phenomenon

In this article, we are trying to deal with the characteristics of Dasein in Heidegger's book Being and Time in a specific and concrete way. In his book, Heidegger wants to show how man accesses Being / Sein. First, he raises the question of being and then says that everything is in the circle of being and asks himself, from which entity should we begin to know being? His answer is to start the knowledge of existence from the existence that questions existence. He calls that Dasein. The reason why Heidegger chose the term “Dasein” instead of man is to save man from the narrowness of previous definitions of man (such as Aristotle's rational animal or Cartesian thinking substance, etc.). He examines his intrinsic and real characteristics, such as sense of situation and understanding, i.e., finding new possibilities; language, which according to Heidegger is the house of being; and also refers to ability and unpredictability. He emphasizes that man as a subject does not have an unchangeable and fixed nature. Each Dasein is personally an incident that temporalizes itself according to the future. Dasein is not pre-determined by nature. He is a historical Dasein who identifies himself with his own self (mienneté) and explains his every behavior to the future. No matter what state a person reaches, he can still appear in other forms. He always has a pas encore (not yet). The fundamental character of Dasein is a condition of already “Being-in-the-world”—of already being caught up in, involved with, or committed to other individuals and things.

The present article attempts to explore two principles out of four literary and poetic principles with the centrality of Kant's conceptual turn concerning the concept of time that Deleuze opted for treating Kant's philosophy. In order to reformulate the Critique of Pure Reason, Deleuze exploits two literary principles. The first one is taken from Hamlet according to which time is out of control, the second one is taken from Arthur Rambo as he said, I is another. For appreciating such complicated statements and explaining Deleuze's particular reading of Critique of Pure Reason, the author proceeds to explore Deleuze's writings and seminars on Kant in order to show that the presupposition of having a good command over Deleuze's philosophy is to study his confrontation with Kant's philosophy. For achieving such an end, the author accompanies Deleuze's treatment of Kant's philosophy step by step in order to shed some light on the concept of time in his reading of The Critique of Pure Reason from various perspectives so to apprehend the two poetic principles concerning the time.

Following Aristotle, some philosophers mainly Peripatetic such as Avicenna hold that Ancient Greek philosophers are physicist. In his al-Shifa, Avicenna calls them tabi'iyyun (physicist), in contrast to other group whom he with respect refers to as ila'hiyyun namely metaphysicians. According to this approach, the project of separating physics from metaphysics was set up in Aristotle's philosophy; thus, the idea of pre-Socratic philosophers that a single element – such as water for Thales or fire for Heraclitus- as the prime matter or the origin of all things was misunderstood and made them belittled. In contrast to this group of philosophers, Muslim mystics and philosophers of Illumination adopted another view closer to that of Ancient Greek philosophers. Their attitude towards nature as manifested existence paraphrased in Ancient Greek as "aletheia" and towards natural things as different manifestations of that truth greatly corresponds to what Greek philosophers meant by "phusis". So is Suhrawardi's view who regards the language of Ancient Greek philosophers symbolic and thus Aristotle and Avicenna unable to understand that language.The concept of manifestation or appearance (Zuhūr)) is the keyword to understand Greek understanding of phusis (Being). As Parmenides specified, "Being exists, and none-being does not", thus Being is one and necessary and impossible not to exist; and all things (phenomena) are its manifestations.In Islamic mysticism, the ontological foundation is "appearance" or manifestation. In his al-Asfar, for example, Mulla Sadra says: Being is one single reality characterized by "being apparent (uncovered) in all forms of appearance and it makes other things apparent. Being is concomitant with appearance. "Were it not apparent for itself and by itself in different things but apparent through something else, it would not be there at all, rather it would still remain under the veil of nothingness and darkness of hiddenness". The same relation between Being (phusis) to truth (aletheia) to the ancient Greek philosophers is between Being and Truth in Islamic mysticism. Al-Qaisari begins his Comments on Fusus al-Hikam with "On Being and that It Is the Truth"; Being is concomitant with Truth(al-haqq), thus it is one and every constituent of multiplicity is a state of it. Every exiting thing is a manifestation of the Truth. The Arabic term mazhar stems from the root zahara which means to appear, thus mazhar means a place where the Truth appears or manifests Himself; this is the precise equivalent of "phenomenon" in Greek language. In fact, what Muslim Sufi mystics say about the Truth Almighty Who manifested Himself in the world of Beings is their understanding and interpretation of the doctrine of creation in the Qur'an. In their view, "God created means that God manifested Himself". Each existing thing is a place where God has appeared and it shows Him somehow. As Jami has said, "It is Being that appears in all things".Nonetheless, Muslim mystic argue, this so-called theory of similitude (tashbih) does not imply the negation of God's incomparability (absolute transcendence or tanzih), because He is far cry from all other than Himself. As per the sufi philosophy rule "The absolutely simple entity is everything, yet it is far cry from everything". Muslim mystics, like mutakalemin, hold that God Almighty is far cry from His creature (the theory of incomparability), but contrary to them and at the same time, they hold that He manifests Himself in all existing things (the doctrine of similitude). Divinity of natural beings, in Ancient Greek thought, somehow denotes the theory of similitude as understood in sufi mystical context. Thales, as reported by Aristotle, "held that the origin of all things was water" while he was used to say that "all things are filled with gods" is an evidence for such divinity theory. In Greek tales, as reported by Homer and Hesiod, natural beings are gods having divine affairs -for example, Gea is the natural earth and at the same time the name of one god i.e. god of earth, or Oceanus is both natural ocean and god of oceans. This issue symbolizes the doctrine of similitude in mysticism yet it is not to be taken by mistake as the "theory of pantheism". This is because Ancient Greek thinkers adopted an attitude of similitude which means the appearance of the Divine in the world, and at the same time they believed in His absolute incomparability, too. Gradually, their belief of similitude was overshadowed by rival theory and transformed or lost its meaning. The separation of logos from mutus and, from another side, physics from metaphysics are the other aspects of such an event.In fact, in the works of Ancient Greek philosophers such as Parmenides, Heraclitus and more explicitly in all those of Plato in his theory of Forms, there can be seen a consideration of incomparability between God as the Good (agathon) and the beings. That is why Plato treats those myths with respects, but expects Homer as one of the first composer of those poems not to enter his utopia.  After the Greek period, in the Christian theology, Logos or the eternal Word adopts the very status and importance of Greek phusis. The theory of manifestation of phusis with the Greek was later substituted by the idea of incarnation of the Father in the Son. As a result, despite many treatises authored under "On The Nature of Things" in the Middle Ages which sometimes are interpreted symbolically considering the nature as God's creature, the world of nature lost its theophanic affair and thus its ontological value in favour of the metaphysical world.In the same way, if we consider the concept of phusis and its relation to Being and Truth in the horizon thought of Ancient Greek philosophers, the opinions of Greek sophists will take on another meaning and facet different from what Aristotle had openly rejected. Here, too, a deep look at and reference to the understanding of the Sufi mystics about the idea of appearance and its relation to the Truth and Being prove that their attitude towards Ancient Greek Sophists is different from the opinions of Aristotelian Peripatetic philosophers who rejected them.

We have two direct ways of recognizing myths. 1) Recognition of natural forms; 2) recognition of mental forms. Human consciousness of his environment is limited to his living conditions, hence we can limit the first elements of human natural thought to areas of food resources, water, wild animals, and geographical location of human life. Human consciousness in the realm of natural intelligence that uses it, is the optimizer of these living conditions and nothing more; it means we can describe myths as we describe natural forms in natural science, it has been methods of people like D. Rosenberg and M. Eliade. But there is a "distinct thing" that grows apart from reality and that is self-sufficient, it is more dependent on the “absence of the object” and not on “the object”. and that is symbolic structures and language. Therefore, it can be found that language is formed around "numen" but doesn’t cover it and is always in progress. Language concerning consciousness with its judicial content can be expressed in A) categorical, B) conditional and C) analogical forms. Expression is to verbalize the "real thing" if there is any reality; it refers to the second way that is to deal with mental and general forms of myths; it has been the method of philosophers like C. Levy Strauss and E. Cassirer.

Kant addressed the distinction between the two domains of phenomena and the thing-in-itself by considering time and space as two conditions of cognition. The result of such a distinction, which is the basis of his transcendental idealism school, was limiting cognition to the domain of phenomena and the impossibility of cognition of reality and the thing-in-itself. As the greatest philosopher of the modern period, and by adopting such an approach, Kant left unanswered the acute duality which he had inherited from his predecessors and left his successors to encounter this problem; the most important of these successors was Hegel. Hegel, who considered duality to be the source of the need for philosophy and his school to be comprehensive of the previous philosophies, holds the establishment of such a comprehensive philosophy to requisite prevalence over dichotomies where the central point of such shortcomings was that very duality that was present within them. By establishing the school of absolute idealism and through the belief in the essential foundation in which the mind and external reality are unified, he saw both the underlying duality in Aristotelian and Platonic thought to be an obstacle for the actualization of his absolute ideal, as well as Kant’s thing-in-itself. Therefore, he denied the thing-in-itself by acknowledging its contradictoriness; however, he was then faced with the challenges that arose from omitting it. These challenges include deducing nature from logic as well as the issue of the existing probabilities in nature; in the first instance, we are faced with the problem of how particular nature can be deduced from general absolute thought and in the second with the problem that Hegel does not provide a rational solution for the existing probabilities in nature. These very challenges move us towards a fresh look at the thing-in-itself according to David Bohm as one of the greatest physicists of Quantum Physics. He studies the thing-in-itself by distinguishing between the two views of ontology and epistemology, the result of which was the distinction between the whole (as reality) and things (as phenomena). Through this distinction, in the ontological approach, he considers the essence of the whole (foundational reality) to transcend the mind and matter and thus, unknowable (the transcendental idealism stance) and denies the possibility actualization of Hegel’s absolute idealism; the result of this is acceptance of Kant’s thing-in-itself. In the epistemological approach too, despite being aligned with Hegel, he considers holomovement to consist of a dynamic movement. However, he departs from Hegel’s view (supposing a human being to be a carrier of the geist and the possibility of the actualization of absolute knowledge) and chooses Kant’s by distinguishing between two types of dynamics (1. The dynamics present in normal incidents and things and 2. The dynamics present in the holomovement). The results of such a study include the following: a) the possibility of addressing some metaphysical issues in the new age and evaluating them through scientific-philosophical criteria; b) strengthening Kant’s stance regarding the thing-in-itself; 3) the overlap of the relationship between physics and philosophy in the study of existence and reality as a common matter that is discussable in both domains and d) the limitation of human thought in the cognition of the true foundation of the universe.

"Question of Being" is Martin Heidegger's most famous concern throughout his intellectual life. This question, according to his own narrative, has started from the very beginning to the moment of his death, and all of his writings can be traced back to this question. However, understanding the meaning, significant and formal structure of the question of being, is essentially based on an understanding of the way Heidegger use the Phenomenon of "question" and its relation to the essence of human beings. The present paper’s goal is to illuminate Heidegger's approach to this fundamental element by laying down the general meaning horizon of "question" in the history of philosophy, so that the how and why of using “Question” in his early works come to light. To do this, first, the significance, the nature and the central role of the question in the history of philosophy will be briefly examined, and then, after discussing Heidegger's conception of this phenomenon in Being and Time, and his early courses, formulation of Questioning will be provided.

Kant is one of the philosophers that believe in the incompatibility between causal determination and free will. He tries to provide an approach in which one can be convinced of both causal necessity and free will. For this purpose, he explains each of causal necessity and free will in a special domain apart from the other domain, so that these two incompatible components are separated and not confronted. In this paper, Kant's viewpoint and his solution to the conflict between causal necessity and free will are explained. In examining Kant's view, it was concluded that Kant's solution has five rejections, and assuming that the necessity and free will are incompatible, Kant's solution is not an appropriate way to believe in free will.

Epistemology is one of the most important issues in philosophy. Since the principle issue of Transcendent Wisdom is the principality of existence, response to this question depends on the principality of existence. According to the principality of existence, existence is real and principal in the external world and quiddity is derivative. According to Mulla Sadra’s opinion the reality of existence does not come in mind, so the conformity of subject to object in his philosophy refers to the issue of quiddity and existence. We can elicit two meanings of principality from Mulla Sadra’s opinion that each of them leads to different conclusions and conformity of subject to object is different from each other in both meanings. According to Kant subject does not correspond to object, because what is in our mind which is known to us, is only the Phenomenon and manifestation of objects and our mind cannot know the reality of objects. In this way, corresponding of subject with object in Kant’s philosophy refers to Noumenon and Phenomenon. To investigate these two approaches, we decided to compare existence in its different meanings with Noumenon and also quiddity in its meanings with Phenomenon. Being in some aspects is similar to psychological meaning of noumenon, but the being is more general than noumenon.

The study of mind as a faculty of the soul, which we acquire knowledge through it, is important in gaining correct conception about the process of perception. Among Islamic philosophers Molla Sadra has a different opinion about soul and perception than his predecessors. Molla Sadra’s different view about the levels of perception consists in the stages the soul gains through substantial motion through sense, imagination and intellect. To focus on the functions of the mind is important to perception process in Molla Sadra. Among contemporary Western philosophers, Edmund Husserl was the first Philosopher that paid attention to the role of the mind. He is originator of theory of phenomenology in contemporary West. Husserl attended to the role of mind in perception process. He raised the sense and intellect perception and proposed different theories about mind and perception. This paper examines the philosopher's perspective about mind and perception.

In this paper I try to refute Guyer’s reading of Kant’s refutation of idealism in a way in which I defend Kant’s idealism which has been denied by Guyer. By the notion of idealism according to Kant’s philosophy I mean we are not allowed to use space referring to thing in itself, as opposed to Guyer’s claim. In other words according to Kant objects of experience are objectively constructed by subject based upon lawful connection between them, as he expresses in the first analogy of experience, overlooking what they are really in themselves as mind-independent reality. I shall show Kant’s refutation of idealism does not involve any knowledge of thing in itself as opposed to Guyer’s reading; rather, Kant uses outer thing as an object of experience, that is, outer things are experience-sensations under application of categories. Some scholars such as Allison (2004) have defended Kant’s idealism. Dina Emundts (2010) shows, as opposed to Guyer’s claim, Kant has located refutation of idealism in the right place, namely after analogies of experience in edition B. She also shows refutation of idealism can attain its goal and it does not thus fail; that is, it can rebut problematic idealism. I endeavor to concentrate on the issue which indicates Kant uses outer thing in refutation of idealism in edition B as object of experience not as thing in itself. Meanwhile, I rebut Guyer’s argument and adduce my own reasons point-by-point in order to defend Kant’s idealism.

It is commonly accepted that most influential philosophers of recent centuries in the east and the west are Molla Sadra-ye-Shirazi, and Kant, the renowned German philosopher, respectively. The evidence for this claim comes from the fact that, in any field, all succeeding philosophers have either made descriptive annotations or critical commentaries on their works. Each of these two philosophers have their own special principles and terminology of which some are comparable. The present article is an attempt to compare and contrast Sadra’s “existence” and “essence” with Kant’s “noumenon” and “phenomenon”. To this end, first three interpretations of the corresponding pair of conceprts are presented, followed by a discussion on their similarities and differences. In interpeting Sadra’s existence and essence, special attention is paid to “aspects” and from among the numerous interpetion of Kant’s nouemenon and phenomenon, the psychological and epistemological interpations are emphasized.

Not only did Newtonian physics make a fundamental evolution in the realm of physics but the methodology utilized by Newton became the prevalent model for the researchers in the field of natural sciences. The pivotal point in Newtonian methodology is an emphasis on experiment and induction and limiting the realm of science to a phenomenal realm. Emmanuel Kant، due to the brilliant practicality of Newtonian physics، tried to reinforce، from one viewpoint، the theoretical basis of Newtonian physics so that it could stand criticism، and، from another viewpoint، presented the idea of limiting scientific research to the realm of phenomenon in the principle framework of the human cognition’s being limited to the realm of phenomena. Kant efforts towards reinforcing the bases of Newtonian physics are considered as the initial serious and systematic endeavors to create a foundation for the philosophy of science.

Inspecting and analyzing the proofs of the existence of God comprises a significant portion of Sadr al Mote’allehin’s concerns and efforts in theological discussions. Evaluating these proofs based on different criteria is from among his praiseworthy efforts, which has also received less attention. The present article will firstly point to the titles of these proofs and explain Molla sadra’s classification of them, and secondly will introduce the criteria of the evaluation of the proofs. Then, the most significant criteria, which are the ones proposed in the science of logic based on which the proofs of God’s existence are divided into the ‘’quiatic’’ proof, ‘’absolute quiatic’’ and ‘’evidence’’ proof, are explained and their documentations are mentioned. Afterwards, it will be indicated that regarding logical criteria, the cognitive (knowledge-related) value of the proof of the righteous is no different from that of the other proofs of God’s existence.

One of the most famous constituents of kant's critical philosophy is distinguishing between knowable and unknowable realm. We want to illustrate characteristics which distinct Kant's version from his predecessors. For the sake of this, first, we express briefly Kant's view on this problem. Then, we briefly study the distinction between knowable and unknowable realm from the viewpoint of some brilliant philosophers. Finally, it is showed that kant's thought, because of some elements, is different from the others.

In Western and Islamic philosophy، one of the most complex and controversial ontological topics has do with the relationship between mind and phenomenal objects، that is the relationship between the form in the mind and the material and objective form. This issue has stirred great confusion for philosophers seeking to explain the relationship of knowledge and the «outside world». In this article we present and compare Kant and Mulla Sadra''s philosophical solutions to this problem. Although in Mulla Sadra''s philosophy، mind and phenomenal objects do not stand on the same ontological levels، however according to the «primacy of existence» (Aṣālat al-wujūd) principle، the two are alongside each other. Knowledge is not separate from ontology and relies on the outside world in its process of perception occurring through the help of the senses، the imagination، reason، and intuition. What occurs between the outside world and the mind is called by Mulla Sadra the construction of quiddity. Quiddity is neither bound to the mind or the outside world; however it is necessary on every ontological level and participates in all the levels of perception. Mulla Sadra can explain the relationship between the intuitions of the mind and the outside world first by positing a soul which creates forms and elements related to perception and secondly، by filling the gap between mind and phenomenal objects by postulating a division of ontological levels. According to Kant، knowledge requires two things: a) observation، which is given to us in space and time and b) the reception of an intelligible upon what has been observed. For the process to occur the phenomenal object and the intelligible must share a similarity. Some intelligibles have no similarity with anything from the experiential level. Kant، in trying to reconcile mind and the phenomenal objects uses the concept of Transcendental Schemata، that is forms produced in time by the imagination. By arguing for a direct reciprocity between the phenomena and the intelligible، Kant is bound to uphold the reciprocity between phenomena and transience.

In Western and Islamic philosophy، one of the most complex and controversial ontological topics has do with the relationship between mind and phenomenal objects، that is the relationship between the form in the mind and the material and objective form. This issue has stirred great confusion for philosophers seeking to explain the relationship of knowledge and the «outside world». In this article we present and compare Kant and Mulla Sadra''s philosophical solutions to this problem. Although in Mulla Sadra''s philosophy، mind and phenomenal objects do not stand on the same ontological levels، however according to the «primacy of existence» (Aṣālat al-wujūd) principle، the two are alongside each other. Knowledge is not separate from ontology and relies on the outside world in its process of perception occurring through the help of the senses، the imagination، reason، and intuition. What occurs between the outside world and the mind is called by Mulla Sadra the construction of quiddity. Quiddity is neither bound to the mind or the outside world; however it is necessary on every ontological level and participates in all the levels of perception. Mulla Sadra can explain the relationship between the intuitions of the mind and the outside world first by positing a soul which creates forms and elements related to perception and secondly، by filling the gap between mind and phenomenal objects by postulating a division of ontological levels. According to Kant، knowledge requires two things: a) observation، which is given to us in space and time and b) the reception of an intelligible upon what has been observed. For the process to occur the phenomenal object and the intelligible must share a similarity. Some intelligibles have no similarity with anything from the experiential level. Kant، in trying to reconcile mind and the phenomenal objects uses the concept of Transcendental Schemata، that is forms produced in time by the imagination. By arguing for a direct reciprocity between the phenomena and the intelligible، Kant is bound to uphold the reciprocity between phenomena and transience.

Transcendental Idealism is the foundation of kant’s philosophical system. According to this view space and time are two subjective forme of man. Kant for explaining his view not only gives a new grasp of space and time concept, but uses proper terminology and give them new senses. Appearance, phenomenon, gegenstand, object and synthesis are just some of the expressions. Transcendental idealism is opposed to material and empirical idealism. In the article I have endeavoured both explain the transcendental idealism and criticize principles and arguments kant uses to make and demonstrate that view. In this way, In can show that kant’s view necessarily leading to relativism and skepticism in knowledge.

This paper is aimed at, first to provide a short background on thehistory of the concept of phenomenon among the pre Husserlphilosophers and second to make a comparative study among Greekphilosophers, Kant, Hegel, and Husserl views on this concept. In orderto make such comparison, first, their ideas on phenomenon areillustrated and then the similarities and differences of their descriptionabout this concept have been articulated. By pointing out thedifferences and also by concentration on their similarities betweenthese philosophers, I am of the opinion that this concept should studyhistorically. It is followed that we should otherwise distinguish betweenthe concept of phenomenon and phenomenology. The concept ofphenomenon among these philosophers is common but the concept ofphenomenology is so different. Kant used “phenomenology” as ascience in which we can know the appearances of things. Hegelunderstood phenomenology as a science in which we explain theexperience of consciousness, and Husserl claimed that phenomenologyis a method for finding out the essence of things in the consciousness.

Kant’s ethics, philosophy and religious thought have been of comprehensive authority in the world. This was the effect left by Kant’s essential critique of weakened philosophy of his time, the fact of which the currency of enlightenment was influenced. Proving incapability of theoretical reason in the field of metaphysics, turned his attention to practical reason. In the epistemological view of Kant, the power of reasoning was known to be of no authority in ethics, religion and metaphysics. The fields, therefore, were founded on practical reason. Ethics or practical reason is argued for as a consequence by theoretical reason. Since for Kant, in practical reason the effectiveness or agency of reason in doing ethical actions has been intended, the fact in which theoretical understanding is not intended. He tries to establish the effectiveness and objectiveness of ethical principles in man himself. In this way, even good will, being absolute good, would be meaningful only so far as it can be understood by man. As a result, one can say that though man can never arrive at metaphysical understanding by the power of theoretical reason, he is equipped with such a ability that he can establish the very fundamental ethical principles. Man’s theoretical self-establishment and subjectivism, in spite of the limitations of theoretical reason, causes humanistic state of ethics and religion, their dependence on man, being essentially limited, and their relativity. And here can we find an instability in religion and man’s morality. Given such the reality, one can never exaltation toward God. This paper, explaining the important foundations of Kantian ethics, has studied the quality of its being religious and the strength and weaknesses of its consequences.

According to pluralism, in all great religious traditions, the unique finaltruth is experienced and comprehended in different forms. Here, amongthree kinds of pluralism, Hick’s pluralism is examined. His pluralism ismainly based on two principles: (1) Kant’s epistemological model; (2)truth-coherentism.According to Kant’s model, the nature of Haq [= the Truth] in Himself, isbeyond the limits of man-made concepts. Haq is called “inexpressible” inWestern religious language, “without-form” in Eastern religious language,and “noumenal truth” in Kantian language, being experienced by humanbeings in the form of a chain of divine phenomena.Some objections are proposed to this view, seemingly similar to the viewsof proponents of Ta’til (Gnosticists) in Islamic tradition. Truth has newconnotation in Hick’s view, which is different from that of Islamicphilosophers such as ‘Allāmeheh Tabātābei andd Motahhari.Hick’s view, finally, approaches to pragmatist view, since he refers to theeffectiveness of religions as an evidence for the Absolute Being.Therefore, we can see a turn in his views from coherentism towardspragmatism.