teleology

Alexander Aphrodisias, a commentator on Aristotle, introduced the theory of intellect and active intellect in his works "On the Intellect of Aristotle")Fi al-'Aql 'ala Aristutalis( and "On the Soul." This theory addresses both the reality and nature of the Active Intellect, as well as its teleological purpose and its relation to human beings. The questions explored in this paper include: What is the nature of the Active Intellect? Is it dependent on human beings or independent? What is its causal role, and what ontological, epistemological, and teleological positions does it hold in Alexander’s theory? Using a descriptive-analytical approach, this paper seeks to clarify these issues. We found that the Active Intellect has both ontological and epistemological functions. It externalizes and has a divine and incorruptible position. Epistemologically, the Active Intellect not only knows itself but also causes the knowledge of intelligibles. From a teleological perspective, the highest goal for human existence is contemplating the highest intelligible. In order to answer these questions, we first briefly introduce Alexander's theory of intellect, and then discuss the theory of active intellect.

After Darwin's theory, the teleological argument from design faced numerous challenges and transformations to the extent that it could no longer explain order according to modern science, as the final cause was unable to account for Darwin's theory. In fact, there was a need for an argument from nature that could, in line with the transformation of Aristotelian natural philosophy, explain the existence of order and its connection to the creator of order within empirical sciences. This is because the teleological intent in Aquinas's argument from design, based on the final cause, suggested the will of an intelligent agent behind the world. But it seemed, the theory of evolution - understanding nature through the "efficient cause" – has rendered this transcendental intelligence unnecessary. Thus, the teleological argument from design failed to align with modern science and gradually, its application to the existence of God was deemed unscientific and unnecessary. Therefore, it is necessary to articulate order in such a manner and utilize it differently in theology and in the defense of theism, so that the empirical order of the world continues to necessitate the existence of God. In reality, it can be shown that the efficient naturalistic order is the only common point between monotheism and atheism that cannot be effective in attributing to the existence or non-existence of God. It is necessary to refine and complete this natural order in defense of theism. Based on this, the teleological argument from design remains significant in its own right.

The present article, in its analytical-comparative method, examines the problem of evil from the perspective of Kant's moral teleology and the faithful theology of Marilyn McCord Adams. In Kant's view, evil has no special status in nature, but it is merely one of the possible capacities of Nature, in the position of actualizing its powers. The human solution to prevent evil is an opportunity to emerge his intellectual and moral powers. It composes an absolute moral order that, contrary to his natural inclinations, transforms humans kinds into rational and creative beings and organizes human relationships. Kant's God is an idea that is assumed and sanctified as a supreme good over the world, following the call of moral conscience. However, nature in its moral and ultimate reading in Kant's third critique moves in the direction of human well-being. It can be considered an institution and foundation far from evil. On the other hand, M.M. Adams as a Christian thinker who has lived in the modern world, has attempted to take a different reading of the problem of evil. He interpreted it as a condition of man's likeness to God through the experience of divine suffering. An interpretation of evil and morality that is immoral in terms of basis and consequence, according to Kant'sreading of the nature of evil and morality

In recent decades, some thinkers have spoken of religious science and although they agreed on its possibility, they did not have a single theory on its meaning, application and how to distinguish it from secular science. Everyone agreed that science was influenced by presuppositions, but there was serious disagreement about how and to what extent they affected them. This statement was discussed more in natural science than in humanities. Because if natural science discovers the laws of nature, how do presuppositions influence the discovery of laws? If the function of religion is not the interpretation of nature, how can it intervene in the knowledge and interpretation of nature and make science a religion? The present article tries to express the meaning of religious natural science and prove its realization by descriptive-analytical method. According to this article, one of the most important features of religion is the teleology of nature, and this feature, makes natural science dependent on religion.

In The Mind and Cosmos, Thomas Nigel argues that naturalism has failed to provide a complete explanation of the universe. Main of Nigel's objections to naturalism are the issues that arise in explaining the mind through a naturalistic view. Naturalism has so far failed to provide a complete explanation that includes mental phenomena, especially the quality of consciousness. Nigel's proposition is that a more complete explanation of existence of all aspects such as consciousness can be given by taking a metaphysical view, similar to that which existed in Aristotle's teleology. In this article, it will be said that Aristotle's theory is not enough to solve this and the problem can be solved by taking Avicenna's teleology.

Nigel opposes the extremist view of explaining the universe as such a naturalist do. In The Mind and the Cosmos, Nigel presents his critique of naturalism from the point of view of mind-related issues, including consciousness, values, and cognition. The reason for the inability of naturalism to provide a complete explanation of the universe from Nigel's point of view is that it uses tools designed for quantitative measurements; when something like consciousness has a qualitative nature. Nigel's argument for the flaws of naturalism is as follows: 1- theory of naturalism necessarily needs to provide a comprehensive physical explanation of all the phenomena in the universe. 2- Consciousness is one of the phenomena of the universe. 3- Consciousness is a phenomenon that can’t be explained in the physical sciences. 4- Therefore, the theory of naturalism is not complete. Contrary to what naturalists think, complete explanation of universe must have order in matter from the beginning. Perhaps, Nigel thinks, in explaining consciousness as a part of universe, one can rely on ideas such as Aristotelian teleology which is related to the basic elements of the universe. Therefore, the end of the formation of the conscious man has been within matter from the beginning.

According to Aristotle, the end in natural affairs is something that has existed in an organism from the beginning. The apple tree has an end that is eternal. Such a view is inconsistent with the theory of evolution, which is of interest to scientists and Nigel. An important idea that Avicenna points out is that motion is raised in physics, and if we go to causality in metaphysics, go to existence. In the discussion of metaphysics, it is not like the physics of motion and change, but it means what exists or does not exist. The difference between the actual and the ultimate cause is a tool we can use to have complete explanation of the universe.

According to Aristotle, teleology is something that entered ontology because of its epistemological need, and therefore entered metaphysics from nature. But in his philosophical system, Avicenna discusses the end from a theological and metaphysical point of view and from there to physics. Therefore, with Avicenna's argument and his metaphysical approach, one can explain the emergence of consciousness in matter. He can believe on natural causes and evolution and hold teleological cause to explain the creation of consciousness from the ordered matter at the same time. In other words, the end intended in Avicenna's view can sum up with the natural history of the formation of species.

In this research, we intend to examine Immanuel Kant's definition of nature in his critique of judgment in both parts, i.e., aesthetics and teleology. Then, we will evaluate these definitions of nature with the criteria of different trends of tourism such as nature tourism. Then we answer the question: Do Kant's definitions of nature in teleology and the relationship of nature with beauty and sublimity and the examples mentioned in this book, provide a proper Criteria for the goals, aspirations, and scopes of nature tourism? Do tourists of nature take us for a walk in the nature that Kant defines or sometimes describes?  Supposedly, both have a lot in common with emphasis on human ends and the importance of morality in praising beauty of nature. We search with a descriptive-analytical method to answer this question: How can a framework for aesthetics of tourism be provided from Kant's third critique? Research studies show that in order to organize the framework of aesthetics of tourism based on Kant's third critique, it is better to first outline the basic rubrics of the critique of the teleological judgment. In the second part of the third critique, considering the organic position of nature and its purpose and also the mechanistic expansion of nature under the supersensible principle, while eliminating the contradiction of this duality, the role of the purpose of nature and human as the ultimate purpose are discussed. In this part, an expansive view is seen for the relationship between man and nature with regard to the ultimate purpose and final purpose. According to the general point of view, human being, from the purposes and recognizing his/her position as the ultimate purpose and paying attention to the final purpose, will reach to a more detailed point of view. Human being, reflects on natural effects and charms and free and dependent beauties based on nature, artifacts and artworks. As a result, the role of beauty and sublimity of nature in cultivating the moral dimension and the promotion of human culture is considered as one of the basic foundations of aesthetics of tourism, especially nature tourism.

In this article, after describing the content of the theory of Evolution from Darwin to the formation of modern synthesis or Neo-Darwinism, its theological implications are discussed. In particular, the Neo-Darwinian reading of Evolution is a ground for many Neo-Darwinists to advance the idea of naturalism. A critical aspect in the Neo-Darwinists defense of naturalism is their emphasis on following empirical evidence to shape their worldview. The second approach to Evolution is Intelligent Design. Although they are generally be presented as opposed to Evolution in the sense of a common ancestor, the central idea of this movement is the need for design in the process of Evolution, and they don't necessarily deny the Evolution from a common ancestor. Nevertheless, Neo-Darwinists often accuse the Intelligent Design movement of being unscientific and having religious motives. As a result, despite the scientific efforts of the Intelligent Design movement, there is no positive view of it in academia. But another interesting approach to Evolution is the third-way or post-Darwinian Evolution. It is opposed to intelligent design, but it has crucial criticisms of the Neo-Darwinian Evolution reading based on new biological evidence. But Neo-Darwinists confrontation with this evidence does not seem to be consistent with their claim to follow empirical evidence.

One of the issues addressed in this article is the study of explaining the function of religion on the basis of virtue, one of the issues that theologians face; That is, despite the opposition to religion, why do people tend to religion, and what is the role and function of religion for human beings? Various approaches have been proposed to explain this issue. One of the approaches that has been reconsidered is the virtuous approach. In this approach, attention is paid to the characteristics, abilities and personal talents of individuals. According to this approach, virtues are divided into two types: one is rational virtues, and the other is normative and moral virtues. Considering that these virtues are also mentioned in religious teachings. It seems that according to this approach, the function of religion can also be explained on the basis of "inference through the best explanation". Therefore, in this article, after briefly stating this approach, the issue of the function of religion has been studied and explained accordingly.

In the philosophy of ethics, especially after Kant, the question arose as to whether the performance of a moral act for motives beyond moral duty and obligation is invalid. The type of answer to this question is the origin of the division of moral systems into two general categories, teleological and task-oriented. Using a descriptive-analytical method this paper seeks to answer this question. While rejecting this approach, this paper emphasizes the existence of goals as the executive guarantee of moral actions. In the meantime, the other worldly type of these executive guarantees, such as closeness to God, is preferable. Because such a guarantee is infinite due to the infinity of God, and it is an endless source for encouraging man to existential excellency and performing moral act.

Discussion of teleology, especially the question of the teleology of divine actions, is an important topic in the field of religious education, especially in the science of theology. For any active and curious mind, it is a question of whether divine actions are impersonal or not, especially in the realm of creation - which is the most important divine act. Is it possible to draw a purpose for divine creation? And if the answer is yes, what is the point? Islamic scholars have expressed different views on the teleology of the divine actions, some considering their basis on the acceptance of the intellectual goodness and rubbish knows the divine actions purposeful, and the negation of teleology of the divine actions requires many bugs that the Imamiyyah, Mu'tazilites, Matridiyeh Theologians are such groups. Others, like most Ash'aries, have rejected the purpose in the divine actions due to their refusal to accept the rule of intellectual goodness and rubbish. Other cults have elaborated on the issue. In the present article, the reasons for the views of different cults on the finality of divine actions

Schopenhauer emphasis to concepts as will entity, teleology, eroticism, pleasure, invisible will and beings languish in his metaphysics; while it is contradiction making clear all this of direction him. Say when discussion is over invisible will nature, Schopenhauer insist to indirection that, while in ealse realms he attribute an unconscious purposeful to that. This is evident example of that: " yearling bird doesn't have any imaginary of eggs that build nest for them; young spider doesn't have any imaginary of hunting that weave gossamer for that; eater doesn't have any imaginary of ant to dig cavity after that first time, and … will is ongoing in action of this fauna clearly". Schopenhauer doesn't front to this question that how is possible an unconscious driftage identicalness itself in a world pregnant purposeful action. And of course in world that any little bit and any movement of that following from newton physic rules.

The supreme place of the issue of the final cause is no secret to the people of thought. This topic is so important that some great figures, such as Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, have considered it as the most important component of wisdom. At the same time, there are some salient differences in this regard among its advocates and opponents. In Islamic philosophy, the problem of final cause has been mainly tackled by responding to the advanced criticisms while, in contemporary Western philosophy, the discussion of this topic is considered to be unimportant and superfluous. Rarely ever have either Islamic or Aristotelian philosophers dealt with the fundamental reasons and roots of the confirmation or rejection of the final cause; however, no consensus will be arrived at regarding superstructures without first analyzing the basic ideas. Here, through an analytic study of the conceptual and assertoric bases of the final cause, the authors have tried to investigate and evaluate the main roots of the conflicts over this problem in order to facilitate the judgment of superstructures. In doing so, they have focused on such concepts as the relationship between efficient and final causes, origin of motion, potency and predisposition, and essentialism and archetype.

The belief in discernibility of the meaning of life is the idea that the meaning of life exists and Can be discovered. Although Tabatabaie has not explicitly addressed the issue, there are pieces of evidence which imply that he believes in discernibility of the meaning of life. Tabatabaie believes that action, subject, and the purpose exist as a unified existence. The purpose is a higher stage in the hierarchy of ontology. The purpose of human life is the result of divine guidance and requires the unity of the divine action. Analysis of this evidence shows that Tabatabaie believes in ontological realism, rationalism, teleology and the capability of human beings in finding the truth in their life which reveal his view about the discernibility. So Tabatabaie’s theory about the meaning of life is a kind of objectivist theories and is far from subjectivism.

From a phenomenological point of view, Levinas holds that the Other is the core to actualise all human relations. To him, there might be, so to say, a possibility of encounter in the realm of spatiotemporality; the Other is prior both axiologically and constitutively to every I. In this way, one cannot confine the Other to the I's totality of selfishness because without caring for the condition of constitution, the constituted lacks its existential, and epistemic origin. It lies certainly on the account that one can expose organisational and administrative systems (as a wide network of inter-personal relations) to serious phenomenological scrutiny. While re-cognising the continuous expansions of inter/inner organisational networks, a new multitude in reciprocal relations and demands has emerged which stands in need of its own regulations and ethical codes. These outputs pave the way for respecting client's and clerk's rights, while accomplishing the organisation's ends. Therefore, the author's main objective is necessarily to re-assess and re-consider the bureaucratic systems implemented in undeveloped, or developing countries; an objective which justifies our proceeding from doing phenomenology upon the extant inefficient system of administration in the globe. If admitted, the objective can extend itself toward becoming an efficient cultural innovation through its philosophical foundation-making. This article scrutinises the possibility of a more ethical encounter with the inferior and clients (as ends in themselves) by adopting Levinas's ethical approach. The raised theory has potentiality to effectively bestow centrality upon clients as the Others so additionally to observe the two partie's interests in organisationaladministrative relations.

Islam is a tree which is rooted in monotheism. Morality is the fruit of this huge tree. Therefore, according to Islam, morality has a religious aspect. Islamic morality covers such a wide range that it not only answers the fundamental moral questions, but also exhibits the perfect and ideal man in relation to psychological characteristics and behavioral patterns and offers the modus operandi for achieving human perfection and highest spiritual stations. This research, which represents a theoretical study of Islamic morality, seeks to offer structural explanation by first explaining the normal viewpoint of Islamic morality and then mentioning and demonstrating its theoretical principles.

In Kant''s transcendental philosophy، «sensible» is an object composed of multiple sense intuitions and a priori constitutive of mind. In this philosophy، sensible nature is empirical and mechanical that becomes universal and necessary under determinate concepts and principles of Understanding. But، there is another space not determined by concepts and principles of Understanding. This space is «super sensible». This super sensible is the space of noumenal objects and is very important in Kant''s system of philosophy. This sphere is important for explaining the principle of uniformity of nature as a supporter to induction، some ethical items and religion theory، organisms and culture. But how can we get at this realm? And is this realm compatible with the realm of empirical knowledge? In this paper we want to explain these matters.

This paper، in its first part، analyzes the status and history of the principle of “maximization of the good” and the different meanings of “maximization” and “good.” After explaining and analyzing this principle and its different interpretations، in the first part، this paper، in its second part، categorizes Rawls’s criticisms on it، step by step، by extracting and mentioning their premises. It should be noted that، prior to Rawls، similar objections to the principle of “maximization of the good” had already been raised by David Ross، Brian Barry and Nicholas Rescher. Rawls was the first person who provide a systematic and comprehensive alternative to this principle as well as coherent and systematic criticisms on it. However، most works on this topic – esp. Persian works – have a very important defect: They do not distinguish Rawls’s different (and sometimes parallel) criticisms. This paper، distinguishes Rawls’s criticism. Then، it shows that: 1. Rawls’s criticism on “total good/utility” is different from his criticism on “average good/utility،” and 2. Rawls uses two different strategies for criticizing the principle of “maximization of the good” which one of them is totally independent of his positive theory (justice as fairness) and the other one is dependent on it.

Different theories about the management of human societies have been proposed over the history such as the theory of guardianship of religious jurist. Some doubts have, for some reasons, been cast on this theory. One the main doubts is the issue of "jurisdiction of religious jurist and lack of particular scope of it". Using a descriptive-analytical method, the present paper elaborates on the question of the need for the foundations of theory of guardianship of religious jurist in terms of the jurisdiction of religious jurist due to the significant status of the foundations of a theory in analyzing its outcomes. To this end, the need which the ontological, anthropological epistemological, and teleological foundations of the theory of guardianship of religious jurist has in terms of the jurisdiction of religious jurist has been examined and its limitations and frameworks are explained. From among these limitations and frameworks are divine rules, expediency of Islamic society, justice and people's supervision.