natural sciences

In recent decades, naturalism in metametaphysics has manifested through debates surrounding both the methodology and subject matter of metaphysics. One significant point in these debates is the criterion proposed by Ladyman and Ross (2007) for distinguishing naturalized metaphysics from non-naturalized metaphysics. McLaurin and Dyke (2012), while critiquing Ladyman and Ross’s proposal, offer an alternative approach to naturalized metaphysics. According to them, a metaphysical theory qualifies as naturalized if it can, in principle, have observational consequences. McLeod and Parsons (2013) challenge this proposal by pointing to long-standing objections against the verifiability criterion of logical positivism. They argue that the distinction between naturalized and non-naturalized metaphysics cannot hinge on a semantic connection between theoretical content and observational statements. In their critique, they briefly mention the B-theory of time. This article first explains McLaurin and Dyke’s criterion for delimiting naturalized metaphysics, McLeod and Parsons’ critique, and McLaurin and Dyke’s subsequent response (2013). We then focus on the A-theory vs. B-theory debate in contemporary metaphysics to highlight additional issues with McLaurin and Dyke’s criterion. We argue that their approach (1) risks circularity, (2) undermines the possibility of naturalizing metaphysical debates, and (3) fails to address the relationship between metaphysical theories and future scientific developments.

During the second half of the 20th century, after the decline of logical empiricism, metaphysics was revived as analytic metaphysics. However, during the last two decades, significant naturalistic objections have been raised to analytic metaphysics. In the first chapter of their seminal book, Every Thing Must Go, Ladyman, Ross, and Spurrett, after taking a destructive approach to contemporary analytic metaphysics, presented a positive plan for appropriate naturalized metaphysics. For them, naturalized metaphysics is an activity to unify, under some constraints, the sciences. Analytic metaphysics, on the other hand, had its serious defenders. One of the enthusiastic advocates of metaphysics, as an inquiry with an independent method and subject matter, is Jonathan Lowe (1950-2014). At the end of his working life, he published various works in which he argued for a remarkable conception of metaphysics, that is, metaphysics as the science of the possible. In this paper, we claim that Jonathan Lowe's views on metaphysics provide a compelling stance for addressing the radical naturalistic objections raised by Ladyman, Ross, and Spurrett, and so it provides a thoughtful defense of metaphysics against those worries.

Galen is one of the most prominent thinkers and scientists in antiquity, who paid special attention to the methodology of natural sciences. On the other hand, the transition of Galenic tradition to the Islamic world had a wide impact on different areas of thought, one of which was methodology. Accordingly, studying Galen's scientific methodology plays a significant role in a true understanding of the scientific tradition in the Islamic medieval ages. This article, using the method of text-oriented analytic interpretation, expounds on the status of reason as one of the two main elements of Galen's methodology. In his view, the reason is the main part of the human soul which provides the scientific method both formally and materially. Its formal functions, pertaining to the logical scope, are as follows: demonstration, division and synthesis, definition, similarity and dissimilarity, analysis and synthesis, and indication. On the other hand, in a material sense, the mind provides the necessary prerequisites for the formation of proof and implication by understanding rational axioms.

Morganti and Tahko advocate a kind of metaphysics that they call "moderate naturalized metaphysics." This moderate naturalism concerning metaphysics differs crucially with, on the one hand, Ladyman & Ross's radical project of naturalizing metaphysics and, on the other hand, proposals aiming to defend the autonomy of metaphysics, such as those of Larry Paul and Jonathan Lowe. Morganti and Tahko hold that metaphysics overlaps with natural sciences in terms of subject matter and has a sufficient degree of independence from it in terms of method. In this article, I will outline this naturalistic project, mainly in contrast with the meta-metaphysical views of Ladyman & Ross, Lowe, and Paul. Then I attempt to examine and criticize it, arguing that their project faces two main challenges. First, it cannot suitably address the overlap between metaphysics and science regarding the subject matter. Second, it cannot provide a criterion for limiting and constraining the metaphysical activity based on naturalism.

In ancient medicine and natural sciences, it was accepted that living beings could arise without reproduction, directly through the constitution of the four elements and receiving Form from their sources. Based on this, they believed that some animals could arise from nonliving matter or the bodies of other living beings that are not genetically similar to them. For example, mice are born from mud, scorpions from hay, and flies from rotten meat. This type of creation of living beings is called a spontaneous generation (Tavalod) which is opposite to birth (Tavalod), caused by the activity of the generative power of living beings. This point of view, which is also mentioned in Aristotle's works, was accepted by Avicenna, and after him, it was popular among Islamic philosophers. This view has had various applications in Islamic philosophy, which include: 1. The stories of Salaman va ‘Absal and Hayy Ibn Yaqzan are not fictional; 2. Explaining the origin of the three produced things (inanimate, plant, and animal) on the earth; 3. complementary view on the theory of the cosmological cycle; 4. Explaining how to preserve species; 5. An example of accidental affairs; 6. A proof of the existence of Non-material intellect; 7. Evidence that some rare religious events can be realizable; 8. Evidence of the possibility of resurrection. The view of spontaneous generation was finally rejected in the 19th century by the experiments of Louis Pasteur. In this article, by analyzing the foundations and reasons for accepting this theory, its applications in Islamic philosophy have been reviewed.

In this article we examined the conflicts of Avicenna as an Aristotlian philosopher and two groups of Islamic theologians on the applicability of mathematical idealizations in natural philosophy. for our aim, we considered two ideal thought experiments suggested by theologians in which the geometrical idealization was emphsised. by considering the reactions to theses cases, we found that there are two different views on applicability of this method in the theologians' side, their metaphysical assumption, atomism, led them to a limitless method which could make their theory satisfactory and one of the ways among this boundless domain is mathematical idealization. in the other side, Avicenna and the other prepatetic philosophers didn't require this method for proving their metaphysical assumption and also believed in some bounded method in natural philosophy, in which hypothetical possibilities weren’t allowed. according to this limited method, mathematical idealization counted as an abstract hypothesis and may noy be used in concrete natural inquiries

In the history of thinking, especially in the field of the humanities, the idea of ​​Wilhelm Dilthey is a turning point. The era of Dilthey coincided with full-fledged science. Those who were scientific did not differ significantly between the method of the natural sciences and the humanities. Dilthey confronted this group and believed that in order to solve the problem the relation of the humanities by recognizing nature, we should pay attention to the similarity of the subject and the content of each science by the method of research in that science; otherwise, we would not achieve sufficient knowledge.. Dilthey considers the subject of the humanities to be social-historical reality and the method of research into it is an introspection and inner experience. The inner experience in his view is more certainty than the outer experience. Hence, humanities can achieve more certainty with respect to natural sciences. The basic principle of Dilthey's thought in this way is the principle phenomena. This principle states that objects are given as human feelings, as consciousness acts, and are subject to conditions of consciousness.

Positivist approach, in modern natural science, believes experience as unique way to the natural sciences. This approach has faced over recent centuries with general acceptance so that the progress of the natural sciences was considered owe this approach. This view was challenged in the second half of the twentieth century and some philosophers and social scientists, to discuss the role of presuppositions, have tried to challenge the exclusivity of the method of natural sciences, At least in some stages.
In this work, have tried to extract, some epistemological assumptions of modern natural science that influenced in selection of data and hypotheses, shaping scientific theories of scientists and even their evaluation. Assumptions that Presence or absence of each of them, in the mental context of scientists in recent centuries, could create a different path in the direction of these sciences, as revised at any of these assumptions could have an impact on the development process of natural sciences.

The relationship between natural sciences and religion is one of the most important issues that has been raised in recent years with the rise of the discussion of "religious science and the Islamization of sciences". Using the descriptive-analytical method, the present paper analyzes this issue from the viewpoint of Ayatollah Misbah. After examining two general views on the relationship between natural sciences and religion, this paper explains the criteria for the religiousness of science, and in the most important part, through the explanations presented in the paper, it comes to the conclusion that there is not any serious incompatibility between natural sciences and religion, rather there is a considerable mutual cooperation between the natural sciences and religion. Issuance of a decree for scientific subjects, extension of the circle of empirical knowledge, confirmation of science, addition of richness to empirical issues and giving direction to the use of science are some examples of the contribution of religion to science. Identifying the subject matter and providing new grounds for religious analysis, determining the details of religious education, such as the expressing of conditions and obstacles, proving some religious teachings, and leading to a better understanding of religious issues can be considered as the helps of religion to science.

Positivist approach to the modern science, has considered the experience as an exclusive research method in the natural sciences. This approach has been accepted generally over recent centuries, so that the progress of the natural sciences was in debt to this approach. This doctrine was challenged in the second half of the twentieth century, some philosophers of science as well as the social scientists tried to show the role of assumptions and the impact of non-empirical factors in modern natural sciences, nowadays, the Renaissance image of science as a pure experimental, has lost its validity. In this article we have tried to derive some ontological pre suppositions of the modern natural sciences, such as the principality of quantity, simplicity and Materialism. At the same time, it was shown that firstly, despite scientists’ claims that the science based on the observation and experiment, non-empirical assumptions also have played a strong role in the natural sciences. Secondly, despite some common elements which are between the modern and pre modern natural sciences, such as the principle of causality and the cosmological principle, there are certain differences between the basis upon which modern science cannot be considered a continuation of the pre modern physics and modern paradigm with its one-sided and materialistic approach, has ignored some aspects of the universe. So to put natural science in its proper place, it is necessary to reflect and revise these pre assumptions.

The discussion about religious science is one of the challenges that have both pros and cons. One of the proponents of religious science theory is Ayatollah Javadi Amoli. In this regard, he considers religion as the colloquial and comprehensive religion; and put all series of sciences under the category of religion. Accepting the possibility of religious science, he believes in the presence of religion in all aspects of humanities and natural sciences. Accordingly, the scope of religion covers all sciences; all sciences are religious and there is no non-religious science. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli proves the quality of religious science with two interpretational and philosophical methods. It is worth pointing out that this attitude has problems and criticisms as: the definition of comprehensive religion and its criticisms; criticism on the scope of religious knowledge; confusion between considering the scientific propositions as being religious and considering the authority of acting that propositions as being religious; not segregating the intellect and intellectuality.

For explaining why "progress" in human sciences is not sensible likeprogress in natural sciences, there are two different approaches. In thefirst approach methodology of natural sciences is the same as themethodology of human sciences. But quality of one of them, i.e. humansciences is lower than another. Proponents of this approach believe thathuman sciences are not "science" in the same way that natural sciencesare. In the second approach, human sciences are "science" in the sameway that natural sciences are. But their quality is different and so theirmethodology is different. Neo-Kantians like Wilhelm Windelband,Heinrisch Rickert and Max Weber are proponents of second approach.In this essay, firstly, I briefly examine the difference between methodsof two sciences and dichotomy between "explanation" and"understanding". Secondly I describe Neo-Kantian approaches and byintroducing new dichotomy proposed by Rickert and Weber, I examineMax Weber's ideas in methodology in details. Finally I come toconclusion that Weber's approach for social science is comparable withsome scientists approach in natural science.