بسیط

The central issue in this article is to understand how is the relationship between the concept of "Being" and the meaning of "God" in Boethius' theological treatises. To this end, four issues are analyzed analytically-descriptively in Theological Treatises; 1. Why did Boethius raise the issue of ontology in Theological Treatises, and what was his purpose in distinguishing between "esse" and "id quod est" in these treatises with a purely Christian and theological nature? 2. The effect of this discussion in explaining God' transcendence through the three attributes "necessity", "perfection" and "to being goodness" of being; 3. The effect of this discussion on God's "creation"; 4. Its effect on God' unity. The study of these cases led to the conclusion that Boethius, by distinguishing between "esse" and "id quod est", considers God to be a simple being in whom "esse" and "id quod est" are one, so being is necessary for Him. God' perfection is also due to His simplicity essence; because He is His own essence and substance, so any quantity and quality that is applied to God will be the carrying of substance. Boethius explains God' simplicity in terms of the originality of being and action, and equates God' being with the Goodness itself, but creatures that are not simple are something else in addition to being good. The Creator and the creature are substantial different, and His Ubiquity goes back to God' substance beyond the two categories of place and time. By distinguishing the abstract number from the concrete number, Boethius believes that the Trinity does not produces plurality, because there is no difference of merit in God and He is nothing but His own essence.

The present research seeks to answer the two questions from “What does the impossibility of knowledge of the divine essence mean?” and “What are the reasons for this impossibility?” The following conclusions have been obtained in this research: the nonidentity of essence and attributes, and the nonidentity of existence and quiddity in God cannot be accepted; the inconceivability of God essence is true, but there may be other ways of knowing Him. Furthermore, some of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s reasons are similar to like examples than independent reasons. Therefore, the data and results seem to show that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī does not have a consistent manner on the issue and in some cases believes in the knowability of the divine essence. The authors will address the possibility of the knowability of the divine essence from the perspective of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in another independent study.

In philosophical explanation, Descartes knows the reason for our errors to be limited to the limits of our will and to rule our minds based on his free and unlimited will on matters that the perception has not clearly and distinctly understood. He intends to present some philosophical demonstration for his explanations. In this paper, I introduce some of his errors in his demonstrations. The most important drawback is that Descartes argument that will is unlimited, i.e., simplicity of will, can in some ways apply to unlimitedness of perceptions. And his argument for the limitation of perceptions because it belongs to  objects of perceptions can also imply the objects of will, and as a result, will is also limited. Another drawback is the inference of the infiniteness of the will because of its simplicity, whereas the pure actuality of will (or perceptions) results in it being immateriality, not its indefiniteness. Consequently, Descartes explanation of error and its origin does not seem to be justified in the difference between the scope of will and perceptions.

The difficulty of extracting multiple concepts from an indivisible essence is one of the main motivation of interest to negative theology. On the other side, believing in the identity of the essence and attributes of God without clarifying the nature of ascribing of attributes to God’s essence is not precise, too. In spite of the variety of solutions to this issue, it seems no one is satisfiable. In this paper, after examining these solutions, we will show that, according to the fact that God is the origin and source of all perfections and the fact that the grantor does not lack the thing he grants, we can ascribe the attributes purified from defects to God although we dont know the nature of this ascription.

The phrase “the one does issue him only the one” is content of a rule which is very important in Islamic philosophy. Muslim philosophers such as Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra accepted this principle and presented certain proofs to prove it. On the other hand, some theologians denied this rule, and through violations and objections were seeking to undermine this principle. This rule, in accordance with the principles of transcendental wisdom has certain elements, so that deniers of that rule fail to understand the correct meaning of these elements. In this paper, firstly, we explain the elements of this rule, and with Sadraian approach, arguments and objections to this rule has been analyzed, and although some Peripatetic arguments against this rule is not without problems, but according to principles of transcendent Wisdom we presented the more stronger argument in witness of this rule and answered the violations and the objections to it.

The discourse of the union of the intellect and the intelligible is one of the important philosophical issues and Porphyrius and Aristotle can be mentioned as among the early advocates of it، which has been common among the peripatetics. However، Kandī and Fārābi can be mentioned among the early Muslims who brought up the issue of the union of the intellect and the intelligible، but Ibn Sīnā has a specific perspective in this discourse. After Shaykh al-Ra’īs (Ibn Sīnā)، with whom all except Ṣadr al-Muti’allihī (Mullā Ṣadrā) were of the same opinion، Transcendental Philosophy is a new period for this discourse. In proving the union of the intellect and the intelligible، Ṣadr al-Muti’allihīn engages in the exposition of the correlation proof (burhān-i taḍāyuf). ‘Allāma Rafī’ī has analyzed the proof in such a way that according to him Ṣadr al-Muti’allihīn has intended nothing but the ‘Allāma’s analysis; but ‘Allāma’s interpretation of Ṣadr al-Muti’allihīn’s proof has a certain form that is rarely seen in the works of other expositors of Transcendental Philosophy، which is said to be ’Allāma Rafī‘ī’s specific viewpoint.

In this paper one of human characteristic namely beyond abstract status is studied from view point of two great philosophers: Mulla Sadra and Mulla Hadi Sabzewari. In philosophic knowledge of human being, transcendental theosophy and its commentators, have paid a particular attention to this certain status and have proved its bases. In this article, opinions of Mulla Sadra and Mulla Hadi Sabzewari on this status are studied and it is concluded that from viewpoint of these two sages, human being, having no determined status, can pass all stages and reach to a stage that is abstract of both: matter and quality. Although these two sages demonstrate and express this subject in a little different ways and this lead them to two different horizon of vision about this status.

From among the philosophical rules on causality bearing closely upon the resemblance principle of cause and its effect is "al-wahed" rule" (the rule that every one and the same cause may have only one and the same effect, and vice versa). This rule has been regarded as a self-evident principle by many metaphysicians, but thought of as raising serious questions particularly on its domain by others. Out of such questions is its fierce opposition to divine absolute activity and omnipotence, so that many considered divine causation as an exception to the rule. Having explained the rule and its domain, this article is going to deal with the limitation of omnipotence. it ends in the conclusion that neither exception to the rational al-wahed rule nor the limitation of omnipotence are true; there is no opposition between what is implied by this rule and the proofs of omnipotence.