wittgenstein

Today, although the debates related to knowledge have expanded, the question of the possibility of knowledge and certainty is still the starting point of epistemological debates. Wittgenstein and Moore are two influential philosophers of the 20th century who stand in an important position against each other. Moore is the only philosopher that Wittgenstein mentions in the book On Certainty and it was Moores view on knowledge that is the basis of the Austrian philosopher for further discussions about knowledge and certainty. In response to the problem of the possibility of knowledge and the problem of skepticism, Moore claims that there are facts that we know and have knowledge of. He lists a list of propositions whose knowledge is certain. Wittgensteins approach to this claim has a negative and a positive side. According to Wittgenstein, Moores propositions such as here is a hand are not correct examples of knowledge or knowing Moore does not use them correctly. There is a difference between knowledge and certainty. Knowledge and certainty belong to different categories. On the other hand, Wittgenstein is with Moore in attributing a different role to the mentioned propositions in the epistemic system. Wittgensteins criticism of Moore does not weaken the epistemological status of Moores propositions, but gives a more fundamental basis to such propositions.

Moral certainty is one of the functional concepts that has recently attracted the attention of some philosophers of ethics and epistemologists. During the last decades, philosophers have approached this concept from different angles; however, they have sometimes provided an incorrect and inaccurate concept of this term because of ignoring its origin and historical development and losing sight of the historical, religious, or legal context in which it might be used. Jean Gerson, the French scholar and educator, created the term “moral certainty” for an appropriate level of certainty. Later, Descartes defined it as a kind of certainty that is sufficient for organizing behavior and assisting people in solving life-related problems. On the other hand, John Locke included absolute certainty and moral certainty in the concept of his own “real certainty”. The concept of moral certainty has also undergone an interesting process of development in Christianity. In church law, the concept of moral certainty is used to describe the mental status of the judge when they should decide with certainty whether the accused is truly guilty or not. In this paper, after referring to the first applications of this concept in the history of Western philosophy in the course of a historical-philosophical research and a study of the development of the concept of moral philosophy in different periods, the authors demonstrate that the concept of certainty has been prone to many changes since the 14th century and its first use in Gerson’s works. They will also clarify the place of this philosophical term in today’s epistemology of ethics after its historical journey and presence in various disciplines, and how the Wittgensteinian approach to this concept has gained widespread acceptance during the recent decades after its introduction many centuries ago.

In his reflections on certainty and his epistemological analyses, Wittgenstein mentions propositions that he calls "hinge propositions". What role do these propositions play in Wittgenstein's epistemological system? What are their characteristics and how many types are there? What is their difference or similarity with other definite propositions such as mathematical propositions? The mentioned items are some of the questions that we will address in this article. According to Wittgenstein, when we reach these propositions, doubt loses its meaning. These propositions are like hinges around which our beliefs revolve. Hinge propositions do not give us knowledge, but they build the basis of knowledge. They are not ordinary propositions because properties such as knowability, being justified or unjustified, being true or false do not have meaning about them. These propositions are the criteria of truth and falsity. In this article after clarifying the concept of hinged propositions, we will enumerate their different types and examine Wittgenstein's claims about propositions. Also, we have tried to show Wittgenstein's meaning by making such propositions and finally we try to criticize his point of view.

Since the time of Aristotle, some philosophers have insisted on the point that a part of knowledge is more fundamental than other parts. There have been various forms of foundationalism in epistemology, ethics and logic, and each of them has considered a certain matter as the basis according to the field under discussion. Avrum Stroll believes that Wittgenstein is a fundamentalist, but his fundamentalism is completely different from the approach of traditional fundamentalists, and Wittgenstein's intelligent distinction between knowledge and its foundations keeps his fundamentalism away from the problems that traditional fundamentalists have. Stroll enumerates nine conditions for fundamentalism and believes that these nine conditions exist in Wittgenstein's epistemological system. He believes that Wittgenstein gives two different understandings of the basis of certain beliefs, one is relative (propositional) fundamentalism and the other is absolute (non-propositional) fundamentalism, and over time Wittgenstein moves away from relative fundamentalism and leans towards absolute fundamentalism. In this article, after clarifying Stroll's argument about Wittgenstein's fundamentalism and the difference between this fundamentalism and its traditional interpretations, we examine Stroll's distinction between Wittgenstein's two conceptions of fundamentalism and show what characteristics each of these two conceptions has and how Wittgenstein prefers the absolute fundamentalism and expands it.

One of the important ethical concepts that has occupied the minds of many philosophers in the past years is the concept of "moral certainty". This means whether there are moral propositions that are so certain that no doubt or argument or evidence can face them. According to some philosophers, for example, the statement "the wrongness of killing innocent people" brings us such moral certainty. Among the philosophers who have written in this field, two basic readings of Nigel Pleasants and Michael Kober can be mentioned. Pleasant considers moral certainty to be an absolute and natural concept that is the basis of our moral judgments, and on the other hand, Kober considers moral certainty to be a relative concept and believes that our certainties are rooted in linguistic society, culture and time. In this article, we try to address the different dimensions of the concept of "moral certainty" and the importance of its application in two different and important readings.

Fideism has gone through ups and downs from its origin to the contemporary period. In a period, faithism is beyond the subject of reason and sometimes beyond and beyond human reason. Sometimes faith is interpreted in such a way that it is not judged by the standards of reason. In a period, faith and reason are in a close relationship and we see a two-way relationship between faith and understanding. Kant with the irrationality of religious propositions and Kierkegaard with the lack of interaction between reason and religious teachings. The practice of religion is included in the Jirga of the believers, but the faith is expressed in religious experience in a different way from the previous periods, religious experience is not knowledge-giving, but a kind of feeling, the feeling of absolute and integrated reliance on an origin and a power distinct from The world is a religious experience (Makher, Otto) separating the field of religion from the field of understanding and reasoning and placing it in the realm of feeling.

Frazer and Wittgenstein had a completely different approach to the nature of religion and rationality arising from science. In Frazer's view, scientific rationality is the standard of everything; therefore, he puts religion aside. The result of Frazer's comparison between magic, religion, and science leads to the denial of religious rationality. Frazer's anthropology is based on scientific and rational explanations. According to him, after centuries of displacement in history, science has finally obtained the golden key that opens the doors of nature's treasure. Wittgenstein criticizes Frazer's opinions based on his fundamental thinking about the meta-rationality of faith. He rejects any rational and scientific explanation of religion. According to Wittgenstein, the language game of religion and the language game of science differ. Frazer cannot compare the rationality of believers' religiosity with the criteria of rationality in science and sees and despises the believers as completely wrong. This study, by analyzing Frazer's and Wittgenstein's opinions and after examining the conflict, will reveal why Frazer's criticisms of scientific rationality failed and how Wittgenstein, using metaphors such as language games and the form of life, freed religious rationality from the trap of Frazer's narrow-minded scientific criteria.

What is called language? In the history of Western philosophy, we have different answers to this question. However, according to Wittgenstein and Gadamer, these different answers are basically similar, and both criticize this basic approach. Gadamer refers to the history of Western philosophy as the history of forgetfulness of language. But he regards Augustine as an exception in this history; for Gadamer, Augustine has appreciated the central status of language and the vital relation between language and thought through his idea of the inner word. However, Wittgenstein introduces Augustine as the main agent of the basic approach of Western philosophy to language, raising his criticisms of this basic approach by objecting to Augustine's claims. In this article, I review these two different interpretations and think about the possibility of making an affinity and compromise between Gadamer's narration of Augustine's idea of the inner word and Wittgenstein's philosophy of language.

In this paper, I will argue against certain criticisms of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument and sceptical solution, made especially by Baker and Hacker, McGinn, and McDowell. I will show that their interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s view is misplaced. According to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument, there is no fact as to what someone means by her words. For Kripke, this conclusion, combined with Classical Realist view of meaning, leads to the Wittgensteinian paradox, according to which there is no such thing as meaning anything by any word. Wittgenstein presents this paradox in paragraph 201 of the Philosophical Investigations. As Kripke reads Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein is in agreement with his sceptic on the sceptical conclusion of the sceptical argument, that is, that there is no fact about meaning, and builds his sceptical solution on an endorsement of that. McDowell, McGinn, and others have objected that Kripke has failed to properly understand Wittgenstein’s main remarks in 201, that is, that the paradox is the result of a misunderstanding of the ordinary notion of meaning. Wittgenstein does not accept such a sceptical conclusion. I will use the distinction George Wilson draws between two different conclusions of the sceptical argument and show that Kripke has respected all of the remarks that Wittgenstein has put in section 201.

In this article, we examine and evaluate Wittgenstein's theory of fideism. It will be said that Wittgenstein's fideism is based on the fact that faith is compatible with the absence of reason, that is, a person can have no reason but have faith. In other words, there is a kind of precedence of faith over reason and reasoning. In Wittgenstein's fideism, the argument is that faith must come first so that man can reason. With the design of language games, he says that believing is a special and practical language game that takes place in the context of religious life. Also, in his opinion, believers have religious images in their background that make their religious life possible. Of course, this image is the result of work and activity, not reasoning.

One might ask about the meaning of something, while the nature of meaning and how one is to get the meaning are the most complicated issues in the philosophy of language. Semantics influenced by empiricism is the most prevailing approach in contemporary Western philosophy. Accordingly, only those perceptions are regarded to carry any meaning that correspond to our sense impressions capable of experience. In his theory of use of language, Wittgenstein considers the meaning as a practical use of words. His theory has greatly influenced many fields of study particularly the philosophy of education.    Having adopted a critically descriptive-analytic method, the authors analyzed the nature of meaning in Wittgenstein’s theory of use of language and then they demonstrated the nature of meaning and language games in terms of family resemblance. Due to the dominance of behaviorism and empirical trait of language with Wittgenstein, language is prior to the mind and regarded as the criterion for having meaning. Consequently, his theory is open to objections such as, the denial of fundamental principles, the impossibility of the very theory, the preference of common reason, that meaning is exclusive to common languages, and lingual idealism stemming from conventionalism in language games.

The concept of ethics, as one of the key and simultaneously most challenging issues in the realm of human teachings, has always been the subject of attention and investigation. Examining ethical principles and rules and developing multiple theories in this field, in order to find the best model of life, is considered one of the most important man’s intellectual endeavors. The present study explores Ludwig Wittgenstein's views in the field of ethics, considering his existential approach, and provides a fresh interpretation of the path to the attainment of a meaningful life in the realm of ethics. Based on the analysis of the concept of bioethics in Wittgenstein's philosophy, it is specifically argued that an ethical and meaningful life, according to him, is based on the exercise of moral will and the solution of the puzzle of life, both of which require adopting a special perspective towards the world. In this perspective, the world is perceived in an eternal domain.