reductionism

Every new school and method in theology and philosophy of religion has to address the different issues that believers face in order to demonstrate its comprehensiveness and coherence. Open theism has attempted in this direction and offered its answers to these problems based on the theory of openness. It emerged in protest against the incompatibility of classical theism with the Bible and its overreliance on metaphysics and Greek philosophy. Using a reductionist view of God's power and a defensive system grounded on love, open theologians attempted to address the issue of evil while reframing God's relationship with the world. However, their strategy in this regard is heavily criticized, meaning that they have failed to attribute love to God in addition to denying His authority to compel. The other major critiques brought against their position are a return to classical theology and the existence of a paradox in the concept of gratuitous evil. Through the use of descriptive and analytical methods, the open theistic approach to resolving the evidential problem of evil is analyzed and critiqued in this study. Despite the small number of studies that have been conducted on this theological school, their perspective and method for addressing the issue of evil have not yet been reviewed; this significant finding is made in the current study.

The issue of free will is one of the most significant and challenging topics that has occupied the minds of philosophers in both the East and the West. Among these philosophers, a group of physicalists, with a reductionist approach, strives to answer these questions: How can a human being possess free will? And if a human possesses free will, how does he/she take responsibility for his/her actions? Considering causal reductionism, which is based on the assumption that the behavior of the parts of an entity determines the behavior of the whole, since the parts of an entity represent the underlying level of complexity and composition, how can reductionist physicalists provide a correct interpretation of free will? Some of these individuals, like Sam Harris, have attempted to answer these questions from a neuroscientific perspective. In contrast, Christian dualists offer different viewpoints on this matter. Based on the principle of simplicity, we conclude that reductionist viewpoints, in opposition to Christian dualist views, cannot provide completely correct and flaw-free explanations for issues such as free will. Consequently, the explanations of the aforementioned rivals in this debate are more acceptable.

The problem of evil has always been a challenge against theism and there has been a lot of disputation about it. What can be considered as a newer challenge to theism is the very problem of divine hiddenness. There are multiple similarities between the two arguments which have caused some thinkers to reduce one to another and to count only one of them as original. It is possible that one of the very concepts of evil or hiddenness be reduced to another one, or one of the arguments that is grounded on them, or the reduction occurs in both phases. Regarding the vastitude of the domain of each problem, what we solely aim at is inspecting the reasons of ones who hold that divine hiddenness is nothing but one articulation of the problem of evil and it is not necessary to be regarded as independent. These reasons range from a sort of resemblance of their logical structure, methodology, conclusion, or responses in order to show that either the problem of divine hiddenness is not independent at all or if it is, it makes a much less severe case against theism in comparison to the problem of evil so it’s not worthy of any concern. What will be eventually concluded is that despite having plentiful available similarities, this kind of reduction is not justified and each problem, regardless of their ability to prove what they claim, is independently precious, inspection-worthy, and original.

In the past, there has been a deep discussion among philosophers and theologians regarding the different aspects of the Divine will. This paper aims to first provide a detailed report and evaluation of Allameh Tabataba'i's theories, and then, in comparison with the ideas of eminent thinkers of transcendental theosophy, a new formulation of this interpretation will be presented based on the reductionist approach, how much they consider the attribute of the Divine will to be essential or action. According to the research method of each of the philosophers, Allameh Tabataba'i, considers God’s will to be debatable in the form of Divine actions and considers it difficult to carry it on the Essence in such a way that it is considered an independent concept, we will consider in the framework of anti-reductionism. We consider On the other hand, Imam Khomeini, who considers the Divine will to be one of the attributes of Essence and considers it to be constant in all levels of existence and one of the attributes of perfection, a minimalist reductionist, and Mulla Sadra, who refers the essential Will to other Essential attributes such as knowledge, love, or pleasure, we formulate maximal reductionist.

The aim of the present study is to organize Avicenna’s meta-ethical thought, providing a foundation for understanding the ethical system derived from his opinions. The primary focus is on determining Avicenna's overarching approach to the existence of moral attributes and propositions. In response to this inquiry, the author seeks to articulate three models of reductionism rooted in Avicenna's perspectives. These reductionist models could be crafted at the levels of conventional attitude, philosophical attitude, as well as Avicenna's mystical and monotheistic stance towards moral truths, so that it could be possible to establish coherence among them. This article begins by examining Avicenna’s viewpoint in accordance with his logical principles, introducing his constructivist approach – aimed at fame and intellectual agreement – as a model of reductionism at a conventional level. Subsequently, Avicenna's attitude is explored through the philosophical science of the soul and the truth of the happiness of the human soul, leading to the introduction of a form of moral reductionism based on Avicenna's philosophical opinions. Finally, attention is given to his mystical and monotheistic perspective, presenting yet another model of reductionism. The research concludes that, based on Avicenna's discussions in the field of ontology, it is not feasible to adopt a true realist position, as there is no independent truth for moral attributes.

Naturalism has typically been entangled with a physicalist view. Physicalism, on the other hand, falls short of accounting for qualitative states of mental phenomena. The hard problem of consciousness seems to be a natural epistemic boundary in such a way that we do not even have any conceptualization as to how we can possibly account for mental states in physicalist terms in the future, which leads us to some version of causal/ontological plurality in the sense that it does not seem possible to explain everything with the same parameters even though the world fundamentally consists in a single substance. If plurality in multiple levels of scientific explanation is necessary, I argue that strong emergentism is, as a metaphysical framework, the best candidate to account for this fact. I will tackle two major physicalist views by Kim and Sider. Kim shows us that non-reductive physicalism is a bankrupt project whereas Sider’s physicalism that postulates a pure and complete fundamental level renders higher-level phenomena (including mental reality) metaphysically spurious. In relation to Kim and Sider’s accounts, I will try to elaborate on my view that physicalism, when pursued to the end, is inherently reductive and ultimately falls short of accounting for the mental reality. I emphasize that the causal identification of brain and mind rests on an arbitrary carving of world, namely a description of the world which cannot be intrinsic to nature. These are the main reasons why I conclude that our revised naturalism should be disentangled from physicalism and embrace the causal/ontological plurality of strong emergentism without falling for substance dualism.

Thick moral concepts are moral concepts that are claimed to bear both evaluative and descriptive content, as opposed to thin ones which bear only the former. This paper firstly argues that the descriptive aspect of these concepts cannot be disentangled from their evaluative aspect. So their evaluative aspect cannot be reduced to thin moral concepts. Secondly, thickness is a gradable concept; any thick concept can be made thicker through adding new descriptive content. Along with changes in the descriptive content of the concept, its evaluative content changes as well; a qualitative change that cannot be reduced to thin evaluative concepts, even if they vary in degree. On this basis and through some other considerations it is concluded that moral deliberations in specific cases are not possible through simply applying general principles which are commonly expressed through thin concepts. Rather, each individual is entrusted with the task of deliberation in each particular case on their own.

The goal of science is to explain reality and the world, and the goal of philosophy is also ontology. Philosophical views on scientific opinions and scientific opinions have had a direct influence on the way of worldview and ontology. Since the early twentieth century, the scientific flow of reduction affects logic and philosophy, psychology and sociology, and even theology and religion. On the other hand, the new emergent flow of emergentism in opposition to reductionism flourished in the late twentieth century. The philosophical and analytical validation of these two seemingly contradictory views promotes the levels of scientific methods and approaches, as well as philosophical views, especially philosophies such as the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of psychology, and the philosophy of sociology. Reductionism is trying to coordinate with unity, realize the unity of sciences, eliminate the waste of scientific theories, and provide the possibility of a stronger justification. On the other hand, emergentism involves the hierarchical plurality of the world's creatures. On the other hand, emergentism involves the hierarchical plurality of the world's creatures which causes the classification of science. Each level and class have its lows, rules, and concepts per se. Reductionism is unable to explain the plurality of facts and levels of existence; But emergentism with its theoretical framework explains both the continuum, unity and multiplicity of reality means the hierarchical plurality of reality. the reduction merely is an essential step in understanding and discovering down-up causality that is used as one of the theoretical concepts of emergentism and somewhat explains the cause of the relationship between the layers of existence. But reduction strategy is not successful in recognizing and explaining the existence of layers and classes of science. Reductions with a priority look at reality are subject to selfish judgment and preference, but in emergentism, reality and ontology determine and identify the methodology and epistemology.

While generally the concern of the researchers of the philosophy of religion is related to the truth, justification and meaningfulness of the religious propositions, the theologian seeks to explain or understand the reason behind the thoughts and rituals of religious people. In this article, we discuss Freud's opinions in the field of religious studies to explain why religion appeared at the beginning of history from Freud's point of view. We also deal with the issue of how Freud's ideas in explaining the origin of religion are related to the opinions of Darwin and some Darwinists. In the introduction of this article, religious studies and its different categories have been discussed. In the second part of the article, we have explained Freud's opinions about the origin of religion in prehistory. In the third part of this chapter, we have discussed which part of Freud's theories in the field of religious studies was influenced by Darwin and in which part it contrasts with Darwin’s theories . In the fourth part, we have raised the criticisms of some Darwinists against Freud in the field of religious studies, and in the fifth part, we have examined these criticisms.

The unity or non-unity of science has been one of the most important philosophical issues in the twentieth century. One of the most important answers to the question of the unity of science has been suggested by reductionists. The present article focuses on two prominent examples of such approaches. The first example was taken from the philosophical movements of rational positivism and the second example was chosen from the post-positivist philosophical movements. We have shown that the supposedly successful reductions in science have given rise to the idea that the answer to the question of the unity of science is possible through reduction. We have then argued that the reductionist approach is fundamentally inefficient, inadequate, and incorrect. Reductionism is ineffective because it does not contribute to conceptual and ontological simplification. It is inadequate because, first, it does not cover the ontological diversity of fundamentally different scientific activities, and second, it does not provide an adequate answer to the explanatory need on why one ontological and epistemological layer is more fundamental than the other ones. Reductionism is wrong because, first, it is incompatible with the history of the evolution of scientific theories; second, it does not properly explain the relationship between evidences and theories. Third, according to Foder, it cannot solve the problem of multiple-realizability; fourth, according to Feyerabend, if the incomparability of scientific theories is correct, the possibility of any kind of communication, including deductive communication, is ruled out. The failure of reductionism shows that models like Nigel and Putnam-Oppenheim do not provide a suitable answer to the problem of the unity of science. Therefore, it is suggested that the answer to the problem of the unity of science be pursued through a non-reductionist approach.

The undeniable success of neuroscience in explaining human mental states, which in the past were explained in terms of supernatural concepts, has led many modern-day scientists and philosophers to advocate physicalist methods in explaining human nature. According to this view, science, by recognizing the physiological structures of man, especially the brain and its functions, will finally be able to explain human nature with all its features through mere physical concepts. The most important challenge to this view has always been the question of consciousness, or in its traditional sense, how the mind and body relate. However, contemporary scientists try to explain the phenomenon of consciousness through the physical sciences by presenting new scientific theories and concepts about the mechanisms of the brain and its relation to mental states. The purpose of this article is to show that phenomenal awareness is the most important challenge to the theory of materialism. Examining the concept of consciousness and dividing it into two parts, "perceptual consciousness" and "phenomenal consciousness", we have argued that scientific theories at best provide only an explanation of perceptual consciousness, while challenging The main science of the natural sciences is the explanation of phenomenal consciousness. But phenomenal consciousness is beyond the reach of the physical sciences because of the inherent nature of mentality, unless it recognizes first-person perspective science.

In this article, after describing the content of the theory of Evolution from Darwin to the formation of modern synthesis or Neo-Darwinism, its theological implications are discussed. In particular, the Neo-Darwinian reading of Evolution is a ground for many Neo-Darwinists to advance the idea of naturalism. A critical aspect in the Neo-Darwinists defense of naturalism is their emphasis on following empirical evidence to shape their worldview. The second approach to Evolution is Intelligent Design. Although they are generally be presented as opposed to Evolution in the sense of a common ancestor, the central idea of this movement is the need for design in the process of Evolution, and they don't necessarily deny the Evolution from a common ancestor. Nevertheless, Neo-Darwinists often accuse the Intelligent Design movement of being unscientific and having religious motives. As a result, despite the scientific efforts of the Intelligent Design movement, there is no positive view of it in academia. But another interesting approach to Evolution is the third-way or post-Darwinian Evolution. It is opposed to intelligent design, but it has crucial criticisms of the Neo-Darwinian Evolution reading based on new biological evidence. But Neo-Darwinists confrontation with this evidence does not seem to be consistent with their claim to follow empirical evidence.

Despite all the ontological doubts about causality, one of the most important pillars of any philosophical theory is the issue of causality, with which it must clarify its task theory. Philosophy of biology as a field of philosophical knowledge has taken various uses of the term: proponents and opponents of the reductionist thesis speak of bottom-up (upward) and top-down (downward) causation, while proponents and opponents of extended evolutionary synthesis talk about reciprocal causation. People like Laland and his colleagues criticize the idea of Mayr including Proximate and Ultimate causation. scientist like Nobel speaks of causality in biological relativity based on an analogy in physics. Some scientists such as Okasha and Woodward, pay attention to causal democracy, while others deny the existence of causal relationships in the field of explaining biological actions and interactions for reasons such as the phenomenon of emergence. In the philosophy of science, there are theories about the properties of the element c causality, which can be used as a criterion to better understand the use of this word and provide a model to reduce disagreements.

Secularism is a kind of exclusivism in the sphere of knowing the existence. It brought a new definition for the subject matter, the method and the goal of any scientific sphere wherein it entered. It defines the foundations and presuppositions of sciences according to its own worldview. This article seeks to prove that if the definition of the man and his values has approached the definition and the nature of the material and mechanical world in the recent centuries, it is just because of the effect of natural sciences on humanities and redefinition of the basic parameters of those sciences (such as viewing the man, the universe and God) following the definition of those parameters in natural sciences. Accordingly, we will discuss reductionism, mechanical view, quantitative view, observability, naturalism, atomism, rejecting the ultimate causes and non-totalist view of the universe as the secularist bases of science. And finally, we will criticize the one-dimensional attitude governing those sciences. The discussion method is analytical and the result of the study emphasizes the necessity of revising many of the foundations of the modern natural sciences.

This article investigates and evaluates models of the unity of science in 20th century. In general, the models of unity of science could be divided into two parts and investigated separately. The first group are models which defend reductionism and eliminativism by relying on physicalism. The second group are the ones that by relying on methodology try to guarantee the unity of science. In evaluating the first group on the works of Thomas Nagle and William James it is argued that these models not adjusted to different ontological fields. The various methods of scientific research and different function of the values of preferring a theory in different contexts of comparison also undermine the claim of scientific unity in the second group models. Anyway, for avoiding the harmful result of the being incommensurable, relying on holism the possibility of giving a model of the unity of science could be defended which has provided possibility of interdisciplinary cooperation and defies any attempt for reductionism or ignorance of the plurality of methods.

The technique of content analysis methodology is considered as an interdisciplinary study of Quranic and Hadith sciences in the recent period, which has come from the field of social sciences in the field of Quranic-etymological studies. In order to provide a coherent framework and logical model in studies with analytic- The structure of religious texts is being processed. This paper, in three main sections, introduces the foundations and functions of the content analysis method in religious texts studies as one of the interdisciplinary capacities of Quran and Hadith sciences. 

This paper, using descriptive-analytical method, studies the capacities and carers of the method of content analysis in the studies of Quranic and hadith sciences.  Results and

The most important findings of this study, through the extraction of the foundations of interdisciplinary study of content analysis, are that content analysis method has two specific methodological and epistemological bases. The pluralism and the convergent combination of the most important methodological foundations of the content analysis method, as well as the avoidance of one-way relation to phenomena and texts, are the epistemological foundations of interdisciplinary content analysis. The application of this method in religious texts has a variety of functions, including compilation, reliability, reducibility, multilevel attitude, laminarogy of texts, and comparison of common texts and, most importantly, the degradation of the logical model through which interdisciplinary studies in science The Quran and hadith have been developed and generalized.

Human innate disposition has been among fundamental issues in anthropology which has attracted thinkers in the long run of the history. Some of these thinkers have held positions in which human innate disposition suffers more limited boundaries. Affected by these positions, nowadays the boundaries of human innate disposition are reduced into the arena of axiomatic perceptions, intuitive cognition, soul faculties and instincts. Reducing human innate disposition into axiomatic perceptions rejects human original innate disposition in contrast with human secondary innate disposition.  Besides, reducing innate disposition into intuitive cognition reduces boundaries of disposition even more than its previous type. Accordingly, even axiomatic perceptions are beyond the boundaries of innate disposition. These two recent interpretations of human innate disposition, yet, reduce the disposition into human instincts and faculties of soul. The first interpretation rejects every kinds of innate actual perception even after the birth and therefore, it is believed that all human perceptions are acquired. The second interpretation, however, touched by the theory of evolution, reduces innate disposition into instincts, either carnal or vital. According to religious thought none of these stances have given an accurate representation of innate disposition. In religious view Man possess different dimensions of innate disposition. In this sense, original disposition, axiomatic disposition and innate faculties are different dimension of human innate disposition (Fitra).

The eliminative materialism does not accept behavior explanation based on mental states and puts emphasis that human behavior should be explained just based nervous events. The supporter of this view, for the rejection of belief in mental states, call folk view which is against neuroscience. The following article, through the analysis of the epistemological basics of eliminative materialism, shown that this view is somehow an unreasonable monopoly of ontology. It will also be arguing that with defying the existence of mental state, not only there will be no space for psychology as a scientific and practical section, there is also no place for the key concepts of social sciences. Scientific psychology goes forward with assuming the existence of individuals in the social world of life and assumption which is the formation of psychology is scientific cannot interpreted in a physicalist way.Theaffirmative claim of this article is the fact that human nature can be understood deeply just through the interaction of psychology and neuroscience. Belief in immaterial mental states is not against neuroscience or other experiments sciences and definition based onimmaterial soul is an unmatchedand coherent ontological basis to defend scientific psychology.