universal

The discussion of "universal" and "particular" is a significant and pervasive topic across both mental and objective realms. This concept extends from essence to existence, making it an inseparable and decisive part of any philosophical school. A key question arises: How do the meanings and implications of "universal" and "particular" change with shifts in philosophical foundations? In the quiddity view, universals and particulars are confined to conceptual and quiddity domains. The individuation of each particular depends on a quiddity subsumed under a broader universal concept. Different types of universals are the results of various quiddity considerations. However, with a shift toward the doctrine of the primacy and gradational unity of existence, the roles of universals and particulars extend beyond quiddity correspondence. Existence, while inherently particular and individualized, universally encompasses all existential levels. Each higher level of existence embodies the truth of the lower, while each lower existence represents a refinement of the higher. Finally, in the third journey, the particular, in its specific meaning, signifies the encompassing nature of a personal existential reality over its manifestations. The universal, on the other hand, refers to the gradational and expansive manifestation of existence encompassing divine appearances. Thus, universality and particularity are conceptual considerations that vary depending on differing perspectives in ontology, whether they pertain to essence, existence, or their related dimensions.

Avicenna in two parts of the book of Al-Shifa (کتاب الشفاء) or The Book of Healing reports the theory of Platonic Ideas or Forms: first account is in the chapter 10 from the second book in the Demonstration Treatise (رساله البرهان) and second account is in the chapter 2 from the seventh book in the Theology Treatise (رساله الالهیات). Both reports have explanations of the theory of Platonic Ideas and then some critiques of the theory. Here we will discuss only Avicenna's description and explanations of the theory of Ideas; what is Avicenna's understanding from Plato's Ideas? At the present essay it is necessary to investigate the range of familiarity that Avicenna has with Platonic Ideas, Aristotle's role in this familiarity and the philosophical functions of the Ideas in Avicenna's understanding and identification of them. First of all, Avicenna thinks that Platonic Ideas are universals and, on this description, he erects other descriptions of their truth. It is vital to know that Avicenna's familiarity with Platonic Forms is essentially mediate; that's by way of Aristotle's works including both descriptions and criticisms of those forms. Review and analysis of Avicenna's texts brings us to the three arguments of Platonists for the existence of Ideas: the argument from the sciences, the one over many arguments and the object of thought argument.

Porphyry's work titled Isagoge is commonly seen as an analysis of Aristotle's Categories, focusing on universal concepts, with the five predicables considered as different types of universals. Often, the same view is ascribed to Aristotle, but in fact, it is an approach arising from a confusion between universal and whole, as well as a confusion between particular and part by Porphyry in the Isagoge. In Categories, Aristotle does not refer to "whole" and "part" as synonyms for "universal" and "particular. Porphyry, however, in some cases distorting this distinction, uses “whole” and “part” to mean “universal” and “particular”. Moreover, they disagree on the essence of the five predicables and their relation to the universal. Aristotle views genes and species as universals and their connection to individuals as universal to particular, but he distinguishes them from the concept of universal and does not believe every universal is a genes or species. Porphyry, on the other hand, reduces genes and species to mere universal conceptions and consider them as synonyms for universal. It appears that there are two approachs in the philosophical tradition that started with Porphyry. These approachs were perpetuated and broadened by later thinkers. Initially, he altered the understanding of whole and part to universal and particular. Furthermore, he reduced genes and species to mere universal.

The "substratum substance" theory is one of the theories proposed in the West regarding the structure of external objects. This theory posits that object is composed of a particular, bare, and featureless substance along with a set of properties. From their perspective, properties are all universal, and identifying them requires a bare particular. Moreover, the bare particular serves as the bearer of properties and the factor ensuring the persistence of an object through change. Similar to hyle (prime matter), the bare particular possesses no actuality of its own but merely carries actualities. Muslim philosophers have also presented their own perspectives on the structure of external objects. Using the method of comparison, explanation, and critique, this article argues that the arguments presented for proving the existence of bare particulars are insufficient. Furthermore, based on the principles of Sadrian philosophy, this theory can be critically examined and challenged.

Aristotle gives a definition of "universal" that Łukasiewicz considers non-comprehensive because it does not include null universals. In addition, Aristotle's definition of a particular can be understood in two ways: (1) a particular can only be predicated on one thing, (2) a particular cannot be predicated. This double conception, which is repeated with great frequency in the words of Aristotle's commentators, on the one hand, calls into question the opinion of Koons and Pickavance - who believe that a particular in Aristotle's view is unpredicable; And on the other hand, it is a conflict that must be resolved. In this essay, it will be shown that, firstly, Łukasiewicz's objection is not relevent and Aristotle's definition also includes null universals; And secondly, the conflict that seems to arise from the definition of particular can be resolved by distinguishing two types of predication, "in the manner of one name" and "not in the manner of one name".

When philosophers and jurists of the natural law school talk about human rights, they consider them to be rights derived from human nature. Philosophers such as Richard Rorty have taken a deconstructive approach to the nature and universal truth about human beings, criticizing essentialism and fundamentalism in human rights with skepticism. Instead, with a historical and pragmatic approach, they dismiss the philosophical approach as a universal foundation for human rights and argue that fundamental rationalist projects such as the concept of human rights if Make no mistake, they are unnecessary and outdated. Rorty believes that at any time and place, a kind of legal discourse is formed for each society and is accepted as a legal principle by a consensus in the same society. Therefore, it would be futile to impose a universal and equal law as human rights on all societies. According to him, there is no transcendent human nature by which we seek to justify our beliefs. What brings us together is not human rationality but common historical contexts. Therefore, the best way to promote a culture of human rights is through our shared sad experiences, in order to lead people towards respect for human rights and a sense of empathy. Human rights here are not rational and metaphysical but constructive in the interests of humanity. Our attempt in this article is to answer such doubts: Can Rorty's irrational sentimentalism be able to distinguish between true and false human rights stories? How is his thought possible and explicable? On the other hand, is the classical theory of human rights, that is, the theory that defines human rights based on the common interests of the people, an unsuitable basis for understanding human rights in international relations? Is deconstruction the general principles of morality, is it not immoral and the negation of morality?

In Sadrian philosophy the change in motion is the same as its immutability, which justifies the relationship between the changing to the immutable. The question here is whether the theory of immutability of change had any supporters before Mullā Ṣadrā. The main purpose of this study is to provide an appropriate response to this question. This theory has been criticized by Muslim thinkers and philosophers for a very long time. Therefore, this paper provides a discussion of the most important of such criticisms based on available evidence. Some scholars have attributed the theory of immutability of change to early philosophers in order to solve the problem of the relation of the changing to the immutable and support their own views, which does not seem to be based on solid evidence. Prior to Mullā Ṣadrā, some philosophers maintained that the heavenly sphere enjoys continuity and fixity in its evolution; however, this cannot be considered as a final resolution to the problem of the relation of the changing to the fixed. Here, the author concludes that the fixity of Sadrian change should be criticized because it leads to accepting a view attributed to Rajol Hamedani about the “universal”.

It is a universal and partial of the issues discussed in philosophy and logic. Whereas, in order to avoid intermingle the issues of each science, their boundaries are Located through their subjects; The question arises why in both the sciences of logic and philosophy, both universal and partial are discussed? The present article seeks to find the distinguishing feature of this discussion in this scientific field. By studying the historical course and using the analytical method, it is concluded that from the beginning of the formation of this discussion in Aristotle's system of thought, there is no significant difference between his metaphysics and logic. Muslim philosophers, including Ibn Sina, although at first acting in the method of Aristotle as a commentator, later considered some issues, such as the categories in which the Five Universals as an entry of categories, to be outside the scope of the science of logic. On the other hand, the discussion of the Five Universals is one of the inevitable issues in logic due to the need for it in the subject of notions and definitions. There are also differences of opinion among philosophers regarding the source of division of the five generalities, which indicates the intermingle of the issues in philosophy and logic. Some views, in distinguishing this discussion in the two mentioned areas, have proposed different considerations and modes, and some have relegated the ontological discussion of generalities to philosophy and the study of its rules to the field of logic.

The universals are one of the controversial topics that have attracted philosophers’ attention since Aristotle’s discussion. E. J. Lowe is an Aristotelian Philosopher who has worked on universals. This article tries to perform a critical analysis of Aristotelian universals from E.J.Lowe's viewpoint. We will explain Lowe’s argument in favor of Realism will be analyzed. Illustrating weaknesses of opposite theories, he rejects all possibilities but Realist’s claim. Lowe believes that his view is able to provide a powerful explanatory framework for natural law. Without universals, Lowe holds, natural events are nothing but permanent regularities that originate from accidental generalization. So universals play a key role in his ontological system and only with the aid of them natural laws are justifiable. Propositions of natural laws deal with nature of entities, namely universals, whereas particulars instances by themselves are not able to establish a firm basis for natural laws owing to the fact that particulars refers to existent state of affairs. Following Aristotle, Lowe argues that Immanent universals are more reasonable. He holds that universals are abstract (by abstract, he means the entities that don’t have spatiotemporal features) because he thinks that concreteness of universals has some contradictory results (concrete entity is not abstract). We will consider strengths and weaknesses existing in his ideas. Authors believe that universal thanks to their different nature could be (and actually are) concrete.

In most of the philosophical books, the issue of "Individuation" and the determination of its criteria have been discussed about which various statements have been made by philosophers. This research aims to examine the opinion of "Ghiyas al-Din Mansur Dashtaki Shirazi", one of the philosophers in the Shiraz Philosophical School, regarding Individuation. With deliberation on the works of this philosopher on the basis of Sadrian thought and by a descriptive-analytical method, it turned out that Ghiyas al-Din considers "Individuation" as a mentally posited issue and amongst the Secondary Intelligibles. Moreover, he considered it as redundant to the quiddity and relevant to the identity of the object; in the sense that it does not have an independent existence outside and is the same as the individual quiddity. Ghiyas al-Din considers the stability of human personality in this world and the hereafter as the continuation of its quiddity and in regard to the cause of human Individuation he has been contradicting himself. What placed Ghiyas al-Din in opposition to Mulla Sadra, is that the basis of his view of Individuation is the principality of quiddity while that of Mulla Sadra is the principality of existence.

Since early times, Plato’s ideas have been assumed as universal entities as opposed to the particulars. More exact analysis of Plato’s terminology, however, shows the contrary. There is no term for “universal” and “particular” in his terminology at all, and he rather uses the words “whole” [کل] and “part” [جزء], which, considering their similitude to “universal” [کلی] and “particular” [جزئی], have been extremely mistaken for the two latter. These terms are developed in the middle Dialogues being closely related with the controversial issue of ideas. Plato regards each idea as one and simple; however, Parmenides’ criticisms urge him to reconstruct his views. To resolve this problem, he makes use of the term “whole” which implicates a middle state between the One and the multitude in the hierarchy of unity. There is nothing absolutely simple and with the exception of the One, all things include parts. In a sense, however, the idea can be considered as one, for although it includes parts, it cannot be reduced to them and so it is somehow independent of them. Such a kind of unity, lying inferior to the absolute One and higher than the multitudes, is called the whole and belongs to the ideas. Every idea is a whole and possesses the highest possible unity after the One. So “wholeness” is almost a synonym for unity or a second unity. It is not the case that the wholeness appertains to ideas, but the particulars also participate in it.

Knowledge by presence has been a matter of dispute in theology. In this paper we attempt to answer the question how and in what way the knowledge by presence of the One will be achieved based on Plotinus and Rumi’s Views. It has been assumed that: there is a possibility of knowledge by presence for understanding the One through Nous; however, it will be achieved in the final step of Knowledge by presence, even by going beyond the Nous. The method of this article in understanding and analyzing Rumi and Plotinus’s discourses is comparative accompanied by the interpretive approach. The importance of the article, especially in the field of intercultural studies, is that although, contrary to Rumi, Plotinus mysticism is not bound to revelation and this mystic did not have much to do with the religion of his time (Christianity), the relative similarities are found as to the possibility of Knowledge by Presence to the One and its quality, apart from the difference in logic and expression.

One of the most perplexing issues in Arabic Logic is the particular quantifier for conditionals. Before discussing particular quantifier at cogent conditionals, Ibn-Sina deals with particular quantifier at categorical propositions and its divisions. But, as we shall see, his explanation at categorical propositions is inconsistent with his discussion at conditionals; and his analogy between the two realms is more confusing than explaining! Despite this, in this paper, I’ll show that by using some branches in Modern Logic, such as second-order logic, modal logic and temporal logic, many of the ambiguities and the objections can be replied. Also, I’ll glance at the reflection of the discussion in some of Ibn-Sina’s great followers: Fakhr Al-Din Al-Razi, Afdal Al-Din Al-Khunaji, Athir Al-Din Al-Abhari, Khaje Nasir Al-Tusi, Shams Al-Din Al-Samaqandi and Qutb Al-Din Al-Razi. I shall show haw far they are from Ibn-Sina. Besides, it will be clear that their distinctions between contingent conditional and particular cogent conditional are very weak and, indeed, cannot help any way to understand the distinction.

Undoubtedly, A Priori needs to be clarified if we are to understand the heart of Critique of Pure Reason; and Kant, precisely for this very reason, devoted a considerable part of Critique to explaining the epistemic status of A Priori, searching its origin, specifying its validity scope, and illustrating its instances. Although he, more or less, in both editions of Critique, put forward some characteristics intrinsic to A Priori (such as necessary, strictly universal, pure, clear, certain and independent of experience) since they have been also used in (pre)post-Kantian traditions, especially in a meaning different from what Kant meant, so they may simply bring about some confusions cause failing to appropriately grasp the heart of Critique. With reference to such confusions the authors make an attempt to shed light on this point in part (1). Then, in part (2-1), based on the text of Critique and its commentators’ views, authors proceed to show that to evade such confusions one should re-define necessary to “what is emerged from the nature of the human mind”, strictly universal to “applicable just in the realm of phenomenon”, pure to “merely focused on the contribution of mind itself in collaboration with the objects themselves to form empirical knowledge”, clear to “what the scope of searching for is limited to within ourselves not outside of it” and certain to “what its scope is immutable –either regarding to its instances themselves or to their numbers”. In part (2-2), by scrutinizing the other characteristic (i.e. independent of experience), we shall show that this characteristic, besides of referring to mere structure, can refer to some kind of knowledge on which every possible experience is based; moreover, we shall determine the relation of above characteristic to pre(post)-Kantian traditions.

Philosophical demarcation regarding sensible and non- sensible world was always a distinctive among philosophers since the inception of philosophy. The result of such demarcation was to build two different kinds of philosophical grouping. On the one hand, there were the materialist philosophers who considered the limit of existence up to sensible beings and on the other hand, there was philosophers who hold that the limit of existence is extended beyond the sensible world as well. A significant distinctive matter in this regard is the method by which the discussion is settled. The aim in this paper is to deal with the method by virtue of which the question about the limit of existence could be dealt with. The writers attempt to reveal that in Plato and Avicenna`s view the method of investigation into sensible being was a common feature. The result displays that both philosophers took the method of investigation into sensible world in action with different metaphysical implication. Plato reached to Ideas and the world of Forms while the Avicenna resulted in natural universal which shared its existence with particular things in sensible world.

The discussion of general concepts and their formation is one of the most important issues in epistemology. Mulla Sadra, in contrast to the method of obtaining partial concepts, does not consider the general concept to be the product of self-creation, but believes that it is due to the intensity of the substance of the soul and the perception of the intellect. This theory is accepted by most scholars of the Transcendental wisdom, but Allameh Tabatabai, accepting the principles of Mulla Sadra's philosophy, has a controversy over Mulla Sadra on this subject, including in the issue of latitudinal intellects and and masters of all kinds, and seeks to transpose the problem from latitudinal intellects to longitudinal intellects, complete the epistemic geometry of Mulla Sadra. In this article, from the point of view of important points and ideas on how to formulate general concepts, we will analyze and compare the views of Mulla Sadr and Allameh Tabatabaii.

Mulla Sadra is a philosopher who has new ideas about “universal” and the manner and conditions of its perception. Mulla Sadra’s view about universal and its perception is based on some issues as follow: principality of existence, ambiguity of existence, substantial motion and Platonic Ideas. He uses the term “remote viewing” for perception of universal which has two interpretations with regard to his phrases and perhaps only one of these two interpretations can be considered as his final opinion in this issue. Perception of universal and its conditions have also different expressions in his works. The write with regard to the principles of Sadra in this regard attempts to gather these various expressions and believes that the perception of universal has hierarchical degrees in Sadraian philosophy that Include the following: perception of widespread universal, perception of the conceptual universal that is purified from imagination, perception of conceptual universal with the help of imagination and perception of imaginative form that is applicable to many.

Muslim philosophers believe that natural universals exist in the external world with the existence of their instances. They, on the other hand, hold that fundamentality lies with existence or essence. Some are of the view that the conviction that natural universals exist in the external world is compatible only with the conviction that fundamentality lies with essence. The fact of the matter is however that the fundamentality of existence or the identicalness of essence with existence is not incompatible with the belief that natural universals exist in the external world. Peripatetic philosophers believe they are compatible.

Until now the discourse on the localization sociology has been considered in the abstract and no attention has been given to the relationship between the institution of sociology and social institutions. This research seeks to investigate the social grounds required for the localization of sociology in Iran by passing through the dualism of epistemology which governs the realm of sociology of science and offer a suitable model of establishment of the institution of sociology inside social structures. Using a qualitative-documental method and investigating the suitable way of the development of (universal-based living of sociology and its interaction with social institutions), this research designates the crux of the problem of localization the human sciences with emphasis on sociology in Iran. The discourse on localization of sociology, regardless of the way it is defined, should look for solutions for improving the establishment of the institution of sociology in Iran. In other words, if, according the different definitions, the localization of sociology is to be fulfilled in Iran, the relationship and interaction of the institution of science and structures with social institutions and also development of universal-based living of science cannot be ignored.

Nominalism developed as an answer to the problems of universals. In this article, we first begin by studying the kinds of universal, and then, examine three theories, discussed much in the area of universals. These three theories are realism, conceptualism, and nominalism. Strict nominalism, metalinguistic nominalism, metaphor theory, narrative nominalism, class nominalism, methodological nominalism, and social nominalism are among the kinds of nominalism which we study in this article. Considering his realist tendency, Allameh Tabataba’i’s view is in clear contrast with some kinds of nominalism. This contrast is shown in the fields of ontology, epistemology, propositions, and fundamental methodology through a deductive and analytical method.