power

The issue of the relationship between religion and power is one of the issues that have long been the subject of many contemporary thinkers' questions and ambiguities, among which Abdul Karim Soroush is one of the most famous people. He introduces the language of Islam as the language of power and violence and the prophet as an armed and power-seeking mystic. In order to prove his point of view, Soroush interprets and analyzes the verses of Jihad, the verses of the punishment of criminals in hell, the opening verses and the verse 29 of Tawbah and taking Jizya from the people of dhimma, citing the verses of the Qur'an, and views it as being consistent with the theory of authoritarianism and violence.  The explanation and re-reading of the narrative evidence of Soroush's point of view has been done with analytical-critical method. The findings of the research show that the narrative evidence of Soroush's point of view does not have the necessary proficiency and his interpretation of the verses is contrary to other verses of the Qur'an, the Muslim way of life, and the opinions of Imamiyyah jurists.

The concept of space and time are intertwined as dimensions of the natural world, the study of each is dependent on the study of the other in order to obtain a better and greater understanding of both. For a better and more complete explanation of the discussion of space and time, we need a discussion of movement, and of course this relationship is two-way, and it is not possible to talk about movement without discussing the discussion of space and time. The aspects of the prism of space, time and motion are invalid without explaining the other two clauses. The purpose of this research is to compare the views of Mulla Sadra essential movement and Einstein's theory of relativity in terms of force, action and event (time-space) and the research is descriptive. It is analytical. The method of collecting information is a library, which has been done by referring to the relevant libraries, extracting files from Mulla Sadra works, articles and other written works on the topic of research. The findings indicated that Sadr al-Mutalahin believed that the essence of things is in motion, and if the essence of things was not in motion, there would be no movement in their symptoms. Because the existence of substance and width outside of our imagination is one and the movement of modernity is existence. There are two types of existence: fixed existence and fluid existence, the existence of the natural world is fluid and modern, which gradually comes into existence and disappears, and at the same time, its unity and personality are preserved. "Einstein" also considers time as the amount of movement and generalizes movement in all universes. And that's why he considers time and space together and to measure anything, he considers time as a fourth dimension.

The existence of nature in humans and its role in knowledge have been discussed. Some scientists have taken its existence for granted and have talked about its extent and nature, while others have denied it. Among Islamic scholars, the existence of nature is considered almost certain and the talk is aimed at the influence and how it affects. Among Western,ers Descartes fully emphasizes the place and role of innate concepts in epistemology and its scope. In a brief comparison between what these two philosophers have said, we find out their differences and possibly their commonalities.From Descartes' point of view, man understands the existence of God, man and nature in a clear and distinct way that is characteristic of natural concepts. According to Ayatollah Javadi, human nature also knows the existence of God and his attributes such as monotheism, prophethood, and resurrection, and in general the principles of belief, morality, and even behavior.It has been objected to both philosophers that we do not find these natural concepts at the beginning of our life. By accepting the lack of innate concepts at the beginning of human creation, Javadi considers this type of knowledge to be intuitive based on the existence of nature and the single soul of man, but Descartes, without emphasizing on intuitive knowledge and merely mentioning intellectual intuition, found these innate concepts at the beginning of human creation. they know, but in a latent form that is revealed with the emergence of the background and discovers their intellect.

In this article, we want to think about the concept of desire in the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, and through it, to understand Deleuze's ontology of the concept of "event". In formulating the concept of "desire", they are looking for an answer to the problem of the chaotic world of contemporary man. A world where for its resilience contemporary man seeks refuge in all kinds of ways of escape. Deleuze and Guattari create a new conceptual system centered on the concept of "desire" in order to answer the why of this situation and draw ways to avoid it. In this text, we tried to analyze the concept of desire from their point of view in connection with the concept of "Apparatus" by Foucault-Agamben and Finally, we should approach a new understanding of the concept of the event as its escape from the relativistic postmodern challenge. An understanding that Deleuze included in the concept of "life power" in his last writing and in this context, he offers us a strange and yet familiar view of "life".

The reality of free will is an intuitive and self-evident matter that all humans perceive through simple presential knowledge. However, analyzing and interpreting this reality and providing a detailed explanation is quite challenging and remains a matter of dispute among scholars. Recently, some scholars of the School of Tafkīk (Separation), by rejecting the philosophical and mystical teachings, have presented an analysis of the intuitive reality of free will, which in some ways is similar to Ash'arite viewpoint. This analysis, while presented with a seemingly rational appearance, has numerous rational flaws. Some of these flaws are attributed to the manner of interpretation of the followers of the School of Tafkīk. In this article, using analytical-descriptive approach, we have demonstrated that the idea of the School of Tafkīk regarding the reality of free will and real free will is incorrect. Consequently, all claims made by the followers of this school based on this idea are groundless and unfounded. It is worth mentioning that in this paper, we have firstly considered the perspective of the School of Tafkīk based on the ideas presented in the book "The Issue of Divine Knowledge and Free Will". Secondly, we have refrained from repeating the criticisms that philosophers and theologians have previously raised in criticizing this perspective

This article aims to reassess the concepts of power, resistance, and subjectivity by examining the ideas of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. At first glance, it seems that these two thinkers, rooted in different philosophical and theoretical foundations, are in opposition to each other, making a dialogue between their perspectives seemingly impossible. However, this article proposes an alternative approach by highlighting the common grounds and commonalities in their deconstruction of power. Moreover, it argues that their political views can be seen as aligned and complementary, leading to a deepening and development of each other's ideas and the creation of new political approaches. Thus, the central questions addressed in this article are: what forms of agency emerge for the contemporary subject as result of the deconstruction of power in thought of Arendt and Foucault? How does power act as a source of resistance while opening up new possibilities for the subject? The main finding of this study is that, in contrast to traditional and modern interpretations, power in the works of these thinkers is seen as a positive, creative, and productive concept. Based on this understanding, resistance and alternative forms of empowerment for the subject emerge. It should be noted, however, that Arendt’s and Foucault’s interpretation of resistance agency and power may differ due to the primacy of political and social issues in their respective theories.

Heidegger and Foucault, two influential thinkers of the 20th century, addressed the fundamental issues from different perspectives. In recent years, researches has been done on the relationship between Heidegger and Foucault on various topics in contemporary Western philosophy. One of the most important topics that can be the subject of the encounter is the question of "technology". Heidegger's essay The Question Concerning Technology (1954) and Foucault's book Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison (1975) will be the main subject for the encounter and perhaps the interaction of these two thinkers in this article. To understand technology from the perspective of these two thinkers, one must begin with being and power as the basis and background of this encounter.By examining the history of Being, Heidegger reveals different manifestations of the revelation of being. He claims that technology is a way of the revelation of being in modernity, in which beings are revealed as objects. The basis of Foucault's thinking is also the question of power. He examines the relationship between power and technology and leads us from the analysis of the relationship between technology and power to one of the forms of technology, which he calls disciplinary technology. According to Foucault, technology is a disciplinary network of power and knowledge relations that turns humans into subjects by shaping general practices and mechanisms. Therefore, Starting from two different bases (being and power), we thus arrive at the common discussion of technology and then at the parallel concepts of Gestell and discipline. By explaining the function of the Gestell, Heidegger shows how modern technology transforms nature and things into objects and standing reserve (Bestand) through a kind of challenging and discipline, revealing the methods of objectifying of things and nature. At the center of Heidegger's philosophy of technology is the idea that modern technology, "enframing" (Gestell), has changed our relationship to the world and to ourselves. He argues that modern technology is not just a tool or an instrument, but a pervasive force that shapes our entire way of being .For Heidegger, technology reveals itself as a mode that reveals or brings forth truth. It frames the world in a certain way and reduces everything to a calculable and manipulable standing reserve. This instrumental understanding of technology obscures its essence and prevents us from experiencing the world in a more authentic and meaningful way. Heidegger is of the opinion that such an understanding of technology leads to an oblivion of being, in which man is separated from his true essence and the deeper meaning of being. He calls for a reflexive attitude towards technology that enables us to establish a more authentic relationship to the world and to our own being.     Foucault's analysis of power and technology focuses on the ways in which power is exercised through disciplinary technologies in modern societies. He explores how power is exercised not only through direct coercion, but also through systems of control and normalization. Foucault introduces the concept of disciplinary power, which operates through various techniques and technologies to regulate individuals and populations. Disciplinary technologies include institutions such as prisons, schools, hospitals and factories, as well as techniques of surveillance, classification and examination. These disciplinary technologies create a network of power relations that shape and control people’s bodies, behaviors, and identities. They produce specific forms of knowledge, norms, and subjectivities, exerting power over individuals' lives and shaping their understanding of themselves and society.Foucault argues that disciplinary technologies are deeply intertwined with modern forms of knowledge and social control. They serve to enforce conformity, maintain social order and uphold dominant power structures. In his analysis, power is not only imposed from above, but is distributed throughout society and operates at different levels and through different mechanisms. On the other hand, Foucault tries to pay more attention to how subjects are made by technology than to how objects are made by technology. 

After this encounter, the final section sets out the similarities and differences between Heidegger's and Foucault's readings of technology issue, drawing on the opinions of commentators such as Sawicki, Dreyfus, Rayner, Sinnerbrink, and Lagdameo. These similar and different aspects sometimes bring the two thinkers closer and sometimes further apart, resulting from Heidegger's ontological encounter with technology as opposed to Foucault's genealogical encounter with technology. The presence of similarities, however, encourages the reader to merely trace the possible influence of Heidegger on Foucault's thinking about technology. The presence of differences can be also reduced to considering technology on two levels: ontological (Heidegger) and ontic (Foucault), but as a conclusion, this opinion is strengthened: Foucault's narrative of technology (especially disciplinary technology) is not a copy.  The repetition is rather a determined, concrete version and completion of Heidegger's analysis of technology. This shows that although two thinkers have taken different paths (being and power) in the discussion of technology, by taking up the discussion of power and technology, Foucault brings technology into complex, multi-layered relationships. By discussing the disciplinary institutions and techniques of biopolitics, he expands technology ontological dimension (in Heidegger). In this sense, technology as a way of revealing of being in modernity, which begins with Heidegger, is developed, completed, and strengthened in Foucault along the same path but in a different way (with a concrete and historical approach).

Equilibrium is one of the central ideas in Simone Weil's intellectual history, which can be examined to recognize the bias of her attitude in all aspects of her life. Through the expression of equilibrium, Simone Weil, by preserving human values, tries to create a harmony between man and the forces that govern nature, as well as between man and the forces that govern society. With the help of the meaning of work, she examines the equilibrium in order to achieve justice in the context of society in such a way that the human personality remains intact. Through the idea of equilibrium, she analyzes concepts such as power, prestige, and oppressed society, and considers the revolution ineffective in saving an oppressed society. Simone Weil shows how man, by changing his attitude to life, can free himself from domination with the help of the element of satisfaction; and how man, through connecting with impersonal matter between man and all the ruling forces (both social and natural), can make an equilibrium between himself and them. In this way, the equilibrium which she puts forward is not only dependent on any party or policy, but also free from reliance on science, which is the human achievement of making life easier.

One of the attributes used in the verses of the Holy Qur'an and the traditions of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them) about God Almighty is the attribute "will". There is no difference between theologians and sages in being a disciple of Almighty God, but there is a difference in the interpretation of God's will. In his numerous theological works, Sheikh Mofid does not consider the divine will to be a true, soulful, and inherent attribute of God Almighty, but rather a virtual, current, and external attribute, and he considers addressing it as entering into the language of Sharia; like the attributes of anger, satisfaction, love, and hatred, which the intellect does not accept to attribute them to God Almighty. Like the Mu'tazili theologians of Baghdad of his time, he considers divine will to be the essence of divine action and contrary to knowledge and power. He also separates the will from accompanying the essence and being at the level of the essence, and in line with the traditions, calls it accidental and non-eternal, while knowledge and power are among the true and inherent attributes of God. Bada is in the form of the first verb (before bada) and second verb (after bada), both of which are the soul of a verb and a stage of development, and bada is in the legislative will (commanding the good verb) and is interpreted as abrogation. From his point of view, destiny takes precedence over a will. Shaykh Mufid, along with the Mu'tazila of Baghdad, denied the inclusion of God's creative will in all matters due to not attributing Qaba'ah to God.

The museum, in the form of a cultural and educational institution, has always expressed a kind of deep relationship and a discourse relationship with power, rather than a warehouse space, arranging and displaying this or that object. In the meantime, the reflection of some themes of power in the museum is accompanied by evidence of the concept of "heterotopia" from space, which is visible among the thoughts of Michel Foucault. Through concepts such as "heterotopia or the space of otherness", Foucault has dealt with how power, order, discipline, and knowledge are manifested through institutional forms in specific spaces. Accordingly, the present study, based on Foucault's ideas, tries to critically analyze the position of the museum. The main question is what are the heterotopic features of the museum depending on the power structure and to what extent it can be adapted to this concept. As a result, in addition to the durability and consistency of the six basic principles of heterotopia in a museum, which reflects the disciplinary power and controlled establishment of knowledge, a seventh principle can be added that operates in the position of resistance.

According to philosophical principles, causal necessity is necessary to prove the flow of causality in all matters from the burden of transcendence to the finest cases of the universe. Apparently, this rule is in conflict with some obvious intellectual and conscientious issues, which has questioned the generality and sometimes the basis of the correctness of this rule. Conscientious objection is one such case as opposed to causal necessity. In the present article, the conflict between the rule of necessity and free will has been studied by analytical-logical method according to the principles of segregation of thought .From the point of view of the companions of separation, the basis for distinguishing the general principle of causality with concepts such as necessity and authority is the search for causality in the homeland. By referring to the self, it becomes clear that basically such an implication does not exist between causality and necessity, and by getting rid of this improper implication, the way will be opened to solve the problem of authority. The school of segregation say The two-sided essence of authority is the key to solving the puzzle. And by accepting the exception in the causal necessity in a negative way; That is, in the case of voluntary actions, they deny the possibility of the realization of the oyster, but without this exception, they consider it impossible to prove the authority.

Descartes, in his epistemological inquiry process, known as grammatical doubt, has chosen a kind of behavioral discipline with a provisional state. In this type of moral advice, living on the basis of common and relatively simple principles is promoted without the need for a previous philosophical basis, and regardless of the content of the belief and the degree of its coherence or strength. The question is that What is the conceivable relationship between: a) This minimalist interpretation of morality, which takes the easy preparation of acknowledging the necessity of morality and discovering its major instances, and b) The so-called postmodern morality, which in the later historical context of Descartes, and it takes a much stricter view of the possibility and value of morality? By an intertextual reading of the relationship between provisional and postmodern perceptions of ethics, it seems that Descartes's provisional behavioral strategy is a commentary on the presence of ethics in postmodern discourse and, in fact, it is the pillar of the survival of this discourse regarding to the necessity of ethics.

Philosophers and intellectuals have always been concerned with the problem of life. Many have considered it from different points of view. In ancient philosophy, life was attributed to the soul. Pythagoras was the first to treat the soul as the origin of life. He was followed by Anaxagoras who referred to the life force, which gave life to the material world, as Nous (intellect or spirit). Just like his predecessors, Plato believed that the soul was the origin of life, and in the case of real entities, life, spirit, motion, and reason are inseparable. Following Plato’s lead, Aristotle traced the cause or origin of life to the soul. These ideas left a great impact on Muslim philosophers. Avicenna—a prominent philosopher in the Islamic world—appealed to Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts to argue that life is essential to the soul, believing that the soul is by itself alive, and physical objects come to be alive by virtue of the soul. Accordingly, the criterion of life for Avicenna is perception and action. After Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā provided the same definition, developing it by drawing on his own philosophical principles.
Mullā Ṣadrā argues that life is the origin of “perception” and “action,” incorporating the two notions in his definition of life. In his view, a living being is a perceiving acting entity; that is, an entity with knowledge and consciousness, which does certain actions. In other words, it should be such that it knowingly and consciously does the action. Given his philosophical principles such as the primacy of existence, its simplicity, and its gradation (tashkīk), he establishes the idea that life is a graded entity pervasive throughout all stages of existence. On this account, every living being’s life is the way of its existence, which determines its vital effects. The nobler and stronger the existence is, the more perfection the perception and the firmer the action will be. Hence, every being enjoys life as much as it enjoys existence. We refer to certain existing entities as non-living because we cannot perceive the effects of life in them. For volitional sensation and motion are indications of life, and beings that tangibly have such characteristics are living, and this is not to deny life in other beings. For instance, Quranic verses affirm that there is such a life in beings which cannot be perceived by human senses. Thus, according to Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, all existing entities are ipso facto alive, whereas pre-Sadraean philosophies attributed life only to animals and humans on account of their perceptive and motive faculties, lacked by plants and solid objects, and thus they saw these entities as non-living. This is incompatible with Quranic verses and the principles of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. There are Quranic verses referring to the exaltation of God by all beings—something not perceived by human senses. These verses indicate that all beings enjoy consciousness and life. Mullā Ṣadrā argued for such general consciousness and life by drawing on his philosophical principles. In this way, the widespread view that only some beings are alive is implausible in terms of Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendent philosophy, and once life is proved for a stage of existence, it will be proved for all other stages of existence by dint of the principles of the primacy, simplicity, and gradation of existence. This is compatible with many Quranic verses and hadiths in which the power to talk, to hear, and to know is attributed to apparently non-living beings, which implies a degree of life in them.
On this account, life is a graded reality that exists as an existential perfection in the necessary being, humans, animals, plants, and solid objects in different degrees. Thus, the necessary being is essentially alive, giving existence and life to other entities. Such existence is the same as life, and solid objects, plants, animals, and humans enjoy degrees of life to the extent that they enjoy degrees of existence. The view is confirmed by Quranic verses, denoting that all beings exalt God, which imply that all beings are alive. Mullā Ṣadrā cites the Quranic verse, “There is not a thing but celebrates His praise, but you do not understand their glorification,” and then comments that all beings prostrate for God and praise Him in a volitional conscious manner, and perfective attributes such as life, knowledge, and power are not separable from these beings.

In this research, with an analytical-descriptive method, the effects of two collateral causes on one caused from the point of view of Muchr('39')tazilites and Imamiyyeh as well as human ability and Divine power are studied. As is understood by the findings, The Muchr('39')tazilites, including Abd ul-Jabbar, while believing in the primacy of human ability over action, also believe in the power of God over all contingent beings. But in the conflict between the power of God and the power of man over an action, they have considered only man as capable and have tended to delegation. In Imamiyyeh, some of the first theologians (from the companions of the Imams) consider both God and man to be capable in such a way that human ability is conditioned on the health of the limbs and joints and the health of the body, and the fulfillment of the action depends on the cause caused by God. . Some have agreed with the Muchr('39')tazilites and some have spoken of Godchr('39')s power as being more effective than that of man. Contemporary theologians have defended both the power of God and the power of man by recognizing human power as being based on that of God.
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The crises that occurred in postmodern era in the West and in other parts of the world have forced thinkers and intellectuals to rethink the events of the Western world and its foundations. The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a revolt of the spheres of thought, especially sociology, against the new order created by the capitalist world, which targeted the centers of power. Among these approaches is the poststructuralists' view, particularly Foucault, on the sphere of power and the resistance against power. Using the ontological view of the institution of family, this descriptive-analytical study considers this institution, which is based on an innate approach to the development of bisexuality, as having advantages that can resist as a focal point against power. The strong point of this institution is to restore the path that the power of the new order has used in the direction of subjectivity. In other words, an attempt is made to first consider the resistance function of family as one of the most stable social institutions. The mechanism of this function is that because of the existence of feelings and the non-individualistic approach in family institution, it finds the resistance power that leads to people's self-awareness, instinct guidance, benefiting from the mentality of women in family and the strength of the family in the economic field, and can disrupt the power of the new order.

Paying much attention to increasing the professional morality in Iran in two recent decades concluded in nothing than instrumental and pleasing to the eye outlook to morality at governmental organizations and departments. In this study we analyzed the reasons of this subject through interdisciplinary approach. Social and historical experience shows that inattention to the importance and role of management power is the main reason for this deficiency. The root of this issue is among the teachings of some mystics and moralists in excessive attention to individual decay of power and inattention of its positive and social effects. Negative attitude of Christianity to the power caused the excessive attention of Nietzsche to the power and denial of religion. Islamic view is realistic to the instrumental role of power of management in correction of organizations and societies. Islam finds the individual and spiritual development of man in the context of the social life. Through this view acquiring and protection of the management post is necessary to the qualified persons and is a part of their development process and flexibility about some jurisprudential and instrumental morality values is permissible and sometimes obligatory.

Nietzsche and Levinas are the most prominent contemporary philosophers who have emphasized on the necessity of passing over rational subjectivity. They tried to rethink the meaning of ethics in a world where neither religion nor other moral philosophies could create a strict and reliable source for the crisis of the contemporary human being. In an attempt to overcome rational subjectivism, Nietzsche and Levinas redefined concepts such as morality and the subject. The purpose of the paper is to describe the attitudes of Nietzsche and Levinas towards their critiques of rational subjectivism. Then examine Nietzsche’s naturalistic reading and Levinas’ transcendental reading of the subject and their encounter with the other and also introduce their critiques of traditional ethics and propose a new kind of ethics in their thoughts. We will then evaluate their alternative concepts in the problem of overcoming rational subjectivism and finally, we will compare these two attitudes. Although Nietzsche and Levinas initially adopted common points of view for the critique of subjectivism and traditional ethics and common criticisms in the field, they presented different results, goals, and methods. Based on these approaches, each has proposed different principles and conclusions about ethics and overcoming rational subjectivism. Nietzsche’s problem is the genealogy of values, and Levinas’s question is the possibility of a moral condition. The answer to the first question is not related to the second question. The present paper shows that both Levinas and Nietzsche have presented different insights into the meaning of subjectivity. Their efforts to find the meaning of subjectivity have also been accompanied by the necessity to destruct the meaning of morality. Accordingly, by focusing on the overman (Nietzsche) and the other (Levinas), they have sought to reevaluate values ​​(Nietzsche) and asymmetric moral responsibility (Levinas). In this regard, they have adopted a completely different view from the traditional view of ethics. Although both of them start with a common point of view, their methods, interpretations, and results are different. With a genealogical approach, Nietzsche considered the will of power in the active subject and the birth of the overman to be desirable and practical to end the history of the development of nihilism. And Levinas, with a phenomenological approach to the concept of asymmetric responsibility in the passive subject, has put an end to the history of neglect of the other and rational subjectivism. The final suggestion is that Nietzsche and Levinas are both looking for a new meaning of morality that resides not in the mind but in the body. In Levinas, the relationship between the body and morality is evolving and transcendental, with concepts of responsibility and suffering, but in Nietzsche, this kind of connection fluctuates between naturalistic and transcendentalist views and considers the concepts of power and instinct important. Nietzsche’s attitude about the human being is a combination of a naturalistic and over-humanist approach, and with the precedence of selfhood, he has expressed a negative view of the other. However, Levinas’ philosophy is more humanistic and inter-subjectivity because of ethical ideals, and ethics begin with recognition of the priority of the other.

This study set out to answer the fundamental question on the relationship between the divine life attribute and other divine attributes from the viewpoint of Fakhr Razi. First, Fakhr’s concern with knowing the attributes was examined. His concern has been to achieve the complete knowledge or at least knowledge that enables the human to fulfill his intellectual liability for knowing the Creator. Then, the relationship of knowledge and power with life was investigated. The results showed that knowledge and power are two means of life, and life functions as their cause. In the next step, the relationship between volition and life was explored. It was revealed that Fakhr deems volition as subsequent to knowledge. Then the hearing and seeing attributes were scrutinized. It was discovered that Fakhr takes these two attributes as concomitant to knowledge or as means of it. In addition, the speaking attribute was examined, and it was found that speech reveals either knowledge or power, and this way connects to the essence. Finally, the eternity of the sublime God was found to be concomitant with His life. The overall finding of the study is that from the viewpoint of Fakhr Razi, the Divine Life is the central attribute connecting other attributes; without the life attribute, other attributes could not exist.