نظریه بازی ها

Based on an implicit general agreement, employee satisfaction and commitment are affected by full rewards, so managers' perceptions of the appropriate and effective use of rewards programs are necessary to increase efficiency. But one of the most important problems in this field is the inability to properly separate the types of labor based on their productivity during the distribution of bonuses, which causes that in many cases the labor force with high and low productivity receives the same reward. The current research tries to show that in some cases, even the distribution of inappropriate rewards can go beyond the equality of rewards for all types of labor force, so that the labor force with lower productivity is paid more reward than the labor force with higher productivity. Therefore, in this research, the relationship between managers and workforce was investigated through game theory. For this purpose, managers' strategy was designed in five modes and employees' strategy was designed in three modes. The results showed that at the equilibrium point, the strategy of managers will be to distribute continuous and equal rewards to employees with higher productivity, and employees will also choose the strategy of more effort to increase productivity (and therefore receive rewards). Finally, it is suggested that in order to create more motivation and effort for employees and as a result to increase their productivity, the distribution of bonuses among employees with higher productivity should be continuous and equal.

In this research, by designing a static game with complete information between the firm (through advertising) and customers (through the effect of advertising on their purchase), the equilibrium and optimal strategy of the players were presented. In this game, the firm will have 6 choices and the customers will have 5 choices. The results showed that B_H B strategy (full purchase with high spending and willingness to buy again and recommend it to others) is considered a dominant strategy for customers, while the firm does not have a dominant strategy. The Nash equilibrium of the game (F, B_H B) is where the company tries to introduce a new product with high quality by improving the quality and advertising a lot (very high absorption) and the customer also makes a complete purchase (spending a lot of money) and the desire to buy again and also, offering it to others gets the highest possible utility. According to the obtained results, it is suggested that firm, while improving the quality of its product, introduces its product with a lot of advertisements and as much as it can to attract many customers and also maximize its profit (utility) and increase public welfare.

In the last decade, attention has been paid to the issue of foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment is the most common form of capital flow towards developing countries, which affects the economic growth and macroeconomic stability of the country (Metaxas & Kechagia, 2016).The government of Iran has spent a lot of resources in order to attract foreign investment, but despite the implementation of supportive policies and the approval of numerous laws in order to remove obstacles in the business environment, less than expected success has been achieved in the field of foreign investment. According to the UNCTAD report (2021), Iran's share of the total amount of foreign direct investment in the world was equal to 0.09 percent. By examining the existing literature, it is clear that the interaction of the actors involved in the issue of foreign investment (foreign investor, government and people) and its effect on policy outcomes has been neglected, which can lead to less success. Iran should play an important role in attracting foreign direct investment.David Cruz et al. (2023) in a study investigated the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment in natural resources with emphasis on the role of recession and economic crisis in Latin American and Caribbean countries during the period of 1995-2020 using the panel approach. The results shown that high levels of corruption lead to a decrease in foreign direct investment in natural resources, which is a confirmation of the hypothesis of greasing wheels in investment literature.In this aspect, the present study is innovative, which aims to highlight the government's lack of attention to two basic issues in Iran. The first issue is the government's lack of attention to the interests of actors involved in foreign investment. The second issue is the presence of complex bureaucratic obstacles in the country.This study aims to analyze the decision-making process of foreign investors by using game theory when choosing Iran as an investment destination. In this study, the production function is considered with three capital inputs, the amount of bribery and provision of benefits. The reason for applying the third input (provision of benefits) in the production function is due to the fact that many activities are implemented. In the sense that their success requires the interaction of many players and adaptation to local conditions (Andrews et al, 2017). Then the problem of foreign investor optimization is examined.According to the findings of this research, with the increase in the level of institutional quality, the amount of bribe paid decreases, which applies to countries with a low level of institutional quality. The results of this study show that the Nash equilibrium is where the investor enters Iran and pays a bribe. In the next step, people choose the threat option. The government should also provide sufficient benefits and keep its promises in the future.

This article tries to provide an analysis of the interactions between taxpayers and tax system based on systematic, institutional, and behavioral factors of the Iranian economy. For this goal, this study extends the behavioral model of Prinz and Pickhardt (2013) to the interactions of Iranian agents. With a game theoretical approach, this model studies the relationships of taxpayers, tax consultants, and tax authorities in three different levels, considering the previous field research about the behaviors of tax agents in the Iranian economy. The results of the study, in all the three levels, have shown that to prevent tax evasion, there should be transparency about the expenditures of tax money. Furthermore, the expectations and trusts for the government should also improve. Moreover, this writing presents that there is a “lose-lose” equilibrium in the interactions of taxpayers and tax authorities when tax consultants intervene in the interactions between these two agents. The reasons for this bad equilibrium are lack of proper legal control and transparency for taxpayers in the Iranian tax system.

Taxes make up the bulk of any government revenue and provide a sustainable source of revenue. In recent years, the main focus of the tax reform program, in almost all countries of the world, has been on VAT. But a major problem in the effective implementation of VAT, which is a nascent tax base in countries, is the phenomenon of tax evasion. Therefore, one of the most basic steps in preventing tax evasion in the field of VAT is to accurately identify tax interactions between taxpayers and the tax organization based on existing variables and laws. Therefore, in this study, for the first time, the phenomenon of tax evasion in the field of VAT is modeled using the game theory tool and based on the Korchen model in the field of income tax, and is analyzed based on the interactions between taxpayers and the tax organization. The results obtained by mathematical analysis of the developed models indicate that with the integration of VAT audit and Income tax audit, the rate of tax evasion in the field of VAT will be reduced.

Todays, the importance of taxes as the main source of government revenue has been approved by economic policymakers and therefore, designing an optimal tax system to achieve this subject is essential. Governments are looking for ways to receive their target taxes from taxpayers at the lowest possible cost and at the declaration tax. Taxpayers, on the other hand, seek to postponed their taxes as much as possible and make the most of the effects of inflation. This paper models the game between taxpayers and tax affairs organization. The results show that the Nash equilibrium in the designed game occurs where taxpayers declare their declared tax less than the diagnostic tax and careful handling by tax affairs organization. In the next step, the equilibrium is somewhere that taxpayers continued their protest until the step of the Court of Justice (the dominant strategy) and tax affairs organization agrees with them (the dominant strategy). Finally, the optimal fine rate for the tax affairs organization was determined until taxpayers do not continue their protest to buy time and devalue the amount paid and agree at the initial stage 238.

The experience of large fluctuations in the Foreign Exchange Market in Iran and the impact of monetary and fiscal policies on this market revealed the importance of adopting a scientific approach by fiscal and monetary policymakers and paying attention to the behavior of other actors (Foreign Exchange Speculators) in the decision-making. The present study tries to evaluate the Social Loss of adopting different approaches by monetary and fiscal policymakers for 9 Years (2011-2019) using the Game Theory approach via identifying the optimal interactive approach between the Government and the Central Bank that leads to the least amount of Social Loss. According to the results, the least Social Loss is achieved when the Monetary Actor pays more attention to the stabilization of Interest Rates and has more Independence in decision-making. In other words, the increase in Interest Rates by the monetary authority increases the desire for Foreign Exchange demand by Foreign Exchange speculators, as well as the desire to further divert government spending from the balanced government budget, which both behaviors interpreted to increase Social Losses. Accordingly, by resorting to the criterion of Social Loss, we can recommend the instrumental independence of the Central Bank to increase Social Welfare. This result requires a change in the conduct of Monetary and Fiscal Policies and a change in the attitude of the country's economic officials about the independence or non-independence of the Central Bank and how it interacts with the Government.

When the monopoly of money creation is removed and private money can be exchanged between people, the issue of Seigniorage share will arise, which is currently conceivable with the advent of cryptocurrencies. The question of the present study is that if we are in a situation where private cryptocurrencies along with money are common in the society with the state publisher, what share of the Seigniorage share will go to the government and what should be the best policy attitude of the central bank in this regard? To answer this question, we used the modeling of evolutionary game theory, the main feature of which is the evolution of a species (in the current research of money). To better approximate the model to reality, the research assumptions were verified by a questionnaire. The research findings show that the central bank's share of the money creation market will fluctuate in a range of about 60 to 80%, and the monetary policymaker's attitude towards cryptocurrencies ultimately determines the share of the private and public sectors in the money creation market. . The main policy implication of this research is that the policymaker's confrontation with the private cryptocurrency and the illegal attitude towards this issue will lead to an increase in the share of the private cryptocurrency in the money market.

In this paper we offer one novel mathematical model of credit lending to customers based on evolutionary game theory‎. ‎This model presents an efficient and realistic approach‎. ‎The target of our paper is to explore the evolutionary game between banks and customers to grant facilities and credit‎.  ‎We assume that customers are divided into two types‎. ‎The first type of customers include individual or small and medium enterprises (SME)‎, ‎apply for micro loans from the bank‎. ‎The second type of customers include corporate banking or large enterprises‎, ‎apply for large loans from the bank‎. ‎The relationship between the bank and the customers is a double-sided‎ ‎problem‎. ‎Banks and customers may trust each other or want to behave opportunistically‎. ‎This model helps the bank to be able to purposefully decide on the allocation of facilities to customers and find the optimal strategy. This article examines the parameters influencing these strategic decisions.The results show that by increasing or decreasing some of the parameters in the model, banks can be more successful in granting facilities to customers and ultimately increase their profitability.

The aim of this paper is examining appropriate structures in order to achieve the objectives of monetary and fiscal policy in the Iranian economy. The behavior of monetary and fiscal policymakers was derived using dynamic optimization and game theory techniques trough defining objective functions and policy makers’ constraints under two basic policy making approaches: commitment and discretionary. findings showed that,Regardless of committed or discretionary policymaking approach, fiscal policy has procyclical behavio. findings showed that, the hypothesis that oil revenues are only reason of fiscal dominance in Iranian economy is rejected and policy maker s commitment is necessary condition and fiscal discipline is sufficient condition for independence of monetary policy.

Environmental security is a significant part of human and national security. Today, attention to environmental issues and sustainable development is one of necessities of economic development and the problem of climate changes or global warming in the environmental domain has turned to one of the most important human concerns, since it will have long-term effects on future generations welfare. Solving the created environmental challenges requires international cooperation for the countries' just and logical exploitation of human resources without damage to other countries. The Paris Agreement or the paris agreement is a treaty within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change. The text of the agreement was approved by the delegates of 195 countries at the 21st United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Paris and was ratified on December 21, 2015. This agreement has been in force since November 4, 2016. According to the text of the agreement, the agreement was to enter into force when 55 countries, which produce at least 55% of the world's greenhouse gases, ratify, accept or sign the agreement. Among the goals of the Paris Agreement is to try to prevent a 1.5 degree rise in temperature compared to the pre-industrial era in order to reduce the risks and effects of climate change, increase the ability to adapt to the severe effects of climate change and create climate resistance, conditions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The United States withdrew on June 1, 2017. American exit has challenged this problem. This study addresses cooperation or non-cooperation of European Union and United States in Paris Agreement using game theory. 

Play is a description of the economic, social and political activities of individuals. Each of these activities or games has a structure and rules according to which players play the game to achieve their goals. The purpose of this theory is to provide a way to express the facts of human life that expresses contradiction and alignment. A game is a situation in which each person's decision affects another person's decision and all the people in that situation are aware of this. Game theory can be used in many cases, the most important of which is to explain the reality, predict the results and recommend, and in this way can show the right way to the players of a game.  The method used in this study is game theory, through which the strategy of each member country can be examined. 

The result of the Nash equilibrium of the US-Europe game in terms of carbon emissions according to the NDC target and two degrees of decrease in air temperature, US and European exit, Nash equilibrium of the US-Europe game in terms of carbon prices, no US-European exit, Also, the Nash equilibrium of the US-Europe game in terms of macroeconomic effects is the non-exit of the US and Europe, because at this point, none of the players is motivated to violate. 

If carbon emission considerations are considered together with economic considerations (carbon prices and macroeconomic effects) by the two groups of the country; The two groups of countries will abide by the agreement and follow the strategy of not leaving. So the United States comes to an agreement.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the capture of the spy nest, the West, and especially the United States, in addition to pursuing other tools, has also used the tools of sanctions and has implemented many sanctions against Iran. One type of sanctions is oil sanctions, which were imposed to force Iran to join the international community. The US and its allieschr('39') embargo on Iranian oil affects the variables of the Iranian and world economies. For this reason, a computable five-zone global trade model (GTAP) is used to calculate the implications of the game tree between the three independent actors of the United States, the European Union, and Iran. The closing of the GTAP model has been changed according to the assumptions used. The results show that the US, Iran and major oil buyers from Iran are damaged by the sanctions. This damage is exacerbated by increasing oil restrictions. With the escalation of sanctions, the European Union is also gaining negative welfare. In the Nash equilibrium, the United States and the European Union will choose weak sanctions, and Iran will try to circumvent the sanctions. Due to the economic costs of oil sanctions against Iran, the lack of full understanding between the United States and Europe, and Iranchr('39')s efforts to circumvent sanctions, it seems that the United States will not be able to reduce Iranchr('39')s oil exports to zero.

Coordination between monetary and financial policies is essential due to the feedback effects of the policies as well as intertemporal decision-makings; As policies enforced by an institution may affect policies adopted by the another entity in a destructive manner, the welfare of the society may be reduced ultimately. Therefore, in order to achieve the desired economic goals, appropriate institutional arrangements and creating a mechanism for the adequate coordination between these policy enforcers is required. In this study, after modeling the structural equations of the Iranian economy, the optimal rule for the monetary and fiscal policymaker, in form of the different policy games, was extracted. then, the basic equations were estimated using the Generalized method of moments (GMM) over the period 2005-2016, and their parameters were used in games simulation (in three situations: normal game, Stackelberg leadership game, as well as cooperative game). The games were simulated using programming with Matlab software, and the value of the minimum losses incurred for each player and community was calculated. Comparison and analysis of the results shows that the best welfare is created by the cooperation of both monetary and financial institutions. But if it is not possible to establish a coordinating institution between the two, central bank leadership is suggested as the best interaction.

In the Islamic legal and economic system, a precise mechanism for land use is defined. The classification of lands, along with the flexible methods available to the government for the allocation of land, raises the question of what is the most desirable method for state lands allocation based on the Islamic legal and economic system? Accordingly, the purpose of the present study is to find a favorable strategy for the transfer of state lands within the framework. The method used in this article is game theory, in which the main actors are the government as the custodian of land management and the applicants for land acquisition, both individuals and legal entities, each of which pursues different goals and strategies. The concept of Nash equilibrium has been used to find the optimal strategy in which none of the actors will be willing to deviate from the status quo. The results of research based on two scenarios of higher profits of productive and useful economic activities than Speculative activities and vice versa, indicate that the allocation of land in exchange for taxes commensurate with the level of production, is the best way for the Islamic government because firstly It will be sustainable and high income, secondly, it will provide excellent support for productive economic activities, and finally, it will prevent speculative activities.

A group is an organized unit whose members have a common goal, work together, and mutually exchange information and experiences. One of the key issues for any organization is finding ways to encourage them to perform better. Businesses constantly need to motivate the workforce to be more flexible, respond more quickly, provide reliable solutions to complex issues, and increase production, generally.  According to conventional economics, increasing monetary rewards will increase the efforts of the workforce. In other words, more monetary rewards mean stronger incentives and vice versa. This simplification is used in many economic situations; however, it does not necessarily apply to environments where the workforce is part of a group and their rewards are affected by the work of the other group members. In fact, it may be that the economic theory claiming that more rewards lead to more effort by the labor force does not apply under certain conditions, and a situation contrary to it occurs. Actually, in such circumstances, some members of the group might take advantage of the other members of the group, and will get more rewards while doing less work, which has been described by Winter (2009) and McClure et al. (2014) as incentive reversal. Incentive reversal indicates a situation in which an increase in rewards for all the members of a group will only lead to an effort made by a fraction of the agents. The main objective of this study is an experimental survey of incentive reversal in the framework of a sequential game. In this regard, 135 students from Ayatollah Haeri University of Meybod participated in a two-stage game consisting of three-person teams. The results showed that: first, with regards to incentive reversal, the increase in the cost of effort results in more effort and thus more production. Second, when the cost of effort is high, each player will attempt to exert his/her effort, if and only if he/she observed that all the agents before him/her have attempted to exert their efforts. Third, based on incentive reversal theory predictions, the first participants exert less effort at low costs. The findings of the present study on incentive reversals indicate the important conclusion that large monetary incentives may lose their effectiveness if the validity of this potential threat is devalued. Also, the explicit and complete introduction of rewards may sometimes not have the desired results. For example, guaranteeing increased pay to employees or providing better job opportunities that reduce effort costs does not always lead to increased performance. Rather, they may even lead to incentive reversals .

Due to the phenomenon of globalization, investors today pay more attention than ever to investing in its global concept. On the other hand, scholars in the field of international relations, especially in the liberal tradition, emphasize the impact of international economic cooperation, such as trade and investment, on the spread of peace and the prevention of war. Accordingly, the present article, while referring to objective examples of international relations, has tried to provide a different answer to the important question of "economic cooperation in the form of international investment while maximizing" by using "game theory". "Investor interests should also prevent war and the development of peace." By presenting a static game between players, the article models the behavior between investors and countries according to the possible strategies for each player. In this regard, first, a situation is considered in which the two countries are indifferent to each other. Then in the second case, two countries are considered to be rivals (enemies) and in the third case, three countries are assumed, one of which is a rival and the other is indifferent. Given the equilibrium obtained in all three cases, the overall result indicates that the investment achieves the best result (Nash equilibrium) by forming portfolios in different markets and the country at home by creating interaction and peace. The results of the research in the language of logic (mathematics) confirm the effect of economic cooperation on the development of peace, where through the development of international investment, governments achieve peace and on the other hand, investors achieve the best results.

The issue of economic growth and identifying factors affect it has always been one of the interesting topics to economists. Extensive studies have identified the role of several factors in economic growth, but in modern models, these factors are function of incentives in societies. In these studies, the incentives that drive or slow economic growth attributes to the different political and economic institutions on those societies. This article by using game theory approach and designing different scenarios, will evaluate the different incentives that can influence the choice of size of government’s policy in the oil countries. At first, elites who seek to maximize government revenue intend to set a government size to maximize the production of middle-class entrepreneurs. Assuming that the government is active in economic activities, elites tend to increase the size of government. If the competition extend to the political arena, the motivation of the elites was strongly influenced, which would result in a larger government than previous scenarios and further weaken economic growth.

Solving the Water conflict and optimal allocation of common water resources are the most important service of cooperative game theory to water economics. Zayandehrud basin is the most important disputed basin in several neighboring provinces in the first class basin of Iran's central plateau. The purpose of this research is to use the game theory with application of Bankruptcy approach (conflicting claims) in order to optimally allocate surface and underground water resources in the Zayandehrud basin, with regard to Zayandehrud need(tourism sector demand), water transfer to Yazd and Kashan, Gavkhoni wetland water use and demand of three sectors: drinking, mining, and agriculture. In order to estimate the river natural water right (tourism sector demand), the Montana method (tenant) was used under three different scenarios: weak, acceptable and optimal tenant during the period 1963-2017, which was 77.7, 130.5, and 466.5 m3 respectively yearly estimated. The conflicting claims theory in various scenarios for the river water right (tourism sector) showed that in all three proposed scenarios based on five different bankruptcy theory rules, Proportional, Constrained Equal Wards, Constrained Equal Losses, Talmud, Random Arrival, CEA rule was the most desirable method for 5 sectors (except agriculture). In order to choose a more equitable method, the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve were used which indicated that CEA rule has less inequality than other rules. Thus, regard to the increasing demand gap in the Zayandehrud Basin, water allocation based on the criteria of bankruptcy theory is proposed.

Although there are many benefits to group activities and interactions in the group and it has been considered as one of the factors that affect the performance of the organization; but recently it has been argued that increasing monetary rewards in group activities will reduce the efforts of some agents (the incentive reversal). Regarding the probability of occurrence of this condition and its effect on cognitive factors such as gender, the main objective of this research is to investigate the effect of gender and gender composition on the occurrence of incentive reversal. In this framework, by providing a laboratory environment and using 210 players (students from Yazd and Ayatollah Haeri Meybod), a two-stage trio team was designed. The research hypotheses test showed that none of the two research hypotheses based on the gender effect and the gender composition on the incentive reversal have been approved.

The central bank is working to reform the structure of the banking system to bring the banking network in line with world standards. The banking network should strive to adapt itself to the modern world in terms of technology, procedures, and operations. The main prerequisite for this is central bank independence and structural reform of the country's budget. In the current situation, the Central Bank of Iran is severely restricted in pursuing monetary policy independently and in order to stabilize prices. The approach used in this research is game theory. This study attempts to describe and make a model the new interaction that has emerged in the current situation of the Iranian economy between the central bank as a monetary authority and the program and budget organization as a financial representative using the game theory. Determines the existence or absence of equilibrium and its type, and ultimately examines whether equilibrium is in favor of economic development or anti-development. If the balance is of an anti-development type, a policy recommendation should be considered. Based on the output of the modeling, there is a stable equilibrium but does not support development. The results show that equilibrium is formed when the plan and budget organization adopts a strategy of dividing oil revenues between the budget and the fund in favor of the budget and the central bank adopts an active strategy against financial pressure. This shows the strengthening of the supervisory role and then the strengthening of the central bank's monetary policy role, so that the central bank, despite Fiscal Dominance, should play an active role in resisting financial pressures and resisting the printing of money, rather than submitting to financial decisions.