philosophy of science

While the significance of beauty and symmetry in science has been a recurring theme in the discourse of many eminent scientists, the philosophical contemplation of aesthetics within the philosophy of science has garnered attention only in recent years. This paper examines the perspectives of renowned scientists on the role of beauty and symmetry, revealing a spectrum of views where beauty is variously seen as a hallmark of truth or regarded with skepticism. We propose a psychological explanation for the scientific preoccupation with beauty and symmetry, suggesting that the human ability to recognize facial symmetry is an evolutionary adaptation. This adaptation's byproduct, we argue, is the inclination to appreciate symmetry in domains beyond the original adaptive purpose. Furthermore, the paper explores how portraiture often deviates from biological standards of beauty, indicating a potential to transcend biological predispositions. The final assertion posits that while the pursuit of beauty and symmetry can drive scientific inquiry, it may also impede the attainment of truth. Drawing parallels with artists who have transcended their biological inclinations, we suggest that scientists, too, might overcome these aesthetic biases.

Science is an objective method to study the world. therefore, it has to be, in principle, independent from any type of subjective judgments and preferences. Aesthetics, judgment, on the contrary, is based on subjective tastes. this is the reason why foe a long period of time philosophers believes that there can be no relation between science and aesthetics. logical positivists, for instance, held the claim that scientific propositions directly imply to the objects and events of the world. Reichnbach said even if aesthetic sense were to be proved to have a role in this or that particular scientist's creativity, yet what is finally important for scientific methodology is the objective justification of a theory. i.e. the way a theory or a set of scientific propositions imply to the objects and events of the world. However, in recent decades, there has been a shift in the point of view of philosophers of science. and the relationship between aesthetics and science has become an attractive and serious subject for the field. The main goal of this research is to survey the relationship between aesthetics and science through both scientist's and philosopher's point of view. we take this survey in five levels: practical, methodological, production, thematic, and explanatory level.

In this article, inspired by the theories presented in the methodology of science and the philosophy of science, the process of changing religious beliefs in the study of religions is explained. Accordingly, Popper's falsifications view is similar to the common view of theologians and rationalists, who consider religious discussions and debates the main and effective factor in changing people's beliefs. In contrast to this view and relying on historical evidence, the change in the worldview of religious people has been considered similar to the change in the scientific paradigms of scientists from the perspective of Thomas Kuhn. In this way, it has been shown that, contrary to the traditional view of theologians, people do not change their beliefs (religion and sect) solely through theoretical discussions and theological proofs and refutations but are influenced by various social and psychological factors. It has also been shown that different religions and sects have incomparable worldviews, and, as a result, theological disputes are considered polemical debates between the two parties. Accordingly, in religious studies, Kuhn's perspective can be used to explain how individuals' religious attitudes change. Also, within the framework of faithism in the philosophy of religion, the question is answered: How do individuals choose their fait?

The evaluation of research in the humanities is a controversial topic. In Iran, this debate is often framed in terms of the International Scientific Index (ISI) and paper production. Two main groups can be identified in this debate. One group believes that the emphasis on articles and the ISI leads to the quantification of humanities research, which ultimately damages the quality of the research. The other group believes that common scientometric methods are a reliable and precise standard for all fields, and that the humanities should adapt to these methods. The debate has been characterized by polemical and rhetorical arguments, and its theoretical and epistemological frameworks have been imprecise and chaotic.The aim of this article is to formulate this polemical debate into an epistemological problem in the philosophy of science, so that it can be properly formulated and understood.The article is divided into three parts. First, we show that scientometrics has its roots in the work of philosophers of science. However, over time, this connection has been broken, and the positivist view of science has come to dominate. This has led to the current crisis in scientometrics.In the second part, we argue that the understanding of this crisis depends on a return to the non-positivist approach in the philosophy of science. This approach sees science as based on the research practices of a research community, rather than as a set of true propositions. By uncovering the differences between the natural sciences and the humanities, we conclude that the contemporary scientometric criteria cannot be applied to the humanities.In the third part, we argue that criticizing common scientometric methods and highlighting their crisis does not mean that the evaluation of humanities research is impossible or unattainable. However, before defining a new set of criteria, we need to conduct philosophical, anthropological, sociological, and historical studies of research communities in the humanities.

Methodological naturalism, which is called Methodological Materialism or Methodological Atheism also, and introduced as a metaparadigm of the modern science, does not tolerate any theory or proposition which relates natural phenomenon to the supernatural causes and entities. Such an approach is divided into the week and strong ones, each one has its own necessities and outcomings. Studying and contemplating on such an approach is the aim of many components of philosophy of science and religion. It, however, identifies the limits and regulations governing the relationships between science and religion. Therefor researching the problem is a necessary obligation for the components of theological studies and those pretending the reformation of science based on religious doctrine.

The present issue studies the subject with biblical and analytical research method.

The result is that methodological naturalism is not based on authentic logical and epistemological foundations, nor is it a rational and coherent claim, and is not able to fulfill the promised expectations of it.

1.The history of science shows that several supernatural explanations have been the best explanations of natural phenomenon, and have boon simpler than the pure natural explanations. It indicates: (a) Insufficiency of stint to pure natural explanation, (b) Essential correlation between science and naturalism, (c) Sophistry of adopting naturalism to simplicity principle. 2.Epistemological and methodological attitudes are interpenetrated to the ontological views. Therefore, there is no room for naturalistic attitude in the former without it in the latter. It somehow leads to selfcontradiction also. 3. From the functional point of view methodological naturalism leads to: (a) Several limitations and disaffiliations, (b) Disconnecting science and technology from moral values, which is at last very harmful for humankind.

The concept of urban form encounters numerous uncertainties. It finds applications in various discussions within architecture, urbanism, and environmental design. However, its meaning is often assumed rather than clearly defined. Urban studies are typically divided into two main categories: architectural and urban historians, and geographers. Yet, these groups often fail to explain the reasons for changes in urban form. Understanding the factors that shape urban form requires a new theoretical framework. The philosophy of science can assess and categorize existing studies while offering a fresh definition. This article aims to classify urban studies through content analysis and library research. The paper demonstrates that previous studies have predominantly embraced a "positivistic" and "critical rationalism" approach, which tends to reduce the ontological nature of urban form to its epistemology. Critical realism can illuminate the hidden mechanisms underlying the urban form, leading to the introduction of the term "influential forces" to represent these concealed mechanisms. In other words, focusing solely on the dimensions of form presents a limited perspective; attention should be given to causal factors in urban form studies. These influential forces can provide insights into causality.

By some standards, chemistry is one of the largest scientific fields in the world, a science that is concerned with the "direct influence of molecules on human life" and thus raises ethical, political, philosophical and epistemological questions. In this article, with the aim of examining the development process of this science from a philosophical and historical perspective, relying on library studies and existing articles, the main issues and trends in the evolution of the philosophical view of this science, and the relationship between the philosophy of chemistry and the philosophy of science, focusing on issues in The philosophy of chemistry that caused major revisions or developments in the philosophy of science was reviewed and evaluated. Studies have shown that until recently, chemistry was practically ignored by professional philosophers of science for various reasons, such as historical neglect of chemistry, reduction of chemistry to physics, and lack of focus on the properties and structure of chemistry, and since the early 1990s, With the social organization formed in it and the expansion of scientific activities increasingly from disciplinary boundaries towards problem-oriented research, the situation changed drastically so that the philosophy of chemistry is currently one of the most flourishing fields in the philosophy of science.

According to some important philosophers of science, such as Popper, Hempel and Tarski, consistency is a necessary condition of establishing any scientific theory. They hold that all inconsistent scientific theories are uninformative, meaningless or deficient. In this paper I will first argue against their clams, then I consider some inconsistencies which happened at the heart of some well-accepted scientific theories (Empirical or Non-Empirical), and by this I will try to open the door for the possibility of the paraconsistent philosophy of science.

The studies of science and religion, which turned into an academic field since the 1960s, have been fortunate enough to maintain their multi-discipline-inter-discipline nature and avoid becoming disciplinary. The specialization of research fields such as "science and religion" will cause the field of discussion and debate between thinkers of different fields, including scientists, theologians, and philosophers, to become such a specialized field that no one understands their language except for a few specialists. This multidisciplinary-interdisciplinary nature can be recognized not only in the variety of topics and disciplines involved but also in the range of research methods in this field, from comparative studies to historical-philosophical analysis.

In this paper, we first examine the reasons for opposing metaphysics. While assessing these reasons, we intend to reach a plausible stance regarding the relationship between science and metaphysics and its role and importance in scientific activity. There are different views on this old question. We argue that the interaction of metaphysics and science is a complex interaction that can only be defended in the light of a critical approach. In this critical attitude, one should not only pay attention to the role and importance of metaphysics in science but also should have an epistemic humility about his expectations of it.

The term “mozaf philosophy” has been noticed, explained and analyzed in Iran by some scholars of recent decades in philosophical literature. In addition to the opportunities and benefits of mozaf philosophy, it may result in some threats and deviations as well. Instead of creating an opportunity for the reproduction of the abundant philosophical writings and concentration on local matters, it has rather made us involved in its related writings and literature and its own origin and issues. I believe the reason for this problem can be mentioned in two parts: first neglecting the cognitive and historical background of the formation of mozaf philosophy; and second not paying exact attention to the semantic changes and course of philosophy in different historical parts. Therefore this writing tries to analyze the grounds of the formation of mozaf philosophies and explain and evaluate the semantic changes of philosophy and analyze the presented definitions of mozaf philosophy in Iran.

In this paper, having described the problem of objectivity, I’ll try to reconstruct the solutions of two important philosophers, Kant and Wittgenstein, and then I’ll attempt to deal with the different consequences of these two divergent attitudes regarding some of our most significant epistemic-semantic concepts. The problem of Objectivity concerns with the question that, what is the source of the ‘objective validity’ or ‘objective reference’ of our representations (mental or linguistic), and what makes them something totally different from some ‘arbitrary impressions’ and ‘mere appearances’? Kant’s response to this question is to rely on the transcendental structure of human mind, particularly the pure categories of the understanding, and Wittgenstein’s response is to advert to the normative structure of social institution or practice; i.e. they try to explain the objectivity of our representations in terms of, respectively, the subjectivity and the intersubjectivity. And in the final part, I’ll try to show that these two different attitudes to the problem of objectivity, give rise to totally different pictures of some of our most important epistemic-semantic concepts: truth, concept-application, conceptual scheme, rationality, and the appropriate form of the field of philosophy of science.

"Classification of knowledge" is one of the most important issues in philosophical epistemology. Considering a comprehensive taxonomy of knowledge is prerequisite to be a scientist; therefore, many philosophers have tried to establish as a classification based on certain philosophical and logical foundations. By the same token, many philosophers in the Islamic ages, especially Allame Tabatabaei, have presented specific classifications according to their philosophical attitudes. This study tries to carry out a detailed analysis of classification of knowledge based on Allame Tabatabaei and an abstract of his principles, by which he argues about subject, method and objectives of various ramifications of knowledge as well as Human faculties of Understanding.

Among the approaches about the nature of scientific theory, we could refer to positivism and model-theory approaches. These approaches are fraught with difficulties so they couldn’t resolve the problem of scientific theories. The model-theory approach which is the Van Fraassen’s concern, is not acceptable, and . In contrast to these views, Churchland --as a scientific realist-- suggests a sense of realism to resolve the scientific theories’ problem. He uses the achievements of cognitive science and proposes a connectionist model as an alternative to propositional and model-theory approaches, but his suggestion is faced with serious problem: Only by the connectionist models of scientific theory we couldn’t give any representation between these models and the world whereas Churchland takes it for granted, and doesn’t give any reasoning. Here we are going to explain the Churchland’s approach and its backgrounds then we will try to treat its difficulties and introduce cognitive approach as an extension of realism.

Learning rational sciences particularly philosophy plays a significant role in man’s life. In their oral and written works, many philosophers have tried to deal with different dimensions of the issue explaining the necessity to learn philosophy. As a prominent Muslim philosopher, Mulla Sadra has his own particular explanation. This article aims to critically and analytically shed light on the above explanation. Some of Mulla Sadra’s premises seem to be incorrect; the necessity to learn philosophy is undeniable, though. Philosophy is the only means to answer man’s fundamental questions and to clear man’s intellectual doubts. A better understanding of the Qur’an and traditions and the truths of the world owes to philosophy.

Scientific realism is the viewpoint that considers the theoretical entities dealt with in scientific theories as having an existence which is independent of the mind and scientific theories. According to this view, entities such as atoms, molecules, waves, electrons, and etc. are ontologically independent, and knowing them is possible through scientific theories. In contrast, scientific instrumentalists challenge the realists in both of their claims, and ontologically deny the existence of any independent theoretical entity. By denying their independent existence, the claim on knowing them will be meaningless. Having examined the views in these two trends, we concluded that the conflict between these two trends still continues; none of them has been able to overtake the other, and the evidence provided by each of them has not defeated or eliminated the opposite trend. Using the descriptive-analytical method, this paper analyzes the views of realists and instrumentalists, and aims to examine and explain the arguments of scientific realism and its superiority over instrumentalism.

In the field of 'contemporary philosophy of science', we can distinction between two current: (1) the current of anti- essentialism, and the current of essentialism. The first current was lone rider of field from the time of Berkeley and Hume until before late forty years, and in late forty years it has been origin of forgetfulness the second current by way of positivists and linguistic and analytical philosophies. The second current has manifested in the late forty years, and in the oppositeness with Humean metaphysic it has strongly developed and supported essentialist metaphysic. Unfortunately contemporary Iran is unaware from second current to a large extent. In this article, I was tried to show that we and our Islamic philosophy, that, in it's principle, is essentialist and realistic, strongly needs to second current, and with taking and criticizing second current we can well to be placed on realist lines in the various fields of science and practice, in the fields like islamic philosophy, philosophy of science, islamic the humanities, religion science, Islamic- Iranian Pattern of Development, and in the scientific and management documents of superior, and in very other fields.

In the age of spread of ethics, and development of applied and professional ethics, there remains nothing more significant than science and belief being accompanied with human being all times; the fact that without ethics would destroy science. Many philosophical and epistemic traditions have spoken of scientific rules and manners of conduct; nevertheless, it seems necessary for ethics of science to be regarded as an scientific field and study it completely. In spite of many works in the ethics of research, few works may be found on ethics of science and tried to compile ethical regulations in libraries and publishing scientific findings. To develop this sub-field and explain a framework for compiling ethics of science, some primary agents and compoents is necessary. Such necessaries including possibility and necessity for ethics of science, content of the ethics, challenges facing the branch to be compiled and necessary grounds for it to be organized have been studied in the paper.

Political interpretation is a part of the Islamic humanities. No considerable effort has been made so far to organize this subject and many questions have been raised about it. One of the questions raised in this regard is about whether or not there are certain principles and rules for making interpretations by using a political approach and what they are. First the “basic principles of the scientific philosophy of political interpretaion", and then the scientific principles are established to finally draw up the rules of political interpretation. With regard to the first step, this paper holds that the basic principles of the scientific philosophy of the political interpretation of the Quran can be laid down. A descriptive and analytical method is used for conducting this research and a library-based method is used for collecting the data.