game theory

In recent years, manufacturers have started selling their products online. This study examines pricing in a supply chain involving manufacturing, retailers, logistics service providers, and integrators. There are three products in this chain: two physical products from manufacturers and a service product from logistics providers. Physical products are sold online and in retail stores, with online purchases including two products. The problem is examined in four scenarios, including decentralized, manufacturer integration with retailer, functional logistics service provider integration with logistics service integrator, and a combined approach of manufacturer integration with retailer and functional logistics service provider integration with logistics service integrator. This paper introduces a novel approach by analyzing the impact of logistics supply chain members, focusing on logistics service levels and pricing. The study aims to explore how the integration of supply chain members influences the profits and service levels of other stakeholders. The results indicate that integrating two supply chain members typically lowers profits for other members. Integrating a logistics service provider and integrator can increase manufacturer profit and decrease retailer profit in certain cases, while in other cases profits remain unchanged. Similarly, integrating manufacturer and retailer usually results in decreased profits for logistics service providers and integrators. The integration of functional logistics service provider and logistics service integrator has an impact on the relationship of parameters with service level. In the decentralized scenario, if service price and service coefficients increase, service levels increase. It also increases service levels as the cost of service increases.

The purpose of the current research is to design a green supply chain pricing model with a multi-criteria decision-making approach and game theory (case study: home appliance industry). In this research, after library study and identification of key indicators in predicting green supply chain pricing, using the fuzzy Delphi method, the screening of indicators was done in three stages, and out of 20 indicators, based on the opinions of 13 experts, 13 indicators were selected and based on the priority selection index approach, company D entered the game theory as the leader company because it had the highest priority. Finally, based on the game theory, the scenario between 4 members of the supply chain was evaluated and analyzed, and the best and worst scenarios were also introduced. Also, in order to test the structural validity of the proposed model, information related to the green supply chain of 9 selected home appliance companies was implemented using MATLAB software.

Governments today are increasingly focused on managing environmental and economic challenges to safeguard the environment. Consequently, companies are striving to remain competitive in society. This paper introduces a revenue-sharing agreement between the retailer and the manufacturer. The contract is designed to alleviate the research and development costs incurred by the manufacturer in greening their products. Additionally, the paper incorporates consumer surplus as a consideration for the social dimension, which is a key pillar of sustainability.

Government interventions in this paper are modeled as subsidies that influence the final price of the product. Notably, this study, for the first time, integrates all three dimensions of sustainability—social, economic, and environmental—within a game-theoretic framework that includes government intervention and a revenue-sharing agreement between the retailer and the manufacturer.

The modeling results demonstrated that incorporating consumer surplus enhances the profitability of both the government and the manufacturer. Although consumer surplus reduces wholesale prices and revenue-sharing proportions, it leads to increased product sales. This boosts the benefits for consumers and members of the supply chain, contributing to improved greenness and higher levels of product sustainability. Consumers show a preference for purchasing products with greater environmental benefits; however, higher levels of greenness require increased production costs. Manufacturers can boost their sales through research and development efforts and by raising public awareness about green products. As a result, manufacturers, retailers, and the government adjust prices and subsidies to maximize their respective profits, altering the overall profitability of the supply chain. The findings highlight that social welfare is a crucial consideration in supply chains, as it significantly enhances the profitability of chain members and promotes higher levels of green production.

Originality/Value: 

This paper is the first to examine all dimensions of sustainability—social, economic, and environmental—within a theoretical framework that incorporates government intervention and the impact of consumer surplus on pricing policies and the greening of products. The scientific contribution of this research lies in providing new insights to managers and policymakers to enhance strategic decision-making aimed at improving sustainability and social welfare within green supply chains.

Nowadays, the issue of supply chain network design has garnered significant attention in supply chain management. Researchers have focused on the competitiveness of markets and the pursuit of greater benefits. Therefore, this article presents a multi-objective mathematical model for the    design of a dynamic and integrated supply chain network, specifically addressing a competitive and sustainable closed-loop supply chain for a perishable commodity. The proposed model        incorporates competition between two supply chains, considering environmental, social, and resilience factors. To solve this competitive model, a two-step approach is introduced. In this two-stage approach, the first stage involves calculating equilibrium values for competitive decisions using game theory. Then, in the second stage, an innovative multi-objective algorithm based on Pareto optimization is employed to solve the network design problem, taking into account the results from the competitive stage and addressing the complexities of the proposed model. Finally, the efficiency of the proposed model and solution approach is evaluated using a numerical example analyzed graphically and statistically. The results and graphs demonstrate that the proposed model performs well and successfully achieves the intended objectives.

In this paper, we consider a Cournot Market for Chain-To-Chain Competition, which includes two distinct competing supply chains. Each supply chain has one Manufacturer, one Visitor, and one Retailer. The Retailer is in common between the two chains. This article will investigate the impact of using visitors to attract retailers as much as possible by the manufacturer. Each visitor should try to convince retailers to order more by paying a cost named Visit Cost in this article. After selling each unit of considered products, the manufacturer would pay a percentage of the wholesale price. It is assumed that there is a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and visitor in each supply chain, in which the manufacturer is the leader. Furthermore, there is a Nash competition between manufacturers and the retailer.

Today online retailers all over the world are looking to oer virtual reality service through their online channels in order to attract customers to purchase product online and increase sales by creating a sense of customer condence. Virtual reality service provides information about how a product ts a customer and closes the gap between online and oine retailers. However, such services also facilitate consumer webrooming behavior, which may reduce online demand and intensify competition between traditional and online retailers. Webrooming behavior means customers use virtual reality service in the online channel and view the specications of the product, but they buy the product in the oine channel. On the other hand, providing virtual reality through the online channel due to the conditions of the testing products before the purchase can have a positive impact on the rate of returned products. This study aims to investigate the optimal amount of investment in virtual reality service and its impact on the rate of return, as well as the impact of webrooming behavior on pricing and competition between the two channels. To address this issue, we develop a dual-channel supply chain including an online and a traditional retailer under two dierent scenarios. In the rst scenario, the online retailer oers a partial refund in his channel to attract customers, but he does not provide virtual reality service. In the second scenario, the online retailer provides virtual reality service in the online channel to compete with the traditional retailer. The results show that providing virtual reality will have a positive eect on the demand of both channels and will increase retail prices on both online and oine channels. Also, providing virtual reality in the online channel causes the customers to view and test the product before buying. Therefore, the number of returned products was reduced.

In this research, a recyclable waste is used to manufacture a specific product. For this reason, a supply chain is considered containing manufacturer, recycler, and waste warehouse. First, the customers’ demand for the considered product is determined based on its price. Then, the manufacturer produces it from a waste with specific recyclability rate. The waste warehouse collects the waste and the recycler recycles it. The manufacturer meets his requirements through two different channels. He can procure the non-recycled waste from the waste warehouse and then recycles it himself, or can buy the recycled waste from the recycler. The manufacturer selects these channels based on the established situations.

The game theory is applied to make the decisions under two considered channels. In this setting, a Stackelberg game is developed based on the competitive situation established among the members, where the manufacturer has higher decision power than the waste warehouse and recycler.

Eventually, the given strategies are discussed and the obtained results are presented. Results indicate that the manufacturer selects each channel as a threshold is met. Moreover, more recyclability rate of the considered waste leads to higher profits for the members.

Originality/Value:

 In this research, to provide the waste materials required for producing a product, the game-theoretic approach as well as the concept of the channel-selection are used. It can be stated that this issue has been proposed for the first time in the literature.

Futurology of the aluminum industry, as a strategic industry and one of the sustainable development pillars, is contemplated by the government strategists in order to know future against unpredictable elements. The purpose is to identify and analyze the upcoming scenarios of the aluminum industry and, finally, its market analysis, to draw a correct vision of the future and choose the appropriate strategy in this industry.

Firstly, the key variables affecting the development of the aluminum industry are identified through interviews with experts and specialists in the industry, and the probability of variables is determined by completing a questionnaire; and then based on the extracted variables, specific scenarios are developed. The interactions of the variables will be determined using the fuzzy DEMATEL method and the matrix obtained from this method will be part of the supermatrix of the analysis network process. Game theory will be used in two forms, considering competition and or cooperation among players to analyze the aluminum industry market, such that one can find balancing points among existing situations of players’ strategic options and scenarios of this industry.

The results indicate that the possibility of "increasing inflation" is the most likely and "increasing investment in the country" is the least likely variable, and "lifting sanctions" is the most influential variable and "production and export" is the most impressive variable. Five scenarios as "Iran's difficult scenario in the ordinary world", "Iran's catastrophic scenario in the ordinary world space", "disaster scenario for Iran in the difficult global space", "Iran's developing scenario in the ordinary world space", and "Iran's favorable space scenario in the difficult world space "were ranked. Three main players, namely policymakers, smalters and downstream, were identified and 13 strategic options in the form of investment, pricing, exports, and energy rates in different directions and shapes were extracted. Players’ preferences in different scenarios are explained in the form of 12 modes and, selected modes are extracted for each scenario based on different equilibrium points.

Originality/Value:

 Futurology has been the main subject of this paper, which, by analyzing the aluminum industry and the activities of the main players active in this industry, paints a picture of the future of this industry, including the entire value chain in a five-year horizon.

The purpose of this paper is to consider products such as disposable tableware produced from plastic waste. In this setting, plastic waste is collected, recycled, and reused. In this research, a supply chain including waste depot, recycler, and manufacturer is considered in which plastic waste is reused in order to manufacture a product. Under this supply chain, the waste depot collects non-recycled plastic waste and the recycler recycles it. Then, the manufacturer uses recycled plastic waste to produce final product and meet customer demand. In this structure, the waste depot, recycler, and manufacturer set the price of non-recycled plastic waste, the price of recycled plastic waste, and the price of final product, respectively.

The game theory is used to make the decisions under the considered supply chain. It is assumed that the decision power of the manufacturer is more than of the waste depot and recycler. In this setting, Stackelberg game-theoretic model is established in order to specify the prices adopted by the members.

Results indicate that decision powers of the waste depot and recycler have no effect on the price and demand of final product. The profits allocated to the manufacturer are the same when decision powers of the waste depot and recycler are different. Moreover, more the price elasticity of the demand for final product leads to lower profits for the members.

Originality/Value: 

Using plastic waste is an effective approach to sustain environment and reduce pollution. In this research, plastic waste is used to produce products such as disposable tableware in a supply chain including manufacturer, recycler and waste depot. The game theory approach is also used to make decisions. To our knowledge, the idea of applying the game theory to use plastic waste in production of products under the considered supply chain has been raised for the first time in the literature.

Finding the best situation for the expected profit by each of the participants (players) in the secondary auction market of financial congestion transmission rights.

From the point of view of game theory, finding at least one Nash equilibrium point for this competition takes into account the various constraints of the secondary auction market.

This paper study the issue of financial transmission congestion contracts then uses the game theory to analyze the short-term (weekly) secondary FTR markets, in which the players manage the transmission risk through optimal biddings.

Originality/Value: 

Congestion risk management is one of the most important topics of transmission network management in restructured power systems and electricity markets in the world, especially markets based on regional or local pricing, whose main tool is transmission financial contracts. In the other scientific articles published so far, mainly the modeling and analysis of the primary auction markets of transission congestion financial rights have been discussed, and the secondary auction markets of these contracts, which have a different pattern, have not been scientifically analyzed. The main innovation of this article is to pay attention to this issue using application of game theory.