Active Imagination:

Corbin’s reliance on active imagination as a tool for accessing the metaphysical realm finds echoes in Imam ʿAlī's ('a) invocation of the unseen (ghayb). Both perspectives affirm the interconnectedness of material and spiritual worlds, though Corbin’s approach leans toward individual mysticism, whereas Imam ʿAlī ('a) advocates collective responsibility in realizing divine justice.

Ethical Dimensions of Sacred History:

A key distinction lies in the ethical orientation of Imam Ali’s teachings. While Corbin’s hiérohistoire often centers on metaphysical exploration, Imam ʿAlī ('a) emphasizes the practical implications of spiritual awareness, urging humanity to act as stewards of God’s creation. This ethical dimension enriches the concept of sacred history, bridging the gap between metaphysical ideals and human action.

The findings highlight significant parallels between Corbin’s hiérohistoire and Imam ʿAlī's ('a)theological framework, yet they also expose critical divergences. Corbin’s emphasis on mystical experience risks overlooking the communal and ethical aspects central to Imam ʿAlī's ('a) teachings. By integrating these dimensions, sacred history can offer a more balanced perspective that accommodates both spiritual transcendence and social responsibility.This study contributes to the growing field of comparative theology by demonstrating how Islamic sources can inform and refine Western philosophical constructs. Furthermore, it underscores the need for interdisciplinary approaches that bridge phenomenology, hermeneutics, and Islamic theology to enrich contemporary understandings of sacred history.

Imam ʿAlī's ('a) teachings in Nahj al-Balagha provide profound insights into the nature of history as a divine narrative, characterized by spiritual hierarchy, cyclical time, and human accountability. While Corbin’s hiérohistoire draws heavily on these principles, it remains incomplete without the ethical and communal dimensions emphasized by Imam ʿAlī  ('a). By re-examining hiérohistoire through the lens of Nahj al-balāgha, this research advocates for a more integrative approach to sacred history, one that harmonizes metaphysical inquiry with moral action.

Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics is one of the significant works from Immanuel Kant’s so-called "pre-Critical" period, published in 1766, fifteen years before the Critique of Pure Reason. In this essay, Kant examines and critiques the claims of Emanuel Swedenborg, the Swedish scholar and mystic, regarding access to a transcendent, supersensible world. The question of this paper is whether Kant’s critique of Swedenborg’s claims was influenced by Hume. If so, which fundamental concepts in the essay Dreams reflect this influence? In the present paper, we read Dreams in light of Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, a work that Kant is believed to have studied before writing Dreams. Through an analysis of both works, we ultimately conclude that some of Kant’s most important positions in Dreams, including his critique of metaphysics, his empirical interpretation of causality, and his understanding of metaphysics as "the science of the limits of human reason," were directly influenced by Hume.

According to ontological naturalism, the existence of an incorporeal cause for the world is in conflict with science, and basically the world does not need such a cause. According to methodological naturalism, too, scientific method is the most successful method for understanding the structure of the world and the causal relationships governing it. Looking at the issue from the perspective of theoretical philosophy, which does not belong to anything other than the outer world, we find that science has a limited share in the explanation of nature in terms of its method, and if the empirical findings arising from it are not in interaction with the metaphysical foundations of science, then it cannot have decisive theories in the explanation of the world and has nothing to say in the ontological issues. It seems that by considering the link between science and metaphysics, one can use philosophical theology in order to defend the belief in God as a complementary element in the explanation of the world of existence, and the use of science in the realm of ontology is considered unscientific and fallacious. Regarding essentialism in science, Ellis believes realistically that instead of lacking properties, creatures have powers and capacities that make up their essence and inherent properties and make their nature active and full of properties. It can be concluded that naturalism is valuable as a way of understanding material nature, without being in conflict with the transcendental and incorporeal cause. Methodological naturalism does not necessarily correlate with ontological naturalism, and what brings these two closer together is the metaphysical foundations of science, which alone is efficient in theology and the ontological explanation of nature. In sum, new essentialism establishes a connection between the inherent properties and the existence of things, and builds an objective and real foundation on the proof of the metaphysical foundations of science, from which theology can open a way to prove the belief in God.

The ever-increasing development and progress of science in the universe has led to providing the ground for man to face the unknown and turbulent future and on the one hand to distance himself from previous matters such as beliefs and religious issues. The aim of the research is to investigate the most important features and consequences of new science and it is to express the existing challenges and opportunities from a religious point of view. Therefore, the research problem is the nature of new science with a pathological approach and a religious approach with a descriptive and analytical method. The findings of the research show that considering that new science is mainly based on empiricism, which has a one-dimensional and incomplete view without considering all aspects of existence, and the scientific and educational institutions of most countries of the world are based on this type. The paradigm and pattern have been designed and targeted; the acceptance of this model by any society requires the acceptance of inevitable harms and crises such as; the material nature of the new science, the one-dimensional view of the laws of the world, the domination of man over nature, the separation from the revealed teachings, the denial of religion with the claim of the originality of science and reason, the negation of metaphysics, the emergence of moral and spiritual crises, and the reliance on the purely experimental method are the new science. Now he is facing it. Therefore, it is necessary to create solutions such as; Negation of the one-dimensional view, two-dimensional explanation of human existence, adjustment of human domination, explanation of the mutual influence of science and religion, creation of a link between knowledge and value, proof of metaphysical ideas and adornment of science with moral virtue, correcting the epistemic base, in such a way that it should be appropriate and compatible with intellectual, cultural and religious and spiritual teachings

There is a controversy in Islamic philosophy over the relationship between something’s being something and something’s being. Two theses are well-known: assumption and entailment. Notoriously, Mirdamad is considered to be among the adherents of the entailment thesis. It is argued here that Mirdamad’s thesis is neither assumption nor entailment. Actually, his thesis includes a collection of different propositions that combine assumption and entailment variously. I interpret his thesis on the basis of his theory of subsistence and existence. Furthermore, I distinguish between semantical and metaphysical aspects of Mirdamad’s thesis. I abstract some logical consequences from these semantical aspects. I explain then why these logical consequences do not follow from a bunch of the alternative theses at issue.

Even though of the Greeks and especially Thales of Meitus are considered the founders of philosophical reflection, cannot deny the importance of economic, cultural and scientific relations and interactions in addition to the influence of their predecessors, especially in the Ionian region and also between them and neighbor civilizations. Thales, as the founder of philosophy, was on the one hand influenced by the mythological thinking before him and therefore his break from the mythological thinking should be regarded with a kind of tolerance; In addition, Thales was greatly influenced by non-Greek civilizations, including Babylonian and Egyptian, in his innovative approach to nature and his attempt to explain it. In general, at the forefront of philosophical thought, like any other category, human thinking has a close connection with historical conditions and social contexts and at the same time with other human fields, including science, in the sense of empirical and concrete human research.

In the rereading of Thales, it will be important to focus on the contextuality and historicity of thought, which is not only an effective factor, but apparently should be counted as a condition for the possibility of philosophical thinking and of course, in this regard, the issue of action and reaction of thinking in relation to the his environment condition is considered important. In particular, what is considered as politics, and to put it better, the political, which means power in the heart of human relations - and not necessarily the official and ruling politics of the society - plays an irreplaceable role in the formation and growth of thought.

Thales' intellectual system includes the connection between various components from different fields, including science and philosophy, both of which contain elements of myth-thought. At the same time, the analysis of Thales' thinking shows that, on the one hand, thought in ancient Greece was not formed in a miraculous way, but in the confrontation with neighbor civilizations and cultures, as well as the existing conflicts and contradictions. In the reflections of Thales, due to the special nature of the conditions and the type of thinking, it is not a matter specific only to his point of view, but a more or less common feature of all human thoughts throughout history. Discussion and

Emphasizing the special conditions in the formation and development of Thales's thought does not deny the importance of his approach.Paying attention to the many watersheds of Thales's approach is, on the one hand, a sign of the curiosity and practice of one of the epoch-making thinkers, along with paying attention to the hybrid dimension of thought.One of the inevitable results of adopting such different elements in the intellectual system is the existence of parts that are incompatible with each other, which itself inspires the thinkers and intellectual currents of the era after it, each of which relies on a particular aspect of the previous thinking. Therefore "Quentin Skinner", with regard to the contexts as well as the intention that the author chooses for himself in thinking, believes that there should not be a coherent framework free of conflicts and contradictions, especially duringtime attributed or imposed on the thinker.A thinker, as a child of his time, engages in reflections and actions that may reveal his contradictions by looking beyond the historical and spatial distance.The important insight of the overview of Thales as a historical and specific experience may indicate a transhistorical point in the analysis of thought that the originality of thought is always based on its interactive aspect with other thoughts and not in a discrete abstraction and separated from other opinions.

This research focusing on self-creation, a key element of Richard Rorty's playful belief system, also known as ironism. It explores how Self-Creation is manifested in the creation of texts. Following the Romantic tradition, Rorty aims to achieve human freedom by moving away from metaphysical ideas. He describes his philosophical stance as ironism, redefining the notions of truth, essence, and language to create his envisioned framework.According to Rorty, truth is not a universal, timeless, or spaceless entity but is constructed through human interactions and expressed through language. In his view, language does not serve as a bridge between truth and humans but is the creator of truth itself, requiring the ability to persuade others. Rorty's ironism emphasizes Self-Creation, which he defines as the freedom to narrate any story we wish to tell.Focusing on this aspect of ironism is crucial because it aims to achieve freedom by acknowledging human individuality. By altering their perspective on language and truth, a self-autonomous person can expand the boundaries of thought by creating new linguistic metaphors, thereby opening up new intellectual possibilities. When such an individual engages in text production, they must consider how the relationships between textual components can make the realization of freedom more achievable.Can we hope for freedom if the text is structured according to the coherence and harmony favored by metaphysicians? Is it possible to advocate for freedom while undermining it through the text's organization and presentation based on metaphysical patterns? Or must the components of the text be arranged in a new relationship, thereby creating a new language game?This new language game can establish a significant distance from previous ones, allowing new entities to emerge. This is the core of the ideal Rorty seeks in discussing individual freedom. The author believes that focusing on compositional qualities such as disharmony, diversity, and dispersion can more effectively achieve Rorty's concept of Self-Creation.Among the works of Persian-speaking researchers, numerous articles and books explore Rorty and his ideas. However, the question of operationalizing Rorty's goals and his romantic ideal through text production has yet to be thoroughly examined. This gap is also evident in Rorty's works. Although he paid attention to the works of writers and novelists, he focused primarily on those who aimed to achieve freedom in the public sphere. Therefore, focusing on texts emphasizing the realization of self-creation and freedom on an individual level can significantly advance Richard Rorty's thought.

This research employs analytical and descriptive methods to examine Rorty's ironism and self-creation. It then introduces ways to achieve self-creation in text production by focusing on compositional qualities aligned with ironism, contrasting the qualities favored by metaphysicians.

To further distance ourselves from metaphysical thoughts, which is the goal of Rorty's philosophy, it is essential to recognize the types of compositional qualities that organize texts. Metaphysicians favor two compositional qualities: coherence and harmony. These qualities require the components of a whole to be placed in a causal or obligatory relationship with each other, structuring the text accordingly. By eliminating ambiguity and disharmony, the text can transmit its message more quickly to the audience, and language can better fulfill its mediating role.Given this context, applying alternative structural patterns such as disharmony, diversity, and dispersion—where the arrangement of components differs from what metaphysicians prefer—can facilitate the production of new thought forms. Introducing works by writers like Samuel Beckett and Peter Handke can provide a clearer understanding of this new path explored in this research. Examples of such works can also be found among Persian-speaking writers and the fifth generation of Iranian literature.

Rorty, by emphasizing the tradition of Romanticism, aims to realize human freedom within the realm of philosophy. He considers freedom at both public and individual levels. On the individual level, the pursuit of Self-Creation is achieved through non-essentialist, anti-nature thoughts, and twentieth-century perspectives on language. Focusing on imagination allows the self-autonomous ironist to craft their desired narrative. By viewing language as contingent, Rorty demonstrates how it can be used to construct new realities, enabling individuals to realize their freedom.If freedom is pursued through the creation of works with new compositional qualities that oppose the metaphysicians' preferred qualities of coherence and harmony, it will seem more attainable. By generating new linguistic metaphors, new terms will gradually emerge, creating a new intellectual space and facilitating the possibility of moving towards new forms of living.

Kant argued that in order to bring about validity for knowledge we have to make a paradigm shift. The paradigm shift which was well known as copernican revolution was based on this assumption that the one who observing could be able to determinate objects. For Kant subject as observer has the ability to determine the world transcendentally. For Hegel the Kantian paradigm shift count as subjetivising the objectivity. He blames Kant for not seeing this basic fact that, subject himself become in the objectivity and the relation could not be as Kant was assuming. Hegel by replacing the transcendental I with Giest attempts to instead of making objectivity, subjective, do the reverse. In this article we argue that by objectivizing the subjectivity, Hegel not inly became able to overcome the problems posed by Kantian philosophy but also assumes subjectivity as intrinsically intersubjective

logotherapy was invented by Viktor Frankl as one of the existentialist psychotherapy schools. The main mission of this school is to emphasize the importance of the meaning of life and its unique role in getting rid of existential emptiness and aimlessness in life. The three main beliefs of this school are: belief in the existence of God, religion and immortality. The present research, which was carried out by descriptive-analytical method and through library sources, after carefully reading the metaphysical beliefs of Frankel's school, evaluates them based on the intellectual foundations of Allameh Tabatabayi (r). The main research question is what are the most important metaphysical beliefs of Frankel's logotherapy school? And what are their similarities and differences with respect to Islamic teaching, based on the opinions of Allameh Tabatabayi? The research findings show: the incorrect and superficial explanation of the concept of God and its degradation from the level of necessary position to the pure level of a meaning-giver, a minimal definition of religion and a pluralistic and instrumentalist view of it, and not paying attention to the reality of happiness and vague interpretations of immortality are the most important points of difference between Frankel and Allameh Tabatabai is in the field of metaphysical beliefs.

Despite Wittgenstein's philosophical activities in Britain and his strong inclination towards analytic philosophy, there are also non-analytic elements in his thought which are rooted in classical German thought, especially in Kant's critical philosophy. We can, therefore, detect Kantian elements in Wittgenstein's thought. Concerning the main aim of this research, i.e., to show the Kantian veins of Wittgenstein’s thought, the following elements can be enumerated: critique of Metaphysics, delimitation of expression of thought, transcendentality of logic and ethics, problem of Metaphysics and science, refutation of private language. Given the evolution of Wittgenstein's though, this paper aims to show that, first, these similarities and parallels can be drawn not only from the Tractatus but also from the Philosophical Investigations. Second, there are fundamental differences between Wittgenstein's commentators, for instance, P.M.S Hacker argues against the transcendental reading of both the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations, and claims that the two philosophers do not share the same concept of the term transcendental. Finally, the question arises as to whether these Kantian veins can be considered as a proof of the unity of Wittgenstein's thought.

Substance is one of the fundamental concepts in the history of philosophy that has a history as long as the history of philosophy itself. Although this concept has underwent profound developments and assumed different layers during the centuries, because of its firm linkage with common-sense, never lost its significance. Since the birthplace of the concept of substance is ancient Greece and Greek philosophy, this essay intends to narrate an analytical history of the genesis of the concept in ancient Greece; then to trace its course of development in Christian and Islamic middle age; and finally, to investigate its remnants in modern philosophy. The purpose of this essay, however, is not merely a philosophy-historical narrative, but its secondary purpose is to place the concept of substance under a critical light and to report its fundamental critiques. Hence, we will consider the most important critiques, mostly proposed by Anglo-Saxon philosophers, and will conclude that this concept in order to have a legitimate presence in philosophy, must submit a fundamental reformulation.

Distinguishing empirical knowledge from non-empirical knowledge is one of the important issues of epistemology.The criterion for distinguishing "science" from non-empirical knowledge actually goes back to determining the role of experience in science. The traditional and inductive view considers the role of experience to confirm scientific statements.From this point of view, a scientific theorem is a theorem that can be confirmed and finally proved by an experimental method.  The famous philosopher of science, Karl Popper, at the beginning of the 20th century, proposed the criterion of "falsifiability" as a criterion for distinguishing "science" from other types of knowledge.In the present article, the author tries to reveal the epistemological result of his opinion by referring to some of the criticisms that have been made to Popper's theory, that in experimental science, neither definite proof nor definite refutation is possible. This important point is an emphasis on the hypothetical nature of experimental science.

Heidegger holds that, although Western philosophy begins with an inquisition of the meaning of Being as the purpose of Metaphysics, at the time, perverted by Plato, and the history of forgetting Being begins from that time. According to Heidegger, the crisis of European sciences and the death of meaning is caused by ontological nihilism. It initiates from the metaphysical dualism that has occurred during centuries of philosophizing due to the disregard of the concept of Being and the obfuscation of this most fundamental thing. Heidegger conceives that with hermeneutical and phenomenological analysis of Dasein as the primary habitat in which the first and most fundamental problem of philosophy, What is Metaphysics?, has become a new way of philosophizing, before the thinkers of the epoch to get rid of this "great desert that Every day expands" (Nietzsche's famous expression, which Heidegger analyzed in the book What is Metaphysics?). This inquiry attempts to examine the characteristics and goals of Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology in the criticism of previous philosophies and in line with fundamental ontology, which is a drawing for understanding Being.

Surveying the problem of emanation in Farabi's view, has some difficulties like that does for Farabi this problem is a fundamental problem in metaphysics or a secondary one? In this issue we are confronted with two main difficulties: one is that some scholars doubted to two Farabi's works that he discussed there the problem of emanation, mean Fosus Al-hekam and Ouoon Al-masael. They cannot say that these two books certainly are Farabi's books. But the more difficult problem is that Farabi's views on the problem of emanation are different in his works. It seem that some of Farabi's books are basically written in the Aristotelian context and some of his books are from his personally views. In addition, there is another difficulty: Farabi discussed the problem of emanation in some of his books that are not basically metaphysical but are psychological. In the present article, we try to survey these difficulties in Farabi's works.

Morganti and Tahko advocate a kind of metaphysics that they call "moderate naturalized metaphysics." This moderate naturalism concerning metaphysics differs crucially with, on the one hand, Ladyman & Ross's radical project of naturalizing metaphysics and, on the other hand, proposals aiming to defend the autonomy of metaphysics, such as those of Larry Paul and Jonathan Lowe. Morganti and Tahko hold that metaphysics overlaps with natural sciences in terms of subject matter and has a sufficient degree of independence from it in terms of method. In this article, I will outline this naturalistic project, mainly in contrast with the meta-metaphysical views of Ladyman & Ross, Lowe, and Paul. Then I attempt to examine and criticize it, arguing that their project faces two main challenges. First, it cannot suitably address the overlap between metaphysics and science regarding the subject matter. Second, it cannot provide a criterion for limiting and constraining the metaphysical activity based on naturalism.