moral responsibility

Non-intentional and immediate awareness has no already relationship with the other. While freedom is always related to others and not having a relationship with others does not fundamentally interfere with freedom. Therefore, freedom is never a question of knowledge. Consciousness in itself and for itself independently and unmediated by external objects internally projects its objectivity. This consciousness-based approach basically does not look outside itself, that is, it finds the origin and idea of ​​truth inside and without the mediation of others. The other is a competitor of freedom in all its forms in the sense that it does not allow any linguistic articulation to form outside its limits and swallows all the illusory elements of self-foundation. At the same time, there is no other way than facing the other towards a kind of reflexive awareness and knowing oneself as an ego. In addition, the link between freedom and moral responsibility is one of the most fundamental and long-standing topics of ethics, which establishes a link between the subject, the other, and agency. Kant's transcendental freedom constructs space as a support for empirical freedom and as a condition for the possibility of experiencing freedom. From this point of view, transcendental and unconscious freedom play the same role in relation to moral responsibility.

Although the country's banking system is committed to the implementation of upstream documents and has always tried to implement its coded ethical charters, a favorable proposal to promote ethical responsibility in banks and further institutionalize this useful and effective culture in the country's banking system is that the central bank By compiling a set of ethical codes, present them to the banking network for implementation. Compilation and notification of these codes and in the continuation of monitoring and evaluation and rating of banks will be able to create competition among banks in conducting ethical activities to obtain top ratings. Therefore, the aim of this research is to investigate the role of moral (social) crisis in the sales crisis in Iran's banking industry. The current research is of a qualitative type using thematic analysis method. In order to identify the role of moral (social) crisis on the banking sales crisis, we tried to extract the factors that form the moral (social) crisis that are effective on the banking sales crisis. The sampling method was purposeful and judgmental. In this judgmental purposeful sampling, our intention is to select cases that have a lot of information according to the purpose of the research, so semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 people from the banking community (R&D managers and corporate banking managers of private commercial banks). . To check the qualitative sample size, we used the theoretical sampling method until the data saturation stage. The factors shaping the moral (social) crisis that are effective on the bank sales crisis were extracted in the form of 2 main themes, 2 sub-themes and 21 concepts. The findings showed that the influential components of the moral (social) crisis that lead to the bank sales crisis are: social factors and internal (moral) drivers. The results showed social factors such as changing expectations and changing attitudes of investors and customers, high unemployment rate and decreasing social capital of banks (lack of trust in banks due to lack of attention to issues important to people (economic and political, etc.)) in addition to moral factors such as Internal banking corruption among employees in relation to customers, improper communication with customers and customers' dissatisfaction with banking services, unethical behavior that is only in line with economic logic, and lack of lending based on trust are the most frequent factors in the aggravation of the banking sales crisis.

The commentators have differences in the interpretation of verse 284 about whether or not this verse is abrogated by verse 286, which originates from historical narrations and plays a central role in the moral responsibility of man against his youthful actions. Despite the difference in historical narrations, what is certain is that the juxtaposition of the words "Tabduwa", "Takhfuwa" and the phrases "Ma fi anfskam" and "Yahasabkam beh Allah" are intended to express and prove the meaning of calculating the inner actions of man. The ability to appear and hide these verbs is a feature that distinguishes them from other verbs. Investigations show that Allameh Tabatabai paid attention to this feature and based on the evidence in the verse, he believes that they are only "personal states" that are considered calculable due to having such a feature based on verse 284. But "properties" and "thoughts" are outside the topic of the verse. The method of the article is descriptive-analytical.

The limits and manner of punishment are not the same for all people, and the question has always been raised whether it is possible to determine a punishment for a child in terms of moral responsibility or not? The present research has studied the precise concept of the term child and has examined the moral responsibility in punishments related to children in detail.

The legal and moral infrastructures for punishing children are determined according to their age, psychological development and understanding. The main goal for children should be to educate, nurture and rehabilitate appropriate behavior so that they can be taught moral values and responsibilities. The punishments applied to children should be fair, measured and deal with children's rights. At the same time, cases where crimes are committed against the law and children are also responsible may require corrective measures. In any case, it is very important to pay attention to children's rights and provide a healthy and safe environment for their growth and development.

In daily life, humans adopt their responsibilities with a sense of freedom and choice, but in a world where deterministic laws prevail, this adoption faces challenges. This conflict comes from the belief in a free image of human being. Questions arise as to how humans can be free in coercion and how their will can act freely? If humans have their own free will, this creates their responsibility. But if humans cannot be free, why should they be blamed or praised based on their behavior? Also, in the absence of human free will, the need for moral, legal, and social concepts is challenged. From the perspective of skeptical philosophers such as Galen Strawson, free will and consequently moral responsibility are impossible. Given his fundamental argument, he is skeptical about the possibility of free will. He argues that free will can be possible if the individual is their own essential cause, but the individual is not their own essential cause. This article tries to examine and criticize Galen Strawson's view of freedom from an analytical-descriptive perspective.

This article explores Paul Ricoeur’s approach to the concept of evil, analyzing its symbolic meaning within various myths through the lens of philosophical and theological interpretation. The study seeks to answer fundamental questions: Where does evil originate? How can the symbolic interpretation of myths contribute to human moral growth? Is it possible to distill the essence of primitive symbols and transfer their meaning into philosophical insight, thereby bridging the semantic gap in a modern world dominated by scientism? Ricoeur argues that evil resists direct and simple linguistic categorization. Instead, he engages with multiple intellectual traditions—mythological thought, rationalism, Gnosticism, theodicy, and fragmented theology—crafting a layered, evolving analysis of evil.

The advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and the emergence of intelligent and superintelligent machines have significantly blurred the traditional boundaries between humans and machines. These technological developments have raised critical philosophical and ethical questions about the possibility of attributing moral agency to these systems. Can intelligent machines act morally, or should moral responsibility for their actions remain solely with their designers and operators? This paper aims to analyze these questions through a conceptual and analytical lens, focusing on the meaning, criteria, and philosophical implications of moral agency in the context of intelligent machines.

In compatibilists believe that we cannot act freely and be morally responsible for an action in a deterministic world, while compatibilists don’t deny the possibility of free action and moral responsibility for the agent, and they believe that we can find some kind of compatibility between moral responsibility and causal determination. This article will analyze Alfred Mele's zygote argument of manipulation, which is an argument in critique of compatibilism between moral responsibility and the deterministic world. Manipulation argument is an argument based on an agent's intuition of a situation in which the agent is under the control of another person or force. It wants to show that an agent in a manipulated situation, despite satisfying the compatibilists conditions, is not morally responsible for her action, and she is like the agent in a deterministic world.

Justice is one of the oldest concepts that mankind has known since the beginning of its civilization and has tried to establish it. Justice has different forms, which can be referred to as social, political, economic, etc. In this, criminal justice is of special importance. Scientists and experts in social sciences have considered several factors effective on criminal justice, among which principles such as the principle of acquittal and the principle of legality of crimes and punishments, as well as the personal nature of criminal responsibility, are important, but criminal responsibility is of particular importance among them. It is necessary to carry out serious scrutiny in this regard and conduct ethical attitudes towards criminal justice, especially collaborative criminal justice, in a scientific manner. Ignoring the areas of moral responsibility in the field of criminal justice violates the right of those referring to the judicial system and causes injustice. Therefore, paying attention to the character and human dignity of people is a necessity of collaborative criminal justice. The present article deals with the ethical attitudes in the field of collaborative criminal justice with a library method and has answered many unknowns in this regard.

Using a descriptive-analytical method, this paper explains the psychological conditions of moral responsibility, analyzes Mûllā Ṣâdrā’s viewpoint in this regard, and expresses its similarities with the views of some contemporary compatibilists. The conditions of moral responsibility can be divided into two kins: 1. the cognitive conditions and 2. the controlling conditions, which include: a) the power and ability, and b) the will and freewill. In his emphasizing on the cognitive and controlling conditions of considering the agent as responsible, Mûllā Ṣâdrā uses both rational and philosophical principles and the religious texts such as the Qur’an and Hadith. By expressing the condition of mental maturity and health for the responsible agent, Mûllā Ṣâdrā has emphasized on the normative characteristics needed for responsibility, and his viewpoint is similar to Frankfurt’s view of “the true self” and Fischer’s and Wolff’s views of “normative desert”. Also, based on the foundations of Transcendent Philosophy, we should talk about the degrees of having normative desert, based on which responsibility will be a graded thing, and its scope, intensity and weakness will be different in human beings. Thus, the responsibility of human beings is not the same, and every human being has a moral responsibility according to his existential degree and his abilities and capacities.

"Responsibility" means asking someone for something and it is used in cases where the petitioner can follow up on his request from the respondent and question him about his behavior in accordance with or against his request and its consequences. Knowledge, authority and power are considered as conditions of moral responsibility. A group of determinists believe that there are laws that question a person's moral responsibility. Discoveries in the field of genetics have fueled these views in recent years. But in the past centuries, the Akhwan al-Safa explained the influence of these natural factors such as temperament, weather, astrological rulings at the time of birth, etc. on ethics at the beginning of their treatise on ethics, but continued with the plan of dividing ethics into "centered" ethics. and "acquired", shows that these factors do not lead to predestination and lack of control and moral responsibility is still established. Addressing the impact of these issues on the part of the Brotherhood is because by planning these factors, the ground can be prepared for people to live more morally.

The first condition of moral responsibility is discretion. In order to explain free will in ethics, Ibn Sina deals with the intellectual foundations of goodness and badness for how virtues are created in humans. According to Ibn Arabi, this is the case that moral virtues are the union with the fixed virtues of man, which is the manifestation of one of the names. In the present study, an attempt has been made to compare the viewpoints of these two Islamic philosophers in the field of human agency in the realm of moral responsibility.

Ibn Sina emphasizes that goodness and badness in the sense that they have ontological aspects can be inspired by the Sharia and active intellect and by revelation to the Prophet and be the basis of practical and moral laws. The answer to the problem of reparation in the will of man, which arises for man due to the obligation to the divine Sharia, is that the perfections of moral limits are found from the Sharia, but then the theoretical powers of man take possession of it through knowing the laws and applying them in detail. Is possible. In Ibn Arabi's view, predestination has an ontological aspect, but man's knowledge of his fixed object and the will to unite with it gives man a kind of free will to create moral virtues. The difference between Ibn Sina's and Ibn Arabi's theories is in the philosophical approach, Ibn Sina's "science and will of mercy" and the theological-mystical approach, Ibn Arabi's "personal unity of existence".

Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility, as a pioneer theory of ethics of virtue, presents a new approach to responsibility because of its particular attention to moral conduct. Aquinas, a follower of Aristotle, has provided a new interpretation of moral responsibility with an emphasis on character and a focus on completely voluntary human acts and the role of apriori reflection on act. In the views of these two philosophers, moral agent is an agent who possesses knowledge, personality vice, and the ability to perform completely voluntary acts. Accordingly, children and animals are never subjected to moral evaluations because they lack such moral capacities and characters. Aristotle and Aquinas believe that the realm of moral agents, in addition to evil and virtuous people, includes restrained and non-restrained ones. Following a descriptive-analytic method, the present paper investigates the conditions under which the acts of moral agents are subjected to ethical evaluations in the views of Aristotle and Aquinas. Based on the findings of this study, those acts that become the subjects of moral responsibility must be done voluntarily based on the moral character of the agent as a non-accidental stimulus for act, even if they do not originate in deliberation and are not based on prior decision making. This is because sudden acts also originate in certain sources and function as clear references for moral evaluations.

Emphasizing the need to pay attention to the environmental crisis, the current research has dealt with the most important attitudinal roots of the creation of this crisis with a critical approach. "Man's exclusive consciousness", "distorted teachings of the Torah and the Bible and inappropriate interpretations of it", "honoring human rights" and "staying away from natural Islamic teachings" are among these roots. This research, with the method of library data processing and with a descriptive-analytical method, considers the best way out of this crisis based on religious teachings, "paying attention to the correct attitudinal foundations" and "morally responsible attitude" of humans in facing the environment. . This attitude is formed on the basis of "belief in the obligation to respect plants and animals", "belief in moderation in the use of the environment", "belief in the inherent value and public life" and "belief in responsibility combined with trustworthiness". . In this view, the environment, in addition to its inherent sanctity, also has instrumental sanctity and aims to achieve human perfection, which should not be treated in any way.

In this study I have tried some meta-ethical reflections on moral responsibility involving disinformation. For this purpose, the conceptual analysis and the reflective equilibrium methods were used. Then, the study was focused on the conditions that this phenomenon occurs. Thus, I first tried to examine whether committing disinformation is a moral dilemma. I used some citations to philosophers and some examples to show dilemmatic view of moral problems is logically fallacious. In the second step, it has examined that whether committing disinformation takes place in the pressure condition and then, the possibility of moral decision in pressure condition was examined. The outcome of study in second step showed that ideal morality fails to explain actions in pressure conditions and implications of care ethics and doing best practices is the best way for doing in such conditions, if the provision of “helping to elimination of poverty and bridging the gap between poor and wealthy” fulfilled. In the third step, I tried to examine disinformation in the context of akrasia and weakness of will and the possibility of them from the moral philosophical point of view. By reviewing arguments of some philosophers, I introduced will and wish as a building blocks of the akrasia and weakness of will phenomenon. Then, 8 rules were predicted for determining moral responsibility in akratic and weakness of will conditions. At the end, i proposed the Fischer’s “Moderate reasons responsiveness” idea for determining moral responsibility in the “irresistible wish” condition.

Tusi wrote works in the name of Ismaili elders and in those books he praised the elders of this sect. There is also a serious possibility that during his presence in this sect, he wrote treatises confirming their religious beliefs. But tusi, a Muslim scholar, is considered to be one of the twelve Imami Shiites, and based on moral responsibility, he is obliged to protect the correctness of the beliefs of his fellow believers, and morally, he cannot approve and promote the beliefs of other sects. Based on our inference from the method of statistics and analysis and comparison of related data, in addition to his explicit statement in the rewritten preface of Akhlaq Naseri, it follows that freedom in choice and agency in action, which The main conditions of moral responsibility were not there during the time of Khwaja''s presence among this sect. Therefore, he cannot be held responsible for the possible consequences of writing those books in support of the beliefs of this sect.

The main issue of this article is how to harmonize determinism and moral responsibility (the classic problem of free will) by reconsidering the philosophy of Avicenna. Certainly, Avicenna believes in determinism and in various works has emphasized the necessity of the effect by its sufficient cause. Avicenna, on the other hand, certainly believes in the moral responsibility of autonomous agents, including human beings. We have shown in the first step that he denies free will in the libertarian sense (the ability to do otherwise) for any agents; Because this notion of free will requires objective possibilities and is not compatible with causal determinism. Avicenna has identified a new type of voluntary agent who does not need to have an over-intentional intention to do something. Here, he looks very similar to proponents of agent causation; His idea, however, was not intended to defend a libertarian notion of free will, but to get rid of the challenge of the infinite regress of wills. Hence, Avicenna can be considered one of the few proponents of the "compatibilist agent causation." In the second step, an overview of Avicenna's theory of action is drawn. Here, in particular, emphasis is placed on the activity of the soul in the stages of the causal process leading to action, and the quality of these activities is introduced as a criterion for the morality degree of the agent..

Assuming responsibility for other human beings has been amongst ethical issues which is underlined in different ethical schools of thought and justified through various argumentations.  The current research is an attempt to investigate this issue in the light of the normative theory of divine command and enjoy the divine books to answer this question that why Man is required to feel responsible and benevolent toward other human beings. Accordingly, major reasons and components of this issue are explained in keeping with the divine books. It was revealed that God is the primary source of human responsibility toward others. The incentive of divine promise, divine love and giving thanks to the most beneficent as well as human resemblance to God and His succession on the earth  as a divine creature are amongst major reasons and components in theories of divine command which motivates Man toward feeling responsibility and benevolences for others.

Revisionism about moral responsibility is the view that there is a difference between descriptive account – as we think- and prescriptive account - as we ought to think- about moral responsibility. It is a Revisionist view to believe that (1) the folk intuitions of moral responsibility are incompatibilist, (2) the incompatibilist conception of moral responsibility is incorrect, and (3) the folk intuition of moral responsibility must be reconsidered. Vargas calls the revised concept of responsibility "the responsibility system" and believes that this new concept has all the functions of the previous concept; In other words, it can provide a new justification for individual and social activities that we have formed based on the traditional concept of responsibility - such as blaming, praising, punishing, etc. But it seems that because the model of justification in "the responsibility system" is forward-looking, it is not able to justify retributive justice. At the same time, Vargas must be able to defend the revised concept of responsibility against the "four-case manipulation" argument. This defense is shown to be unsuccessful.