اطلاعات نامتقارن

In recent years, e-commerce has developed rapidly and many transactions are made through websites and applications. According to asymmetric information theory, one party (buyer or seller) usually has more information than the other party in the transaction, and this causes loss of one of the two and disrupts the efficiency of the market. The problem of asymmetric information in online markets seems to be greater than in physical markets. In physical markets, the buyer and seller or their representative are physically present in the transaction; In online commerce, on the other hand, buyers and sellers do not have a physical presence, even at the same time. Asymmetric information in these transactions can be related to the identity of the buyer and seller, the quality and quantity of the product, price, payment operations, delivery, contract obligations and so on. Because of the importance of information symmetry in market efficiency, online marketers try to reduce asymmetric information in a variety of ways. In the present article, content analysis of the experiences of users of online markets for second-hand goods shows that asymmetric information has many negative consequences. Analysis of Islamic texts also indicates that in Islam there are rules to eliminate or reduce information asymmetry, which if used in the regulation of Internet transactions can greatly reduce the negative consequences. Online trading intermediary platforms should have a supervisory role in transactions and judge in accordance with Islamic law in cases of dispute in order to increase the efficiency of transactions and prevent one party from being deceived.

Considering the position of supplementary health insurance in the insurance industry, it is important to address the problem of adverse selection as one of the effective factors for increasing the loss ratio in this industry. In this paper, the correlation model between individuals' risk appetite under the indemnity amount and coverage amount, insurance specifications, and insureds' demographic characteristics was used to identify potential variations and risk components that influence this phenomenon. The data used were taken from the 2019 group insured information of a selected insurance company. Due to the nature of the data, the Tobit regression method was used to estimate the model. The results show that the signs of the coefficients of the variables included in the model are as expected and statistically significant. In other words, the effective variables that determine to some extent the level of risk of the insured are directly related to the level of costs. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the components that influence the occurrence or increase of medical costs and take them into account when setting the premium rate.JEL Classification: I13, D82, C34.

Adverse selection appear when insured persons have information about their risk that is not observed by insurers. Under these circumstances, insurers are unable to identify customer risk and they are forced to offer the same contract based on the average of all their customers. It is clear that offering such a similar contract will be relatively more attractive to high-risk customers. In contrast, it is not very pleasant for customers who have less risk. This will gradually drive low-risk customers out of the insurance industry. The end result will be that such a situation will prevent a stable balance in the market and it allows the market to collapse completely. In the present study, the phenomenon of adverse selection, which is one of the side effects of asymmetric information, in the basic health insurance market in Iran, it has been studied and tested. To test the research hypothesis, that is, to confirm the existence of an adverse selection, household budget data between 1993 and 1994 have been used. Attempts have been made to make the model under the least parametric assumptions, to be able to test adverse selection in health insurance. Also, unlike all previous models, the uncertainty of repayment and its amount was considered in this model, which is much more consistent with reality. The results confirm the adverse selection in health insurance, health care and social security in Iran.

Asymmetric information in insurance markets leads to adverse selection and moral hazard. The amount of asymmetric information could change over time due to learning. Unlike other insurance contracts, supplementary health insurance contracts in Iran are in group form. Therefore, between group asymmetric information might play an important role. In this article, positive correlation test is used to test presence of between group asymmetric information. Since acute hospital disease category does not have moral hazard, adverse selection is separately identified. Finally, using the temporal variation in insurance contracts, moral hazard is separated from learning. The data is a panel of insurance contracts from Asia Insurance Company, for two types of paraclinical and hospital health services, during the period of 2011-2016. Results show no asymmetric information for acute hospital disease and since there is not any moral hazard, we can conclude no between group adverse selection. For paraclinical services, we find significant evidence for asymmetric information, mainly due to moral hazard. We also found evidence of learning for insured groups.

Experimental evidence related to 2008 financial crisis and its consequences indicated the importance role of the financial sector to transfer the shocks to the real sector of the economy. In the Iranian economy also, banking is one of the major financial sectors that affects and is influences by the overall performance of the national economy through resource mobilization, recruitment of liquidity, provision of payment tools, granting facilities, and creating interaction between investment and savings.
The analysis of the banks’ roles as financial accelerators over Iranian commercial eras may provide a better understanding of effectiveness of shocks on the economy. In this paper using a New Keynesian standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model regarding price-stickiness, and structural parameters of the model and some of the variables are calibrated and the impacts of different shocks on some macroeconomic factors are analyzed in the following two ways.
The first mode is a model that includes financial accelerators. The second is a model without a financial accelerator. Then the ability of each model in describing each key feature of data and the effects of momentums on key variables in Iranian economy are analyzed. All the data used in this paper refer to constant prices in 2011 and 1966-2016 period annually. Results of the estimates for the models indicate that the effect of money demand momentum on the investment variable, and also the effect of monetary policy momentum on consumption, investment and production variables in the model, taking into consideration the financial accelerators, are tenser than that of the model without financial accelerator.

One of the most important aspects of financial deregulation is the freedom to compete in interest rates. The experiences of banking crises around the world have shown that, in most cases, high interest rates on deposits Not only does not prove the banking effectivity, but also points to Ponzi's gameplay in the banking system. The process is like this: the banks lend to risky clients and then the loan will be defaulted. As a result, banks are forced to attract deposits and repay debts. This trend has emerged in the banking system of Iran and in particular in recent years. The question is that in the competition for the attraction of deposits, what is the relativity between interest rates offered by the high-risk Bank and Low-Risk Bank. This question was answered through modeling the behavior of banks and loan applicants in the form of a two-stage game in the context of information asymmetry and by postulating some feature of banking system of Iran. The result shows that the interest rate offered by the high-risk bank is higher than the interest rate risk of the low risk bank. so, unhealthy banks have a significant role in directing interest rates.

The banking system is one of the pillars of every country's economy, whose efficiency or inefficiency can directly and indirectly affect the performance of its economy. The challenges posed by the usury free banking system are the asymmetric information issue between the bank and the facility applicant in partnership agreements. The existence of asymmetric information leads to the adverse selection and moral hazard in the markets. Since the 1970s, asymmetry of information has become one of the key issues in the economy.
The present research is to answer the question; the factors affecting the formation of moral hazard and adverse selection in partnership contracts used in Specialized banks in usury free banking, using a combination of AHP and TOPSIS math’s and using field data (questionnaire) to examine These hypotheses suggest that several factors such as the lack of attention to the customer credit risk score and the lack of incentive and punishment mechanisms for customers is effective on the formation of moral hazard and adverse selection. The results of the research indicate that the abovementioned factors have a greater effect on moral hazard and adverse selection. Supervision and control have the most important effect and widespread use of civic participation contracts has the least importance in moral hazard and adverse selection.

The presence of asymmetric information is an important source of efficiency loss for insurance companies and could reduce profitability. In this paper, we test the conditional independence of coverage choice and risk, where “conditional” means conditional on all variables observed by the insurer. We use two parametric a pair of probits and a bivariate probit model. The data includes all third-party and hull policies as well as claims data for private automobiles during 2013-2016. The data are derived from the administrative database of a small insurance company in Iran. Once we control for individuals’ risk aversion by limiting our test to subsamples of individuals who only bought minimum third-party insurance, we find evidence for the presence of asymmetric information. Based on our results, those who bought hull and third party insurance have higher risk of accident in comparison to those who only bought third party insurance. The existing premiums does not fully compensate for this extra risk.

Ethics in Islam are based on Islamic norms. Adherence to these principles can promote behavioral patterns in Islamic banking and improve interaction of banks with each other or with other organizations, clients, and employees. Islamic banking introduces new products and resources and also a different ideology which create challenges in the competitive environment of banking. Besides, Islamic banking has expanded dramatically in the international banking market. This paper studies the problem of asymmetric information in banking from the perspective of Islamic Economics and does modeling the relationship between the lending applicant and the bank in the form of a dynamic game of incomplete information. This study discusses the major risks in Islamic banking products and points out the importance of regulations and ethical codes. It is necessary to consider problems arising from adverse selection and moral hazard due to the different structure of Islamic banks and financial institutions. Adherence to the principles of Islamic ethics can prevent the negative effects of adverse selection and moral hazard.

failed to achieve to its advantages. The One of the most important reasons for not achieving to the advantages of Islamic banking is high costs associated with monitoring and controlling musharekah contracts. It is argued that these costs are due to the phenomenon of asymmetric information in these contracts, which implementing them for banks will be lack of cost-effectiveness. In this article, meanwhile explaining asymmetric information, we show musharekah contracts are useful and cost effective and the use of these contracts for banks; despite being costly; on four cases are justifiable.1- similar monitor- based activities.2-the restrictions of loan agreement.3- musharekah contract's advantages,4- the possibility of reducing asymmetric information and we conclude that the costs of monitoring musharekah contracts for Islamic Banking is justifiable and therefore implementation and development this type of contracts, does not create serious

In this paper, we try to present a theoretical model for participatory contracts in the form of principal agent model in an asymmetric information conditions in game theory framework. Using the principal agent model, how can we solve the advrsselection problem in the Islamic banking contracts and provide a simpler and less costly model? There are two hypotheses to answer the research questions. One is the use of acheivments of principal agent model in participatory contracts is more efficient. Another is the using principal agent model in an Islamic environment would minimize the adversselection problem in this model.
The results obtained from solving of the proposed model shows that by designing participatory contracts in a banking system the first hypothesis of the research is confirmed, also the results of the model confirms the cost of participation contracts in an adnersselection environment. The most important consequence of this research the possibility of of the elimination asymmetric information condition between the bank and the client if the parties adhere to the religious and Islamic regulations, this will confirm the second hypothesis of the research. In addition it has been shown that the financial instruments in Islamic economics as new achievement of economics are usable.

Nowadays, banking system plays an important role in the economy. In fact, the banks are the service institution that their main task is collecting deposit and lending the credits. One of the principal challenges to the banking system is the improper allocation of credit, which induces credit diversion. The credit diversion occurs due to asymmetric information before and after the lending credit in the partnership and exchange contracts. In this study, we examine credit diversion in 32 areas within the bank A during 2007-2016 with a descriptive-analytical approach. The results show that over these years despite the increase in the number and amount of the credit, the number of cases of credit diversion without supervision greatly reduced.

Contracts, exchanges and trade-offs are the necessary and unavoidable part of social life of human. Although from old times, ýsocieties have always tried to go legalized to reach security, social peace, public discipline and preparing and maintaining people’s benefits, but as human needs and wants are naturally alike, there have always been struggle to gain more profits and welfare. Islam also has paid attention to this subject. This paper through a descriptive-analytical methodology, studies the effect of jurisprudential (fiqhi) effects of business like banning the hoarding (ihtikar), banning the najsh, banning the deceit (gharar), banning the collusion for overcharging and … on removing the information asymmetry and related misuses and based on this study, presents a pattern of exchange system from the viewpoint of Islam. Studying Islamic resources including Quran, tradition (sunnat), reason (aql) and consensus (ijma), shows that in a society that rules and real criteria of Islam dominates and the culture and behavior of its’ people is based on Islam rules, the society will have a clear space and all the people will have an equal access to information. No one will go toward hiding the information and misusing it on behalf of himself/herself. Lying, deception, breach of promise will have no place in such a society and in opposition, the truth, transparency and loyalty to contracts will substitute; jurisprudential (fiqhi) rules also confirm this subject.

This research aims to study lease contract among set of Islamic contracts by explaining the importance and necessity of detailed study about Islamic contracts and contractual approach to Islamic economics. In this regard by considering asymmetric information as the most important challenge facing lease contract, we will study lease contract using contract theory and incentives economics. For this purpose, using a library method we study the various aspects of asymmetry of information in the lease contract considering Islamic economics and we construct a mathematical model to solve the problem. Finally we reach theoretical model that can design optimal contracts for lease of house (by replacing parameters) in a way that adverse selection problem will be solved. Then we use hypothetical parameters to solve the constructed model using LINGO software, for testing the model.

According to Iranian Constitution, Oil and Gas are classified under Anfal. Conservation in production of oil is the most important criterion in exploitation of oil resources which affects all phases of exploration, appraisal, and development and production of oil from a reservoir. Despite the passage of more than hundred years of oil production in Iran, there have been no rules, regulation or any regulation for conservation in production of oil other than its definition in the amendment to the Oil Law of the year 1366. Studies show that variety of reasons including the complexity of technical and economic calculations, heavy investment volume, achievement of results in the long term, serious uncertainties with regard to the results of EOR programs, and asymmetry and conflict of interest between contracting parties cause the factors which lead to market failure, such as huge economies of scale, asymmetric information and its resulting problems, i.e. moral hazards and adverse selection, and externalities, clearly affect the conservation programs to exploit the oil reserves and several evidences resulting from contracts to develop Iranian oil and gas fields confirm these facts. Therefore, it is necessary to deal with such issues and decision making should occur in at sovereignty position of the government other than the company level.