non-reductive physicalism

Based on the interaction between science and religion, Nancy Murphy turns to a special version of non-transitive physicalism that uses empirical science, physicalism, and the Bible to formulate her holistic physicalism; A middle position between essential dualism and illusionism that defines humans as spiritual beings and hides the problem of the mind within it. Murphy brings the soul into holistic physicalism with his theological assumptions and not with scientific evidence and philosophical arguments. The distinguishing feature of non-transmission physicalism from transmission physicalism is the attention to the explanatory gap in the issue of "supervenience". Holistic physicalism has not filled this gap and has only changed the form of the problem from explaining the relationship between human parts to explaining the relationship between human dimensions. Therefore, combining the universal and weak perceptions of supervenience, along with the positive and negative teachings of holistic physicalism, that is, the use of pure holistic physicalism and avoiding introducing theological presuppositions in a philosophical theory, can be used to solve the problem.

According to Rorty the problem of our philosophical tradition to be the Platonic notion that man has the Glassy Essence by which we reflect the world around us, and this view of man results in the duality of mind and body, and ultimately the separation of human from the world. This paper is a descriptive method and content analysis and the main issue of this paper is how the nature of man and the world is described in Rorty's thought which leads to monism and Mulla Sadra's critique on what basis. The findings of this study indicate that in Rorty's Non- reductive physicalism, all lines between human and the world are removed and only the causation is established, which is a materialist view of man and the world. But Mulla  Sadra does not accept the dualism of body and soul on the basis of the principality of existence, substantial motion, the gradation of being, and finally with theory of ”Theophany”, and assumes a kind of human existential relation with the universe where the soul is nothing but the perfected body and the body is the cheap of soul.

In the division of theories of the philosophy of mind, all kinds of physicalists, whether reductionist or non-reductionist, are considered Monist; because they believe in the physicality of everything. Reductionist physicists, on the other hand, believe that in addition to knowing everything as physical, everything can be reduced to lower levels of physics; But non-reductionists in physicalism, although they consider everything to be physical, believe that in the field of physics we are confronted with "emergent" things that cannot be reduced to the fundamental particles of physics and given a microphysical explanation of Have them; Because we are basically dealing with something new; But "property dualism", by acknowledging the non-physical nature of mental features, believes in two kinds of things in the universe and, as a result, has fundamentally rejected both Monist physicalist theories. Moreover, although in feature dualism, as in non-reductionist physicalism, we encounter a genus of non-reductionism and novelty, non-reductionism and novelty in property dualism are "species" and "species," respectively. Is "fundamental", not "typical" and "superficial". The present article prevents further sputum by clarifying the exact boundaries of the dualistic nature of property with physicalism, especially its non-reductionist type.

In physicalism and its various types, it is often tried to explain the mind-body relationship scientifically and philosophically; but the main problem arises when two general and scientifically accepted principles, namely the completeness of physical world and the causal closure of physics, are considered along with the mental causation problem. In this paper, Kim's objections to non-reductive physicalism regarding mental causation problem will be discussed. These objections include casual exclusion and overdetermination of the mental. The former is the first problem with which, in Kim's sight, physicalism encounters. Kim also argues that mind-body supervenience is an accepted concept in all kinds of physicalism. Then he argues that non-reductive forms of physicalism, given that the mind-body supervenience is valid, lead to epiphenomenalism and even to its radical forms. He then argues that the same problem exists for physical realism. Moreover, Kim talks about various aspects of Anomalous Monism which had tried to solve the mental causation problem.