کژگزینی

Unemployment insurance is the most basic social security plan in the world. However, the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection have confined unemployment insurance to low-risk occupational groups. The coverage of unemployment insurance in Iran seems to be even less extensive. In 2017, According to the Statistics Center of Iran, only 2/5 % of the unemployed were covered by unemployment insurance. However, even with this limited coverage, unemployment insurance funds are exposed to financial difficulties. The presence of moral hazard among the Iranian unemployed, insured for unemployment, is well confirmed in the literature. They provide a negative association between unemployment benefits and unemployed incentives to return to the labor market.
 They also found that unemployed workers with more statutory duration of unemployment benefits have less motivation to find new jobs. This study addresses the problem of adverse selection in the unemployment insurance plan neglected in the literature. So, we first estimate the unemployment risk in terms of incidence and duration of unemployment. Then, considering the relation between workers' risk of unemployment and their insurance coverage, we investigate adverse selection in the labor market.
 The results confirm adverse selection in the Iranian insurance plan that forces insurance funds to exclude a broad group of employees, e.g., self-employed workers and labor forces who lack the skills necessary to get hired.

Considering the position of supplementary health insurance in the insurance industry, it is important to address the problem of adverse selection as one of the effective factors for increasing the loss ratio in this industry. In this paper, the correlation model between individuals' risk appetite under the indemnity amount and coverage amount, insurance specifications, and insureds' demographic characteristics was used to identify potential variations and risk components that influence this phenomenon. The data used were taken from the 2019 group insured information of a selected insurance company. Due to the nature of the data, the Tobit regression method was used to estimate the model. The results show that the signs of the coefficients of the variables included in the model are as expected and statistically significant. In other words, the effective variables that determine to some extent the level of risk of the insured are directly related to the level of costs. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the components that influence the occurrence or increase of medical costs and take them into account when setting the premium rate.JEL Classification: I13, D82, C34.

There is no convergence in the results of the credit relationship between the financial contracting parties (banks and customers) due to the different importance of the contract variables. Therefore, while examining the impact of the empirical relationship between the variables commercial profit-loss sharing contracts, the dual role of the collateral variable (screening and motivation) is investigated. The statistical population of Bank Rafah Kargaran contracts and the statistical sample of data items during period 1383-1393 were used for estimation by purposeful sampling method of multiple logit template. Hypothesis: Low-risk facilitators opted for more liquidity collateral, confirming the existence of an adverse selection phenomenon. Accordingly, individuals are willing to provide the bank with the quality and degree of risk to the bank through the type of collateral (deposit, property, combination, and contract) and the other hypothesis; To help with the collateral, this effect was accepted only for the profit rate variable. However, the model was not validated for the significant underlying variables. Therefore, coordination in the interactive relationships between financial contract variables to mitigate the consequences of asymmetric information in banks' credit policy to improve contract profitability is inevitable.

From the perspective of conventional neoclassical theories, consumers, corporations and economic factors are maximizer and optimizer.Therefore, without the need for interference of any external factor, they maximize the utility, profitability and, consequently, social welfare. But it is claimed that in Iran’s housing industry, the level of building retrofitting, especially the seismic resistance level, is not optimal, which means that the optimizing Agents spend Budget less than the optimal rate for this task. Accepting this claim, this paper tries to explain why this event is occurred emphasizing the framework of information economics and behavioral economics. This study first examines the cataclysmic events in the Iranian Housing industry, due to the lack of asymmetric information flow between housing producers and consumers, and provides solutions in the form of signaling, screening, and standardization of information. Secondly, the uncertainty effect of earthquake definite risk over retrofitting is analyzed. And, finally, based on some behavioral economics’ assumptions, we attempt to explain how to reduce demands for and costs of retrofitting proportional to the optimal level, and to develop theoretical solutions to the problem.

Information asymmetry is one of the important reasons that lead to be inappropriate decision-making by economic agents in the market. Shaeri et al (2016) in their study about the role of Contract Theory on the maximum profit in Iran Tier company, showed that contract theory under the asymmetric information condition and with strong assumptions on production and cost functions as well as parameters in the model, cause just 10 percent difference between the maximum profit under asymmetric and symmetric information conditions. This study as a reassessment of the aforementioned paper, by weakening its assumptions shows that by a well-behaved form of cost and production functions, for all possible values of parameters, the difference between maximum benefit under asymmetric and symmetric information conditions -except in some special cases- in all equilibriums is under 10 percent. So, by ignoring the strong assumptions in the aforementioned paper, we can still show the importance of implementing Contract Theory in the maximum profit of Iran Tier Company.

The banking system is one of the pillars of every country's economy, whose efficiency or inefficiency can directly and indirectly affect the performance of its economy. The challenges posed by the usury free banking system are the asymmetric information issue between the bank and the facility applicant in partnership agreements. The existence of asymmetric information leads to the adverse selection and moral hazard in the markets. Since the 1970s, asymmetry of information has become one of the key issues in the economy.
The present research is to answer the question; the factors affecting the formation of moral hazard and adverse selection in partnership contracts used in Specialized banks in usury free banking, using a combination of AHP and TOPSIS math’s and using field data (questionnaire) to examine These hypotheses suggest that several factors such as the lack of attention to the customer credit risk score and the lack of incentive and punishment mechanisms for customers is effective on the formation of moral hazard and adverse selection. The results of the research indicate that the abovementioned factors have a greater effect on moral hazard and adverse selection. Supervision and control have the most important effect and widespread use of civic participation contracts has the least importance in moral hazard and adverse selection.

The presence of asymmetric information is an important source of efficiency loss for insurance companies and could reduce profitability. In this paper, we test the conditional independence of coverage choice and risk, where “conditional” means conditional on all variables observed by the insurer. We use two parametric a pair of probits and a bivariate probit model. The data includes all third-party and hull policies as well as claims data for private automobiles during 2013-2016. The data are derived from the administrative database of a small insurance company in Iran. Once we control for individuals’ risk aversion by limiting our test to subsamples of individuals who only bought minimum third-party insurance, we find evidence for the presence of asymmetric information. Based on our results, those who bought hull and third party insurance have higher risk of accident in comparison to those who only bought third party insurance. The existing premiums does not fully compensate for this extra risk.

Although the average statutory tax rates are not significantly different between developed and developing countries, tax to GDP ratio in the former is almost twice as much as the latter. What does explain this sharp difference? The main argument is that tax administration's accessibility to taxpayers information, of course after controlling the effects of GDP composition, inflation, and quality of government, will influence government's tax power and increase tax compliance. To examine the effect, we have studied 47 developing countries during the period of 2006 to 2013 and employed a (cross-section weights) GLS method to estimate panel model. Results indicate that information sharing have positive and significant effect on the ratio of tax to GDP and implies that the recent tax reform which regulates tax authoritie's accessibility to taxpayer's information, will improve government's tax power.

In this paper, we try to present a theoretical model for participatory contracts in the form of principal agent model in an asymmetric information conditions in game theory framework. Using the principal agent model, how can we solve the advrsselection problem in the Islamic banking contracts and provide a simpler and less costly model? There are two hypotheses to answer the research questions. One is the use of acheivments of principal agent model in participatory contracts is more efficient. Another is the using principal agent model in an Islamic environment would minimize the adversselection problem in this model.
The results obtained from solving of the proposed model shows that by designing participatory contracts in a banking system the first hypothesis of the research is confirmed, also the results of the model confirms the cost of participation contracts in an adnersselection environment. The most important consequence of this research the possibility of of the elimination asymmetric information condition between the bank and the client if the parties adhere to the religious and Islamic regulations, this will confirm the second hypothesis of the research. In addition it has been shown that the financial instruments in Islamic economics as new achievement of economics are usable.

Contracts, exchanges and trade-offs are the necessary and unavoidable part of social life of human. Although from old times, ýsocieties have always tried to go legalized to reach security, social peace, public discipline and preparing and maintaining people’s benefits, but as human needs and wants are naturally alike, there have always been struggle to gain more profits and welfare. Islam also has paid attention to this subject. This paper through a descriptive-analytical methodology, studies the effect of jurisprudential (fiqhi) effects of business like banning the hoarding (ihtikar), banning the najsh, banning the deceit (gharar), banning the collusion for overcharging and … on removing the information asymmetry and related misuses and based on this study, presents a pattern of exchange system from the viewpoint of Islam. Studying Islamic resources including Quran, tradition (sunnat), reason (aql) and consensus (ijma), shows that in a society that rules and real criteria of Islam dominates and the culture and behavior of its’ people is based on Islam rules, the society will have a clear space and all the people will have an equal access to information. No one will go toward hiding the information and misusing it on behalf of himself/herself. Lying, deception, breach of promise will have no place in such a society and in opposition, the truth, transparency and loyalty to contracts will substitute; jurisprudential (fiqhi) rules also confirm this subject.

By considering the different importance of collateral variable in Islamic and in conventional banking, theoretical and experimental studies show that the necessary convergence in the credit relationship between bank and customer has not been achieved. In this article, in addition to the explaining feasibility of studying and accepting empirical role of collateral in commercial profit - loss sharing contracts, we have studied the dual role of collateral as screening and motivation tool in banking relations. We have also used credit data of Bank Refah Kargaran with application of Logit estimation to test our hypotheses regarding the role of collateral. Based on our results, the hypothesis that borrowers with lower risk have provided safer collateral, has been confirmed. This result shows the existence of adverse selection phenomenon. So, low-risk individuals tend to send signals of their quality and reveal their situation to banks. In addition, other economic and social variables of contract could use the potential of signaling and contribute to reduce the role of collateral. In the data under consideration, except for the variable of account historyinterest rate, this hypothesis was rejected and other economic and social variables have failed to have the expected impact.

In real world, taxpayers have private information of which tax agencies are either completely or partly not aware of. This issue gives rise to the so-called asymmetric information problem, seriously preventing tax laws from being justly and efficiently enforced. Asymmetry of information motivates taxpayer towards falsifying or concealing information, trying to enjoy benefits of failure to pay taxes (moral hazard); furthermore, by granting licenses to bad economic operators for operating as authorized economic operators, law-abiding companies may leave licensed and authorized market (adverse selection). It is obvious that, information sharing and availability of databases containing taxpayers’ information can help governments in recognizing and collecting taxes in a justly and fair manner. In this paper, using statistics from 92 countries during 2006 – 2012 (in the form of panel data), we have studied the effects of information sharing variables on tax-to-GDP ratio. The findings indicate that, information sharing has a positive, yet statistically insignificant, effect on the ratio, which is in agreement with theoretical foundations.

An essential feature of interest- free banking is the use of partnership contracts in financing the applicants. The real implementation of these contracts causes the banks to confront some problems, such as adverse selection and moral hazard, which are primarily rooted in the lack of symmetric information between the bank and the applicant. Using a descriptive-analytical method, this study seeks, within the framework of basic research model which comes under the theory of contracts (the aspect of the theory of motivations) to provide a clearer explanation of the problem of information asymmetry in partnership contracts and solve part of it. According to this model, when there is asymmetric information in the contracts, if the contracts serve the purposes of the different applicants with whom the bank deals are made within the framework of the principle of clarification, not only the profit expected by the bank can rise to peak level, but also the problem of adverse selection can be solved by stimulating the applicants by making contracts prepared for each particular one. These contracts, which suggest the probability of obtaining a loan from the limited resources of the banks and amount of repayment for each specific applicant, are extracted from the bank's maximization of the expected profit. In the present study, taking in to account the characteristics and conditions of signing partnership contracts, a model is proposed for these contracts by making some changes in the basic model in three stages with the aim of solving the problem of adverse selection that results from asymmetric information.

Financial development and growing significance of financial competition, implicate study of ethical processes in financial institutes. Therefore in this article we first study effect of ethic in management of financial institutes and also analyse side effect of precept organizational ethic in facilitating managerial operations as a new approach of ethic as an advantage of competition. As a part of this analysis we determined some hypothesis about relation between ethic and compatible managerial style in four extent of creating, saving, transferring and suitable instrumenets of value in financial institutes.

Pricing and risk sharing in oil and gas service contracts such as buyback has always been the most important challenges in the contracting design. Asymmetric information leads to agency costs such as moral hazard and adverse selection and the process of contracting is complicated. In this paper, by using of agency theory, the process of buy-back contracts is modeled between the National Oil Company (NOC) and International Oil Company (IOC) with regard to moral hazard in case of risk averse and risk-neutral contractor. Finally, Mathematical modeling techniques are used to provide analysis of agency costs, and then optimal contract is extracted. An optimal contract is a contract in which the contractor will bear part of the increased costs. The results show that there is not corner solution for offering a contract, but the equilibrium relationship can be created between moral hazard, competition in the bidding and sharing the risk.

Asymmetric Information in Iran’s Insurance Market: Case Study for Automobile Insurance in Iran Insurance Company This research aims to test the presence of asymmetric information by using the dynamic information of automobile policyholders in the Iran Insurance Company (IIC). The Conditional Independence test is conducted by Bivariate Probit model، the dynamic properties which are presented for bonus/malus system is tsted by a Dynamic Bivariate Probit model. Making use of a sample of 86637 policyholders in IIC، Our finding confirms positive correlation between risk and coverage in Bivariate Probit Model، which supports presence of asymmetric information. Also، there is a negative correlation between claim in the periods of t and t-1 in Dynamic Bivariate Probit model، where confirms that behavior of the insurance policy holders are subject to moral hazard.

During the 1950's and 1960's, the theoretical trend in economics, particularly neoclassical economics, was rested on certain assumptions including rational behavior maximization, methodological individualism, and complete information. Some economists believe that such inflexible assumptions caused the failures of neoclassical economics and hence, established a new method for studying and analyzing the economic relations. Instead of using general equilibrium models, their basic idea is centered on partial analyses to clarify the complexities of strategic interactions among economic agents possessing private information. A firm in this approach is considered as an organizing structure rather than a production function or a technical foundation. In this structure both the process in the formation of a contract among economic agents due to lack of symmetric information and the ways that lead the agents to make appropriate decisions are analyzed by using the incentive theory. This study is mainly aimed at introducing the incentive theory, explicating its operational method, as well as implementing it in empirical contexts.

One of the main challenges for exploiting endowments is their administration, such that some scholars attribute all problems of endowment to their administration. They believe that reforming endowment administration and their caretaker's good conduct will lead to the elimination of many corruptions related to endowments. Since the motives of caretaker as the manager of endowment are not necessarily along with donor's aim, he may act against donor's will. This is also possible in renting endowment as the most common way of exploiting endowments. The science of economy of information as a branch of conventional economics investigates the problems caused by asymmetric information in economic exchanges and provides some suggestions to solve them. The findings of this research which is conducted through a library survey sheds light on symmetry of information in endowment and indicate that modus operands proposed by economy of information can be used to eliminate problems caused by asymmetry of information in endowment.

Frome the emergence of human social life, there appeared interaction and participation Umong human beings which lasted for ages. In the 60’s scientists realized this as a power and they called it “social capital”. later on, many studies were Carried out on the concept social capital they showed that social capital, despite having positive effects, could bring about oppositions and contradictions in the soviety. With the accumulation of social capital may occur problems such as “Adverse Selection”, “Moral Hazard”, and “Free Riding” and "Group fish". So social capital is not always profitable. This paper seeks to introduce the concept “Religious Capital” based on Islamic doctrines showing that religious capital has the merits of social capital but it does not have its defects. So religious capital has much more positive effects than social capital in achieving the developmental objectives.