نظریه بازی

In recent years, manufacturers have started selling their products online. This study examines pricing in a supply chain involving manufacturing, retailers, logistics service providers, and integrators. There are three products in this chain: two physical products from manufacturers and a service product from logistics providers. Physical products are sold online and in retail stores, with online purchases including two products. The problem is examined in four scenarios, including decentralized, manufacturer integration with retailer, functional logistics service provider integration with logistics service integrator, and a combined approach of manufacturer integration with retailer and functional logistics service provider integration with logistics service integrator. This paper introduces a novel approach by analyzing the impact of logistics supply chain members, focusing on logistics service levels and pricing. The study aims to explore how the integration of supply chain members influences the profits and service levels of other stakeholders. The results indicate that integrating two supply chain members typically lowers profits for other members. Integrating a logistics service provider and integrator can increase manufacturer profit and decrease retailer profit in certain cases, while in other cases profits remain unchanged. Similarly, integrating manufacturer and retailer usually results in decreased profits for logistics service providers and integrators. The integration of functional logistics service provider and logistics service integrator has an impact on the relationship of parameters with service level. In the decentralized scenario, if service price and service coefficients increase, service levels increase. It also increases service levels as the cost of service increases.

Consider two substitutable electricity home-appliances that are produced by two competing manufacturers and are then sold to customers by two agencies. In the considered market, customers’ demands for these products are specified based on the selling prices as well as their energy-efficiency levels. To attract customers, one of the manufacturers aims to invest on the energy-efficiency improvement of his products. In this research, the pricing and energy-efficiency decisions are investigated on the mentioned problem. Moreover, the game theory is applied to set these decisions. In this setting, the problem is analyzed under Nash and Chain-to-chain games. In Nash game, the competition among the members is independently considered, while the products’ supply chains compete in Chain-to-chain game. Finally, the decisions are analyzed and some results and insights are provided. The results indicate that under some conditions, it is possible to attract more customers and obtain higher profits by investing on the energy-efficiency improvement. Due to the competition between both supply chains, the members’ profits in the cooperative mode ​​may be set lower than in the competitive mode. Also, policies that reduce the cost for the energy-efficiency improvement of an electricity appliance will be beneficial for its members.

The purpose of the current research is to design a green supply chain pricing model with a multi-criteria decision-making approach and game theory (case study: home appliance industry). In this research, after library study and identification of key indicators in predicting green supply chain pricing, using the fuzzy Delphi method, the screening of indicators was done in three stages, and out of 20 indicators, based on the opinions of 13 experts, 13 indicators were selected and based on the priority selection index approach, company D entered the game theory as the leader company because it had the highest priority. Finally, based on the game theory, the scenario between 4 members of the supply chain was evaluated and analyzed, and the best and worst scenarios were also introduced. Also, in order to test the structural validity of the proposed model, information related to the green supply chain of 9 selected home appliance companies was implemented using MATLAB software.

Governments today are increasingly focused on managing environmental and economic challenges to safeguard the environment. Consequently, companies are striving to remain competitive in society. This paper introduces a revenue-sharing agreement between the retailer and the manufacturer. The contract is designed to alleviate the research and development costs incurred by the manufacturer in greening their products. Additionally, the paper incorporates consumer surplus as a consideration for the social dimension, which is a key pillar of sustainability.

Government interventions in this paper are modeled as subsidies that influence the final price of the product. Notably, this study, for the first time, integrates all three dimensions of sustainability—social, economic, and environmental—within a game-theoretic framework that includes government intervention and a revenue-sharing agreement between the retailer and the manufacturer.

The modeling results demonstrated that incorporating consumer surplus enhances the profitability of both the government and the manufacturer. Although consumer surplus reduces wholesale prices and revenue-sharing proportions, it leads to increased product sales. This boosts the benefits for consumers and members of the supply chain, contributing to improved greenness and higher levels of product sustainability. Consumers show a preference for purchasing products with greater environmental benefits; however, higher levels of greenness require increased production costs. Manufacturers can boost their sales through research and development efforts and by raising public awareness about green products. As a result, manufacturers, retailers, and the government adjust prices and subsidies to maximize their respective profits, altering the overall profitability of the supply chain. The findings highlight that social welfare is a crucial consideration in supply chains, as it significantly enhances the profitability of chain members and promotes higher levels of green production.

Originality/Value: 

This paper is the first to examine all dimensions of sustainability—social, economic, and environmental—within a theoretical framework that incorporates government intervention and the impact of consumer surplus on pricing policies and the greening of products. The scientific contribution of this research lies in providing new insights to managers and policymakers to enhance strategic decision-making aimed at improving sustainability and social welfare within green supply chains.

In this paper, we consider a Cournot Market for Chain-To-Chain Competition, which includes two distinct competing supply chains. Each supply chain has one Manufacturer, one Visitor, and one Retailer. The Retailer is in common between the two chains. This article will investigate the impact of using visitors to attract retailers as much as possible by the manufacturer. Each visitor should try to convince retailers to order more by paying a cost named Visit Cost in this article. After selling each unit of considered products, the manufacturer would pay a percentage of the wholesale price. It is assumed that there is a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and visitor in each supply chain, in which the manufacturer is the leader. Furthermore, there is a Nash competition between manufacturers and the retailer.

In the current study, the competition between two substitutable products is investigated on a supply chain containing two manufacturers and two sellers. In this structure, two substitutable products are made by two competing manufacturers and are then delivered to customers through two competing sellers. One of the manufacturers sells his products with no investment on advertising, whereas another one aims to attract more customers by investing on the advertisement level. In this setting, a cooperative advertising contract is implemented between the manufacturer and seller of the second product in which the seller undertakes a portion of the related investment. Then, the game theory is applied to make the pricing and advertising decisions under the considered problem. Note that in the previous studies, the issue of the cooperative advertising has been considered for a specific product and then the game theory has been used in order to set the decisions among its supply chain members, while in this research, two substitutable products are considered and the effect of implementing a cooperative advertising contract is investigated on their demands and the profit values of their supply chain members. Regarding the results, increasing the elasticity of the demand for a product with respect to its advertisement level leads to enhancing the profits for its members and reducing the profits for the others. Moreover, if the required budget does not exceed a specific value, then investing on the advertisement level of a product is beneficial for its members.

Today online retailers all over the world are looking to oer virtual reality service through their online channels in order to attract customers to purchase product online and increase sales by creating a sense of customer condence. Virtual reality service provides information about how a product ts a customer and closes the gap between online and oine retailers. However, such services also facilitate consumer webrooming behavior, which may reduce online demand and intensify competition between traditional and online retailers. Webrooming behavior means customers use virtual reality service in the online channel and view the specications of the product, but they buy the product in the oine channel. On the other hand, providing virtual reality through the online channel due to the conditions of the testing products before the purchase can have a positive impact on the rate of returned products. This study aims to investigate the optimal amount of investment in virtual reality service and its impact on the rate of return, as well as the impact of webrooming behavior on pricing and competition between the two channels. To address this issue, we develop a dual-channel supply chain including an online and a traditional retailer under two dierent scenarios. In the rst scenario, the online retailer oers a partial refund in his channel to attract customers, but he does not provide virtual reality service. In the second scenario, the online retailer provides virtual reality service in the online channel to compete with the traditional retailer. The results show that providing virtual reality will have a positive eect on the demand of both channels and will increase retail prices on both online and oine channels. Also, providing virtual reality in the online channel causes the customers to view and test the product before buying. Therefore, the number of returned products was reduced.

In this research, a recyclable waste is used to manufacture a specific product. For this reason, a supply chain is considered containing manufacturer, recycler, and waste warehouse. First, the customers’ demand for the considered product is determined based on its price. Then, the manufacturer produces it from a waste with specific recyclability rate. The waste warehouse collects the waste and the recycler recycles it. The manufacturer meets his requirements through two different channels. He can procure the non-recycled waste from the waste warehouse and then recycles it himself, or can buy the recycled waste from the recycler. The manufacturer selects these channels based on the established situations.

The game theory is applied to make the decisions under two considered channels. In this setting, a Stackelberg game is developed based on the competitive situation established among the members, where the manufacturer has higher decision power than the waste warehouse and recycler.

Eventually, the given strategies are discussed and the obtained results are presented. Results indicate that the manufacturer selects each channel as a threshold is met. Moreover, more recyclability rate of the considered waste leads to higher profits for the members.

Originality/Value:

 In this research, to provide the waste materials required for producing a product, the game-theoretic approach as well as the concept of the channel-selection are used. It can be stated that this issue has been proposed for the first time in the literature.

Futurology of the aluminum industry, as a strategic industry and one of the sustainable development pillars, is contemplated by the government strategists in order to know future against unpredictable elements. The purpose is to identify and analyze the upcoming scenarios of the aluminum industry and, finally, its market analysis, to draw a correct vision of the future and choose the appropriate strategy in this industry.

Firstly, the key variables affecting the development of the aluminum industry are identified through interviews with experts and specialists in the industry, and the probability of variables is determined by completing a questionnaire; and then based on the extracted variables, specific scenarios are developed. The interactions of the variables will be determined using the fuzzy DEMATEL method and the matrix obtained from this method will be part of the supermatrix of the analysis network process. Game theory will be used in two forms, considering competition and or cooperation among players to analyze the aluminum industry market, such that one can find balancing points among existing situations of players’ strategic options and scenarios of this industry.

The results indicate that the possibility of "increasing inflation" is the most likely and "increasing investment in the country" is the least likely variable, and "lifting sanctions" is the most influential variable and "production and export" is the most impressive variable. Five scenarios as "Iran's difficult scenario in the ordinary world", "Iran's catastrophic scenario in the ordinary world space", "disaster scenario for Iran in the difficult global space", "Iran's developing scenario in the ordinary world space", and "Iran's favorable space scenario in the difficult world space "were ranked. Three main players, namely policymakers, smalters and downstream, were identified and 13 strategic options in the form of investment, pricing, exports, and energy rates in different directions and shapes were extracted. Players’ preferences in different scenarios are explained in the form of 12 modes and, selected modes are extracted for each scenario based on different equilibrium points.

Originality/Value:

 Futurology has been the main subject of this paper, which, by analyzing the aluminum industry and the activities of the main players active in this industry, paints a picture of the future of this industry, including the entire value chain in a five-year horizon.

The purpose of this paper is to consider products such as disposable tableware produced from plastic waste. In this setting, plastic waste is collected, recycled, and reused. In this research, a supply chain including waste depot, recycler, and manufacturer is considered in which plastic waste is reused in order to manufacture a product. Under this supply chain, the waste depot collects non-recycled plastic waste and the recycler recycles it. Then, the manufacturer uses recycled plastic waste to produce final product and meet customer demand. In this structure, the waste depot, recycler, and manufacturer set the price of non-recycled plastic waste, the price of recycled plastic waste, and the price of final product, respectively.

The game theory is used to make the decisions under the considered supply chain. It is assumed that the decision power of the manufacturer is more than of the waste depot and recycler. In this setting, Stackelberg game-theoretic model is established in order to specify the prices adopted by the members.

Results indicate that decision powers of the waste depot and recycler have no effect on the price and demand of final product. The profits allocated to the manufacturer are the same when decision powers of the waste depot and recycler are different. Moreover, more the price elasticity of the demand for final product leads to lower profits for the members.

Originality/Value: 

Using plastic waste is an effective approach to sustain environment and reduce pollution. In this research, plastic waste is used to produce products such as disposable tableware in a supply chain including manufacturer, recycler and waste depot. The game theory approach is also used to make decisions. To our knowledge, the idea of applying the game theory to use plastic waste in production of products under the considered supply chain has been raised for the first time in the literature.

In this study, pricing and retail-servicing decisions are investigated on a dual-channel supply chain including one manufacturer and one retailer. For this reason, the game-theoretic approach is used to make the decisions under both the competitive and cooperative situations in the considered supply chain. Under the competitive situation, the players maximize their profits independently, while under the cooperative situation, the manufacturer and retailer cooperate to maximize the profit of the whole system. A numerical example is presented to illustrate the obtained results. Then, the analysis obtained from the investigated models will be presented. The results indicate that the retailer’s profit increases by increasing the price in the e-tail channel as well as by decreasing the price set by the manufacturer to the retailer. Under the competitive situation, the retail price increases as the retail services increase. The change of the retail price with respect to the retail services is greater than the change of the etail price. Under the cooperative situation, the retail price of the product increases by increasing the retail services. In addition, the change of the retail price with respect to the retail services is higher than the change of the etail price. Finally, a sensitivity analysis is performed on the considered parameters to determine the effect of the change of the parameters on the players’ profits

This study examines the pricing and product greenness level determining policies in two competing supply chains. Each supply chain consists of one manufacturer and one retailer, in which the manufacturer produces a green product, and the retailer delivers it to the end consumer. The manufactured products in supply chains are substitutable. This problem is considered in two scenarios: either the manufacturer or the retailer leads the market. In both cases, the government, as a powerful party, can affect the market by establishing a subsidy/punishment system. This system sets a threshold for the product greenness level and punishes or supports the manufacturer accordingly. In this research, we present the manufacturer and retailer profit functions, taking advantage of wholesale and retail prices, the amount of subsidy and punishment, and demand functions. Next, we use a game-theoretic approach to provide the equilibrium wholesale and retail prices and the equilibrium greenness levels. Numerical results show that the retailer-Stackelberg structure provides better conditions for the supply chain members and the environment, and it is even more highlighted with the competition intensity between the members.

This study considers optimal warranty and maintenance services from service agent and consumer view points for vehicles under two dimensional warranty policy. The interactions between the agent service and consumers are modeled by estimating their profits and then are examined by game theory in the base warranty and extended warranty. Maintenance policies are performed as period preventive maintenance (PM), home and road corrective maintenance (CM). Then, the agent and the consumer’s profits are optimized and the number of period preventive maintenance (PM) and the price of warranty services are estimated by the stackelberg equilibrium. For demonstrating the applicability of this research, finally the proposed model is investigated by using of real data from a truck service agent.

In the twenty-first century especially in the recent decade, due to concerns about the environment and social responsibility, the Closed-loop supply chain has attracted more attention. In this paper, a closed loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-party collector is considered. The manufacturer also produces new products from raw materials and simultaneously remanufacturing the used products. In the direct channel, the manufacturer introduces new products and remanufactured products to the market through a retailer, and in the reverse channel, the retailer and third-party collector competitively collect the products used. To analyze the optimal pricing and collecting decisions under different channel leadership, Four different scenarios based on game theory have been developed - a centralized model and three decentralized models based on the Stackelberg game including Manufacturer-led, Retailer-led, and Third Party collector-led. Then, using numerical analysis, we compared and analyzed the optimal decisions in different scenarios and examined the effect of competition intensity between the dual recycling channel of the retailer and third-party collector on decision variables, profit of members and total profit. We concluded that the profit of chain Supply in the centralized scenario is larger than decentralized models, In addition it can be concluded that the retailer-led decentralized model is often the most effective scenario in the CLSC.

Different variables effect on customer decision in product selection. The most important factor are price and service provided by the manufacturer to the customer. Advertising is one of the effective factors in the selection and purchase of goods is usually done by the manufacturer to increase goodwill of manufacturer brand. Therefore in this research we use centralized game approach to find optimal price, service level & advertising level in a dual channel supply chain simultaneously. Chain used in this study included a manufacturer and a retailer in which the manufacturer sells its products through retailer and through direct channel. Demand function used in this paper provide review possibility of three elements of price, service and advertising on customer demand seamlessly at the same time. Conduct examined in this paper, is cooperative behavior. Therefore, after modeling the problem is solved by centralized approach. After numerical examples, sensitivity analysis performed in this study provide the effect of important parameters on decisions players particularly price sensitivity factor. The issue examined in this study had a variety of practical applications for example can be cited its use in airlines, manufacturing sets and retailers to determine prices, service and advertising.

In the present study, the abusive of some doctors from trusting a patient to earn the more financial benefits is investigated using the Markov chain and Zero-Determinant (ZD) strategy. When someone gets sick and visits a doctor, it is clear that the patient should trust the doctor and considers medical advices certainly. The doctors who abuse the trust of patients, they usually use tricks (including scare the patient from getting worse of disease, performing unnecessary tests and performing unnecessary surgery) to prolong the course of the patient's treatment especially for acute diseases. In order to model this problem, the ZD strategy is used for Repetitive games. This strategy helps the doctors to unilaterally consider the probable outcome of opponent (patient) with the desired amount, or to apply a linear relationship between doctor and opponent's consequences. According to the results of the game between the doctor and the patient, it can be concluded that when the doctor’s recommendations aren’t effective for the patient, the patient must go to another doctor to obtain the correct treatment

In this research, we develop an economic production quantity model in a three layers supply chain with two different structures. Aforementioned chain composed of a supplier, a manufacturer and multiple retailers. In this chain, the supplier transforms raw material to the semi-finished product and sends them to the manufacturer and then the manufacturer transmutes them to the finished product and delivers to the retailers in order to satisfy market demand. The retailers replenish their inventory at the same time and demand of each retailer is different due to essence of various demand customers and according to the decisions of the chain’s members, two structures of non-integrated and integrated supply chains are surveyed. In this research, we will use the Stackelberg approach to solve the presented models. The ordering cycle of retailers is the decision variable of the model. The main aim of this study is to develop an inventory and production model in three layers supply chains in order to minimize the total cost of chain by utilizing the optimal inventory control policy. At last, numerical examples are presented for each structure of supply chains.

This paper develops a model based on game theory to analyze a two-echelon supply chain consists of two manufacturers and two retailers, that are operating in a make-to-order environment. The considerable point in the defined supply chain is that the manufacturers by taking into account the discount to the retailer that exclusively sells their products want to seize the market. In this model, manufacturers’ brand value and customers loyalty to a brand has high importance. It should be noted that in the defined Stackelberg model retail prices would be determined after specifying the lead times. We show that the reduction in the proportion of goods received by a retailer from a manufacturer will increase its retail price, also the exclusive supplying of a good rising its wholesale price.