sensible

Avicenna in two parts of the book of Al-Shifa (کتاب الشفاء) or The Book of Healing reports the theory of Platonic Ideas or Forms: first account is in the chapter 10 from the second book in the Demonstration Treatise (رساله البرهان) and second account is in the chapter 2 from the seventh book in the Theology Treatise (رساله الالهیات). Both reports have explanations of the theory of Platonic Ideas and then some critiques of the theory. Here we will discuss only Avicenna's description and explanations of the theory of Ideas; what is Avicenna's understanding from Plato's Ideas? At the present essay it is necessary to investigate the range of familiarity that Avicenna has with Platonic Ideas, Aristotle's role in this familiarity and the philosophical functions of the Ideas in Avicenna's understanding and identification of them. First of all, Avicenna thinks that Platonic Ideas are universals and, on this description, he erects other descriptions of their truth. It is vital to know that Avicenna's familiarity with Platonic Forms is essentially mediate; that's by way of Aristotle's works including both descriptions and criticisms of those forms. Review and analysis of Avicenna's texts brings us to the three arguments of Platonists for the existence of Ideas: the argument from the sciences, the one over many arguments and the object of thought argument.

The "spirit of meaning" is one of the ideas on the semantics of the religious words that has attracted the attention of scholars such as Ghazali and Allameh Tabataba'i. Using a descriptive-analytical and documentary method, this paper, examines and adapts this theory to the teachings of these two thinkers, while emphasizing the semantic analysis of the Qur'anic words. Ghazali has based this theory on the balance of the unseen world and the material world, and the relation between exoteric and esoteric. The spirit of meaning to him is a heavenly truth, which has the possibility of representing in the form of sensory examples, and its achievement depends on a Sufi pass from the realm of imagination and removal of the extensional features from the gem of meaning. He has presented a different account in this regard. Allameh Tabataba'i, in the light of this theory, has also explained the semantics of the words and their relation to various senses based on their function and purpose. Nevertheless, despite the fact that both thinkers, by proposing this theory, emphasize the denial of esoteric commentary in the sense of the deviate from the literal meaning, in many cases, they have accepted the theory of the existence of figurative expression in the Word of God and its necessity.

Reason as a power of human powers has various functions that are perception and understanding, abstraction, generalization, analysis, decomposition, composition, definition, measurement and comparison, judgment and reasoning or inference. The mention of these functions is inductive and other things can be found and added to these. Ibn 'Arabi in al-Futuhat spoke spontaneously about the  functions of reason, and has specific explanations in this regard. The reason has the ability to perceive immaterial meanings, and perceives and accepts the intuitive learning because of the property of acceptance in him. The condition for the acquisition of reason to immaterial meanings is abstraction and freshening of meaning from matter and its accidents and this is done by imagination and with the help of reason. Also, the degradation of immaterial meanings from the world of intellect to world of imagination and sense requires the duplication and formulation of meanings in imagination. The sensory and imagination perception provides the necessary talent for the perception of meanings by reason. The meanings can not be created and invented. They are merely thought out and their main position is in the presence of meanings and the Divine knowledge. The truth of things is made up of meanings, and the emergence and degradation of them in every stage requires the adoption of the rules and effects of that stage. The sense perception of things is perception of meanings on sensible material forms, the imaginary apprehension is apprehension of meaning on imaginal forms, and intellectual apprehension is apprehension of meaning on intellectual forms. Most people do not have the power to abstract the meaning of their material and maximum use of meanings in the form of fantasy and imaginal forms is obscure.

In the first chapter of the fourth section of his al-Isharat, Avicenna, relying on the common nature of material things, presents an argument against materialism, which has been focused on by later thinkers. In this argument, the negatively conditioned nature is confused with the unconditioned nature. What is available with material examples is the unconditioned nature that is plural and material and what is immaterial is the negatively conditioned nature which is not available along with the instances of nature. Relying on Avicenna's words, this article tries to explain this argument in a manner that may not be prone to this objection. According to the author, Avicenna wants to falsify the epistemic and methodological foundations of materialism through showing the inefficiency of senses in perceiving sensible natures. Material things include an immaterial nature. When Avicenna says that nature is not sensible he does not intend to say that it is not sensible ontologically. Instead he intends to say that it is not sensible methodologically and epistemologically.

In the first pages of ‘theology’ in his Ishārāt, Avicenna claims that we may find out an abstract non-sensible thing through investigating the sensible things. By superimposing mixed quiddity over the non-conditioned quiddity, he argues that non-conditioned quiddity is free from the material accidents of mixed quiddities, hence non-sensible. This leads to misunderstanding that he regards the non-conditioned quiddity as existing out of the mind; thus, Khwāja Tūsī, unlike some of his books that regard general entities out of mind as impossible, in interpreting Avicenna’s statement says that non-conditioned quiddity, while non-sensible, is out of mind. This is in spite of the fact that Avicenna, based on his other books, regards general entities existing only in mind. It seems that in Ishārāt, Avicenna is seeking to prove that general entity in mind, i.e. non-conditioned quiddity in mind, is an abstract entity; thus, he prove an abstract being.

Ghazzali has viewed pleasure as perceiving what is desirable and has given it in different types of: sensible and hearty, sensible and non sensible, external and internal, sensible and intellectual, intellectual and bodily. He has viewed human pleasure growth to be in five steps and known five elements for distinguishing them including those of the faculty of perception, perceptions, the meanings perceived, species difference and difference in power and weakness. Abu Hamid has followed Farabi in his view on pleasure and his little attention to Avicenna`s two definitions of pleasure can be regarded as a defect in his study. Furthermore, different divisions of pleasure in Ghazzali may be reduced into one. Lack of distinction between heart and intellect in his view can be regarded as a failure.

Muslim philosophers believe human's desirable goal and felicity is divided into different parts and does not have one specific meaning and referent; therefore they have divided it from different perspectives and dimension and from various respects. This article will try to investigate and criticize the most basic divisions of human's felicity and farthest perfection posed in Islamic philosophy; it will criticize the methods used in these divisions, their content, comprehensiveness and comperhemirenem inclusirenell. A study and research of the different aspects of this subject and the words and statements of the theosophists shows that the most important divisions of felicity are questionable and doubtable; such as the following divisions: sensible and rational felicity, individual and collective felicity, human and rational felicity, this worldly and the other worldly, and also the division of felicity based on the belief. This is because some deny sensible felicity which is resulted from sensible understandings, and also believe innate felicity, which definitely exists, is the only homogeneaus of rational felicity; the human felicity, emphasized by some philosophers, may not be accomplished without rational felicity and is in fact one of its degrees; the collective felicity, despite its great effect on achieving personal felicity, is not sufficiently noticed; and the different aspects of the other worldly felicity is not noted as is expected from the theosophical discussions. These points make it necessary to have a second critical look at this subject.

The intellect and revelation are two categories that have always attracted the attention of thinkers and philosophers. Perhaps one of the most important achievements of Mulla Sadra is his synthesis of the intellect and revelation. A study of his method in accomplishing this task can serve as a luminous torch guiding many of the seekers of the truth.This paper examines two important approaches followed by Mulla Sadra in this regard: the first is clarifying the problem of esoteric interpretation (ta‘wil) and equating it with perfectional interpretation, and the second is distinguishing rational rules from estimative and imaginal ones. Both of these methods play significant roles in the structure of Sadrian philosophy and connect Sharia‘h, the intellect, and gnosis.