time

Brentano attempts to resolve the problems of perception of temporal things by postulating the “original association, but Husserl considers Brentano's thoughts inadequate and, with constant effort, tries to answer the problems of time in different stages of his thought. Before anything, he transforms the problem of time into the problem of time-consciousness, then tries to discover the deeper levels of time along with the development of his thought. First, he investigates our consciousness of temporal objects, then studies the temporal consciousness of this consciousness, and finally investigates the absolute stream of consciousness. Although he had not taken this path consciously, the process of Husserl’s thought about time moved toward the direction that challenges the dominance of the actual present now in the consciousness of time. Postulating concepts like "primary memory" and "primary expectation" and later "retention" and "protection," Husserl gets away from the centrality of “presence” and “now,” which are the basic elements of the metaphysics of presence. Despite taking a significant step towards passing through the metaphysics of presence, Husserl did not take the last step, namely bypassing absolutely present consciousness.

The proclamation of the verses of disavowal in the ninth year of Hijra is a significant controversial issue in Islamic history. Many Sunni and Shiite scholars agree that the Prophet assigned someone to deliver these verses that year. Shiites identify Imam ‘Alī as the envoy, while most Sunnis attribute this role to Abū Bakr, with both groups citing various arguments in support of their claims. This study offers a fresh perspective on the proclamation of these verses, examining it from geographical and temporal standpoints. To this end, reports from both Sunni and Shiite sources are scrutinized. An analysis of the historical claims made by both groups indicates that, geographically, the locations mentioned in early sources suggest that Abū Bakr’s return to Medina and subsequent rejoining of Imam ʿAlī for the proclamation would not have been feasible within the available timeframe.

In Descartes' epistemological system, God is the foundation and basis for the duration of knowledge and its certainty. He is not merely a transcendent and passive being but an active entity who continuously intervenes in the structure of the world, ensuring the continuity of phenomena and, as a result, the coherence of knowledge. The dependence of certainty on God confronts Descartes' epistemology with one of its most fundamental challenges, the "Cartesian Circle." Proving the existence of God is necessary to validate clear and distinct perceptions, while these very perceptions serve as the basis for proving God's existence. This article offers a way to resolve this circularity by linking Descartes' theory of time to the notion of continuous creation. Descartes does not believe in the intrinsic continuity between different moments. The continuity of time and the survival of each moment of the world are the results of God's constant action. According to this interpretation, Descartes' epistemological system is not separate from theology, and the validity and foundation of knowledge are tied to the existence and will of God.

Lee Smolin sees modern cosmology in crisis in explaining phenomena as the result of using a special methodology called "the Newtonian schema". According to the Newtonian schema, the world is like a computer that receives its initial conditions as inputs, and then the governing rules, in terms of differential equations with respect to time, produce its subsequent states as outputs. He considers it necessary to abandon this schema to overcome the crisis. However, he has not proposed an alternative. As far as I know, the only available alternative is provided by Ken Wharton. He considers the "Lagrangian schema" to be an appropriate alternative to the Newtonian schema. The Lagrangian schema is a holistic approach that denies the mentioned algorithmic understanding of the world. This article aims to examine Smolin's criticisms and Wharton's proposal. We will argue that although it has advantages over the Newtonian schema, the Lagrangian schema cannot be favorable to Smolin.

The concept of space and time are intertwined as dimensions of the natural world, the study of each is dependent on the study of the other in order to obtain a better and greater understanding of both. For a better and more complete explanation of the discussion of space and time, we need a discussion of movement, and of course this relationship is two-way, and it is not possible to talk about movement without discussing the discussion of space and time. The aspects of the prism of space, time and motion are invalid without explaining the other two clauses. The purpose of this research is to compare the views of Mulla Sadra essential movement and Einstein's theory of relativity in terms of force, action and event (time-space) and the research is descriptive. It is analytical. The method of collecting information is a library, which has been done by referring to the relevant libraries, extracting files from Mulla Sadra works, articles and other written works on the topic of research. The findings indicated that Sadr al-Mutalahin believed that the essence of things is in motion, and if the essence of things was not in motion, there would be no movement in their symptoms. Because the existence of substance and width outside of our imagination is one and the movement of modernity is existence. There are two types of existence: fixed existence and fluid existence, the existence of the natural world is fluid and modern, which gradually comes into existence and disappears, and at the same time, its unity and personality are preserved. "Einstein" also considers time as the amount of movement and generalizes movement in all universes. And that's why he considers time and space together and to measure anything, he considers time as a fourth dimension.

The issue of self-knowledge, while ancient, has always been both challenging and paradoxical. In this paper, considering that the "self" is the central axis of Kant’s thought in all three Critiques, we will attempt to analyze the mystery surrounding self-knowledge in Kant’s philosophy. To this end, we will briefly examine the following points: (1) What is the difference between self-consciousness and knowledge of the "self"? (2) Awareness of something without having knowledge of it is one of the dilemmas of Kantian philosophy, and this becomes more pronounced when it comes to the "self." However, this mystery cannot be seen as a flaw in Kant’s philosophy, as in the discourse on self-knowledge, the self is always a logical step behind itself. (3) Finally, despite Kant’s claim that the thing-in-itself has no relation to time, we will explore the connection between the "self" as a thing-in-itself and time, which contributes to the mystery of the "self."

Plotinus is the greatest Neoplatonic philosopher and one of the most prominent thinkers of ancient times, whose ideas have greatly influenced later philosophers. The issue of time is of great importance to philosophers and philosophical schools after Aristotle, especially in the thinking of Plotinus. One of the important aspects of time-related discussions is how temporal fluid entities are related to fixed and discrete entities. Regarding the issue of time, Plotin first criticized Aristotle's definition of time and then explained the eternal, eternal and fixedness of the order of ages. pay Plotin finally proves his innovative point of view about the time of the image or the appearance of the soul in the world of matter. In the current research, it has been stated with the analytical-comparative method that Plotin's problems with the definition of time are not correct from Mulla Sadra's point of view. Plotin's claim that time is the image of the soul also faces many problems according to Mulla Sadra's principles in transcendental wisdom.

Causality and time are the most central subjects in Kant's philosophy. He considers phenomena as objects of experience that are possible only with the law of causality and determines them in temporal relation. Kant responded to Hume who considered causality to be purely empirical and habit-based, and saw the causality to be a priori. For Kant, there is an order among human representations; the current state in this order is correlated to a prior and past state, and this correlation is still undetermined. Determining the current phenomenon from the past phenomenon is possible through time; so this mental sequence becomes an objective sequence, and phenomena are determined through their temporal determination. This process for Kant makes possible an empirical understanding of the time sequence. Causality does not occur through sensory perception and comparison of phenomena by repetition, uniformly, and through a succession of previous phenomena; rather, causality is an a priori concept. Kant introduces time in any transition from one state to another state and thus deals with the empirical determination of time. From Kant's point of view, the relationships are not in the phenomena, but the links of time have an empirical structure, according to which we determine objectively these phenomena as perceptual objects of a single experience with the help of A Priori Principles.

Although the fourth dimension has gone beyond the boundaries of philosophy and is now a major concern in physics, the exact origins and history remain a mystery. Therefore, it should be investigated in the context of which philosophical problems of the Islamic world the fourth dimension was formed and then, how it developed. We will see that in the philosophical society of Iran, it has been traced back to Mullā Sadrā; we will show that, however, in the Islamic world prior to him, there are quite explicit statements in the works of Naṣīr al–Dīn Ṭūsī, Ibn Kammūna, Quṭb al–Dīn Shīrāzī, Mīrak Bukhārī, Qūshchī, Mīr Dāmād and others. In Western philosophy, the fourth dimension has been arguably traced back to the opinions of some medieval thinkers such as Anselm; but some western thinkers have correctly shown that there is no explicit statement about this in their works. In short, in this article, we will collect the views of the mentioned thinkers in a historical way and analyze them rationally. In the end, we will take a glance at the history of Ibn ʿArafa’s relevant opinion about reductional four–dimensionalism.

At the beginning of Being and Time, Bergson's name comes alongside Aristotle’s name when Heidegger tried to distinguish the concept of temporality from traditional time. Now, the question is why after Aristotle, the name of Bergson comes? If he meant to name the last philosopher, why didn’t he mention Husserl, who was Heidegger’s professor and was supposed to have a lecture about Time-consciousness? Why not Hegel, whose interpretation of the concept of time is the subject of the penultimate chapter in Being and Time? Why not Dilthey, whose thoughts are the focus of Heidegger’s most critical early investigations of time? However, in the footnote near the end of Being and Time, Heidegger admits that he only wanted to distinguish his thoughts from Bergson about the concept of time. But our investigations show something different. It shows that Heidegger used Bergson’s concept of time to build his theory in Being and Time. Although, recently, researchers gave a great interest to Bergson's work and his influences on Gilles Deleuze's philosophy, but the questions about Bergson's influence on phenomenology and Heidegger's philosophy had been unanswered. The increasing attention of scholars toward these questions is promising, but not enough. This article tries to answer some of these questions.

According to Kant, Synthesis is temporally structured. However, the "transcendental I" which serves as the foundation for temporal Synthesis, is out of time. In the analogies of experience, the "transcendental I" does not put into any moods of time (persistence, succession, and simultaneity). This may seem contradictory, as it raises the question of how the timeless "transcendental I" can form the basis of a synthetic judgment while also being out of time. This article aims to show that, based on the discussion on synthesis and the analogies of experience, the timelessness of the transcendental self does not entail a disconnection from time. Because the disconnection with time will render the transcendence of the self meaningless in Kant's philosophy. Although the "transcendental I" is not "in" time, it is always "with" time. Being "with" time means that the subject, as pure spontaneity, constitutes objectivity through time. This is because the existence of phenomena and their objective knowledge is only possible through objectivity as a determination in time. By giving time to itself a priori, the transcendental self affects itself and thus guarantees its transcendence through its finitude which is the constant companionship to time.IntroductionKant's philosophy posits that every synthesis, such as apprehension, reproduction, or recognition, is temporally structured. However, the unity of these combinations requires the existence of the transcendental self as their a priori ground for knowledge. According to Kant, the transcendental self, as the ground of the temporality of combinations, exists outside of time. In the analogies of experience, Kant goes beyond this and claims that the transcendental self is even outside of any of the modes of time (persistence, succession, and simultaneity). This raises a problem: if the transcendental I is outside of time, then its transcendence would be meaningless in Kant's philosophy. We will show that the synthetic unity of knowledge occurs in all its stages in connection with time. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge depends on the relationship between time and the transcendental self. This article has tried to show with the phenomenological approach and by examining the discussion of synthesis and analogies of experience that the temporality of the transcendental self does not mean its "being in time" but rather, it means the constant companionship of the transcendental self and time itself.The relationship between time and SynthesisAccording to Kant, multiplicity needs synthesis to be known. The multiplicity of time cannot be understood unless the unity of time is assumed beforehand. The unity of time is the formal and a priori condition of the intuition of all phenomena. The synthesis of apprehension is related to the present. The synthesis of reproduction that is related to the past is the synthesis of the current moments with the previous moments. This is the responsibility of the transcendental imagination. The synthesis of recognition is related to the future because the a priori identity of the two moments will be the end based on which the imagination can order the multiplicity of intuitions (moments).The combination of recognition or the identification of understanding itself requires a fundamental identity that unites all three combinations. This second identity is called “Transcendental Apperception” which according to Kant is outside of time. How can the timeless transcendental self be the ground of the temporal combination? If the transcendental self is outside of time, it is no longer transcendental, and if it is in time, like other phenomena, it becomes an object of knowledge. How can this conflict be resolved in Kant? The answer to this question can be found in the section on analogies of experience.Analogies of experience: relation of time with the transcendentalself-consciousnessIn the analogies of experience, In analogies of experience, Kant talks about the moods of time. The moods of time are persistence, succession, and simultaneity. Even in analogies of experience, although Kant proposes these three modes of time, the above conflict is not resolved. Therefore, not only is the transcendental self not placed in any of the divisions of time, but also according to the analogies of experience, it is not placed in any moods of time.The conflict is resolved only when we note that all three analogies are related to the categories of relation. In addition to being related to the categories of relation, analogies reveal the meaning of "relation"; The "relation" between the subject and the predicate of the sentence and the relationship between the subject and the object in general. The pure unity of time - which is assumed by the transcendental subject - is the necessity that makes possible not only the knowledge of objects but also the realization of objectivity. Therefore, transcendental self-consciousness, as the necessary condition for knowing objects, must always consider its connection with the pure unity of time. If these rules - the analogies of experience - do not exist as transcendental time- determinations, the unity of nature and the temporality of phenomena will be lost. As a result, experience in the sense of a priori synthesis of phenomena also becomes meaningless.Therefore, even though nothing has been directly said about the relationship between time and transcendental self-consciousness in analogies, there is a fundamental connection between transcendental self-consciousness and time. The objectivity of synthetic judgments depends on time; Although, time is neither something outside the transcendental subject nor inside the subject. Rather, time is the way by which the subject affects itself. According to Heidegger, time is the continuous self-affecting of the subject.ConclusionAccording to what has been said, in the discussion of the analogies, it becomes clear how the transcendental subject, though it is not "in" time, makes it possible to be "in" time, And this is the same constant companionship of the transcendental self with time itself. Time and transcendental self are two sides of a pure combination. The transcendental self makes possible one side of knowledge - that is, subjectivity - and time - the other side - that is, objectivity. Neither time nor the transcendent self is "in" time. At the same time, both of them are a priori to all of the intra-temporal objects.Moreover, the transcendent self is not "in" time but "with" time. And in being with time, The transcendent self can make all the moods of time possible. This companionship means the persistence of the relationship.Finally, only being "with" time can justify the paradox of receptivity of self in intuition and spontaneity of understanding. The transcendental self as pure spontaneity accompanied with time can pose the receptive self in front of itself as objectivity and it guarantees the transcendence of the subject.

The present article attempts to explore two principles out of four literary and poetic principles with the centrality of Kant's conceptual turn concerning the concept of time that Deleuze opted for treating Kant's philosophy. In order to reformulate the Critique of Pure Reason, Deleuze exploits two literary principles. The first one is taken from Hamlet according to which time is out of control, the second one is taken from Arthur Rambo as he said, I is another. For appreciating such complicated statements and explaining Deleuze's particular reading of Critique of Pure Reason, the author proceeds to explore Deleuze's writings and seminars on Kant in order to show that the presupposition of having a good command over Deleuze's philosophy is to study his confrontation with Kant's philosophy. For achieving such an end, the author accompanies Deleuze's treatment of Kant's philosophy step by step in order to shed some light on the concept of time in his reading of The Critique of Pure Reason from various perspectives so to apprehend the two poetic principles concerning the time.

The question of time has always been one of the greatest questions of philosophers and physicists throughout history. Undoubtedly, every philosophical thought is manifested in different forms in literary and artistic works, and among them there are writers and artists who use philosophy as the basis of their works. Samuel Beckett is one of the most influential writers in shaping the school of thought of Absurd Theater, which has its roots in philosophy. This article purports to examine and express the issue of time in the play Waiting for Godot using the ideas of Martin Heidegger. Martin Heidegger looks at the question of "time" from an ontological point of view and in his divisions, he considers "time" in both original and non-original forms for Dasein (existence). As in the play Waiting for Godot, the most important action of the play "the issue of time" is the characters' conflict in the form of two Dasein. Thus, according to Heidegger's definition of the original and non-original "time" with which Dasein is involved in life, "time" was examined as the most important element in the play Waiting for Godot. To achieve this analysis, it was first necessary to provide an exhaustive definition of "time" in the philosophical thought of Heidegger and the philosophers before him, and then by examining the issue of wait and its meaning in Heidegger's "time", the play Waiting for Godot and the characters' continuous wait were interpreted. Analytical research has been used in this study and by examining Heidegger's thoughts and Samuel Beckett's the play Waiting for Godot, and using descriptive-analytical method, it has been tried to find the common ground between Beckett's thought on writing and performing the scenes of this play and Heidegger's philosophical thoughts to shed new light on its analysis and conducting.

.The main problem of the article is to examine the relationship between the three concepts of time, life and moral life, and the goal is to answer the question, what is the philosophical relationship between these three concepts? In this article, it has been tried to prove with the descriptive and analytical method that the relationship between time and the meaning of life can be analyzed and explained only in the third angle, which is moral life. Because the truth of man is nothing but existence and all perfectional attributes are a way of existence, but the essence of existence, the stronger and more noble the existence, the higher the perfectional attributes will be. Also, moral life has an ontological approach. And man is a fluid and changing being. It is that one order of existence goes towards a more complete order with its essential movement to reach the goal of elimination, that is, to reach happiness or destruction in the presence of God. Acquiring moral virtues over time and in accordance with the essential movement of the human soul over time is a part of moral life, and moral life is the same period of life; sometimes short and sometimes long; It is used to achieve the goal and acquire moral virtues to beautify it and achieve the goal; Consequently, it takes time to gain purpose or meaning in life.

Time is one of the most important features of the world of matter, and the knowledge of which has always attracted the attention of philosophers. The simplicity of perception of time and the difficulty of its explanation have resulted in some disagreements among philosophers concerning its definition. Islamic philosophers are no exception in this regard, and the roots of their disagreements go back to Plato’s and Aristotle’s different definitions of time. Plato defined time as a self-subsistent and essentially independent substance that is a differentiated form of the world of Ideas. In Aristotle’s view, time represents the number of motion from its priority and posteriority aspects, which cannot be gathered with each other. While acknowledging the difference between these two definitions, Islamic philosophers have usually chosen one of these definitions and tried to respond to the suspicions about their selected definition and reject the arguments in favor of the opposing one. Some philosophers such as Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sīnā, and Suhrawardī adopted Aristotle’s definition, while Zakarīyyā Rāzī and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī advocated Plato’s definition. Nevertheless, no effort as to demonstrating the contrast between Aristotelean and Platonic definitions of time is justified because both philosophers believe that although time is different from motion, their existences are inseparable from each other. In other words, the perception of one depends on the perception of the other. accordingly, the present paper, while clarifying Plato’s view, initially intends to explain that it is not in contrast to Aristotle’s view and, secondly, aims to demonstrate the effects of their view on those of Muslim philosophers.

According to Gilles Deleuze, the Virtual is the ideal dimension of reality and the virtual image is the inseparable part of crystal-time between subjectivity and objectivity, which is the most complex form and structure of narrating time Deleuze,. This study aims to illuminate the concept of the virtual image in Gilles Deleuze's philosophy, and since the main hypothesis of this research is the effect of the concept of the virtual image on the "European art cinema movement" in the field of narrative's methods and structures, hence the research In order to prove this hypothesis, after explaining the concept of the virtual image and its role in the crystal-time model in Gilles Deleuze's philosophy, the study will examine movies like; Hiroshima My Love 1959 - last year in Marine Wind 1961 - Immortal 1963 in order to demonstrate how these films have achieved different representations of a time in their narrative structure and what are the differences with a linear structure of time. Also, this research seeks to achieve a model for reading and analyzing this type of time-oriented narrative.

According to the verses and Hadithes, time is one of the most valuable things that a person benefits from in his life. Life is an opportunity and time that is considered as one of the most important divine blessings, for which man is responsible and wasting it will lead to punishment. Given that in the viewpoint of some thinkers, time is an unreal thing, and on the other hand, time, assuming its existence, is a non-optional phenomenon, the question that is raised is how the human responsibility towards time is justified? Analyzing the nature of time from Mullah Sadra's point of view, this article tries to explain philosophically the responsibility of man towards time. The hypothesis of the discussion is that achievement of beatitude, which is the goal of human creation, depends on paying attention to time, life and not neglecting it and using it as much as possible, and in this sense, time is not only an optional matter and a duty, but rather the only way to human beatitude is to use this great blessing that God has given to man. Paying attention to this point can show the reason for the necessity of this discussion.

This article first explores Augustine's view of the subject of time and proves that from Augustine's point of view the nature of time is mental not objective. According to his explanation of time extension, it is indeed our mind that, given the passage of time, imagines the extension for the present. According to Augustine, the fact is that the moment that comes and destroys the previous one has no extension. Future, whether long or short, is nothing but our expectation which is attributed to time by mind. After proving the subjectivity of time, the place of time in theology and also the relationship of time with God are examined from Augustine's perspective. Given the negation of the objectivity of time, what is related to man as time is not related to God, and therefore God takes precedence over man's time.