naturalized metaphysics

In recent decades, naturalism in metametaphysics has manifested through debates surrounding both the methodology and subject matter of metaphysics. One significant point in these debates is the criterion proposed by Ladyman and Ross (2007) for distinguishing naturalized metaphysics from non-naturalized metaphysics. McLaurin and Dyke (2012), while critiquing Ladyman and Ross’s proposal, offer an alternative approach to naturalized metaphysics. According to them, a metaphysical theory qualifies as naturalized if it can, in principle, have observational consequences. McLeod and Parsons (2013) challenge this proposal by pointing to long-standing objections against the verifiability criterion of logical positivism. They argue that the distinction between naturalized and non-naturalized metaphysics cannot hinge on a semantic connection between theoretical content and observational statements. In their critique, they briefly mention the B-theory of time. This article first explains McLaurin and Dyke’s criterion for delimiting naturalized metaphysics, McLeod and Parsons’ critique, and McLaurin and Dyke’s subsequent response (2013). We then focus on the A-theory vs. B-theory debate in contemporary metaphysics to highlight additional issues with McLaurin and Dyke’s criterion. We argue that their approach (1) risks circularity, (2) undermines the possibility of naturalizing metaphysical debates, and (3) fails to address the relationship between metaphysical theories and future scientific developments.

In this paper, after a brief discussion of traditional metaphysics and its guiding principles, we take a look at naturalized metaphysics. There is an agreement in the practice of naturalized metaphysics that it is continuous with science. However, it turns out that this commitment is not enough to define the discipline. Having defined what naturalized metaphysics is, a concrete example drawn from the literature on the philosophy of time is examined thoroughly. The example is taken from Putnam's famous paper on the relation of science to the problem of time. In that paper, he argued that special relativity favors the static model of time, which has a counterpart in philosophy. Based on our chosen example, four kinds of approaches to naturalized metaphysics emerge. Additionally, the naturalistic aspects of these approaches are introduced. Finally, we conclude by saying that naturalized metaphysics is not radically different from the traditional one with respect to its methods. Therefore, there is a fundamental vagueness in terms of methods in multiple instances of alleged naturalized metaphysics.

Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary study what is the mind and how it works. By contrast, metaphysics concern is the study and discovery of objective structures of reality. Apart from the "metaphysics of mind", which is the point of reference for these two domains, there is not much connection between them. The "Naturalized Metaphysics" project is a metaphysical approach in which contemporary philosopher, Alvin Goldman, seeks to show that the findings of cognitive science play an essential role in accepting or rejecting a metaphysical theory. In his view, although the study of the mind is only part of the metaphysics, it plays a role in any metaphysical inquiry. He believes that the study of the mind is part of any metaphysical inquiry, even those metaphysical investigations that are not a question of the mind and the mental state of their purpose. Our goal in this paper is to analyze the relationship between metaphysics and cognitive science based on Naturalized Metaphysics of Alvin Goldman. Accordingly, we will show that although cognitive science findings can play a significant role in the metaphysics of mind and conceptual metaphysics, their role in realistic metaphysics is doubtful. In addition, we will show that the findings of cognitive science alone can not play a role in metaphysical judgments without using a metaphysical background