property dualism

Property Dualism in substance is physicalist and dualist in its prperty; That is, at the same time that he considers man as a physical substance, but believes that the mentioned substance carries two types of physical and non-physical (mental) characteristics. It is the physical feature that physics has access to and theorizes about it, on the other hand, the mental feature is beyond the reach of physics. If we prove that every mental thing occurs in the existential realm of the mind and every physical thing occurs in the existential realm of physics, then the requirement of the dualism of the attribute is that the mental attribute is in one realm of existence and its physical substance is in another realm of existence. Comes true. The present article considers the unreasonableness of the mentioned requirement because the characteristic of a substance is one of the existential levels of that substance and is co-ordinate with its substance and must be co-planar with its substance; So if it was a mental characteristic; That is, we proved that it is realized in the field of mind; It indicates that a suitable substance (in addition to the physical essence of the body) is realized in the same existential plane; Therefore, the requirement for the truth of dualism is the characteristic of the realization of substanct dualism.

Our method in this article is analytical and argumentative.

The realm of mental affairs is separate from the realm of physical affairs; If we believe in the dualism of the mind and physics, we must accept that the mind is manifested in the field and world of the mind. As a result, Johari must also be a researcher in the mental field, which carries mental characteristics; And this means that we have reached from property dualism of substance dualism

From the perspective of the duality of the characteristic, mental characteristics are beyond the reach of physical science due to their personal nature. In this article, it is necessary to be beyond the reach of physical science, because if a mental property is beyond the reach of physical science, it is a non-physical thing by definition, and if it is a non-physical thing, it is out of the realm due to the objectivity of the physical realm and physical affairs. The physical is outside and it is realized in a non-physical plane. Since the quality or breadth cannot be realized without substance, the mental quality (realized in the non-physical realm) also requires a substance, and due to the fact that width is the dignity of substance and they are realized in the same order of existence with their essence, then physical substance cannot be the carrier of mental characteristics, therefore, mental characteristics must have a substance of the same plane; That is, a non-physical substance. In this way, the requirement of the duality of the characteristic is the duality of substance, that is, the promise of the existence of two types of physical and non-physical substance is proportional to the physical and non-physical characteristics.

The dualistic theory of the characteristic in the philosophy of mind considers human beings to be entirely physical from the point of view of substance, however, it assigns two types of characteristics to the said physical substance; Physical property and non-physical (mental) property. In the meantime, the most serious problem facing the dualists of the characteristic is the danger of them being pushed towards epiphenomenalism. epiphenomenalism does not accept the causality and effect on the physical body without rejecting the principle of realization of non-physical (mental) characteristics. As a result, in addition to making it difficult for someone who wants to bridge poperty dualism to substance dualism, the poperty dualism itself leads to monotheism. In this article, in addition to the original problems, we have presented several structural and structural problems in refuting epiphenomenalism, and at the end, we have criticized the theories that led to epiphenomenalism. Method of Study: We use analytical-rational method in this article.

It should be said about the origin of epiphenomenalism; As mentioned, the basis of epiphenomenalism is the dualism of characteristics; But it is questionable how a mental philosopher like Jackson, who designed the "cognition" argument to prove the distinction between mental and physical characteristics, has given epiphenomenalism to mental qualities and like Davidson for Mental characteristics do not have a causal role? (For further study on the change of Jackson's point of view, refer to: Martin Nida-Remilin, it can be said; The same explanatory gap that led to Cartesian essence dualism despite its admirable advantages, the same crisis occurred for attribute dualism; To say that after Descartes proposed the pineal gland in response to Elizabeth's question about the interaction between soul and body, philosophers were disappointed with the way Descartes went and instead of repairing Descartes' arguments (which was possible because Descartes' problem The failure to find a correct explanation of the causality between the mind and the brain was not the absence of any correct explanation - in this context, refer to: basically, he moved from essential dualism to homogenous, reductionist and physicalist theories such as behaviorism and functionalism.

For someone who accepts the poperty dualism, it is necessary to remove the factor called epiphenomenalism, which introduces the mental attributes as secondary matters and considers them to be ineffective especially in relation to mental matters. In the present article, in order to remove the obstacle called epiphenomenalism, we stated in the first step, despite the fact that the origin of epiphenomenalism, i.e. "physical causal layer" has been proven to be distorted, this origin cannot be the causality of mental affairs in relation to In the second step, we proved that the promise of epiphenomenalism practically destroys the dualistic structure of the attribute and once again leads it to monotheism. In the third step, we introduced five forms based on epiphenomenalism; First, the manat that neutralizes the effect of mental things on physical things, the same manat can negate the effect of physical things on the mind, which is accepted by epiphenomenalism. Secondly, believing in the doctrine of epiphenomenalism is a self-contradictory event; Because the mentioned belief is effective in epiphenomenalism behaviors. Thirdly, acceptance of epiphenomenalism makes there is practically no difference between a zombie and a real person. Fourthly, we can make a proof with present and experimental premises and prove the effect of mental things on physical things in a present-acquired (experimental) way. Fifthly, the promise of epiphenomenalism actually denies what is confirmed by empirical science, because from an empirical point of view, mental matters (regardless of whether they are physical or non-physical) affect physical matters.

In the division of theories of the philosophy of mind, all kinds of physicalists, whether reductionist or non-reductionist, are considered Monist; because they believe in the physicality of everything. Reductionist physicists, on the other hand, believe that in addition to knowing everything as physical, everything can be reduced to lower levels of physics; But non-reductionists in physicalism, although they consider everything to be physical, believe that in the field of physics we are confronted with "emergent" things that cannot be reduced to the fundamental particles of physics and given a microphysical explanation of Have them; Because we are basically dealing with something new; But "property dualism", by acknowledging the non-physical nature of mental features, believes in two kinds of things in the universe and, as a result, has fundamentally rejected both Monist physicalist theories. Moreover, although in feature dualism, as in non-reductionist physicalism, we encounter a genus of non-reductionism and novelty, non-reductionism and novelty in property dualism are "species" and "species," respectively. Is "fundamental", not "typical" and "superficial". The present article prevents further sputum by clarifying the exact boundaries of the dualistic nature of property with physicalism, especially its non-reductionist type.